Prepared by Philippe Egoume–Bossogo. The author thanks Mr. Gonzalo Caprirolo of the Ministry of Finance of Slovenia for providing the data and for useful discussions.
See Chapter II, “Budget Rigidity and Expenditure Efficiency in Slovenia.”
See Chapter III “Impact of Aging on Fiscal Sustainability in Slovenia.”
Low labor participation among individuals aged 15–24 may also be due to the “student status”. As it exempts employers from payroll taxes and social security contributions, it may have led to abuses and under–reporting. However, data to measure the phenomenon are not available. For a discussion about low labor participation among older individuals and incentives to retire earlier, see Chapter IV, “Retirement Incentives in the Pension System in Slovenia.”
See IMF Country Report No. 05/253, Table 8, which provides a comparison of selected benefits (amount and duration) in Slovenia and several EU–25 countries.
Most low–income earners who become unemployed would be eligible for the minimum UB or an amount close, and thus would receive a financial windfall when they exhaust the UB and qualify for UA. In this case, the METR between the minimum UB should be regarded as a marginal effective subsidy that accrue to recipients of UA.
The duration of the UB could reach 24 months for workers over 55 with insurance periods over 25 years. The UA duration could rise to 3 years if conditions for old–age pension were fulfilled during this period.