Equatorial Guinea
Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix

This study discusses a number of policy options that could help transform Equatorial Guinea’s oil wealth into sustainable improvements in living conditions. The development of Equatorial Guinea’s non-oil sector over the coming years will be essential for long-term economic growth and sustainable poverty reduction. Statistical data of GDP by sector, production of principal export commodities, timber, public investment program, consumer price index, consumer price inflation, fiscal indicators, revenue and expenditure of the central government, monetary survey, balance of payments, petroleum sector accounts, and so on were also presented.


This study discusses a number of policy options that could help transform Equatorial Guinea’s oil wealth into sustainable improvements in living conditions. The development of Equatorial Guinea’s non-oil sector over the coming years will be essential for long-term economic growth and sustainable poverty reduction. Statistical data of GDP by sector, production of principal export commodities, timber, public investment program, consumer price index, consumer price inflation, fiscal indicators, revenue and expenditure of the central government, monetary survey, balance of payments, petroleum sector accounts, and so on were also presented.

I. Recent Economic Developments

1. The strong expansion of oil output during 1998-2002 dominated economic developments in all areas of Equatorial Guinea’s economy. It led to rapid growth of GDP, including in some parts of the non-oil sector; generated large increases in fiscal revenue, which gave rise to considerable fiscal surpluses in spite of growing fiscal outlays; and, following several years of surging imports of investment goods financed by foreign direct investment, allowed a remarkable improvement in the external current account and a quick accumulation of foreign reserves. However, the oil boom also created a number of difficulties. Most important, the spending of public and private income from oil exceeded the non-oil sector’s limited absorption capacity and led to considerable inflation and a marked appreciation of the real exchange rate. Strong rates of money growth, fueled in part by an increase in government deposits in domestic commercial banks, have reinforced these trends. Traditional non-oil activities, such as agriculture, suffered most from these developments. The resulting migration of rural labor to urban centers, in part attracted by job opportunities in sectors catering to oil activities, tended to exacerbate living conditions. Improvements in social conditions, as expected from rapidly expanding public spending programs, materialized only in part, owing to difficulties in policy design and implementation.

2. First, the oil boom led to rapid real GDP growth. However, inflation also rose and parts of the non-oil sector suffered. Oil production rose from roughly 60,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1997 to about 250,000 bpd in 2002. Reflecting this development, real GDP growth averaged 24 percent per year during 1998-2002, while non-oil activity expanded by an average 13 percent per year on account of strong growth in services to the oil sector and public spending-fueled construction activity.1 By contrast, growth in agriculture, logging, fishing, and manufacturing was sluggish, reflecting a loss of competitiveness and the enforcement of sustainable limits on logging (Statistical Appendix Tables 1, 2, 3). Annual consumer price inflation rose from 6 percent in 1998 to 8 percent in 2002, exceeding the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC’s) regional target of 3 percent (Statistical Appendix Table 10).2 These price pressures and the appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar led to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of 21 percent between end-1997 and end-2002 (Statistical Appendix Table 30).3

3. Second, the oil boom generated rapid budgetary revenue growth. As a result, the Fiscal position improved despite strong spending growth. Revenue increased by an average rate of 50 percent per year during 1998-2002. As a result, the overall fiscal position improved from near-balance during 1998-99 to surpluses of 8 percent of GDP in 2000 and 15½ percent in 2001 in spite of a fast pace of spending growth. In 2002, significant spending overruns caused the surplus to slip by 3 percentage points to 12½ percent of GDP (Statistical Appendix Tables 11 to 14).

4. Oil revenue grew very rapidly thanks to a combination of factors. Oil revenue, which comprises royalties (a percentage of oil exports), the government’s profit share, corporate income taxes on oil companies, and sales taxes on oil contractors, increased by an average of 61 percent per year. This exceptional performance resulted from a combination of oil output growth, rising oil prices, and a growing government take (the government revenue from oil as a share of the oil export value). As specified in the production sharing agreements concluded with the oil companies, the government take grows over time because (i) royalties as a share of exports increase with the production volume, (ii) and the profits accruing to the government rise as investment costs decline following the early years of an oil field’s life.

5. Non-oil revenue also grew quickly. Non-oil tax revenue, which consists mainly of taxes on income and profits, taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade, increased by an average of 29 percent per year during 1998-2002. Taxes on income and profit showed the strongest growth rates, largely because they include income taxes on oil sector workers.

6. The improvement of the Fiscal situation allowed the authorities to expand spending at a rapid pace. However, this resulted in considerable pressure on the country’s small non-oil economy. During 1998-2002, total expenditure and net lending grew by an average of 36 percent per year. Capital expenditure and current expenditure rose at average annual rates of 66 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Most of capital expenditure was invested into the construction of basic infrastructure. Among the current spending items, spending on subsidies and transfers increased the fastest, spending on wages, goods, and services rose more moderately, and interest payments fell as a result of an improving debt situation. Reflecting the unsustainable character of spending growth, the non-oil deficit expanded substantially in relation to non-oil GDP and exceeded the non-oil economy’s absorption capacity, thus contributing to rising inflation.

7. Third, the oil sector boom benefited the external current account and the overall balance of payments. The external current account deficit narrowed from 82 percent of GDP in 1998 to 9 percent in 2002, and the overall balance of payments improved from a deficit of 1 percent of GDP in 1998 to a surplus of 9 percent of GDP in 2002 (Statistical Appendix Table 20). The terms of trade improved by a total of 88 percent between 1998 and 2002, mainly owing to rising oil prices. However, the non-oil current account deficit widened as non-oil imports surged, reflecting strong demand fueled by income generated in the oil sector, expanding public investment, and an appreciating real exchange rate.

8. External debt indicators also improved. The total stock of external debt decreased from $270 million in 1998 to US$222 million in June 2003, of which US$60 million were in arrears (mostly to Spain, Equatorial Guinea’s single largest creditor). Bilateral external arrears are being regularized, and the authorities recently reached agreements on debt rescheduling with Spain and Russia that will eliminate all arrears to these countries in the coming months. External debt service decreased from US$18 million (4 percent of exports) in 1998 to US$15 million in 2002 (1 percent of exports). As a share of government revenue, debt service declined from 20 percent to less than 1 percent during the same period. Debt sustainability is not expected to become an issue in the coming years, taking into account Equatorial Guinea’s abundant oil receipts, and assuming that the authorities will adhere to their policy of abstaining from borrowing against future oil revenue (Statistical Appendix Table 29).

9. Finally, the oil boom shaped monetary developments via an accumulation of foreign assets in the banking system. The rising oil revenue resulted in a significant buildup in the net foreign assets of the banking system as the government accumulated deposits both at the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) and in domestic commercial banks, in addition to rising balances held in accounts abroad (Statistical Appendix Tables 15 to 18). The increases in government deposits in commercial banks resulted in strong additions to banks’ loanable funds and in large swings in bank liquidity, creating a challenge for the BEAC, which has at its disposal only a limited set of instruments for sterilizing foreign currency inflows and influencing disparities in member countries’ banking sector liquidity. As a result, private sector credit grew by an annual average of 33 percent; and broad money (M2), narrow money (M1), and currency in circulation expanded by annual averages of 46 percent, 40 percent, and 32 percent, respectively.4 The resulting inflationary impact would have been even larger had commercial banks not voluntarily constituted substantial free reserves at the central bank. The inflationary impact was also reduced by some remonetization of the economy. Reflecting commercial banks’ overall prudent lending practices,5 and despite the strong growth of private sector credit, the share of nonperforming loans remained broadly stable, at about 11 percent, between 1998 and 2002.

10. While these effects of the oil boom were unfolding, the authorities implemented some structural reform measures. Following enactment of the 1997 law on forestry management, the authorities passed a law protecting parts of the forest from logging. In December 1998, they liberalized the distribution of petroleum products and privatized the public companies active in this field. In January 2000, they improved the application of the CEMAC customs union by removing remaining quantitative import restrictions and phasing out import duties on goods produced in other CEMAC countries. However, little progress has been made in the implementation of the CEMAC’s common external tariff.6 Moreover, the authorities started to implement a strategy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food supply and stemming the exodus from rural areas into the cities. The strategy tries to boost agricultural productivity through a strengthening of basic infrastructure in rural areas. Finally, as a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), Equatorial Guinea has modernized some areas of its commercial law.

II. Oil Wealth and Sustainable Development

11. This chapter discusses a number of policy options that could help transform Equatorial Guinea’s oil wealth into sustainable improvements in living conditions. The fundamental reshaping of Equatorial Guinea’s economy brought about by rapidly growing oil production since the mid-1990s has generated strong GDP and fiscal revenue growth. At the same time, however, it has confronted the authorities with considerable difficulties. Fiscal policy has suffered from a lack of conceptual clarity and limited implementation capacity; inflation has increased because the spending of public and private income from oil has exceeded the non-oil economy’s absorption capacity; and parts of the non-oil sector have suffered from inflation-induced real appreciation and losses of competitiveness. Against this background, this chapter discusses (i) how fiscal policy could respond to the challenges posed by intergenerational equity and long-term sustainability, the non-oil economy’s absorption capacity, and the government’s limited implementation capacity; (ii) how the management of financial assets acquired with a part of oil revenue could be brought in line with international best practices; and (iii) how structural reforms could help offset recent losses of competitiveness, thereby promoting the sustainable development of the non-oil economy. After some background is provided in section A, these three issues are discussed in sections B, C and D.

A. Background

12. The rise of oil production in Equatorial Guinea since the mid-1990s has allowed some improvements in living conditions, but it has also created obstacles for sustainable development. Since the mid-1990s, a rapidly expanding oil sector has generated strong per capita income growth and allowed some poverty reduction. However, Equatorial Guinea has lost ground in the global ranking of human development indicators (Table II.1). The reasons behind this mixed record include the considerable inflation and marked appreciation of the real exchange rate created by strong spending increases in public and private oil income (Figure II.1). The ensuing adverse consequences on the development of the non-oil economy are particularly pronounced in agriculture and manufacturing. While other sectors (mostly services and construction) have fared better, they appear to be strongly dependent on the oil sector and might therefore be vulnerable to the eventual decline of oil production.7

Table II. 1.

Equatorial Guinea: Human Development Index, 1990-2001

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Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 2003.

A higher index indicates improved human development indicators.

Figure II.1.
Figure II.1.

Equatorial Guinea: Real and Nominal Effective Exchange Rates, January 1990- June 2003

(Index, 1990=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 386; 10.5089/9781451815931.002.A001

Source: IMF, Information Notice System.

13. These obstacles are typical of resource-dependent economies. With strong inflation, an appreciating exchange rate, and slow non-oil sector growth, the Equatoguinean economy exhibits all the signs of “Dutch disease” typical of economies mainly based on the exploitation of depletable resources. Furthermore, as in other such economies, Equatorial Guinea’s labor market shows qualification-based segmentation. While literacy rates in Equatorial Guinea are high by sub-Saharan standards, the overall education and training levels of most Equatoguineans are still relatively weak in a global comparison. This makes it difficult for them to find well-remunerated private sector positions.

14. Nevertheless, the staff believes that good macroeconomic management and adequate structural reforms could turn Equatorial Guinea’s oil wealth into the basis for sustainable development. The recurrence of Dutch disease and the other phenomena typical of resource dependence has made some researchers call it a “curse,” rather than a blessing. However, this unfavorable assessment is not shared universally, because good macroeconomic management and structural reforms can indeed transform the available natural nonrenewable resources into sustainable development and rising living standards.8

15. Such management and reforms will have to respond to Equatorial Guinea’s specificities:

  • Its oil wealth is large compared with its small population of just over 1 million inhabitants.

  • Its oil sector generates such considerable fiscal revenues that large fiscal surpluses are expected throughout the oil period.9

  • At only about 13 percent of overall GDP, its non-oil sector is very small compared with the oil sector.

On the one hand, these characteristics allow considerable fiscal spending from oil in the long run and make it unnecessary to consider how spending could be protected from short-run oil price fluctuations. On the other hand, they create room for potentially very pronounced Dutch disease effects.

B. Fiscal Policy Determination

16. An important issue in conducting Fiscal policy in resource-rich countries is how much to save out of current and expected revenues. One determinant of the saving decision should be intergenerational equity. This concept involves a weighting of different generations’ welfare. Under common assumptions the concept of intergenerational equity implies constant levels of consumption per capita. This result is closely related to the consumption theory’s permanent income hypothesis.

17. Intergenerational equity can be achieved by the application of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) to fiscal policy. The PIH’s policy prescription is to hold fiscal spending constant on a real per capita basis.10 A frequently cited alternative to a fiscal spending rule based on the PIH is the so-called bird-in-hand rule, which calls for limiting spending out of oil wealth to the interest income on assets acquired with oil revenues. The spending paths prescribed by the PIH and the bird-in-hand rule are presented qualitatively in Figure II.2. The figure shows that the PIH-based rule allows for higher spending in the early years of oil production than the bird-in-hand alternative. For this reason, a PIH-based rule responds best to the tension between, on the one hand, the necessity to preserve macroeconomic stability and save part of oil revenue for the future and, on the other hand, the imperative to quickly address Equatorial Guinea’s pressing social needs.

Figure II.2.
Figure II.2.

Equatorial Guinea: Alternative Fiscal Savings Rules

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 386; 10.5089/9781451815931.002.A001

Source: Fund staff estimates

18. Staff calculations show that real per capita spending of US$107 could be permanently maintained, corresponding to an average primary non-oil fiscal deficit of 40 percent of non-oil GDP during the oil period. The assumptions underlying the baseline scenario are as follows:

  • A growth of oil revenue through 2008 in line with the staff’s medium-term projections and constant oil revenues in real terms until 2021 (no further oil revenue as of 2022).

  • A growth of non-oil revenue in line with the staff’s medium-term projections through 2008 and, subsequently, non-oil revenue growth identical to non-oil GDP growth.

  • A growth of non-oil GDP in line with the staff’s medium-term projections through 2008 and, subsequently, non-oil growth identical to the population growth rate.11

  • A population of 1.015 million inhabitants in 2001 and a constant population growth rate of 2 percent per year.12

  • A real risk-free rate of return of 2.75 percent per year on financial assets invested abroad.

19. However, the calculation is highly sensitive to parameter changes, and there is considerable uncertainty about which parameter assumptions should be used. The level of spending that has been identified as sustainable should therefore be seen as an upper limit. Table II.2 presents a sensitivity analysis that varies the real interest rate, the amount of oil reserves (via a variation in the length of the oil period), and the oil price. As individual agents can be assumed to be risk averse, the optimal fiscal policy reaction to uncertainty is a reduction of spending below the baseline sustainable level. The exact strength of risk aversion is, however, not known.

Table II.2.

Equatorial Guinea: Sustainable Fiscal Spending and Primary Non-Oil Balances

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Source: Fund staff calculations.

20. In recent years, fiscal spending has exceeded the sustain ability criterion by considerable margins (Figure II.3). In 2000, the non-oil deficit amounted to 53 percent of non-oil GDP, and in 2001 to 57 percent, while in 2002 it even reached 80 percent; these deficits thus exceeded the sustainable non-oil deficit of 40 percent by 13, 17, and 40 percentage points, respectively. In the first half of 2003, the authorities have shown greater spending restraint.

Figure II.3.
Figure II.3.

Equatorial Guinea: Non-Oil Fiscal Deficits, 2000-2004 1/

(In percent of non-oil GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 386; 10.5089/9781451815931.002.A001

Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.1/ Fund staff calculations show that a non-oil deficit of 40.2 percent of non-oil GDP would be sustainable.

21. In addition to intergenerational equity considerations, the fiscal saving decision should take into account the effects of public spending on the development of the non-oil economy and the government’s implementation capacity. An important determinant of these effects is the non-oil economy’s absorption capacity. The strong inflation of recent years suggests that the absorption capacity constraint has been exceeded by considerable margins as well. It has also become clear that the structure of spending has not adequately reflected government priorities. Among the reasons for this unsatisfactory outcome are weak expenditure controls and deficiencies in coordinating policy planning and implementation among government institutions.

22. Public spending could be brought gradually in line with these criteria. Maintaining nominal spending unchanged with respect to the first half the year would reduce the non-oil deficit to about 50 percent of non-oil GDP in 2003 and 43 percent in 2004. In 2005, the non-oil deficit could be further lowered to or somewhat below the sustainable 40 percent threshold. This reduction of fiscal deficits would satisfy the sustainability constraint and facilitate the achievement of lower inflation. It should also improve spending quality by reducing the demands on the government’s limited imlementation capacity.

C. Best Practices in Financial Asset Management

23. A number of oil-producing countries have created oil reserve funds to manage the financial assets acquired with oil-related fiscal surpluses. Experience shows that such funds can help manage these assets, but only if they are well designed. In case the authorities decide to establish a proper oil fund, it would therefore be important to follow international best practices.13 Hallmarks of best practices are that the fund’s balance reflects government financial saving and that the fund is coherently integrated into the budget process, operating as a government account rather than a separate institution. Also, under best practices, fund operations are not governed by rigid asset accumulation and withdrawal rules, which could hamper fiscal management for uncertain gain. Rather, the appropriate fiscal position is determined by the consideration of the sustainability, absorption, and implementation issues laid out in the previous section, with all remaining balances being transferred to the fund. In addition, in the case of relatively small economies with large fiscal surpluses, these balances are invested into foreign financial assets, because investing in domestic assets would inject funds into the domestic economy and could create just the demand pressures that fiscal spending restraint seeks to avoid.14 Finally, under best practices, rules for supervision and audit of fund operations meet international standards of transparency, and all audit reports are published.

24. The following Table II.3 presents design elements of four oil funds from around the world. Included is the Norwegian oil fund, which features a number of the mentioned best practices.

Table II.3.

Operational Aspects of Selected Oil Funds

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D. Structural Policies for Sustainable Non-Oil Sector Development

25. The development of Equatorial Guinea’s non-oil sector over the coming years will be essential for long-term economic growth and sustainable poverty reduction. As oil production will come to an end in about two decades, the development of a dynamic and diversified non-oil economy is a task of high importance.

26. Policies for strengthening the non-oil sector could aim at increasing the productivity of physical and human capital, so as to allow the non-oil sector to compete successfully. They could also aim at opening new investment opportunities in the domestic economy. Human capital productivity could be enhanced by allowing greater access to secondary, professional, and university-level education; strengthening the quality of public administration by providing better training to public officials and by introducing a performance-based remuneration and promotion scheme; and intensifying the training of local entrepreneurs, for example, by offering management and accounting training courses. The authorities have already made first steps in this direction. Furthermore, in line with the recommendations of the Foreign Investment Advisory Service, an investment promotion agency could review the existing legal and regulatory framework and suggest ways to make it more business friendly. This agency could also identify export opportunities for local companies.

27. In addition, the non-oil sector would benefit from a lowering of the fiscal burden to the minimum allowed by agreements with Equatorial Guinea’s partners in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). For example, all taxes on non-oil exports could be eliminated and import taxes further reduced in collaboration with the CEMAC. A strengthening of the judicial system, in particular of tax courts, would also help reducing the costs of doing business in Equatorial Guinea.

28. In order to gain an idea of how sizable the non-oil sector might be at the end of the oil period, which is currently projected for 2022, the staff simulated a non-oil sector growth scenario. This scenario is predicated on the implementation of all the policy suggestions made above and therefore represents an estimate of the overall growth potential. The model underlying the simulation is a static partial equilibrium savings-investment framework. It focuses on the non-oil sector. Influences from the oil sector are considered to be exogenous. The model mechanics are as follows: (i) oil GDP grows through 2008, then remains stable through 2021 and falls to zero by 2022; and (ii) higher oil production results in higher export and fiscal revenues from oil, which, in turn, leads to larger current account and overall balance of payments surpluses, as well as higher gross national savings. A portion of these savings is invested through both private and public channels in the non-oil sector. Assuming an average capital productivity of 13 percent,16 non-oil GDP increases steadily over time.

29. The scenario’s key assumptions are as follows:

  • Private domestic investment. Ten percent of non-oil GDP is invested in the non-oil sector.

  • Foreign direct investment in the domestic economy (FDI). Petroleum companies transfer their entire income out of the country. However, there is FDI in the non-oil sector of 10 percent of non-oil GDP during 2003-2008. From 2009 onward, FDI is held constant in U.S. dollar terms.

  • Public investment. Fifty percent of non-oil GDP is invested in the non-oil sector in 2003. This ratio declines gradually to 35 percent during 2004-08, and is kept at this level subsequently.

  • Imports. All increases in private and public investment are reflected in higher imports in a one to one ratio.

  • Technological progress. In contrast to assumptions underlying the sustainability calculations, technological improvements increase non-oil productivity and output growth by 1 percentage point each year.

  • Population size. In line with the sustainability calculations, the population is assumed to be 1.015 million in 2001 and to grow at a constant rate of 2 percent per year.

30. The simulation resulted in an annual non-oil GDP growth of about 10 percent through 2008 and of 8.5 percent in outer years. About 4 percentage points of growth are brought about by private investment of 20 percent of non-oil GDP, along with a capital productivity of 20 percent. An additional 5 percentage points of growth are achieved through public investment of 50 percent of non-oil GDP, along with a capital productivity of 10 percent. One additional percentage point of growth results from technological change. These growth rates yield an increase in the ratio of non-oil GDP to total GDP from 13 percent in 2003 to 25 percent in 2022, which thus pushes real non-oil GDP per capita from US$346 in 2003 to US$1,266 in 2022 (Figure II.4).

Figure II.4.
Figure II.4.

Equatorial Guinea: A Simulated Profile of Oil and Non-Oil GDP Per Capita, 2003-2025

(In current U.S. dollars)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 386; 10.5089/9781451815931.002.A001

Source: Fund staff estimates.

31. The simulation therefore suggests that, with adequate and timely implemented macroeconomic and structural policies, the non-oil sector could generate significant per capita income by the end of the oil period and beyond. However, less effective policies could well result in rather low income levels at a time when the country can no longer rely on oil income. The scenario thus underscores the importance of saving part of oil revenues for the future and of strengthening the non-oil sector.


  • Auty, R. M., 2001, Resource Abundance and Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Easterly, W., and R. Levine, 2002, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development,” NBER Working Paper No. 9106 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).

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  • Gelb, A. and Associates, 1988, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank).

  • Sachs, J. D., and A. M. Warner, 2001, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (May), pp. 827 -38.

Equatorial Guinea: Basic Data

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2001; and Fund staff estimates.

Crop year (October 1-September 30).

Includes foreign-financed capital expenditure and unclassified/extra budgetary expenditure.

Excludes official transfers.

Includes official transfers.

Including the IMF.

In percent of exports of goods and nonfactor services.

In percent of domestic government revenue.

Table 1.

Equatorial Guinea: Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1997-2002

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 2.

Equatorial Guinea: Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1997-2002

(In percent of GDP in current CFA francs)

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 3.

Equatorial Guinea: Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1997-2002

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 4.

Equatorial Guinea: Gross Domestic Product by Use of Resources, 1997-2002

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 5.

Equatorial Guinea: Production of Principal Export Commodities, 1997-2002

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Data for Malabo only for 1999-2002.

Table 6.

Equatorial Guinea: Production and Exports of Timber, 1997-2002

(In thousands of cubic meters)

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Calculated as a residual.

Table 7.

Equatorial Guinea: Official Producer Prices of Main Export Crops, 1997-2003

(In CFA francs per kilogram)

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Source: Equatoguinean authorities.

First-grade dried cocoa.

Grano elaborado.

Table 8.

Equatorial Guinea: Public Investment Program, 1997-2001

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 9.

Equatorial Guinea: Consumer Price Index, 2000-2002

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities.
Table 10:

Consumer Price Inflation, 2001-2003

(12-month percentage change)

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities.
Table 11.

Equatorial Guinea: Summary of Central Government Financial Operations, 1997-2002

(In millions of CFA francs, unless otherwise specified)

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Sources: Equatoguinean authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Including grants and excluding foreign-financed capital expenditure.