Republic of Tajikistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
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This Selected Issues paper analyzes the sources of recent growth in Tajikistan. It concludes that economic growth has been mainly driven by the services sector and a surge in remittances that have been mainly used for private consumption and small-scale private investment. The paper summarizes the recently introduced revisions to the Tax Code, which are an evolutionary step in simplifying the tax system and setting the base for better revenue administration. It also examines the likely impact on households of increasing electricity prices to cost-recovery levels.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper analyzes the sources of recent growth in Tajikistan. It concludes that economic growth has been mainly driven by the services sector and a surge in remittances that have been mainly used for private consumption and small-scale private investment. The paper summarizes the recently introduced revisions to the Tax Code, which are an evolutionary step in simplifying the tax system and setting the base for better revenue administration. It also examines the likely impact on households of increasing electricity prices to cost-recovery levels.

VII. Regional Cooperation in Trade and Investment1

A. Background

1. Tajikistan is emerging from years of economic instability and civil conflict and is reintegrating into the world and regional economy. The breakdown of economic links after the demise of the Soviet Union, civil unrest, poor governance and macroeconomic management, difficult political relations with neighbors, and overall geopolitical instability in the region—all contributed to the disruption of Tajikistan’s external economic relations in the 1990s. Exports narrowed to a few products, traditional markets were lost, and the payments system was broken. Daily household consumption had to rely to a large extent on humanitarian aid, revenues from small-scale shuttle trade, and remittances sent by a rapidly rising number of Tajik migrant workers employed outside Tajikistan.

2. The economic breakdown was aggravated by Tajikistan’s difficult geographical location. Tajikistan is a triple-locked economy: land-locked with no commercial access to sea, even by river; mountain-locked by one of the world’s highest mountain-mass—the Trans-Alay Range in the north and the Pamirs in the southeast; and distance-locked. These factors result in one of the highest export costs to international markets. Tajikistan borders four countries (Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, China, and the Kyrgyz Republic), but has only one commercially viable railroad and a few poorly maintained highways to the outside world. The longest borders are with Afghanistan, and with Uzbekistan, which is still largely a command economy.

3. Since 2000 Tajikistan has made substantial progress in reestablishing economic relations with its neighboring countries. Traditional channels of cooperation are being normalized with the countries of the former Soviet Union and new links with the partners to the south, in particular, China, Pakistan, and Iran are being established.

B. Cooperation in Trade

4. Tajikistan has been actively promoting regional cooperation by participating in regional organizations, although many of them are still at an incipient stage. In addition to CIS, Tajikistan is a member of four regional organizations:

  • The Euro-Asian Economic Community (EAEC, comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, and Tajikistan), which aims at creating a customs union by end-2006 and, eventually, a single economic space (Box 1).

  • The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), which initially focused on regional security, but has approved a program of promotion of trade and investment. Uzbekistan has floated the idea of a Central Asian Common Market.

  • The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (comprising Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), which focuses on developing consortiums for joint projects in hydroelectricity, foodstuffs, and transport.

  • The Economic Cooperation Organization (comprising Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), which seeks to develop energy infrastructure, trade, transportation, agriculture, and drug control.

External Trade by Regional Group, 2004

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Source: Goskomstat of Tajikistan.

5. Three main factors motivate Tajikistan’s participation in these regional organizations: general formal commercial operations, labor and shuttle trade, and raising Tajikistan’s international profile. First, the main purpose of Tajikistan’s involvement in regional trade initiatives is to reestablish economic linkages with enterprises in Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, which were lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, opportunities to establish links with major regional economies, such as China, Turkey, and Pakistan, reflect pre-Soviet Union trade and cultural links. Second, with the intensive migration and shuttle trading, travel linkages, in particular with Russia and China, are important channels for private import. Finally, participation in regional groups is seen as contributing to the effort to raise the international profile of Tajikistan by engaging larger countries (Russia, China, and Turkey) in frequent and meaningful policy discussions.

6. The harmonization of trade policies with other members of the EAEC is high on the list of priorities in regional integration. The Agreement on the Establishment of a Customs Union of February 17, 2000, stipulates that the formation of the customs union should be completed in five years, i.e., by February 2005. (Box 1).

7. The EAEC members undertook to coordinate their trade liberalization strategies within the regional and multilateral context. The four EAEC members acceding to the WTO (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) undertook to: (a) conduct the WTO accession negotiations individually, while developing and presenting coordinated initial offers on market access; (b) achieve a higher degree of harmonization of national tariffs with the EAEC Basic List, while enhancing its coverage from the current 6,178 to all 11,086 tariff lines; and (c) target the final rates of the common EAEC external tariff at levels below the final tariff rates bound in the WTO, while ensuring adequate protection of the priority sectors of each EAEC member.

8. The harmonization process resulted in some increase in Tajikistan’s external customs tariff. The simple average tariff has increased from 5 to 7.7 percent. The authorities justify the increased level of protection based on three factors: (i) the previous uniform tariff of 5 percent was a temporary measure introduced in 2002 for a year to allow for a smooth transition from an old—and considerably more restrictive tariff system—to a new, less restrictive system; (ii) the need to harmonize Tajikistan’s tariff with that of other members of the EAEC, in accordance with the commitments undertaken under the Agreement on the Establishment of a Customs Union of February 17, 2000, and its basic Harmonized System-based nomenclature; and (iii) the intention to preserve some leverage on tariff reduction in the upcoming negotiations on the WTO accession.

The Euro-Asian Economic Community Harmonization Techniques

Harmonization procedures in the EAEC depend on the starting conditions and types of commodities. The basis for harmonization is the Basic List of Common External Tariffs. The list was approved by the EAEC Council in September 2003 and represents an HS-based list of commodities for which tariff rates in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia are identical. The Basic List covers only 6,178 tariff lines, out of 11,086 in the harmonized system. In addition to the Basic List, EAEC members compile other lists:

  • A list of commodities for which differences in tariff rates among the EAEC members is less than 5 percent. There are 262 lines in this list (4.2 percent of the total). EAEC members intend to engage in bilateral negotiations with the view to harmonizing the tariffs.

  • A list of commodities for which differences in tariff rates among the EAEC members is over 5 percent. There are 1,537 lines on this list (25 percent of the total).

  • A list of sensitive commodities identified by each member, which would be exempt from common external tariff rates.

During the transition period before the customs union is completed, each member is allowed to exempt up to 15 percent of its trade in sensitive commodities from the commonly agreed tariffs. Tajikistan is allowed to exempt up to 25 percent in value terms but only alumina. The shares and values are reassessed every year.

9. Tajikistan is coordinating the EAEC harmonization with its WTO accession, which is at a negotiating stage. The first meeting of the working party on accession took place in March 2004; the second is scheduled for early 2005. Key issues discussed included: the level of tariff protection for the industrial goods; the maximum level of subsidies in agriculture; and the protection of intellectual property. The Tajik authorities intend to coordinate initial offers on market access with the corresponding offers by the Russian Federation and to bind their tariffs in the WTO at rates above their currently applied rates. This would allow the Tajik authorities to increase their applied rates in case of a need without violating their WTO commitments.

C. Attracting Foreign Investment

10. Mobilizing foreign investment for projects of national importance is high on the list of the government’s priorities. Tajikistan is well endowed in rich mineral deposits (gold and other non-ferrous metals, coal, and salt) and water, a scarce resource in the region. Water is an important factor in Tajikistan’s specialization in cotton cultivation and hydropower generation, the latter, in turn, being the basis for aluminum smelting. The government’s investment strategy emphasizes the need for attracting foreign investment in key sectors of comparative advantage, which would help increase employment and productivity, raise exports, and contribute to budget revenue and poverty reduction.

11. Aluminum and energy sectors are the main focus of foreign investment. In October 2004, Tajikistan signed a seven-year $1.6 billion (76 percent of GDP) investment package with Russian interests, which at this point should be considered as an expression of interest (most of this financing is still to be raised). It includes the commitment of the Russian Aluminum holding company to invest in the Rogun hydro power station ($560 million) in 2005–2009, the reconstruction of the TadAZ aluminum smelter ($160 million), and the construction of two new aluminum plants ($600 million) in 2010—2013. The completion of the power stations will help Tajikistan solve protracted pProblems of electricity shortages, enhance aluminum production, and start commercial exports of electricity. These agreements are still preliminary and considerably more details about the projects and their export potential will need to be discussed before the investment could materialize.

12. The agreements on two Sangtuda hydro power stations are closer to the finalization stage, although the modalities of the projects still remain uncertain. RAO EEC has committed to invest $200 million in Sangtuda I during 2005-2009, which will complement a $50 million investment by the Tajik government on behalf of Russia as part of the debt regularization agreement concluded in October 2004. Iran will invest in the construction of the Sangtuda II power station, which will export to Iran and Pakistan.

13. Transport infrastructure is also an important area of regional investment projects. A number of major infrastructure projects are in different phases of development: roads from Dushanbe through the Anzob tunnel to Khujand (estimated cost of $360 million); from Dushanbe to the Chinese border ($290 million); and from Dushanbe to the Kyrgyz Republic ($110 million); as well as roads to the Afghan border and bridges over the Pianj river. Iran is providing co-financing in the form of a $25 million loan and a $10 million grant for the construction of the Anzob tunnel, the project of major economic significance for Tajikistan. The tunnel is viewed as a major economic link for the central and northern parts of Tajikistan, and for Iran, to Kazakhstan and Russia. China provides partial financing for upgrading the road to the Chinese border, which will give Tajikistan access also to Pakistan and India. The United States, together with Norway, will finance the construction of a new transport bridge to Afghanistan. The rehabilitation of roads, in particular to the Kyrgyz Republic, is viewed as an important commercial bypass of Uzbekistan (see Box 2 on roblems related to transit through Uzbekistan).

D. Conclusions

14. Tajikistan has taken substantial steps towards reestablishing regional linkages. Cooperation in the areas of investment and trade has contributed to economic growth, the cementing of political relations with neighbors, and the easing of social tensions. Regional cooperation has helped raise Tajikistan’s profile in the world by promoting private sector development, learning from the experience of others, and facilitating the transition to a market economy. However, the cumbersome transit through Uzbekistan and numerous procedural requirements in Russia and other EAEC countries still need to be addressed on a bilateral and regional basis.

The Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Nexus

Difficult relations with Uzbekistan remain the main bottleneck for Tajik exports. All commercially viable export routes—the only railroad and a few highways—go through Uzbekistan. During the winter closure of the Anzob Pass, Tajik traders have to transit through Uzbek territory even for domestic trade between the south and the north of the country. Because of delays at the border, harassment of traders and bribes, Tajikistan cannot take full advantage of its export potential, especially in agriculture, and incurs substantial export losses, as the cost of delivering perishable produce to the traditional markets in Russia becomes prohibitive.

Part of the problem is due to inefficiencies in Tajikistan. Poor transportation grid, corruption, and cumbersome customs top the list of impediments. As an illustration, a study commissioned by the World Bank found that in Tajikistan there is one security control post every 20-kilometer segment of all major roads leading to foreign markets, with an average bribe required of $3 for clearance. The total bribes required for one commercial ride from Dushanbe to the Uzbek border is about $50 per truck, similar to the estimated monthly wage in the private sector in Tajikistan. By presidential decree of February 4, 2005, the number of traffic police will be cut by 50 percent.

But the transit crossing of Uzbekistan is much more problematic. The World Bank estimates that non-transport related transaction costs are around $50 per ton for the domestic route but can amount up to $200 per ton for the route via Uzbekistan. The difference of $150 per ton can be loosely interpreted as a cost estimate for the bureaucratic hassle and corruption involved in border crossing and transit through Uzbekistan. There are at least eight types of official fees to be paid for transit through Uzbekistan, which may amount to $500 per truck. Official and unofficial transit and border crossing payments in Uzbekistan constitute more than 30 percent of the total road transportation costs from Dushanbe to Moscow. Under the Uzbek regulations, each cargo crossing the Tajik-Uzbek border has to be unloaded on the Tajik side and reloaded on vehicles with Uzbek licence plates. Passengers are required to leave their vehicles in Tajikistan, cross the border on foot, and use Uzbek vehicles in Uzbekistan.

References

  • Lev Freinkman, Evgeny Polyakov, Carolina Revenco, Trade Performance and Regional Integration of the CIS Countries, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004 World Bank Working Paper, No. 38.

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  • World Bank. Tajikistan Trade Study, 2005, mimeo.

ANNEX Tajikistan: Evolution of the Trade Regime

Tajikistan’s trade regime remains liberal. New customs tariffs have been applied starting on November 1, 2003. All imports from members of the Euro-Asian Economic Community, excluding alumina, are exempt from import duties. The tariff on imported alumina was increased from 2 to 5 percent in November 2003. In addition to import duties, new specific excise taxes were approved on March 31, 2003, and are levied on imports of alcohol (HS 22), tobacco (HS 24), and oil products (HS 27). Other explicit trade restrictions include the licensing of trade in alcohol and tobacco, and other goods restricted for health, security, moral, and cultural reasons. Tajikistan has no export tariff.

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Prepared by Alexei Kireyev.

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