The Kingdom of Swaziland
2008 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director
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1. High and sustained economic growth remains elusive. Real GDP growth is lower than the 5 percent government target for effectively reducing poverty. Growth prospects are clouded by low investments, slow pace of economic reforms, and deterioration of preferential treatment for Swaziland’s main exports, sugar and textiles. The recent global shocks—surges of commodity prices and inflation, slowdown of economic growth, and continuing financial rebalancing—further increases risks to the Swazi economy. Years of persistently low growth have pushed up poverty and unemployment, a situation worsened by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, labor force absenteeism, and low productivity. Since 1997 the epidemic has also limited annual population growth to about 0.4 percent.1

Abstract

1. High and sustained economic growth remains elusive. Real GDP growth is lower than the 5 percent government target for effectively reducing poverty. Growth prospects are clouded by low investments, slow pace of economic reforms, and deterioration of preferential treatment for Swaziland’s main exports, sugar and textiles. The recent global shocks—surges of commodity prices and inflation, slowdown of economic growth, and continuing financial rebalancing—further increases risks to the Swazi economy. Years of persistently low growth have pushed up poverty and unemployment, a situation worsened by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, labor force absenteeism, and low productivity. Since 1997 the epidemic has also limited annual population growth to about 0.4 percent.1

I. Background

1. High and sustained economic growth remains elusive. Real GDP growth is lower than the 5 percent government target for effectively reducing poverty. Growth prospects are clouded by low investments, slow pace of economic reforms, and deterioration of preferential treatment for Swaziland’s main exports, sugar and textiles. The recent global shocks—surges of commodity prices and inflation, slowdown of economic growth, and continuing financial rebalancing—further increases risks to the Swazi economy. Years of persistently low growth have pushed up poverty and unemployment, a situation worsened by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, labor force absenteeism, and low productivity. Since 1997 the epidemic has also limited annual population growth to about 0.4 percent.1

uA01fig01

Real Per Capita GDP

(1995=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: World Economic Outlook.

2. High and rising revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) have allowed Swaziland to expand public expenditure and accumulate international reserves. The authorities have increased fiscal savings during the last two years; international reserves now cover more than three months of imports of goods and services after years of less than adequate coverage. Yet despite escalated public expenditure, the country’s social challenges remain daunting.

uA01fig02

Poverty rate1

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

1 The food poverty represents the fraction of people who cannot afford buying food in order to maintain a minimum daily intake of 2,100 calories.

3. The first parliamentary election under the new constitution took place on September 19 using the traditional tinkhundla system—a grass roots system of local government and chiefdoms (Swaziland is a constitutional monarchy). A new Cabinet is expected to be sworn in during October 2008.

II. Recent Economic Developments and Outlook

4. As Swaziland recovered from the 2006 drought, real GDP growth in 2007 rose to 3.5 percent, and inflation escalated. Growth was also driven by increases in output in services and manufacturing. Inflation reached 9.8 percent at the end of 2007 as food and fuel prices rose. By the end of July 2008, inflation was at 13.4 percent. The authorities have responded to the recent surges of food, fuel and transportation prices mainly through a delayed pass-through of price increases.2 In 2008 average inflation is expected to be about 13 percent based on second-round effects from double-digit wage settlements, and despite recent declines in global fuel prices. Interest rates generally have risen in line with those of South Africa but the authorities decided in June 2008 not to match a 50 basis point increase by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).

uA01fig03

Inflation, July 2003–July 2008

(Annual percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates.
uA01fig04

Inflation July 2003–July 2008

(Annual percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates.

5. In 2007/08 high SACU transfers contributed to the second consecutive budget surplus (6.4 percent of GDP), an improved current account, and an accumulation of international reserves. The recent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate along with the South African rand, to which it is pegged, is possibly having a positive impact on the export sector. External debt in 2007 declined to 16.7 percent of GDP, and international reserves reached the equivalent of 3.5 months of imports.

uA01fig05

Current Account and Reserves

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates.
uA01fig06

Fiscal Developments

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise stated)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates.

6. Since the last consultation the authorities have consolidated international reserves at the central bank (CBS) and enhanced supervision of the financial sector, but have done little to tighten expenditures and reform the civil service. The 2008/09 budget forecasts increased expenditure by 7 percent of GDP to 40.3 percent and the wage bill to rise to 16.7 percent of GDP. Under the 2007 Revenue Authority (RA) Act, the authorities have established the RA and are recruiting staff. With insurance sector liberalization, four new companies started up in 2008. The authorities have begun the process of privatizing the government owned Swazi Bank and of supervising saving and credit cooperatives (SCCOs.)

7. With current policies, medium-term prospects are not encouraging and subject to substantial risks that could undermine macroeconomic stability. Growth could be further hampered by uncertainties about the viability and timing of investment projects, low competitiveness scores, an investment climate that keeps the cost of doing business high, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Staff therefore expects a growth slowdown to less than 3 percent annually, although the authorities, anticipating investment projects, expect growth rates of at least 3 percent. The current account deficit is expected to widen as tariff protection in the SACU market is eliminated, and preferential prices for sugar in the EU market are reduced.3 Furthermore, recent global financial market developments may have an adverse impact on the country’s financial sector should South African banks, which dominate the sector, suffer significant losses. The outlook is further clouded by a fiscal stance that is overly dependent on SACU revenue, high inflation, and a vulnerable financial sector.

III. Policy Discussions

Summary of the 2007 Consultation Discussions

Directors expressed concern about the slow pace of economic growth that lags behind most of other lower middle income countries, emphasized the need to ensure fiscal sustainability and safeguard priority spending to address urgent social needs (HIV/AIDS and unemployment). The Fund encouraged the authorities to use the buoyant SACU revenues to accelerate fiscal and structural reforms aimed at securing macroeconomic stability and addressing impediments to higher growth and poverty reduction. It commended the authorities’ efforts in rebuilding international reserves, strengthening banking supervision, and the passage of key financial legislation. Finally, directors recommended the timely implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Program and in line with the medium-term fiscal expenditure framework.

A. Fiscal Sustainability and Reforms

8. Swaziland’s fiscal stance is highly dependent on SACU revenues but these are not likely to be sustained, based on: (i) a call by South Africa to revisit the revenue-sharing formula; (ii) a slowdown in South Africa’s economic growth; (iii) a reduction in common external tariff rates due to trade liberalization; and (iv) possible transformation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) into a customs union, which would imply lower shares for SACU members.

9. In anticipation of SACU revenue declines in the long term, fiscal policy is not tight enough to make room for the savings needed to smooth expenditure and prevent abrupt fiscal adjustment that could undermine macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, a tighter fiscal policy in the near term is also advisable from a cyclical perspective given the current high inflation that is anticipated to remain in 2009. Hence, the fiscal expansion of the 2008/09 budget and its medium-term fiscal outlook should be corrected, with adjustments equivalent to 4 percent of GDP over the medium term to secure savings (see below).

uA01fig07

SACU Revenues and Fiscal Balance Including Grants 1990/91–2013/14

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
uA01fig08

Swaziland and Sub-Saharan Africa: Central Government Wages; Swaziland 2007/08, other countries latest available data

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

10. To help put in context recent fiscal surpluses owing to temporary surges of SACU revenue, the non-SACU fiscal balance is used to estimate the deficit and level of adjustment needed for fiscal sustainability.4 Based on “normal” SACU revenue of 13 percent of GDP (the average for 1996/97–2004/05), staff targeted a sustainable non-SACU deficit of 16.8 percent of GDP. However, the authorities project a non-SACU deficit of 26.8 percent of GDP in the 2008/09 budget. Staff estimates that without reform, the fiscal imbalance would worsen, with non-SACU deficits of about 22 percent over the medium term.

11. To achieve sustainable fiscal balances, staff proposed a phased implementation of revenue and expenditure reforms while providing for more spending on high-priority sectors. Measures to immediately improve tax administration and introduce the VAT in the next few years should increase revenue by about 2 percent of GDP by 2013/14.5 Civil service reform could bring the wage bill back to 12 percent of GDP, about the level in 2004/05—though the sub-Saharan African average is 7.3 percent to GDP. Expenditure reform should therefore combine consolidation, reorientation, and quality improvements to reduce spending by about 2 percent of GDP and allow fiscal space to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty. On civil service reform, the performance management system, developed with the Botswana National Productivity Board, needs to be implemented promptly; it should involve redeployment toward prioritized sectors such as health care while promoting increased productivity, transparency, and accountability.6 Though they concurred with the staff analysis, the authorities admitted that social pressures and a cumbersome bureaucracy had delayed implementation.

Swaziland: Medium Term Fiscal Scenario Without and With Measures 1/

(Percent of GDP)

article image

The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

The buoyant SACU revenues through 2013/14 are consistent with the forecast of the South African staff team.

12. Improvement in public expenditure management and assurance that spending is of high quality is crucial to successful fiscal adjustment. Poor coordination of budget execution across government agencies has resulted in under-spending for some, arrears for others, and frequent supplementary budgets. To better manage public expenditure, the authorities highlighted continuing improvement of the procurement system and reform of the Public Finance Management Act. Staff underscored the need to assess expenditure and budget allocation on the basis of the social rate of return and government priorities in health, education, and agriculture, consistent with the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Program (PRSAP).

13. Staff proposed an alternative scenario based on fiscal and structural reforms, preferably starting in 2008/09, that could generate GDP growth of about 4 percent over the medium term. With reforms, the saving-investment balance should improve and foreign investment and donor financing be attracted, thus helping to raise GDP growth. Improved fiscal surpluses will help sustain reserves at more than 3.5 months of imports of goods and services7 while reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to about 8 percent by 2012. While agreeing with staff on the risk to SACU revenues and the need for fiscal adjustments, the authorities identified political constraints and enormous social needs as formidable challenges to fiscal consolidation. Nonetheless, the authorities plan to save this year’s unbudgeted SACU windfall.8

Swaziland: Medium-Term Scenario, 2008–2013

(Percent of GDP, unless noted otherwise)

article image

Fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

Assuming that fiscal policy and structural reforms including reducing the cost of doing business; improving the quality of public institutions; addressing the lack of transparency and poor administrative coordination; increasing labor market flexibility; simplifying business licensing; and improving infrastructure) will result in fiscal and current account surpluses.

B. External Stability and Exchange Rate Policy

14. Sufficient international reserves are critical to safeguard external stability and confidence in the currency peg with South Africa, which has served the country well. Staff supported the authorities’ policy to have reserves of at least three months of import cover. The authorities believe that this level is appropriate in relation to the domestic monetary base (reflecting the free circulation of the rand) and external debt, while preserving confidence in the peg and serving as a cushion against adverse external shocks.

15. Debt sustainability analysis (DSA) shows that Swaziland has very low debt Tables 7 and 8). Since 2002 despite the most recent depreciation, total public sector debt has declined, reflecting in part limited new borrowing and an exchange rate appreciation between 2003 and 2006. As a lower-medium-income country, Swaziland has limited access to concessionary loans; any large increases in external debt would carry high interest costs.

Table 1.

Swaziland: Basic Economic and Financial Indicators, 2005–2013

article image
Sources: Swazi authorities; and IMF staff projections.

IMF Information Notice System trade-weighted; end of period.

In percent of beginning-of-period broad money.

Includes government holdings abroad.

The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

The official GDP numbers from 1994 to 2006 were significantly revised in 2007, and recently in 2008.

Table 2.

Swaziland: Summary of Central Government Operations, 2006/07–2013/14 1

article image
Sources: Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff projections.

Without corrective policy measures. The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

Includes requested supplementary budget

Disbursements less amortizations.

Table 3.

Swaziland: Monetary Survey, 2004–2008 1

(Millions of emalangeni)

article image
Sources: Central Bank of Swaziland (CBS); and Fund staff estimates.

End-of-year data. (For 2008, as of end-June)

Counterpart of government deposits held abroad.

Excludes rand in circulation.

4/ For 2008, change from June 2007.
Table 4.

Swaziland: Commercial Banks’ Performance Ratios, Dec. 2003–2008

article image
Source: Central Bank of Swaziland.

Excluding the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank, which is owned by the government and offers both development finance and commercial banking services since its recapitalization and relaunch by the government in 2001.

Table 5.

Swaziland: Balance of Payments, 2005–2013 1

(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified)

article image
Sources: Central Bank of Swaziland; and IMF staff projections.

Without corrective policy measures.

SACU: Southern African Customs Union. SACU transfers in the current account does not reflect the true level of SACU revenue because of the particular treatment of those transfers in the accounts where the authorities make an estimate based on the level of imports and adjust in ‘other investment’ to reflect the total SACU revenues.

Table 6.

Swaziland: Millennium Development Goals

article image
Source: World Development Indicators database, June 2008
Table 7.

Swaziland: External Debt Sustainability Framework, 2002–2013

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

article image

Derived as [r- g - ρ(1+g) + εα(1+r)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt stock, with r = nominal effective interest rate on external debt; ρ = change in domestic GDP deflator in US dollar terms, g = real GDP growth rate, e = nominal appreciation (increase in dollar value of domestic currency), and a= share of domestic-currency denominated debt in total external debt.

The contribution from price and exchange rate changes is defined as [-ρ(1+g) + εα(1+r)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt stock, ρ increases with an appreciating domestic currency (ε >0) and rising inflation (based on GDP deflator).

For projection, line includes the impact of price and exchange rate changes.

Defined as current account deficit, plus amortization on medium- and long-term debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.

The key variables include real GDP growth; nominal interest rate; dollar deflator growth; and both non-interest current account and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP.

Long-run, constant balance that stabilizes the debt ratio assuming that key variables (real GDP growth, nominal interest rate, dollar deflator growth, and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP) remain at their levels of the last projection year.

Table 8.

Swaziland: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, 2002–2013

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise Indicated)

article image

Gross debt of the general government.

Derived as [(r - π(1 +g) - g + αε (1 +r)]/(1 +g+π+gπ)) times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate;π= growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; α = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and ε = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).

The real interest rate contribution is derived from the denominator in footnote 2/as r-π(1+g) and the real growth contribution as-g.

The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 2/asαε (l+r).

For projections, this line includes exchange rate changes.

Defined as public sector deficit, plus amortization of medium and long-term public sector debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.

The key variables include real GDP growth; real interest rate; and primary balance in percent of GDP.

Derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock.

Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.

16. The level of the exchange rate seems broadly adequate and the exchange rate regime is appropriate. The assessment of the exchange rate level is based on two methodologies. The purchasing power parity methodology, adjusted for productivity differentials, indicates no misalignment as of 2008. The external sustainability approach indicates that stabilizing the current account at the net foreign asset (NFA) position as of 2007 would imply a somewhat stronger current account than projected, which could imply some overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Yet there are no other clear signs of an overvaluation and the depreciation of the real exchange rate since 2006 has boosted Swaziland’s exports. As to the exchange rate regime, staff and the authorities agreed that the currency peg under the CMA should be maintained because it facilitates capital and current transactions with the country’s most important economic partner, South Africa.

17. In the CMA, movements in the real effective exchange rate are largely exogenously determined, and more effort is needed to improve structural competitiveness. With the Swaziland’s inflation rate also closely tracking South Africa’s—and responsibility for macroeconomic stability resting squarely with fiscal policy—competitiveness should be pursued through structural reforms that improve the investment climate and compensate for eroding trade preferences. Staff acknowledged that—despite the depreciation in 2008 of the rand—Swaziland’s lackluster export performance was, to a large part, due to lower preferential prices for sugar exports to the EU. Loss of preferences in the textiles sector is aggravated by escalating wage and other operational costs, labor strikes, and prospects for that sector do not look encouraging.

uA01fig09

Exchange Rates, January 2001–June 2008

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: International Financial Statistics and Information Notice System.
uA01fig10

Current Account and REER

(Percent of GDP, 2000=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

uA01fig11

Real Effective Exchange Rates, January 2001–June 2008

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

C. Monetary and Financial Sector Policies

18. The CBS has limited independent monetary policy as a CMA member, and financial institutions tend to follow their rates in South Africa rather than the CBS policy rate. Nevertheless, for the first time in recent memory, the CBS in June this year did not match a 50 basis point increase in the SARB repo rate. A lower policy rate does not necessarily lead to lower effective interest rates in Swaziland and by having a different policy rate from the SARB rate; the CBS could risk public misinterpretation about its commitment to combat inflation. The CBS is closely monitoring the impact of its June interest rate decision and capital outflows.

uA01fig12

Monetary Aggregates

(Percent of beginning-of-period broad money)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: National authorities, and IMF staff estimates and projections.

19. Authorities and staff agreed that continuing supply shocks and rising inflation expectations heighten the importance of clearly communicated justification of policy to help contain the rise in inflation expectations, particularly given the July government wage settlement of 10.5 percent. Efforts could be made to educate the public about the nature of the current shocks, the importance of anchoring second-round inflation effects, and the long-run tradeoff between inflation and growth.

uA01fig13

Private Sector Credit and Interest Rate

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: International Financial Statistics and IMF staff estimates.

20. The financial sector faces some vulnerabilities from weaknesses in one bank and emerging vulnerabilities from the fast growth of insufficiently regulated SCCOs and the emergence of pyramid schemes. In 2008 the number of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) has grown significantly as they attempt to take advantage of the liquidity surge from the requirement that all insurance and retirement funds must increase their holdings of domestic assets from 10 to 30 percent of total assets through 2009. The emergence of pyramid schemes, offering inordinately high rates of return, could also pose significant risks to the financial sector if left unchecked because they face constant rollover risks and are very likely to fail. Staff reiterated the urgency of prompt enactment and full implementation of the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA), Security, Payment System and Clearance bills to under gird the soundness of the financial sector, prevent regulatory arbitrage, and facilitate deepening of the sector. The authorities welcomed the financial sector strategy note prepared by staff emphasizing the need for deepening.

uA01fig14

Ratio of M 2 to GDP

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook.
uA01fig15

Ratio of Private Sector Credit to GDP

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook.

21. The authorities have approved privatization of Swazi Bank and are monitoring bank lending to the sugar industry. On Swazi Bank, an advisory committee concurred with the staff view that any privatization strategy should be preceded by separation of its development and commercial activities. As prospects for the sugar sector weaken, staff urged the authorities to closely monitor loans to the industry and further scrutinize the risk management practices of banks. It is imperative that revised loan provisioning requirements be issued and enforced.

22. To better supervise and regulate SCCOs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) and the CBS have begun a technical collaboration plan. The plan sets prudential standards for SCCOs and provides for training of MACO staff to better monitor financial soundness, enforce compliance, and compile information relevant to monitoring SCCOs. MACO should move quickly to preserve the assets of some insolvent SCCOs to ensure public confidence in that sector.

23. The recent emergence of pyramid schemes has increased the threat they pose to the stability of the financial system. These entities as yet are relatively small. The authorities have warned the public of the risks and have taken legal action against some operators. Staff urges further efforts, such as formalizing coordinated efforts among financial sector regulators, improving internal processes for dealing with fraudulent financial operations, and passing legislation prohibiting such operations.

24. Concerning the insurance and retirement sector, a recently announced domestic investment requirement should be reconsidered. Staff noted that, in the absence of deep markets, the requirement—at least 10 percent by 2007 and 30 percent by 2009 of investable funds will need to be held in Swazi assets—could lead to severe distortions, discourage investment flows to Swaziland and undermine efforts to develop the financial sector in the country. It argued that implementation experience to date showed that some insurance and retirement funds are merely displacing commercial bank lending and some are rerouted offshore without financing new capital formation in Swaziland. Hence, staff recommended that the requirement should be gradually phased out.

D. Response to the Fuel and Food Price Increases

25. The recent surges of food and fuel prices have significantly affected the poor and created special challenges for the authorities. Staff discussed policy options for dealing with surging prices, focusing on fiscal viability, minimization of market distortions, and effective and timely delivery to target groups. Staff recommended liberalization of food imports (e.g., maize) and providing assistance through already extensive food distribution programs. The policy of delaying the price pass-through should be abolished to depoliticize price adjustments and eliminate market distortion. Because Swaziland faces frequent food shortages, the authorities need to implement long-term solutions that are consistent with their sectoral policy while remaining fiscally sustainable. The National Disaster Management Agency needs to improve coordination of stakeholders on the food security issue. The authorities agreed that targeted assistance to the most vulnerable groups is appropriate, but are concerned about increasing public outcry for more interventionist programs, mostly general subsidies for commodities, and for agricultural inputs and finance.

26. In September, in response to the surges of food and fuel prices, the “food price crisis” committee proposed several measures to the Cabinet, but it remains unclear when implementation will take place. These measures are consistent with the Comprehensive Agricultural Strategy and the National Program for Food Security. Short-term measures include improvements to the food distribution provided by the World Food Program and other donors, provision of cash transfers, and removal of levies on dairy and wheat products. Other recommendations included subsidies to boost maize production and implementation of the agricultural strategy.

E. Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Competitiveness

27. Poverty and lackluster economic growth are major risks to the social and economic stability of Swaziland. Growth prospects are seriously constrained by a low investment-to-GDP ratio, a poor investment climate, recurrent droughts, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the high cost of doing business. Failure to implement other structural and land reforms further reduces growth prospects. The PRSAP approved last year could be the basis for strategies and policies to reduce poverty, but it needs a clearer implementation strategy and measures of tangible progress.

uA01fig16

Swaziland: Real Per Capita GDP Growth Rate and Investment

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: World Economic Outlook.

28. To increase its growth prospects, Swaziland needs to increase investment and deepen its financial sector (see the SIP). Since 2002 total investment has been stagnant at about 18 percent of GDP—not enough to promote growth and employment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to decline. Swaziland needs to channel domestic resources to viable investment projects, with special attention to small and medium enterprises and public and Private Partnerships (PPPs). The authorities agreed with staff’s view that the approach to PPPs should be cautious given the country’s limited institutional capacity, inadequate legal framework, and the need to mitigate fiscal risks. Deepening the financial sector should help improve resource allocation.

uA01fig17

Ratio of Investment to GDP

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

29. Private-sector-led growth is severely constrained by concerns about Swaziland’s competitiveness and governance issues (Figure 1). To address these issues, staff recommended that the authorities implement the recommendations of the Swaziland Investor Roadmap Study (2005) and the Investment Climate Assessment (2008) prepared by the World Bank. The authorities welcomed the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note to help them address competitiveness, governance, and HIV/AIDS issues. They also noted that enactment of the Companies and Competition Bills in 2008 provides a legal framework for businesses to flourish, and expected the one-stop shop at the Swaziland Investment Promotion Agency to help reduce the cost of doing business. An anticorruption commissioner was appointed in 2008 and work has started on bringing corruption cases before the court. However, serious constraints within the court system could hinder the work.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Swaziland: Competitiveness Indicators

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

30. Swaziland continues to promote regional economic integration and negotiate trade agreements in order to increase market access for its exports. Discussions continue within SADC to initiate a free trade area and eventually a SADC customs union. In 2007Swaziland and four other SADC members initialed an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU for duty- and quota-free access to the EU market. Negotiations have also been concluded on a SACU-EFTA (European Free Trade Association) free trade agreement. SACU is negotiating with the US on a Trade Investment Development and Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) and with the Latin American trading block MERCOSUR on a preferential trade agreement.

31. The authorities are taking steps to mitigate the adverse effects of HIV/AIDS (Box 2). A plan will be provided to the Global Fund that details the use of $81 million that was awarded in 2007. The authorities are currently considering a multiyear plan to: (i) scale up investment in education of young children and orphans left behind by HIV/AIDS, providing them with free meals and reducing drop-out rates; (ii) provide short-term child support grants with assistance from the World Bank and IFC; and (iii) scale up use of antiretroviral therapy.

uA01fig18

HIV/AIDS prevelance rate

(In percent of pregnant women aged 15–49 years atteding antenatal clinics)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 10th. Round of Serosurveillance
uA01fig19

HIV/AIDS Prevalence in SACU, latest year

(Percent of adult population, ages 15–49)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: UNAIDS Reports, 2006 and 2007.

Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Swaziland

HIV/AIDS presents formidable longer-term challenges for Swaziland. Cross-country studies of the impact of HIV/AIDS on growth range from insignificant or very modest to losses of more than 2 percentage points a year. HIV/AIDS affects growth negatively by, among other things, lowering life expectancy, reducing incentives for human and physical capital formation, and limiting productivity growth.

Staff estimates based on two studies1 suggest that if life expectancy (a measure of health and human capital) had stayed at 57 years—the level in mid-1990s before HIV/AIDS accelerated and growth decelerated—instead of the current estimate of 41 years, Swaziland’s per capita GDP growth would have been higher on average by 1.3 percentage points a year.

Using a different methodology, the International Labor Organization (2004) estimates that HIV/AIDS reduced per capita GDP growth in Swaziland on average by 1.8 percentage points each year from 1992 through 2002.

uA01fig20

Life expectancy at birth, 1960–2006

(In years)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

The adverse impact on education could be sizable, increasing the burden on future generations. According to the ILO (2004), in Swaziland the cost of hiring and training teachers to replace those lost to HIV/AIDS is projected to reach US$233 million (8 percent of 2007 GDP) by 2016.

The toll on Swaziland’s agriculture, a major source of earnings for a large segment of the population, could be heavy. HIV/AIDS can lower the agricultural labor supply, reduce the productivity of affected farmers, as well as the income needed for purchasing farm inputs. These effects have resulted in an estimated 54 percent reduction in production of maize and 34 percent reduction in land cultivation (UNAIDS, 2002).

The impact on Swaziland’s businesses is significantly larger than in comparator countries that also suffer from HIV/AIDS. According to the 2007 World bank investment climate assessment survey, over 50 percent of company managers reported much higher worker absenteeism due to sickness than other countries in Southern Africa. Among the workers surveyed, 25 percent reported being sick in the previous 30 days compared with less that 20 percent in Botswana and Namibia.

1 See Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, 1997, “Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87, no. 2., pp. 184–88; and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Dooppelhofer, and Ronald I. Miller, 2004, “Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach American Economic Review, Vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 813–35. 2 International Labor Organization, 2004, “HIV/AIDS and work: global estimates, impact and response.”

IV. Staff Appraisal

32. Achieving government’s target growth over the medium term remains elusive, without prompt structural reforms. Risks stem from the eventual decline of SACU revenues and emerging financial vulnerabilities. The short-term outlook is further clouded by a global economic slowdown and the adverse impact of high food and fuel prices. Timely economic and structural reforms, increasing investment, and aggressively tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic are necessary to stimulate growth and reduce poverty.

33. Because SACU revenues are expected to stay high in the next few years, they offer an opportunity for Swaziland to generate fiscal savings to help smooth out expenditure later when SACU revenues decline and to safeguard economic stability, address structural reforms, and improve the effectiveness of public policy. The authorities should take immediate steps to reduce the level of expenditures in 2008/09 and make further adjustments in the 2009/10 budget and the medium-term fiscal policy framework. Operationalizing the Revenue Authority and introducing the VAT could increase domestic revenue significantly. Much-needed spending reform requires improving the quality of expenditure, tangible civil service reform, and better assessment of investments. Expenditure must be reoriented toward priority sectors to reduce widespread poverty.

34. The monetary regime under the CMA, including the exchange rate peg to the rand have served the country well given Swaziland’s economic integration with South Africa. Fiscal and structural adjustment is required to support confidence in the peg and ensure external stability. With comfortable reserve levels, the exchange rate does not appear to be misaligned. Monetary policy should stay tight to limit the effects from surges of food and fuel prices, and the CBS should keep its policy rate as close as possible to the SARB’s.

35. Improvement of the financial position of the Swazi Bank through privatization, tighter supervision of SCCOs, and addressing pyramid schemes are priorities for preserving financial stability. Prompt enactment of financial sector bills will help safeguard financial stability. Addressing pyramid schemes implies better coordination among domestic and regional financial regulators, improving internal processes for dealing with fraudulent operations, and passing laws prohibiting pyramid operations. For the insurance and retirement funds, the domestic investment requirement should be reconsidered, with a view to gradual phase-out because it could create a nonmarket risk premium and make it harder to deepen the financial sector if the market perceives it to be a move toward capital control.

36. Responses to food and fuel price surges should focus on the most vulnerable population, using existing distribution channels for food delivery and liberalizing food imports. General subsidies and delayed pass-through of price adjustment should be discouraged.

37. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with Swaziland be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Swaziland: Monetary and Financial Developments

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Swaziland: Regional Comparison

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Source: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Swaziland: External Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests1

(External debt in percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Country desk data, and staff estimates.1 Shaded areas represent actual data. Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.2 Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance3 One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2008.
Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Swaziland: Public Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests1

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 356; 10.5089/9781451836165.002.A001

Sources: International Monetary Fund, country desk data, and staff estimates.1 Shaded areas represent actual data. Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.2 Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and primary balance.3 One-time real depreciation of 30 percent and 10 percent of GDP shock to contingent liabilities occur in 2008, with real depreciation defined as nominal depreciation (measured by percentage fall in dollar value of local currency) minus domestic inflation (based on GDP deflator).
1

The 2007 census showed the population had increased to 1,018 million from 980 million in 1997.

2

Between June 2007 and June 2008 the price of maize increased by 38 percent, bread by 58 percent, milk by 11 percent, and rice by 100 percent. Bus fares increased by 60 percent in August. Despite relying mainly on imports from South Africa, electricity prices have been increased only with delays and at a more gradual pace than in South Africa. Swazi electricity prices increased in July, after the South African price increase announced in April.

3

Sugar prices to the EU will fall by 17.3 percent in 2008 and by a further 19 percent in 2009.

4

The non-SACU fiscal balance is defined as the overall fiscal balance excluding SACU revenues (see the 2007 Selected Issues Paper). A sustainable non-SACU fiscal balance allows for maintaining international reserves at about three months of imports, sufficient to support confidence in the currency peg and a low debt burden.

5

In 2007 the revenue administration consultant estimated that only 20 percent of collectible tax is collected.

6

Human resource allocations should better reflect priority sectors. For example, in 2007/08, only 7 percent of the wage bill was for the health sector; education received 37 percent and protection services 27 percent.

7

Neighboring countries have higher import coverage: Botswana, more than 26 months; Lesotho, about seven months; and South Africa 3.7 months. Only Namibia has lower import coverage at 2.8 months.

8

The difference between the estimated and actual value of the revenue-sharing pool in any given year.

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The Kingdom of Swaziland: 2008 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director
Author:
International Monetary Fund