Cameroon: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund
Publication Date:
16 Aug 2007
eISBN:
9781451808230
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; Cameroon; growth acceleration; spending; nonoil GDP; return on assets; a number of bank; B. financial system overview; deposit structure; CEMAC country; Nonperforming loans; Small and medium enterprises; Sub-Saharan Africa; bank penetration
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This Selected Issues paper on Cameroon identifies impediments to growth acceleration in the country. A two-step approach is followed: first, the characteristics of middle-income countries currently experiencing growth accelerations are examined; and, second, the extent to which Cameroon shares these characteristics is assessed. The focus of the analysis is a set of variables the literature has identified as helping to accelerate growth. This paper also presents a possible fiscal strategy for Cameroon based on the permanent income approach.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper on Cameroon identifies impediments to growth acceleration in the country. A two-step approach is followed: first, the characteristics of middle-income countries currently experiencing growth accelerations are examined; and, second, the extent to which Cameroon shares these characteristics is assessed. The focus of the analysis is a set of variables the literature has identified as helping to accelerate growth. This paper also presents a possible fiscal strategy for Cameroon based on the permanent income approach.

III. Promoting Financial Intermediation: Issues and Reform Prospects1

A. Introduction

1. A developed financial system stimulates economic growth. The economic literature2 provides ample evidence that improvements in financial systems contribute to increased efficiency in resource allocation, and hence growth. Savings are channeled into more productive uses, facilitating investment diversification as well as risk management for savers and investors. Furthermore, a large access to financial services for small and medium size enterprises and lower-income households improves their ability to benefit from investment opportunities, and access better quality health and education services. Empirical studies have also shown that financial development reduces income inequality.3

2. The role of the financial sector in fostering nonoil sector activities has been limited in Cameroon. Financial depth, as measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP, has been lower in Cameroon than in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The financial system’s ability to attract long-term savings and promote credit creation has been constrained by a number of factors, contributing in part to relatively lower growth performance in Cameroon than in sub-Saharan Africa on average over the past twenty years or so.

3. This chapter discusses impediments to financial development in Cameroon. The main conclusions are that greater access to financial services, particularly for small and medium size enterprises and households, has been limited by several factors, including the decline in bank penetration, cumbersome administrative procedures, inefficiencies in the financial system’s operating environment, particularly in the judiciary, and difficulties in assessing credit risk. The latter is mainly due to the lack of a rating system and poor accounting practices. Measures at the national and regional levels would be needed to remove these obstacles and enhance the financial system’s support to nonoil economic growth.4

B. Financial System Overview

4. Cameroon’s financial system, the largest in the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), continues to be dominated by banks (Tables III.1 and III.2). Cameroon accounts for about 55 percent of CEMAC’s financial assets, the bulk of which is from the banking sector. Despite its rapid growth in recent years, the microfinance sector remains marginal. According to estimates, it accounts for less than 5 percent of the financial system’s assets in Cameroon.

Table III.1.

Cameroon - Financial System Structure, 2005

article image
Source: COBAC.
Table III.2.

Cameroon’s Position in CEMAC Financial System, 2005

article image
Source: COBAC, 2006 Regional FSAP.

5. Cameroon is one of the few CEMAC countries with minimal public sector participation in the banking sector (Figure III.1). The public sector’s stake in the banking sector declined markedly after banks were restructured in the early 1990s. Before the banking sector crisis, the government was a shareholder in six out eight commercial banks and had majority ownership in two of the banks. By end-2005, the government held 35 percent stake in one bank and less than 30 percent in two banks.

Figure III.1.
Figure III.1.

Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Banks Shareholding, 2005

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: COBAC.

6. The banking sector’s concentration is moderate, and the lowest in CEMAC. Two out of eight banks in 1999 held half the sector’s deposits and credit; four out of ten banks in 2005 accounted for about three-quarters of deposits and credit (Figure III.2).5 Furthermore, the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index (HHI), which measures concentration, stood at 1,019 in 2005, and was higher than 1,800 in other CEMAC countries. 6

Figure III.2.
Figure III.2.

Cameroon - Credit and Deposits Structure, 2005

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: BEAC.

7. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) seem to have expanded rapidly in recent years, but remain marginal players. Their deposits and credit are estimated to have more than doubled in 2001–05. Deposits in 2005 were 7 percent of commercial bank deposits, up from 4 percent in 2001. The increase in microfinance activity partly reflects the banking sector’s inadequate response to demand for financial services from small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and households. MFIs’ activity also benefited from the decline in bank penetration after the sector’s restructuring in the early 1990s, which resulted in higher branch concentration in major cities. The microfinance sector, however, remains marginal, and has limited capacity to finance long-term investment. A regional regulatory framework for MFIs was adopted in 2002. Under the framework, some 300 unlicensed institutions were closed at end-2005. Guidelines for MFIs’ financial reporting, and prudential norms for the sector are under preparation.

8. Other financial market participants include insurance companies, specialized nonbank institutions, and the Douala Stock Exchange (DSX). The insurance sector offers a limited range of services, and many companies face solvency problems. In recent years, the regional supervisory agency withdrew operating licenses for five companies. The postal and savings bank (CAMPOST) and the housing bank (Credit Foncier) are being restructured (Box III.1). Other specialized institutions offer leasing services, loan guarantees, and micro credit. The public pension fund (CNPS) covers maternity, workers’ compensation, and pension payments. The DSX has been idle since it was established in 2002. At end-2006, only one company was listed, and trading has been minimal.7

C. Banking Sector Performance

9. The banking sector’s soundness has improved somewhat, though the sector remains vulnerable to shocks. Observance of regional prudential norms improved in the last two years (Table III.3). Nonetheless, as in other CEMAC countries, Cameroonian banks’ compliance with the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), and with the limit on single large exposure, remains weak. Given the scarcity of lending opportunities, banks have concentrated credit on a few large creditworthy corporate clients in the non-oil sector. Stress tests indicate that (i) credit concentration has made the banking system vulnerable to credit risks; (ii) the system is vulnerable to interest rate risk; and (iii) excess liquidity would allow the system to weather large deposit withdrawals.

Table III.3.

Cameroon: Banking System Indicators

(Units indicated)

article image
Sources: COBAC, and staff calculations.

Number of banks. There were 9 banks through 2004, 10 in 2005, and 11 in 2006.

Short-term assets (up to one month remaining maturity) over short-term liabilities (up to one month remaining maturity).

Net capital and other permanent resources over fixed assets.

Long-term assets (more than five years) over long-term liabilities (more than five years).

CFAF 1 billion for Cameroon.

Single large exposure is limited to 45 percent of capital.

10. The share of nonperforming loans banks’ portfolio has declined markedly. Gross nonperforming loans (NPL) declined from 40 percent of total credit in 1995 to 12½ percent in 2005 (Figure III.3), mostly reflecting the transfer of important outstanding claims to the loan recovery agency in the context of commercial banks restructuring. The substantial reduction in government domestic payment arrears in recent years also contributed to the improvement.8 In addition, provisioning has improved, thus strengthening the quality of banks’ portfolio (See Table III.3).

Figure III.3.
Figure III.3.

Cameroon and CEMAC - Non-Performing Loans

(Percent of credit to the private sector)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: COBAC.

Financial Sector Reforms, 1989–2006

In the late 1980s, Cameroon financial sector experienced a severe crisis. The banking sector was undermined by the difficult economic environment, weak judicial system, poor management, excessive risk concentration, weak supervisory framework, and government interference in banks’ lending policies. These factors led to liquidity and solvency problems in the sector. A number of non-bank financial institutions as well as insurance companies were also in a critical position (2000 FSAP).

The reform package put in place in 1989 gave priority to the banking sector. During the initial phase (1989–1992), reform measures included liquidation, restructuring and privatization. Their cost amounted to some CFAF 600 billion, financed mostly by shareholders and creditors, debt compensation, and cancellation of public enterprises deposits. Government participation was financed through an advance from the regional central bank (BEAC) and a bilateral structural adjustment loan. At the end of this phase, however, a number of banks remained undercapitalized and the quality of banks’ portfolio had not improved. As a result, by end-1995, the five largest banks, accounting for almost three-quarters of the banking sector’s assets were technically insolvent, and about half of loans to private sector was nonperforming. The second phase of reforms (1995-June 1997), therefore, comprised further liquidations, recapitalizations, and the issuance of government securities on its debt to commercial banks (2000 FSAP).

A third phase of reforms was initiated in 2004. It covers mostly non bank financial institutions. In 2004, the authorities liquidated two insolvent institutions (Caisse d’Epargne Postale, SONAPOSTE), and put in place the savings and postal bank (CAMPOST). However, the latter became illiquid in 2005, and a reform plan for its rehabilitation was adopted. The plan includes the setting up of a dedicated account to rebuild liquidity, the recruitment of an international management team, and the separation of universal postal and financial services. The housing credit bank (Credit Foncier du Cameroon) is also under restructuring. Poor management and a high level of non performing loans in the last several years had generated severe financial difficulties. Following an inspection report by COBAC, a restructuring plan was prepared and is being implemented by a new management team appointed in late 2005. The plan calls for cost cutting measures, actions to collect delinquent loans, and enhanced management and accounting processes.

11. The banking sector profitability has improved. The return on assets (ROA) averaged 2.2 percent in 2005, up from 1.8 percent in 2001; meanwhile, the sector’s return on equity averaged 25 percent, compared with 17 percent, on average, in CEMAC. Banks’ revenues are only partly based on maturity transformation. Interest earnings, excluding that on overdraft facilities, make up less than half of total revenue, while fees and commissions continue to be an important source of revenue (Figure III.4).

Figure III.4.
Figure III.4.

Cameroon—Commercial Banks Income, 2001–05

(Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: COBAC.

12. Financial intermediation, however, is lower in Cameroon than most other sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, though it compares favorably with other CEMAC countries (Figures III.5, III.6, and III.7). In 2005 the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP, a measure of financial intermediation depth, stood at 17 percent of GDP, compared with 27 percent in Benin, and 44 percent, on average, in SSA.9 Credit to the private sector, at some 9 percent of GDP, is also low, and has only marginally increased in the past decade. The ratio of quasi-money (M1) to M2 remains high, reflecting the financial system’s difficulty in attracting financial savings and promoting capital accumulation (Table III.4).

Figure III.5.
Figure III.5.

Cameroon and Comparator Countries—Broad Money and Private Sector Credit

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Sources: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff estimates.
Figure III.6.
Figure III.6.

Cameroon and CEMAC—Broad Money and Credit to Private Sector, 1995–2005

(Percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: COBAC.
Figure III.7.
Figure III.7.

Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Credit to Private Sector to GDP, 2005

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Sources: COBAC; and Cameroonian authorities
Table III.4.

Cameroon and Comparator Countries—Selected Financial Indicators

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Sources: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff estimates.

D. Impediments to Financial Intermediation: Key Issues and Possible Reform Areas

13. Physical access to formal banking services is limited and lower than in comparator countries (Figure III.8). Banks’ outreach declined since the restructuring of the sector. Consequently, bank branches are concentrated in major cities, and their number declined from 105 for 8 banks in 1995, to 98 for 10 banks in 2005. Today, only one bank is represented in all the provinces of Cameroon. Recent MFI growth has only partly offset the decrease in bank penetration.

Figure III.8.
Figure III.8.

Number of Bank Branches per Hundred 100,000 People

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

14. Administrative hurdles hamper access to financial services. The minimum amount to open an individual checking or savings account is about US$ 400. It ranges between US$300 and US$10,000 for corporate accounts. These reportedly excessive requirements are compounded by cumbersome administrative procedures, and sizable maintenance fees and minimum balances. Furthermore, the use of non-cash payment instruments is limited, and cash withdrawals at bank branches is time consuming and remains the commonly used means to access deposited funds. As a result, only 3 percent of the population holds a bank account.

15. The pricing of credit may not be appropriate. The floor on deposit rates and the ceiling on lending rates, set by the BEAC, may be out of line with market fundamentals as pointed out by the 2006 CEMAC regional FSAP (Box III.2). The market for banking services in Cameroon is, in fact, rather segmented with banks competing for creditworthy clients. For these clients, interest rates could be quite low. On the other hand, credit to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) with a limited credit history, is rationed owing to the lending rate rigidity. The average cost for a loan is 11 percent for large corporations, 16½ percent for SMEs, and 20½ percent for households. As a comparison, interest rates on credit extended by microfinance institutions, which are not subject to the ceiling, can reach 30 percent.

16. The deposit structure may also impede long-term credit. As stipulated by current prudential requirements, long-term credit commitments must be financed by long-term deposits. However, because the bulk of deposits in Cameroon is short or medium term in nature (75 percent), private sector credit is dominated by short- and medium-term loans. During 1995–2005, long-term credit averaged less than 1 percent of total credit to the private sector (Figure III.9).

Figure III.9.
Figure III.9.

Cameroon - Credit Structure

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2007, 287; 10.5089/9781451808230.002.A003

Source: BEAC.

17. Timely and reliable financial information on potential borrowers is lacking. Because credit applicants often have no recorded payment history, banks find it difficult to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness. For SMEs, this is exacerbated by the poor quality of financial statements presented with loan applications.

Findings and Recommendations of the CEMAC Regional FSAP

The 2006 CEMAC regional FSAP assessment found improved financial sector stability but continuing important challenges:

  • In relation to the Basel Core Principles (BCP) and the IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies—Transparency of Banking Supervision, the region generally complies with international best practices, but shortcomings remain in areas of prudential regulation, such as the level and calculation of the solvency ratio and limits to large exposures and the capacity and institutional independence of the regional banking commission.

  • A significant number of banks do not meet all prudential rules. With limited implementation capacity, COBAC has shown continued forbearance.

  • Stress tests based on individual banks and region-wide data show that the banking sector is particularly vulnerable to credit risks: a relatively large number of banks are undercapitalized and there is a high sectoral concentration of bank loans.

  • While a legal framework to criminalize money laundering and combat the financing of terrorism has been adopted, the FSAP assessment found that its implementation is hampered by unclear assignment of responsibilities between regional agencies and national authorities.

The FSAP’s main conclusions on financial sector development relate to limited access to finance, both households and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The findings are based on discussions with policy-makers and representatives of banks and banking associations and on analysis of detailed banking surveys on lending practices and deposit relations. Key conclusions:

  • Banks are reluctant to finance SMEs due to flaws in the legal and judicial framework and poor corporate accounting and governance.

  • The imposition on banks of minimum deposit and maximum lending rates curtails access. As a result, banks mainly deal with a small number of large corporate clients.

  • Although the microfinance sector has witnessed significant membership growth and emerging linkages with banks in recent years, its outreach is still relatively limited.

  • The OHADA (Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law) accounting framework places an excessive burden on SMEs.

Implementing the recommendations will require actions both at regional and national levels.

At the regional level, the recommendations call for

  • strengthening the supervisory capacity and institutional independence of COBAC,

  • revising the OHADA legislation on debt collection and accounting practices, and

  • adjusting administered interest rates to better align with market fundamentals.

At the national level, the recommendations call for

  • upgrading the judicial system through, e.g., larger allocations and more training,

  • tackling governance issues,

  • improving commercial and land registries, and

  • adopting a framework for appointing and training insolvency administrators.

18. Registering property is costly and lengthy, which negatively impacts the use of land and real estate titles in financial transactions (Table III.5). According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business” database, it takes almost a month to obtain a copy of the deed for a property in Cameroon, and about three months to register a property title. Registration fees are also high (about 19 percent of the property’s value). Moreover, the real-estate registry is in a poor condition and covers only Cameroon’s two largest cities.

Table III.5

Cameroon and Comparators: Financial Sector Indicators, 2006

article image
Source: World Bank Doing Business Survey.

Procedures, time, and costs to build a warehouse, including obtaining necessary licenses and permits, completing required notifications and inspections, and obtaining utility connections.

Included are the number of steps, time, and cost involved in registering property.

The Legal Rights Index ranges from 0–10, with higher scores indicating that those laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The Credit Information Index measures the scope, access, and quality of credit information available through public registries or private bureaus. It ranges from 0–6, with higher values indicating that more credit information is available from a public registry or private bureau.

This is determined by following the evolution of a payment dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of procedures involved from the moment a plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual payment.

The index varies between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating better investor protection.

19. Lack of loan guarantees and inefficiencies in the judicial system constrain credit growth. Banks’ requirements on collateral are quite stringent, in view of difficulties in assessing potential borrowers’ credit risk. High value collaterals are, however, inaccessible for SMEs, and lower-income households. According to the most recent household survey (2002), nine out ten household requests for investment financing were declined, mostly because of insufficient collateral. Even when borrowers can access collaterals, the weak judicial system limits lending, because lengthy procedures for judgments execution deter acceptance of collaterals.

20. Fostering financial intermediation would require policy reflections at the national and regional levels in the following areas.

  • Pricing risks. At the regional level, limits on interest rates would need to be reviewed to reflect market conditions. According to the regional FSAP, lifting the ceiling on lending rates would facilitate an optimal risk pricing, give SMEs and households greater access to credit, and allow banks to generate their profits from intermediation rather than fees and commissions.

  • Financial information. The completion of the ongoing regional project to set up credit bureaus will be an important step. Credit bureaus would collect and disseminate information on borrowers’ financial position and payment record, thus eliminating information asymmetry in the market, and enhancing banks’ ability to assess and manage risks. Establishing a credit rating system would usefully supplement credit bureaus information. At the national level, the authorities would need to encourage stronger corporate governance and the use of best accounting practices for SMEs. These steps would help improve the quality of SMEs’ financial statements.

  • Property registry. To encourage greater use of land and real estate titles as collateral, the authorities would need to take appropriate actions to computerize registries, extend their coverage to other major cities, and reduce registration delays and costs.

  • Judicial system. Increased physical and financial resources for courts would support the financial system, particularly by reducing delays in court procedures, execution of collaterals and judgments, dispute settlement, and bankruptcy procedures. In addition, Cameroon would benefit from harmonizing the national business law with that of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and could take advantage of the OHADA regional training facilities. 10

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1

Prepared by Malangu Kabedi-Mbuyi and Romain Veyrune.

2

See Allen and Ndikumana (2000) for a review of the literature.

4

Lack of reliable data on most financial institutions hampers a comprehensive analysis of the financial system at this stage. Consequently, the chapter focuses mostly on the banking sector.

5

Three of the largest banks in the sector are subsidiaries of foreign banks.

6

The Hirschman-Herfindhal Index is calculated as the sum of square market shares of banks. The HHI indicates: an unconcentrated marked when it is below 1,000; moderate concentration when it is higher than 1,000 but less than 1,800; and high concentration when it is above 1,800.

7

A regional stock exchange was established in Libreville (Gabon) in 2003. This may have generated increased competition for the DSX, in view of the thinness of the CEMAC market.

8

Payment on domestic debt in 2005–06 totaled CFAF 560.7 billion, including CFAF 66 billion to commercial banks.

9

The SSA average excludes Nigeria and South Africa.

10

Cameroon is one of the countries that adhered to OHADA in 1993. The OHADA Uniform Acts cover a wide range of laws and legal arrangements relating to business, and therefore relevant for the financial sector. Harmonization covers the business and corporate laws, bankruptcy, debt enforcement, accounting and arbitrage.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Cameroon: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2007: Issue 287
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781451808230
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
43
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451808230.002
  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Banks Shareholding, 2005

    (Percent)

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon - Credit and Deposits Structure, 2005

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and CEMAC - Non-Performing Loans

    (Percent of credit to the private sector)

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon—Commercial Banks Income, 2001–05

    (Percent)

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and Comparator Countries—Broad Money and Private Sector Credit

    (Percent of GDP)

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and CEMAC—Broad Money and Credit to Private Sector, 1995–2005

    (Percent of GDP)

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Credit to Private Sector to GDP, 2005

  • View in gallery

    Number of Bank Branches per Hundred 100,000 People

  • View in gallery

    Cameroon - Credit Structure

Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Banks Shareholding, 2005

(Percent)

Cameroon - Credit and Deposits Structure, 2005

Cameroon and CEMAC - Non-Performing Loans

(Percent of credit to the private sector)

Cameroon—Commercial Banks Income, 2001–05

(Percent)

Cameroon and Comparator Countries—Broad Money and Private Sector Credit

(Percent of GDP)

Cameroon and CEMAC—Broad Money and Credit to Private Sector, 1995–2005

(Percent of GDP)

Cameroon and CEMAC Countries—Credit to Private Sector to GDP, 2005

Number of Bank Branches per Hundred 100,000 People

Cameroon - Credit Structure