Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
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International Monetary Fund
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Publication Date:
20 Jul 2006
eISBN:
9781451821826
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; Cambodia; poverty incidence; debt; government; poverty estimate; poverty reduction; debt obligation; restructuring agreement; DK regime; obligations to the United States; external-debt-to-GDP ratio; Public and publicly-guaranteed external debt; Arrears; Debt service; Debt restructuring
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The Selected Issues paper discusses Cambodia’s poverty and growth, private sector development, public financial management reform, and debt sustainability. It summarizes the Poverty Assessment and describes the regime of tax incentives, costs, and limits for private investment. It also summarizes the assessment of Cambodia’s Public Expenditure Management system and Public Financial Management Reform Program. It highlights the key reform priorities, and provides historical background on Cambodia’s external and domestic debt. It also includes a statistical appendix and a summary of the tax system.

Abstract

The Selected Issues paper discusses Cambodia’s poverty and growth, private sector development, public financial management reform, and debt sustainability. It summarizes the Poverty Assessment and describes the regime of tax incentives, costs, and limits for private investment. It also summarizes the assessment of Cambodia’s Public Expenditure Management system and Public Financial Management Reform Program. It highlights the key reform priorities, and provides historical background on Cambodia’s external and domestic debt. It also includes a statistical appendix and a summary of the tax system.

V. A Historical Analysis of Cambodian Debt18

A. Introduction

36. In the half century since its independence, Cambodia has accumulated debt from many different sources.19 Multilateral borrowing has been an important source of development financing, especially since the early 1990s.20 Bilateral debt mainly reflects the legacy of an even earlier era; most was contracted during a period of internal and external conflicts. As of end-2005, total public debt outstanding amounted to US$3.4 billion, of which US$3.2 billion was external. About 36 percent of total external debt was from multilateral sources, mainly the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Bilateral debt is mostly owed to the United States and the Russian Federation.

37. Cambodia is currently classified by staffs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as having a high risk of debt distress. The Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) presented in the accompanying Staff Report shows nominal public-debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 50 percent at end-2005. This level of distress, however, is based on the currently high level of outstanding debt, pending reconciliation and restructuring of debt owed to the two largest bilateral creditors. Once restructuring is concluded, and provided macroeconomic assumptions in the baseline projections hold, this risk is expected to moderate sharply.

38. Against this background, this paper provides a historical context to Cambodia's debt.21 Section B discusses historical trends and recent developments of Cambodia's multilateral debt. The paper then focuses on outstanding debt to the two main bilateral creditors, examining in Section C the circumstances and conditions under which the debt to the United States was incurred and describing steps undertaken in recent months to resolve the issue. Subsequently, Section D describes the Russian debt. Section E discusses other bilateral and domestic debt, while Section F describes the Fund's role in the context of a possible arrangement and Section G concludes.

B. Multilateral Debt

39. Since the early nineties, Cambodia has seen a rapid rise in debt contracted from multilateral sources. Debt owed to the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund has fluctuated around 30 percent of total external debt, with a decline (as a share of the total) in the late nineties and a pick-up thereafter. In nominal dollar terms, however, there has been a secular increase (Figure 1). These loans, however, have been contracted on concessional terms, yielding lower corresponding amounts in net present value (NPV) terms.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Multilateral External Debt Outstanding, 1995–2005

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2006, 265; 10.5089/9781451821826.002.A005

40. Outstanding debt obligations to the Fund remained relatively stable in nominal terms. Disbursements came from three successive Fund-supported programs, with obligations reaching US$102 million in 2003 at the end of the third arrangement, a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.22 However, as a proportion of total external debt, the share of debt owed to the Fund declined from 13 percent in 1995 to 2½ percent in 2005.

41. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of January 2006 erased the remaining obligations to the Fund.23 The relief, of about SDR57 million (approximately US$82 million at prevailing exchange rates), has reduced Cambodia's external-debt-to-GDP ratio by 1¼ percentage points in NPV terms. Cambodia was one of only two non-HIPC countries eligible for MDRI relief from the Fund; as such, its obligations to other multilateral organizations remain unaffected.

C. The U.S. Debt

42. In the 1960s and 1970s, Cambodia was embroiled in political developments in the Southeast Asian region. Increasing United States involvement in Vietnam coincided with unstable political dynamics in Cambodia. Prince Norodom Sihanouk's rule was instrumental in delaying Cambodia's involvements in the conflict next door, but he was ultimately ousted in 1970. While the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) had started an armed struggle against his regime, Sihanouk was actually overthrown in March 1970 by his erstwhile conservative allies—his Prime Minister Lon Nol and his deputy (and Sihanouk's cousin) Sisowath Sirik Matak. With the ascent of Lon Nol, Cambodia was drawn heavily into the Vietnam War, with extensive bombing of its territories and suffering heavy casualties.

43. The U.S. commodity aid was contracted during this period.24 Six agreements were signed on three dates between January 1972 and August 1974, with delivery of commodities between 1972 and 1975 (Table 1). According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), US$277 million out of a contracted US$322 million was actually disbursed. Each loan was of a 40-year maturity with a 10-year grace period, and was associated with an initial interest rate of 2 percent for the first 10 years, raised to 3 percent thereafter.25 All associated records, however, appear to have been destroyed on the Cambodian side as the Lon Nol regime collapsed. As described by Chandler (2000), Lon Nol fled the country in early March 1975, and the uniformed combatants of the Khmer Rouge—led by Pol Pot—entered the city in April.

Table 1.

P.L. 480 Loan Agreements between Cambodia and the United States, 1972–74

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Source: United States Department of Agriculture.

44. In attempts to agree on amounts, repeated adjustments have been made in recent years (Table 2). The USDA records show around US$18 million listed as undelivered, and a further US$2 million transferred to Title II, an emergency and development food assistance (grant) under P.L. 480.26 In addition, due to the lack of documentation, some claims were further reduced. These latter adjustments have reduced the total obligation by US$28 million, bringing the principal owed down to US$228 million. Part of this total obligation was cleared by applying the Currency Unit Payments (CUP) made by Cambodia in local currency, subtracting a further US$66 million and reducing Cambodia's total debt obligations to the United States to US$162 million.27

Table 2.

Calculation of Cambodia’s Debt Obligations to the United States

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Source: USDA and Fund staff calculations.

Adjustments due to undelivered cargo and transfer to Title II.

Adjustment due to missing documents or other lack of information.

45. These adjustments took place in the backdrop of the 1995 Paris Club meeting. The participating creditors at the meeting—France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States—finalized an agreed minute, which set the stage for subsequent bilateral agreements. While bilateral agreements have since been signed with France, Germany and Japan—and payments resumed—no agreement with the United States was signed.28

46. Until recently, disagreements had revolved around obligations claimed. The Cambodian authorities noted that the loans were made in a politically charged environment to a partisan government and expressed strong reservations over the lack of convincing evidence of actual delivery of commodities involved. The U.S. authorities, in turn, clarified their position on outstanding legal issues, noting that they were unable to waive charges for interest on late principal payments and stating that, once the commodities were loaded onto vessels, the shipments became legal responsibility of the recipient nation.

47. The authorities of the two countries have since agreed on the total principal owed and on the procedure for finalizing debt rescheduling. In principle, the two sides have agreed that the principal owed was US$162 million and that arrears would be rescheduled in the context of a new Paris Club meeting.29 The United States is currently preparing a bilateral agreement, which will provide a basis to conclude discussions on the debt obligations under the parameters set by the 1995 Paris Club agreed minute. If the Cambodian authorities are prepared to agree on the principal amount and sign the bilateral agreement, the U.S. authorities have expressed their willingness to then return to the Paris Club for a new rescheduling of accumulated arrears not covered by the 1995 agreed minute, adding that the U.S. would support rescheduling on Naples terms, though the ultimate outcome would depend on the consent of other Paris Club creditors.

D. The Russian Debt

48. The Russian debt was incurred after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime and takeover by the Communist People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK).30 By 1978, the Vietnamese Army had made major inroads into Cambodia; Phnom Penh itself finally fell on January 7, 1979—with Pol Pot fleeing just as Lon Nol had done half a decade before—and the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was replaced by a People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Cambodia, though ruled by PRPK, was under the occupation of Vietnam, which was in turn allied with the Soviet Union. Political alliances at the time led to most of the neighboring countries supporting the exiled DK regime, and U.N. development agencies prohibited from operating within Cambodia. The PRK, notes Chandler (2000) relied by 1982 on economic aid from “India, a few small anti-American states, and what remained of the Soviet bloc.”

49. The Russian debt was incurred in the context of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) system. While Cambodia was not officially a member of the CMEA, much of its external trade during this period took place with other CMEA countries.31 Until 1987, all official foreign trade had to be conducted through the Kampuchea Export and Import Corporation (KAMPEXIM), which had been set up by the Ministry of Foreign and Local trade to handle exports, imports, and foreign aid (Shimomura, 1994). Contracts with trading partners were denominated in Transferable Rubles (TR) which acted as units of settlement, and transactions were governed by annual protocols with CMEA countries.32 As with most Eastern European countries (Marrese, 1986), the Soviet Union ran surpluses in its trade with Cambodia, thus acquiring TR claims.

50. The total amount of debt owed to the Soviet Union—now assumed by the Russian Federation—has never been in doubt. Btoh governments agree that as of end-2005, total outstanding debt was at US$1.52 billion, obtained by using the agreed-upon exchange rate of TR0.6 per unit of US$ on total obligations of TR914.7 million.33 Accompanying this conversion was a conventional upfront discount of 70 percent, bringing the total principal obligation to US$457 million. No interest payment or interest on late payments of this principal has been claimed by the Russian Federation.

51. Differences, however, still remain on two issues:

  • Two credits, totaling US$40 million, relate to transactions that took place in 1980—before the cut-off date of December 31, 1985—but for which claims were recorded in 1987. The Russian Federation’s position is that since they were short-term trade credits, they should be treated as post-cut-off; Cambodia, on the other hand, has stated that, as the credits were contracted before the cut-off date, they should be treated as pre-cut-off debt.

  • Treatment of post cut-off debt.34 The Russian Federation has argued that commercial terms should be applied to post-cut-off claims, while the Cambodian authorities have noted that since the original loans were incurred at zero interest rates, usual Paris Club terms may not be applicable.35

52. Recent debt restructuring agreements involving the Russian Federation point to a possible resolution to the discussions (Table 3). Recent agreements have covered a broad spectrum of concessionality, from a very high upfront discount as well as a high grant element offered to Nicaragua (a HIPC-eligible country) to a one-off payment offer accepted by Mongolia. In the Mekong delta region, Vietnam and Lao P.D.R. received have a differing mix of concessions, with the former receiving a slightly higher upfront discount but a lower grant element. Staff understands that current proposals being discussed between the Cambodian and Russian authorities are within this range, and involve varying levels of concessionality based on different grace periods and maturities being considered.

Table 3.

Comparison with Other Recent Debt Restructuring Agreements

article image
Source: Fund staff calculations.

Calculated using CIRRs at time of rescheduling.

Reflects level to which Russia had agreed to reduce Nicaragua debt. The debt was reduced to zero at HIPC completion point.

E. Other Debt

53. Other bilateral debt of Cambodia has remained minimal. Given Cambodia’s poverty, most of the assistance received from bilateral partners now is in the form of grants (or highly concessional loans). As of end-2005, other bilateral creditors (excluding the Russian Federation and the United States) constituted 5 percent of total external debt in NPV terms. Korea, Japan, and China each accounted for around 1 percent of total external obligations, about the same as the total for all Paris Club-rescheduled creditors.36

54. Fund staff estimates indicate domestic debt to be low. At end-2005, total domestic debt was estimated at US$210 million, or 3.4 percent of GDP. Of this, almost one-half is due to outstanding stock of payment orders, which has declined considerably in recent years (from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2003 to 1.5 percent at end-2005). Compensation payments to various enterprises affected by disturbances in the 2003 riots comprise less than a third of the total domestic debt. These claims, paid through offsetting tax liabilities of affected companies, are expected to decline further. The remainder are Treasury bills—which constitute barely 0.1 percent of GDP and which the authorities started buying back in 2005—and some central bank claims on the government, dating to the mid-1990s.

F. Debt and Program Modalities

55. Outstanding debt issues currently prevent consideration of a Fund-supported program by the Executive Board. Fund policy precludes financing to a member when arrears to official bilateral creditors exist. However, there are two circumstances in which arrears may be deemed not to have arisen for Fund program purposes: (i) when the Fund accepts a member’s representation of a dispute as to the validity or amount of the underlying debt obligation; and (ii) when a member is judged to have made best efforts to conclude a rescheduling agreement following a Paris Club agreed minute (where the deadline for concluding bilateral implementing agreements under the Paris Club agreed minute has passed). Judgments on “best efforts” are made on a case-by-case basis. Earlier Fund-supported programs for Cambodia were approved on the basis that Cambodia’s arrears were being addressed within the Paris Club framework.

56. Steps required in the near future to resolve the outstanding issues are clearly identified. With respect to the United States, once a bilateral agreement has been signed, further discussions would be held in the context of the Paris Club. Once understandings are reached with the Russian Federation, the Paris Club could be approached for financing assurances, which would allow a PRGF-supported program to be discussed at the Board.37 A subsequent meeting of the Paris Club would then involve the participating creditor countries—including the Russian Federation—discussing rescheduling of Cambodia’s debt.

G. Conclusions

57. Risk of debt distress faced by Cambodia depends crucially on resolution of outstanding debt issues with the Russian Federation and the United States. As discussed above, other bilateral and domestic obligations are minimal, and obligations to multilateral organizations remain manageable. Debt restructuring with the two largest creditors would reduce relevant ratios to below the indicative thresholds.

58. In the context of the 1995 Paris Club meeting, Cambodia had accepted the inheritance of debt obligations from previous regimes. Despite historical significance of incurred debt, normalization of debt relationships with two of its biggest creditors would enable Cambodia to fruitfully engage in economic relations with these counterparts. Even with the small increase in debt service payments in the medium term, resumption of debt servicing would also reduce the vulnerabilities the country faces.

Cambodia: Basic Data, 2000–05

article image
Sources: Data provided by the Cambodian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Prior to 1999, non-budgetary grant-financed investment is included in nongovernment investment.

As a percent of beginning broad money stock. Represents contributions to 12-month changes of broad money.

Excluding re-exports.

Including gold holdings.

Starting in 1997, includes $1,346 million owed to countries of the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. This amount is indicative and subject to negotiations and rescheduling.

Table 1.

Cambodia: Gross Domestic Product by Sector at Current Prices, 2000–05

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Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).
Table 2.

Cambodia: Gross Domestic Product by Sector at Constant Prices, 2000–05

article image
Source: Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).
Table 3.

Cambodia: Aggregate Demand at Current Prices, 2000–05

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Source: Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).

Including statistical discrepancy.

Fund staff estimates based on latest balance of payments estimates.

Gross national income under the 1997 System of National Accounts (SNA) corresponds to the former Gross national product (GNP) aggregate.

Defined as GDP net of final consumption.

Defined as GNDI net of final consumption. Includes net income and transfers from abroad.

Table 4.

Cambodia: Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure at Constant Prices, 2000–05 1/

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Source: Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).

Including statistical discrepancy.

Table 5.

Cambodia: Gross Value Added of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry at Constant Prices, 2000–05

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Source: Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).
Table 6.

Cambodia: Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishery Production, 2000–05

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Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (MAFF).

Harvest year for crops; tons are metric tons.

Table 7.

Cambodia: Visitor Arrivals and Tourism, 2000–05

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Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Tourism.

Arrivals at Pochentong (Phnom Penh) and Siem Reap airports.

Arrivals at Pochentong (Phnom Penh) airport only.

Arrivals by land and boat.

Including business and other purposes.

As recorded in the balance of payments.

Table 8.

Cambodia: Consumer Price Index, 2000–05 1/

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Source: Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics (NIS).

As measured by the consumer price index for Phnom Penh (Jul–Dec. 2000=100).

Table 9.

Cambodia: Central Government Operations, 2000–06 1/

(In billions of riels)

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Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Fund staff estimates.

Excludes provincial revenue and expenditure data.

Current expenditure is based on cash basis, while capital expenditure is based on accrual basis.

Table 10.

Cambodia: Central Government Operations, 2000–05 1/

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Fund staff estimates.

Excludes provincial revenue and expenditure data.

Current expenditure is based on cash basis, while capital expenditure is based on accrual basis.

Table 11.

Cambodia: Budgetary Expenditure by Ministry, 2000–05 1/

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Source: Data provided by the M inistry of Economy and Finance.

Commitment basis. Total current expenditure different from fiscal tables due to VAT refunds.

Excludes externally financed capital expenditure. Before 2004, capital expenditure reported in total only.

Includes unclassified items.

From 2000–03 no information is available about the ministerial breakdown of capital spending.

Table 12.

Cambodia: Official External Assistance to the Budget, 2000–05

(In billions of riels)

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Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Grants from 2005 onwards based on information provided by the CDC for the CG meeting.

Table 13.

Cambodia: Profile of the Commercial Bank System

(As of March 2006)

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Subsidiary of foreign banks.

Insolvent banks.

Registered Capital in Riel

Table 14.

Cambodia: Monetary Survey, 2000–05

(In billions of riels; unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: Data provided by the National Bank of Cambodia.

Ratio of nominal GDP to average stock of broad money.

Table 15.

Cambodia: Reserve Money, 2000–05

(In billions of riels; unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: Data provided by the National Bank of Cambodia.

Effective May 1994, deposits required of new commercial banks prior to their commencing operations.

Consists mainly of holdings of short-term securities issued by foreign governments.

Table 16.

Cambodia: Consolidated Balance Sheet of Deposit Money Banks, 2000–05

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Sources: Data provided by the Cambodian authorities.

Predominantly in foreign currency.

Virtually all loans to the private sector in Cambodia are denominated in foreign currencies.

Table 17.

Cambodia: Prudential Regulations

(As of end-April 2006)

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Table 18.

Cambodia: Balance of Payments, 2000–05

(In millions of U.S. dollars; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Data provided by the Cambodian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Includes estimates for unrecorded exports.

Excludes unrestricted foreign currency deposits at NBC and valuation changes.

Includes debts owed to the Russian Federation and the United States.

Table 19.

Cambodia: Merchandise Exports, 2000–05 1/

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Data provided by the authorities.

Includes estimates for unrecorded exports.

Table 20.

Cambodia: Merchandise Imports, 2000–05 1/

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Data provided by the Cambodian authorities.

Includes imports for re-exports.

Includes goods procured by resident carriers.

Table 21.

Cambodia: Investment Approvals by Sector, 2000–05

(Total fixed assets approved; in millions of US dollars)

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Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia.
Table 22.

Cambodia: Investment Approvals by Investor Country of Origin, 2000–05

(Total fixed assets approved; in millions of US dollars)

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Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia.
Table 23.

Cambodia: Foreign Debt, 2000–05

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Data provided by the Cambodian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Includes debts owed to the Russian Federation and the United States.

Table 24.

Cambodia: Previously State-Owned Enterprises Sold to the Private Sector

(As of May 2006)

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Source: Data provided by Cambodian authorities (State Property Department of MEF).
Table 25.

Cambodia: Employment by Sector of Activity, 2000–05

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Source: Data provided by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS).

Based on the results of the Labor Force Survey of Phnom Penh.

Based on the results of the Labor Force Survey of Cambodia (LFS 2001).

Based on the results of (LFS 2001, CSES 2004, extrapolation/interpolation).

Based on the results of the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES 2004).

Based on the results of (CSES 2004, extrapolation).

Summary of the Cambodian Tax System May 2006

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References

  • Chandler, David P., 2000, A History of Cambodia, 233 (Boulder: Westview Press, 3rd ed.).

  • Kornai, János, 1992, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

  • Marrese, Michael, 1986, “CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy,” in Industrial Organization, Vol. 40, No. 2, pages 287 –327.

    • Search Google Scholar
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  • Shimomura, Yasutami, et al., 1994, “Transition to Market Economies in Asia,” Economic Analysis Series No. 137 (Tokyo: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan). Available via the Internet: http://www.esri.go.jp/en/archive/bun/abstract/bun137-e.html.

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18

Prepared by Bikas Joshi (PDR).

19

Historical descriptions in this paper benefited greatly from the survey of Cambodian history by Chandler (2000).

20

After years of civil war, and after the Paris Conference of October 1991, the United Nations established a protectorate over Cambodia—United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)—which managed to hold peaceful elections in 1993.

21

This paper provides a follow-up, with historical context, to an earlier review, presented in Country Report No. 02/36 (March 1, 2002).

22

See Country Report No. 04/324 (October 22, 2004) for an ex post review of previous Fund engagement in Cambodia.

23

See Staff Assessment of Qualification under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (December 8, 2005).

24

These loans were incurred under Public Law 480 (more commonly known as P.L. 480), overseas food aid formalized in the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. See http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/FoodAid/pl480/pl480brief.html for further discussion of the program.

25

The same interest rates were also used for late (penalty) interest rates.

26

See the USAID webpage—http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/pl480ffp.html—for a description of the motivation of P.L. 480 Title II and some recent aid programs.

27

Local currency payments under P.L. 480 are normally used in the borrowing country to develop new markets for U.S. agricultural commodities on a mutually beneficial basis, to pay U.S. obligations, and support agricultural development or research. See http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/FoodAid/Title 1/pl480ofst.html.

28

No bilateral agreement has yet been signed with respect to a small outstanding obligation to Italy. Efforts are being made to agree on a repayment schedule.

29

The U.S. authorities have noted that more than $100 million would be in arrears and due immediately. This includes principal falling due since the 1995 Paris Club agreed minute was signed and the associated penalties. Such calculations are dependent on assumptions regarding the consolidation period, subject to further discussions between the two governments once a bilateral agreement is drafted.

30

Records indicate that one loan was booked in April 1963, when Norodom Sihanouk was the head of state, and one in February 1990.

31

As described by Kornai (1992), the CMEA included, in 1990, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam, with Yugoslavia as a limited participant. The arrangement was dissolved in 1991.

32

TRs were not convertible to any of the “hard” currencies as relative prices in CMEA trade sometimes differed considerably from world prices. Additionally, due to the desire to control trade relationships between countries, TRs were not transferable within the CMEA, preventing surpluses built in trade with one country to be used in trade with another country in the CMEA. See Kornai (1992, pages 355–59).

33

For two credits denominated in Pounds Sterling, the exchange rate of US$1.4993 per Pound was used.

34

There is no disagreement over the treatment of pre-cut-off date debt. In negotiations held in Phnom Penh in June 2002, both sides agreed on a payment profile, with an interest rate of 0.8129 percent and a maturity of 33 years (with no grace period).

35

Paris Club discussions provide concessional restructuring terms of pre-cut-off date claims, but post-cut-off claims are handled on a bilateral basis with the creditor, usually on commercial terms.

36

In 2006, China made a further pledge to assist Cambodia—through grants and loans—by about US$600 million.

37

The U.S. has indicated its willingness to grant financing assurances in the context of the Paris Club for a new Fund-supported program.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2006: Issue 265
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781451821826
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
68
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451821826.002
  • Figure 1.
    View in gallery
    Figure 1.

    Multilateral External Debt Outstanding, 1995–2005

    (In millions of U.S. dollars)

Figure 1.

Multilateral External Debt Outstanding, 1995–2005

(In millions of U.S. dollars)