This study discusses the Philippine output gap from three perspectives and evaluates the utility of the approaches for policymaking. Incentives in the Philippines appear broadly comparable with those in neighboring countries. The reform would also improve short- and especially medium-term revenue collection. The general tax provisions and investment incentives in seven east-Asian economies are compared. The analysis focuses on stocks of foreign assets and liabilities and adopts a cross-country perspective to help determine the Philippines’ position within a broader universe of emerging market economies.

Abstract

This study discusses the Philippine output gap from three perspectives and evaluates the utility of the approaches for policymaking. Incentives in the Philippines appear broadly comparable with those in neighboring countries. The reform would also improve short- and especially medium-term revenue collection. The general tax provisions and investment incentives in seven east-Asian economies are compared. The analysis focuses on stocks of foreign assets and liabilities and adopts a cross-country perspective to help determine the Philippines’ position within a broader universe of emerging market economies.

III. Assessing the Structure of the Philippine Financial Account: An External Asset-Liabilities Perspective14

42. Since 2005, the Philippines has experienced a surge in net foreign exchange inflows. These inflows were predominantly driven by the current account, particularly very strong inflows of transfers and remittances. By contrast, the financial account has remained broadly balanced, leaving reserves accumulation as the primary absorber of inflows (see Annex III.I).

43. The broadly balanced financial account, however, masks major compositional shifts.

Philippines: Balance of Payments, 2004-07

article image
Sources: BSP, and Fund staff calculations.

FDI and other capital in 2007Q2 are distorted by a one-off sale of a large foreign-owned firm.

  • Net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which had been very weak in previous years, turned strongly positive since 2005.

  • Portfolio flows took an even more pronounced swing during the same time period.

  • By contrast, net other investment (essentially loans) showed a large increase in outflows, reflecting stepped up debt prepayments by both the public and the corporate sector, as well as increased foreign lending by Philippine banks. Additionally, currency outflows also picked up, as domestic investors sought to increase the diversification of their holdings.

44. This chapter examines some of these recent developments using the stocks of external assets and liabilities, which carries several distinct advantages:

  • Stocks are a natural benchmark for international comparisons, allowing assessment of the Philippine portfolio allocation against other emerging markets;

  • Stocks are more indicative of medium-term trends and vulnerabilities, including economy-wide balance sheet mismatches.

Annex III.II contains a description of the data used and countries included in this chapter.

A. Developments in the Broad Composition of External Assets and Liabilities

Net international investment position

45 All through 2001-2006. the Philippines has been in a negative net International Investment Position (IIP), as would be expected in most emerging markets. Traditionally, developing economies have a comparatively high rate of return on capital, encouraging foreign investment and leverage.

uA03fig01

Net Foreign Assets

Percent of GDP

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

46. At the same time, the Philippines’ negative net IIP has been steadily narrowing from 2004 on, at a pace much faster than other Emerging Market Economies (EMEs): between 2001 and 2006, its net IIP had improved by over 25 percentage points of GDP. As a result, the Philippines, starting from a position of a clear outlier compared to all three EME regional groups, by 2006 had reached a comparable net international investment position.

Philippine Holdings of External Assets

47. Philippine external assets (gross reserves, gross FDI and portfolio assets abroad, and gross other investment claims on the rest of the world) has been broadly stable as a share of GDP since 2001. Initially, the stock of assets fell slightly, before marginally recovering in 2005. By 2006, Philippine gross foreign assets were just 1½ percent of GDP higher than their 2001 level.

uA03fig02

Foreign Assets

Percent of GDP

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

48. By contrast, gross external assets to GDP rose much faster elsewhere. In emerging Asia, this was due mainly to reserve accumulation. In emerging Europe, primarily FDI, but also portfolio and other assets, rose sharply. The corresponding upward trend in emerging Latin America was, however, much milder.

49. As a result, by 2006, the Philippines’ gross asset position was much lower relative to emerging Europe (by some 15 percentage points of GDP) and the rest of emerging Asia (by some 10 percentage points of GDP), but remained above that of emerging Latin America (by some 5 percentage points of GDP).

External Holdings of Philippine Assets (Gross Foreign Liabilities)

50. External liabilities by Philippine residents (as measured by FDI liabilities, gross portfolio liabilities, and other liabilities—currency and deposits, as well as loans) have fallen sharply since 2004. Starting from a level above 90 percent of GDP, which was raising serious sustainability concerns, external liabilities had declined by over 20 percentage points of GDP by 2006. This sharp decline reflects the significant debt prepayments of the general government and corporate sectors (including the highly indebted power sector).

uA03fig03

External Liabilities

Percent of GDP

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

51. This reduction is particularly stark in comparison with other countries. The Philippines was a clear outlier at the start of the decade. Since then, the Philippines’ total gross foreign liabilities (as a share of GDP) have converged rapidly to the levels of emerging Asia and emerging Latin America., and by 2006 had actually fallen slightly below the averages of both regional groups. During the same period, emerging Europe has diverged sharply from the other regional groups, with its stock of gross foreign liabilities exceeding 110 percent of GDP by 2006, driven both by debt and non-debt flows, as discussed in the next section.

B. Comparison of FDI and Equity Inflows

52. There is a major shift afoot in the composition of financial flows. In the Philippines, this involves a reallocation of liabilities away from debt and toward FDI and equity holdings by foreigners. However, this trend appears to reflect a sharp global shift in the composition of EME portfolio allocations. Since the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s, global flows to EMEs have shifted sharply in favor of FDI and portfolio equity investment, and away from debt instruments. In this respect, it appears that the Philippines has not fully participated in this shift, recent trends notwithstanding.

uA03fig04

FDI + Equity Liabilities

Percent of total liabilities

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

53. For example, while FDI flows have increased, the Philippines remains a clear outlier, with relatively low levels of foreign investment. ?oreover, the gaps relative to all three EME groups have grown, and by 2006 amounted to 10 percent points of GDP relative to emerging Asia, more than 15 percent of GDP relative to emerging Latin America, and more than 30 percent of GDP relative to emerging Europe.

uA03fig05

FDI Liabilities

Percent of GDP

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

54. The Philippines’ relative standing does not improve if foreign holdings of portfolio equity are included along with FDI.15 By 2006, the Philippines’ broader equity aggregate was some 15-20 percentage points of GDP lower relative to the emerging Asia and emerging Latin America averages and some 35 percent of GDP lower relative to the emerging Europe average.

uA03fig06

FDI + Equity Liabilities

Percent of GDP

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

55. However, the Philippines has made progress at a similar pace as in other countries in paring the importance of debt in financing foreign claims on Philippine assets. For example, the “debt-equity ratio” (the share of foreign equity and FDI holdings to total foreign liabilities) has risen at a similar pace as in other EMEs. Nevertheless, foreign equity stakes remain relatively small compared with other EMEs.

C. Structural Explanations of the Low Level of Philippine Equity Foreign Ownership

56. Two potential reasons have often been cited as explanations of the low level of Philippine equity held by nonresidents: (i) the high degree of non-capital intensive service industries imparts a downward bias; and (ii) problems in collecting data on equity liabilities. This section argues that neither of these hypotheses is particularly compelling. However, a broader set of structural factors, including governance, financial development, and competition issues, could be much more relevant; this is taken up in the next section.

Philippine industrial structure

57. The Philippines has a somewhat unusual industrial structure for a low-income EME. In particular, services constitute a large share of GDP and manufacturing a relatively low share. With the service sector characterized by relatively low capital intensity, some have argued that there is only a relatively small need to attract foreign capital.

58. However, there are two problems with this view. First, sectoral shares in GDP are an imperfect measure of the attractiveness of foreign capital. For example, the electronics sector (despite the relatively small value added because of high import content) is a major share of goods exports and was an important destination of FDI in the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, capital inflows should be driven by the present discounted value of returns to the industry (in turn reflecting comparative advantage patterns), and not its capital intensity.16

59. These considerations are validated by empirical evidence from other EMEs:

  • Cross-sectional and panel studies fail to detect a statistically significant impact of sectoral composition on the magnitude of foreign equity inflows.17

  • Some EMEs also have a large shares of services (the Baltics, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Chile), but are significantly more successful in attracting FDI and equity inflows.

  • In individual EMEs, the manufacturing sector is not systematically more likely to attract higher foreign equity. Rather, the sectoral destination of inflows appears broadly in line with patterns of comparative advantage.18

Under-reporting of financial flows

60. The balance of payments data could be understating FDI and portfolio equity inflow, especially in recent years. For example, the recent surge in remittances may have a financial component, rather than current one, since many of these funds were used to purchase real estate.

61. However, these flows appear too small to materially change the results in this section. At most,19 the financial component of remittances during the past two years is estimated to some 1-1½ percent of GDP annually. By contrast, equity and FDI liabilities are between 15 and 35 percent of GDP lower in the Philippines than elsewhere.

D. Outlook and Policy Implications

62. If total equity inflows could be increased and foreign holdings of Philippine companies be brought closer to other EME standards, there would be substantial benefits:

  • By facilitating faster technology transfer and moving the economy closer to the global technological frontier, it could provide a powerful self-reinforcing mechanism supporting faster income convergence.20

  • Closing of the “equity gap” could provide a more diversified source of balance of payments financing over the near and medium term. It could also help ensure that the strategy of retiring external debt does not entail pressure on reserves or the peso.

  • Switching from debt (denominated in a foreign currency) to peso-denominated equity financing could reduce economy-wide balance sheet vulnerabilities arising for currency mismatches, such as a sudden rise in demand for foreign exchange causing runs on reserves in periods of stress.21

63. However, policy makers face the question of how to increase the attractiveness of Philippine shares to foreign investors. There is increasing empirical evidence that the quality of growth is important, which would require that the Philippines achieve a more balanced growth profile. In particular, the slump in investment (as a share of GDP) needs to be reversed. Sustaining key supporting policies, notably the planned shift of government expenditure away from current spending and toward infrastructure, would be crucial. Moreover, expanding domestic employment opportunities, so as to limit (or reverse) outward migration of skilled labor, could also play an important role—given the well-established strong skilled labor-capital complementarity. This would reverse the recent, arguably second-best pattern, whereby convergence in capital-labor ratios has been effectively taking place through labor migration (and recently increasingly of skilled labor) rather than via import of capital.

64. More recent research has also identified the key role of microeconomic factors in attracting equity capital. For example, Harms and Lutz (2006) estimate a panel regression model, that attempts to link the determinants of foreign investment to a broad range of explanatory variables, including per capita income, governance, foreign aid per capita, and openness to trade. Specifically, the authors estimate a number of alternative specification, each employing a different governance indicator. The tabulation below summarizes the estimated partial elasticities only of GDP per capita and various governance indicators that are of special interest to this chapter.

Dependent variable: log (Private foreign investment per capita)

article image
Source: Harms and Lutz (2006).

65. On the basis of the average estimated elasticity of the GDP variable, full income convergence by the Philippines to the sample average would be consistent with a rise of FDI and equity per capita by over 35 percent from its current level. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function specification, and a labor income share of 65 percent (see Chapter I),22 this would translate into a higher level of total equity by some 5 percentage points of GDP. In addition, if institutional reforms were introduced that would raise the governance indicators to their sample average,23 a further increase in total equity by over 6 percentage points of GDP could be realized. The overall impact is likely to be quite substantial, closing more than half of the Philippines’ equity gap relative to other EMEs.

uA03fig07

Governance Indicators

Percentile

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: World Bank, and Fund staff calculations.

66. Some specific suggestions include:

  • With regard to FDI, the emerging consensus seems to be that factors such as improving governance, strengthening property rights, reducing firm set-up costs and costs of doing business, and ensuring a competitive market environment and freedom of entry are crucial. On the basis of these indicators, the Philippines generally falls short of the standards of other EMEs, especially in the areas of political stability, the rule of law, and corruption.24 Also, the lack of an effective competition policy and a high degree of cartelization of important sectors in the Philippines could further deter foreign entry.

  • With regard to portfolio equity, financial and capital markets need to be developed further. The banking system, despite considerable recent progress, requires additional resolution of longstanding structural weaknesses. Despite a substantial reduction in recent years,25 non-performing loans are high by EME standards, and bank profitability and the degree of financial intermediation are low. The state of capital market development is arguably even more problematic: the number of listed companies is extremely low even by the standards of much less developed economies. Lack of progress in these areas could pose serious constraints in the Philippines’ ability to attract portfolio equity capital. In this regard, recent legislative initiatives26 to address moral hazard and asymmetric information problems are particularly encouraging.

E. Summary

67. This chapter has explored the main features of the Philippines’ financial account, in an effort to identify key recent trends and make inferences on future prospects. The analysis focused on stocks of foreign assets and liabilities and adopted a cross-country perspective to help determine the Philippines’ position within a broader universe of emerging market economies. The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows:

  • In terms of its net international investment position, the Philippines is currently well in line with other EMEs: while remaining a net debtor, it has seen its net liability position improve sharply since the time of the Asian crisis.

  • With regard to gross foreign assets, while there is considerable regional variation across EMEs, the Philippines does not constitute an outlier.

  • Similarly, with regard to total gross external liabilities, the Philippines has reached a position well in line with other EMEs, starting from a position of borderline unsustainability at the time of the Asian crisis.

  • The Philippines’ gross equity liability position remains remarkably low by EME standards; this is a key component of its external balance sheet where it constitutes a clear outlier relative to virtually every other EME: This “equity gap” is very large and persistent, irrespective of whether one focuses on FDI alone or on the aggregate of FDI and portfolio equity.

  • This equity gap highlights important missed opportunities by the Philippines in a period marked by a major shift in global capital flows from debt towards equity. At the same time, it suggests considerable “catch up” potential looking forward: such catching up could have major beneficial implications for income convergence, providing stable balance of payments financing, and addressing key balance sheet vulnerabilities.

  • Such catching up would depend critically on a some key prerequisites: while considerable progress has already been made on the macroeconomic front, there is an important outstanding agenda in the areas of structural reform and institution building. The empirical literature suggests that the gains from such reforms towards closing the Philippines’ “equity gap” can be substantial.

68. Over the medium-term, there is greater potential for diversification-driven capital outflows in the wake of the recent rounds of financial account liberalization. These non-debt capital flows could be increasingly called upon to provide balance of payments financing, especially given the authorities’ intentions to continue with debt prepayments and the likelihood that remittances will fall to more traditional levels.

References

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Annex III.I: Assessing the Philippines’ Foreign Exchange Reserve Position

Following the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s, Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) have accumulated a large amount of foreign exchange reserves. While EME reserve accumulation has been a global phenomenon, it has been particularly pronounced in Asia and Europe. This development reflects a combination of post-crisis competitive exchange rates and a quick resumption of global capital inflows, particularly the non-debt component FDI and portfolio equity.

The Philippines has lagged behind other EMEs as regards reserve accumulation since it was not able to fully benefit from the resurgent global capital flows. From 2005, however, the Philippines’ authorities took advantage of higher remittance inflows and stronger FDI and portfolio equity to build up reserves, even as they prepaid a substantial amount of external debt. Reserve accumulation was particularly strong in 2007, rising by over US$22 billion (including swaps), doubling their end-2006 level.

uA03app01fig01

Foreign Exchange Reserves

Index, 2000 = 100

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2008, 120; 10.5089/9781451831429.002.A003

Sources: IFS, WEO, and Fund staff calculations.

This recent trends raise the question of whether the Philippines’ current reserve levels can be regarded as adequate, or whether further reserve accumulation is called for, on insurance or other grounds. A key function of reserves is to provide a buffer against sudden balance of payments shocks. Accordingly, the literature suggests a number of indicators, expressing reserves scaled by the main components of current and capital account outflows, as a way to gauge an economy’s relative vulnerability to such shocks. This annex looks at the following vulnerability indicators:

  • Reserve import coverage: This indicator, defined as end-year reserves in months of next year’s imports, attempts to capture an economy’s vulnerability to shocks to the current account. While theory provides little guidance on an appropriate numerical value, a benchmark of 3 months of imports is sometimes used as a “safe” threshold. It should be noted, however, that in countries with an open capital account, this measure is less relevant.

  • Ratio of reserves to broad money: This indicator attempts to capture vulnerability to sudden capital outflows (“capital flight”)—with broad money meant to provide an upper limit to demand for foreign exchange by domestic residents. Full reserve coverage of broad money would clearly provide complete insurance in this regard, but such a threshold is typically viewed as too stringent—even some formal currency boards limit coverage to the monetary base.

  • Ratio of reserves to short-term debt (by residual maturity): This indicator attempts to capture “sudden stop” or rollover risk. An often-discussed threshold is the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which stipulates 100 percent reserve coverage of short-term debt as a minimum “safe” level. This measure is more relevant in countries with an open capital account.

The tabulation below summarizes the evolution of the Philippines’ import coverage ratio against selected EME comparators and corresponding regional group averages, dropping outliers as appropriate:27

Reserve Coverage of Imports

(in months)

article image
Source: IFS, WEO and Fund staff calculations.

Reflecting trends in gross reserves, the Philippines’ import coverage ratio rose sharply in 2007. Its current import coverage remains well below the very high Asia average and equals the levels of Indonesia and Thailand. It is, however, well above average European and Latin American EME levels, and substantially exceeds the 3-month threshold. It also needs to be taken into account that the indicator in question could be understating the effective coverage provided by a given level of reserves given the high import content of the Philippines’ exports; in particular, electronics, by far the dominant export category, has an estimated import content of over 70 percent.

The evolution and cross-country comparison of the Philippinesreserves to broad money ratio are summarized in the tabulation below:

Gross International Reserves to Broad Money

(in percent)

article image
Sources: IFS, WEO and Fund staff calculations.

The Philippines’ reserves-to-broad money ratio has been consistently high throughout the period under consideration, partly reflecting its low degree of monetization relative to other EMEs. As with other reserve indicators, this ratio exhibits a distinct jump in 2007, to over 50 percent, exceeding the levels in most other EMEs.

Finally, the tabulation below summarizes the recent trends in the reserves to short-term debt ratio (on a residual maturity basis) for the Philippines and the rest of the EME sample, with regional averages computed after dropping a few clear outliers:28

Gross International Reserves to Short-term Debt

(in percent)

article image
Sources: IFS, WEO and Fund staff calculations.

The table above confirms the substantial improvement registered by the Philippines in the last few years, both relative to its own past trends and other EMEs. After hovering around, or even below, the Greenspan-Guidotti 100 percent threshold, the reserve-to short-term debt ratio rose sharply during 2006-07, essentially doubling by end-2007. Even so, the Philippines’ high short-term debt (as a share of GDP) by EME standards, has kept this indicator significantly below the Asia average and slightly below the Europe average (which contains a number of very highly indebted countries); the indicator edges above the Latin American average only in 2007.

To summarize, the evolution of the three vulnerability indicators of this annex suggests a broadly consistent picture: starting from a relatively vulnerable position, rapid reserve accumulation in the last two years has placed the Philippines economy in a much more robust position, both relative to its own past trends and in relation to other EMEs. The strengthened reserve position appears to have rendered the economy particularly robust to trade shocks (especially if one takes into account the high import content of exports) and shocks to capital outflows; and while the high level of short-term debt continues to create some rollover or “sudden stop” risk relative to other EMEs, this risk has also been sharply reduced very recently, with the reserve-to-short-term debt ratio at twice the Greenspan-Guidotti threshold.

Annex III.II Data Description and Country Coverage

International Investment Position (IIP) Data Description

This chapter utilizes IIP data on a broad sample of emerging market economies (EMEs). The IIP data record holdings of foreign assets and liabilities (or a residency basis) broken down into FDI, portfolio investment (equity and debt separately), and other investment (essentially non-portfolio debt). While important strides have been made in improving the accuracy and international comparability of IIP data, two important caveats remain:29

  • The treatment of nonresident holdings of domestic currency instruments (mainly government paper) is not consistent. While many countries include such holdings in their IIP data (as they should), data availability (or other) problems preclude others from adopting the same treatment. Given the rapid expansion of such holdings in recent years,30 such differential treatment could generate increasingly serious comparability issues.

  • IIP stocks are not always consistent with recorded balance of payments flows, even after correcting for valuation changes. While this problem impacts on a number of external asset and liability components, it appears to be quantitatively more significant in the case of short-term capital outflows, due primarily to incomplete information on the types of assets.

Also, IIP data are generally available only over a short time period, typically since 2001, although this limitation is not particularly serious for the issues addressed in this chapter. First, the 2001-06 period arguably constitutes a sufficient basis for forward-looking inferences, the main point of interest of this chapter. Second, focusing on this period is interesting in its own right, as it coincides with a major post-crisis shift in global EME flows from debt to equity instruments.

Country Comparisons

Philippine holdings of external assets and liabilities are compared with the average of three regional EME groupings: Asia (excluding the Philippines), Latin America, and Europe. Some countries were excluded, because of their atypical nature:

  • Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR were dropped from the emerging Asia group due to their non-typical (by EME standards) net foreign asset (NFA) position—the latter also because of its status as a financial center and currency board regime.

  • Argentina and Uruguay were dropped from the Latin America group as their large debt restructuring had a one-off impact on their external liability position—it turns out that including them would not materially affect the results.

  • Russia was dropped from the Europe group due to its non-typical NFA position. Bulgaria and Lithuania were also dropped to control for their currency board regime—results are robust to their inclusion, however.

In summary, the full EME sample used for the purposes of this chapter, broken down by region, is presented in the tabulation below:

Emerging Market Sample

article image
14

Prepared by Ioannis Halikias.

15

The division between equity investment and FDI is relatively arbitrary. For classification purposes, a 10 percent ownership threshold is typically used to distinguish between FDI and portfolio equity. In addition, the vulnerability implications of equity and FDI holdings are more similar to each other than to debt (as neither involves necessarily regular scheduled payments of principal and interest in a foreign currency, and the size of payments against these liabilities tends to vary counter cyclically with the state of the domestic economy).

16

For an early contribution on the role of international comparative advantage, see Baldwin (1989).

17

At the macroeconomic level, studies include Chakrabarti (2001) and Harms and Lutz (2006). On industry- or firm-level studies, an early empirical reference is Horst (1972); see also Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Buch et. al. (2005).

18

See Eichengreen (2001), which draws on numerous World Bank country studies. On the empirical link to comparative advantage, see Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) and Do and Levchenko (2007).

19

It should be noted that data collection and classification, at least as regards financial flows via the banking system, have improved substantially in recent years.

20

The staff’s reform scenario discussed in the staff report provides a stylized description of such a mechanism. On the impact of equity investment on recipient economies, see Henry (2003, 2007) and Prasad et. al. (2003).

21

See, for example, Rosenberg et. al. (2005).

22

See Chapter 1.

23

With the exception of the political stability index, which is conservatively assumed to be independent of policy.

24

For a detailed discussion on, and the latest vintage of, the indicators in question, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).

25

Non-performing loans have come down from 13 percent of total loans in 2003 to 7 percent in 2006. Moreover, in contrast to other Asian countries, this improvement in the Philippine banks’ asset portfolios was achieved without government financial support.

26

These include laws submitted to Congress on credit information disclosure, corporate bankruptcy, and the regulatory framework.

27

Outliers include some large (and relatively closed) EMEs: China in the Asia group, Russia in the Europe group, and Brazil in the Latin America group.

28

The outliers are EMEs with very low short-term debt: India in the Asia group and Ukraine in the Europe group.

29

For a comprehensive discussion of IIP data issues, and attempts at addressing them, the standard reference is the pioneering work of Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, in particular Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003). For the most recent vintage of this work, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).

30

See GFSR, various issues.

Philippines: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund