Isham, J., M. Woolcock, L. Pritchett, and G. Busby, 2003, “The Varieties of Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth,” mimeo (Harvard University, Middlebury College, and World Bank).
Katz, M., U. Bartsch, H. Malothra, and M. Cuc, 2004, “Lifting the Oil Curse. Improving Petroleum Revenue Management in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Washington: International Monetary Fund)
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, 2003, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002” (Washington: World Bank).
Kuralbayeva, K. and Michael L. Wyzan, 2001, “Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease?” Center for European Integration Studies, Working Paper B01-29.
Petrie, M., 2003, “Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The Complementary Roles of the IMF, Financial Markets, and Civil Society, IMF Working Paper 03/199 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
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Transparency International: Annual Reports, Berlin
Prepared by Katrin Elborgh-Woytek.
Secondary negative effects of corruption on growth are discussed by Isham et al. (2003) who find that the negative impact on institutional quality results in a systematic and robust negative impact on growth. Leite and Weidmann (1999) also emphasize the importance of the corruption channel as an explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich economies. The negative effect of corruption on growth was found to be more pronounced in less developed economies, where institution building, i.e. improvements in monitoring capacity, was crucial but lacking.
The authors are critical of the argument for withholding information about resource availability on the presumption that inappropriate spending pressures would build up in case parliament and the general public had access to full information.
Kazakhstan subscribes to the SDDS and publishes its Staff Reports and PINs, and there are no constraints on discussing data or specific issues in Board reports. Unlike in neighboring Azerbaijan, contracts related to oil production in Kazakhstan are neither published nor approved by parliament.
A soft budget constraint may weaken accountability, create moral hazard, and eventually threaten macroeconomic stability by creating contingent liabilities for the central government, which it may find hard not to pay.
Since this conference, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and Nigeria have volunteered to become pilot cases for the initiative, while some other countries had indicated strong interest.
While the number of NGOs in Kazakhstan is sizable, also comprising organizations and research institutes with a focus on economic developments, NGO activities remain constrained by bureaucratic regulations and direct government control (Ruffin and Waugh 1999).
As was revealed by the then Prime Minister of Kazakhstan in March 2002, about $1 billion in receipts from the sale of shares in the Tengiz oil field bypassed the budget in the second half of the 1990s and were hidden from parliament in an offshore account. A group of Kazakhstani parliamentary deputies recently authored a draft law, still to be considered, aiming at requiring the government to reveal the details of subsurface use contracts signed between the government and oil companies.
In his speech in Almaty in November 2003, the then Managing Director of the IMF encouraged all resource-rich countries in the region to become active participants.
On April 20, 2004, Sarybay Kalmurzaev, former chief of the presidential administration, was named Chairman of the Agency.