This Selected Issues paper takes stock of the progress made in meeting the objectives under Indonesia’s Extended Arrangements (1998–2003) program. The paper addresses progress in achieving the programs’ core macroeconomic objectives, with an emphasis on how Indonesia’s economic recovery compares with those of the other major Asian “crisis” countries. A major conclusion of the paper is that, while significant progress has been made against many of the key objectives of the arrangements, Indonesia’s overall economic performance has lagged behind others in the region.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper takes stock of the progress made in meeting the objectives under Indonesia’s Extended Arrangements (1998–2003) program. The paper addresses progress in achieving the programs’ core macroeconomic objectives, with an emphasis on how Indonesia’s economic recovery compares with those of the other major Asian “crisis” countries. A major conclusion of the paper is that, while significant progress has been made against many of the key objectives of the arrangements, Indonesia’s overall economic performance has lagged behind others in the region.

I. Indonesia’s Recovery1

A. Introduction

1. This Selected Issues paper takes stock of the progress made in meeting the objectives under Indonesia’s Extended Arrangements (1998-2003). This chapter addresses progress in achieving the programs’ core macroeconomic objectives, with an emphasis on how Indonesia’s economic recovery compares to those of the other major Asian “crisis” countries. 2

2. A major theme of this and the following chapters is that, while significant progress has been made against many of the key objectives of the arrangements, Indonesia’s overall economic performance has lagged behind others in the region. On the macro front, inflation has fallen to around 5 percent and the exchange rate has stabilized; the external position has improved with a significant build up in gross reserves; and public debt levels have fallen. Moreover, as described in the following chapters, considerable progress has been made in restoring the corporate and banking sectors to health, although fragilities remain. Against these achievements, however, Indonesia’s economic growth remains lower than others in the region. Going forward, the main challenge for the authorities is to place the economy on a higher growth path in order to achieve sustained reductions in poverty and unemployment.

B. Background

3. The fallout of the Asian financial crisis was the most severe in Indonesia of all the major countries affected. The economic impact was exacerbated by political and social upheaval. Real GDP contracted by 13 percent in 1998 (compared to 10½ percent in Thailand, the next largest decline), and by July 1998 the rupiah had depreciated by about 80 percent from the previous year and inflation had accelerated to about 70 percent per annum (Figure I.1). The banking system came under severe stress as many corporate borrowers defaulted on loans, and a general loss of confidence in the banking system resulted in several bank runs.

Figure I.1.
Figure I.1.

Consumer Price Inflation and Exchange Rate,(1996-1998)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

4. Facing a significant depletion of reserves and loss of investor confidence, the authorities turned to the international community for official financial support. Initial support from the IMF took the form of a Stand-By Arrangement in November 1997, followed by two Extended Arrangements (EFF) beginning in August 1998, as it became clear that more deep-seated structural weaknesses needed to be addressed (Box I.1).

5. The Extended Arrangements aimed to restore macroeconomic stability and external viability, and lay the foundations for a durable economic recovery. The principal objectives were to:

  • Restore price and exchange rate stability. Inflation was targeted to fall to single digits by 2000, by reining in rampant monetary growth associated with the emergency liquidity support extended to distressed banks by Bank Indonesia;

  • Restore external viability. Reserves were targeted to increase to $30 billion or over

    100 percent of short-term debt by 2002, through a drawdown of exceptional financing and by stemming capital outflows;

  • Restore fiscal sustainability. Public debt to GDP was targeted to fall to 65 percent of GDP by 2004, through an adjustment in the primary surplus, facilitated by an expected gradual decline in interest rates and appreciation of the exchange rate;

  • Restructure and revitalize the financial and corporate sectors. This was to be achieved by facilitating debt restructuring and providing public support to the banking system;

  • Restore economic growth. GDP growth was projected to rise to 5–6 percent by 2002, underpinned by a pick up in private investment and exports.

C. Progress Under the Extended Arrangements

Restoring Price and Exchange Rate Stability

6. Indonesia’s slow progress in restoring macroeconomic stability on a sustained basis contrasts with that of the other Asian crisis countries (Figures I.2. and I.3.). The peak in inflation and extent of exchange rate depreciation was much larger in Indonesia. In part, this reflected the political turmoil and weak economic policy implementation in the immediate post-crisis period. More generally, progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over time has been relatively uneven, unlike the other crisis countries which were able to maintain macroeconomic stability once it had been restored.

Figure I.2.
Figure I.2.

Inflation

(12-month percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

Figure I.3.
Figure I.3.

Exchange Rate

(January 1998=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

Brief Overview of the Fund Supported Programs

On November 5, 1997 a three-year Stand-By-Arrangement was approved by the Executive Board of the IMF, equivalent to US$10 billion (SDR 7.34 billion or 490 percent of quota). As well as restoring confidence, the objectives of the arrangement were to limit the depreciation in the exchange rate by maintaining a moderately tight monetary policy, supplemented by limited foreign exchange intervention if needed. At that stage, output growth was still expected to be positive, enough to accommodate a restrictive monetary stance to support the currency. The arrangement included measures to address problem banks, although it did not at that stage include a comprehensive bank restructuring plan. Other structural measures were designed to improve efficiency and transparency of the corporate sector.

Major slippages in policy implementation and political developments meant that the crisis deepened soon after the Stand-By-Arrangement was agreed. For example, backtracking on the closure of some banks connected to the President damaged the credibility of the Fund-supported program and did little to restore confidence in the banking system. The turbulent political background, which culminated in the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 added to the confluence of factors that created deep uncertainty and undermined confidence.

Against a background of deep crisis, on 25 August 1998, the IMF Executive Board approved the authorities request to replace the Stand-By-Arrangement with an Extended Fund Facility equivalent to US$6.2 billion (SDR 4.7 billion) through November 2000. Replacing the Stand-By Arrangement with an Extended Fund Facility reflected a realization that wide-ranging and deep-seated structural reform was needed to restore Indonesia to a path of sustained economic recovery and to close the financing gap for the balance of payments.

In early 2000, the authorities requested that the 1998 Extended Arrangement be replaced with a new extended arrangement to support the government’s new economic program developed in conjunction with the new and first democratically elected Parliament. The request was approved by the IMF Executive Board on February 4, 2000. This program envisaged continuity in monetary and exchange rate policies that were designed to deliver low inflation, a strengthened rupiah, and allow for declining interest rates, once risk premia declined in line with rising confidence. The fiscal deficit accommodated some room for supporting the recovery whilst also beginning the process of fiscal consolidation.

At the core of the Extended Arrangement were a set of structural reforms that included banking sector reform, corporate restructuring, deregulation of monopolies, the privatization of stateowned enterprises, and improved governance designed to support the macroeconomic objectives. The comprehensive strategy in the banking sector was to provide fresh capital to sound banks and merge or close weak banks while maintaining the comprehensive deposit guarantee. The state banks were to be restructured and recapitalized. Objectives for the corporate sector included setting up an effective bankruptcy system, including a framework for financial restructuring of the viable corporate entities. Several key state-owned enterprises were to be privatized and audits of key enterprises were to be undertaken to determine their financial health.

7. Beginning in mid-1998, Indonesia made encouraging progress in restoring macroeconomic stability. The government launched a stabilization program that was anchored by an aggressive tightening of the monetary stance. With the help of two new monetary instruments—weekly auctions of central bank SBI securities and direct intervention in the overnight interbank market—Bank Indonesia started to take firm action to regain monetary control. Base money and net domestic assets were held unchanged in nominal terms and Bank Indonesia intervened aggressively in the interbank market driving short term interest rates up to over 70 percent (Figure I.4).

Figure I.4.
Figure I.4.

Inflation and Interest Rates, 1998-2000

(In percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

8. By mid-1999 macroeconomic stability was beginning to take hold. With the restoration of political stability and positive progress under the extended arrangement market sentiment improved significantly, with the exchange rate appreciating from close to Rp 12,000 per dollar in mid 1998 to around Rp 7,000 per dollar by mid 1999. Inflation also declined sharply, aided by improved supplies of key commodities such as rice and cooking oil, falling to low single digits by the end of that year. With inflation subdued, interest rates were brought down progressively, falling to around 12 percent by early 2000.

9. However, the early gains in macroeconomic stability began to unravel in 2000 and 2001 (Figure I.5). Slippages in reforms and an increasingly uncertain political climate—culminating ultimately in the impeachment of President Wahid in mid 2001—raised risk premia and contributed to renewed downward pressure on the rupiah, which fell to Rp 12,000 per dollar by early 2001. Partly as a result, domestic price pressures remerged, with inflation rising steadily throughout 2000 and back into double digits in 2001. Bank Indonesia was initially slow to respond to the emerging inflation threat, reflecting partly concerns about the effects of higher interest rates on economic activity, the banking system, and the budget. Its ability to raise interest rates during this period was also constrained by pressures to change the central bank law and remove its senior management.

Figure I.5.
Figure I.5.

Consumer Price Inflation and Exchange Rate

(2000-2002)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

10. Bank Indonesia started to tighten monetary conditions more aggressively in mid-2001 (Figure I.6). This partly reflected further moves by Bank Indonesia to raise its key policy interest rates to over 15 percent by end-2001. In addition, the improvement in market sentiment as the new government started to implement economic reforms contributed to a marked recovery in the rupiah. Since mid-2002, the rupiah has traded below Rp 9,000 per dollar.

Figure I.6.
Figure I.6.

Interest Rates and Monetary Condition Index

(In percent per annum)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

11. Macroeconomic stability has since been restored. Having peaked at around 15 percent in early 2002, inflation has fallen steadily, declining to around 5 percent by early 2004. The decline in inflation has, in turn, allowed Bank Indonesia to progressively adopt a more accommodative monetary stance, and policy interest rates have accordingly been brought down steadily to a current level of around 7 percent. More generally, the authorities have been successful in re-establishing the virtuous circle that had existed in 1998-2000, in which strengthened policies bolstered confidence in the rupiah, providing stable financial conditions that have enabled monetary policy to become more supportive of economic activity.

Restoring External Viability

12. Indonesia, like the other Asian crisis countries, experienced a massive capital outflow during the crisis. Foreign reserves fell sharply as national central banks intervened to try to support their currencies, and indicators of external vulnerability deteriorated sharply (Figure I.7). The sharp increase in external vulnerability occurred despite a substantial turnaround in the current account balances of the crisis economies in the aftermath of the crisis, as a result of the collapse in output and import demand (Figure I.8).

Figure I.7.
Figure I.7.

Reserves

(In percent of external debt)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

Figure I.8.
Figure I.8.

Current Account Balance

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

13. The strategy to restore external viability hinged largely on reversing the capital outflows that had been precipitated by the crisis. The immediate aim was to raise external reserves from their post crisis low of around $11 billion to around $30 billion by the end of the extended arrangement. The objective was to provide sufficient reserves to cover at least 100 percent of short-term debt or around 5–6 months of imports. The expectation was that, with strengthened economic policies under the extended arrangements, private capital flows would reverse sufficiently and, with the aid of exceptional financing from the Fund and external creditors, 3 there would be sufficient easing of the external financing constraint to enable a rebound in imports and a progressive narrowing of the external current account surplus.

14. In the event, the improvement in Indonesia’s external position exceeded expectations (Table I.1). The accumulation of net foreign assets routinely exceeded program targets, often by significant margins, and by the end of the second extended arrangement in 2003, external reserves had risen to $36 billion, sufficient to cover over 150 percent of short-term debt and over 7 months of imports.

Table I.1.

Balance of Payments

Performance Against Program Targets

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

article image
Sources: Data from the Indonesian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

15. The composition of the adjustment in the external accounts has, however, differed significantly from the original program design. In particular, the reversal in capital flows has been much slower than expected, with significant net private capital outflows persisting throughout the arrangements. In contrast, the surpluses on the external current account have proved to be stronger and longer-lasting than expected. This has reflected in part the impact of higher-than-expected oil prices. Unfortunately, however, with the growth in non-oil exports generally lagging expectations, the strength of the external current account surpluses has to a large extent reflected a much smaller rebound in imports, consistent with a weaker recovery in economic activity.

Restoring Fiscal Sustainability

16. Indonesia’s public debt burden rose far more sharply than in the other Asian crisis countries (Figure I.9). At its peak in 2000, total government debt had risen to over 100 percent of GDP from a pre-crisis level of 25 percent of GDP. The sharp increase in public debt did not reflect the impact of expansionary fiscal policies. Indeed, Indonesia had a long history of prudent fiscal management, anchored by a balanced budget rule which had kept public debt at low levels. Rather, the increase in debt reflected the following combination of factors:

Figure I.9.
Figure I.9.

Central Government Debt

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

  • Recapitalization of the banking system. Most of the increase in public debt resulted from the issuance of bonds to finance the costs of bank restructuring. About Rp 650 trillion in recapitalization bonds were issued, raising domestic debt to over 50 percent of GDP (from zero prior to the crisis).

  • Depreciation of the rupiah. External debt roughly doubled as a percent of GDP, largely reflecting the impact of the depreciation of the rupiah. In U.S. dollar terms, the increase was relatively modest.

17. The crisis more generally imposed a heavy burden on Indonesia’s public finances. The increase in public debt resulted in a large increase in interest costs, which rose from less than 10 percent of government revenues, to over 30 percent by 2001. The budget also absorbed additional costs associated with the provision of subsidies to lessen the social impact of the crisis. The fiscal decentralization process, launched in 2001, added to the burden on the central government budget: despite the original intention that decentralization should be fiscally neutral, the subnational governments received a net transfer of resources of about 1½ percent of GDP in 2001.

18. The primary fiscal objective under the program was to restore Indonesia’s public debt to a more sustainable footing. Specifically, the program aimed to reduce the government debt to GDP ratio to around 65 percent by 2004. The strategy for achieving the objective rested on fiscal consolidation and the mobilization of resources through IBRA asset recoveries and privatization to reduce the debt burden. The achievement of sustainable debt dynamics also hinged on maintaining a favorable macroeconomic environment, in particular a stable rupiah.

19. By the end of the extended arrangement, significant progress had been made against the program’s main fiscal objectives (Table I.2). By 2004 public debt had fallen to a little above 65 percent of GDP, although the decline reflected in large part the impact of the appreciation of the rupiah, and to a lesser extent the success in mobilizing resources from IBRA asset sales and privatization. Significant progress was made in advancing fiscal consolidation, although performance on the primary balance and the overall deficit fell somewhat short of the original program targets. Progress was also made in mobilizing nonoil revenues and reducing ill-targeted subsidies, although, with oil revenues projected to decline over the medium-term, further effort in both these areas will be critical to sustaining the gains made in placing the budget on a sound footing.

Table I.2.

Fiscal Sustainability, 1999-2004

Performance Compared with Original Program Targets

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Data from the Indonesian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Restoring the Financial Sector to Health

20. The banking strategy is described in chapter II. The main objectives of the strategy were to recapitalize and restructure the banks, and to reform the financial architecture to address pre-crisis weaknesses. As part of the strategy, a blanket guarantee on bank liabilities was adopted, and the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was established. 4

21. Good progress has been made in reforming the banking system over the period of the extended arrangements. The financial condition of the banking system has improved markedly, with NPL ratios down sharply and indicators of profitability rising (Figure I.10). After a slow start, most of the banks taken over by IBRA have been returned to private ownership (the last remaining IBRA bank is scheduled for divestment later in 2004). There have also been significant advances in reforming the financial sector safety net, with the preparation of deposit insurance legislation and the development of a lender of last resort facility at Bank Indonesia. With the key elements soon to be in place, a gradual phase out of the blanket guarantee can commence.

Figure I.10.
Figure I.10.

Nonperforming Loans and Bank Profits

(Top 15 domestic banks, in percent of loans)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

22. Despite these advances, financial sector restructuring remains incomplete. The state bank sector remains a particular source of vulnerability. While state bank financial indicators have improved, asset quality and capital remain weaker than at private banks, and state banks continue to suffer from poor governance. Initial minority stakes have been sold in the state banks, but further steps are needed to increase private sector participation and improve state bank operations.

Corporate Sector Revitalization

23. The economic crisis decimated the corporate sector. As in other Asian economies, the Indonesian corporate sector was marked by relatively high debt ratios and weak liquidity. Indonesian corporations had rapidly increased their foreign currency borrowing prior to the crisis, with the external debt of private Indonesian companies rising from $34 billion in early 1996 to over $60 billion in early 1998. The collapse of the rupiah severely affected corporate balance sheets, and by 1999, the majority of corporate debts had become distressed.

24. Initial efforts to revitalize the corporate sector focused on promoting effective restructuring. IBRA would take the lead in restructuring onshore debts which it had acquired as part of the bank recapitalization strategy. For external debts, the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF) was established to mediate out-of-court restructuring agreements between Indonesian corporations and foreign creditors. 5

25. In the event, progress in corporate restructuring was very slow. IBRA made slow progress in restructuring its portfolio, and by early 2002 had shifted the emphasis to selling unrestructured loans. Initial restructurings under JITF were also very slow, as the agency was unable to compel debtors to participate in negotiations, and creditors were unable to press their claims through the court system. Over time, as the agency’s role was strengthened (notably through its ability to report uncooperative debtors to a high-level ministerial committee) and creditor expectations were lowered, the pace of restructurings increased. By the end of its mandate at end-2003, JITF had completed restructurings of over $20 billion in debt and had helped mediate cases involving an additional $9 billion dollars in debt. More generally, market-based restructurings have advanced, as secondary market activity has increased (driven in part by debtors repurchasing their debts at steep discounts).

26. Available indicators suggest that the health of the corporate sector has improved in recent years. For listed companies with positive equity, debt burdens have declined, with the average debt-equity ratios in 2002 having returned to pre-crisis levels, broadly in line with the experience of other Asian economies (Figure I.11). 6 Access to domestic and foreign debt markets has increased sharply for the top corporations in recent years (Figure I.12).

Figure I.11.
Figure I.11.

Debt/Equity Ratios

(Positive equity firms only)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

Source: Worldscope and Fund staff estimates.
Figure I.12.
Figure I.12.

Bond Issues by Indonesian Corporations

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

Source: BEL and Fund staff estimates.

Elevating Growth

27. It was originally hoped that restoring macroeconomic stability and addressing key structural weaknesses would help bring about an early economic recovery. Revitalizing the corporate and banking sectors and improved governance of key public institutions were seen as key to restoring growth to its potential. The program consequently aimed to restore economic growth to around 5–6 percent on a sustained basis. It was expected that the recovery would be driven initially by private consumption and restocking, but that over time, as reforms took hold, the recovery would broaden with investment and exports starting to make a significant contribution.

28. To date less progress has been made on this front than with the other macroeconomic objectives under the program. Despite a promising beginning, when the economy initially rebounded by 4.8 percent in 2000 above the 3-4 range assumed under the program, the recovery has since been modest. Economic growth has averaged only 3-4 percent since 1999. This is significantly below the growth levels needed for a sustained reduction in poverty and to absorb new entrants into the labor market.

29. The recovery in economic activity has also lagged behind the other the other countries hit by the 1997/98 economic crisis. Not only did Indonesia suffered a deeper downturn in GDP than other Asian countries affected by the crisis, the subsequent recovery has been significantly slower (Figure I.13). Moreover, in contrast to expectations growth has been narrowly based, driven largely by private consumption, with investment and exports remaining weak. From the supply side, production across all industrial sectors and the service sector has been much weaker since the crisis—for example, from 1998 to 2003 manufacturing grew by an average of only 1.5 percent, compared to 12.8 percent over the period 1994-96.

Figure I.13.
Figure I.13.

Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted

(1997 Q1=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2004, 189; 10.5089/9781451818314.002.A001

30. Chapters V and VI explore in greater depth some of the key factors behind Indonesia’s relatively slow economic recovery. However, the dominant feature of the economic recovery to date has been the weak investment and export performance compared to other Asian economies (Table I.3). While there is no single factor behind the weak investment and export performance, the analysis suggests that the following principal factors:

Table I.3.

Components of Real GDP in 2003

(Index; 1998=100)

article image
Source: CEIC.
  • Investment climate. One important impediment to growth has been the weak investment climate, arising from continued structural weaknesses in taxation and regulation, labor relations, and the legal system. Many of these weaknesses existed prior to the crisis, when the growth performance was much stronger. However the absence of strong institutions needed for the efficient functioning of a market economy was becoming evident even then. The crisis has heightened market scrutiny of these structural weaknesses.

  • Foreign direct investment. The impact of weaknesses in the investment climate has been particularly evident in foreign direct investment, which has collapsed since the crisis. The sharp decline in foreign direct investment to export sectors has been one of the principal factors behind Indonesia’s relatively poor export performance.

  • Cost competitiveness. Recent trends in unit labor costs suggest that much of the improvement in competitiveness in the immediate post-crisis period has been eroded in the last couple of years, by rising formal sector wages and the appreciation of the rupiah. While the rise in unit labor costs is not currently considered a binding constraint on either investment or exports—labor costs have risen from a very low level—cost competitiveness could become a strong deterrent to manufacturing exports in particular if recent trends are sustained.

D. Conclusion

31. The authorities in Indonesia have made significant progress toward the macrocritical goals of the extended arrangements. Significant progress has been made in restoring macroeconomic stability, and the authorities have demonstrated that when firm policy action is taken, including in the area of structural reform, that the gains are robust to shocks. The fiscal position has improved significantly and the external position is now much stronger than at the time of the crisis, and continued progress in these areas should mean that vulnerability to future shocks is reduced.

32. Nonetheless, important challenges remain, most notably to elevate growth through higher levels of productive investment and exports. The government’s economic program for the post-program period, as outlined in its White Paper issued in September 2003, recognizes that this is now the main economic priority. In addition to maintaining macroeconomic stability and continuing the restructuring of the financial sector, the focus is on creating a conducive business climate by addressing key structural weakness in taxation and regulation, labor market rigidities, and a weak and inefficient legal system.

References

  • Ghosh, Atish, Timothy Lane, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, Ales Bulir, Javier Hamman, and Alex Mourmouras, 2002, IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crisis, IMF Occasional Paper 210 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

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  • Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), 2003, IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

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  • World Bank, 2002, Indonesia Maintaining Stability, Deepening Reforms, World Bank Brief for the Consultative Group on Indonesia (Washington: World Bank Group).

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1

Prepared by Ashok Bhundia.

2

Events in the early stages of Indonesia’s crisis (July 1997 to July 1998) have been covered extensively in other papers; see IEO (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002).

3

Indonesia signed three agreements with Paris Club creditors—in 1998, 2000, and 2002—to reschedule debt service falling due to external official creditors. Under the agreements, relief was provided on debt service of about $3 billion per year between 2000 and 2003. Obligations to commercial banks amounting to some $6.4 billion were also rescheduled under the First and Second Exchange Offers, which exchanged bank credits for securities guaranteed by the government.

4

Chapter III assesses IBRA’s performance.

5

In addition, the Indonesia Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) was established to provide foreign exchange guarantees for domestic corporations that had reached restructuring agreements with creditors. INDRA lapsed in 2000, with only one firm making use of the facility.

6

This overstates the improvement in corporate health, as over 10 percent of Indonesian listed companies reported negative equity in 2002.

Indonesia: Selected Issues
Author: International Monetary Fund