Angola: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
Author: International Monetary Fund
Publication Date:
10 Sep 2003
eISBN:
9781451800524
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; government; Angola; monetary aggregate; central bank; government activity; royalty regime; government ministry; oil business; Sonangol equity opportunity costs; Bonuses; authorities' explanation
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Several years of high inflation rates have negatively affected economic conditions in Angola. Macroeconomic stabilization in Angola entails strict control over central bank credit to the government, an ending of the quasi-fiscal expenditures, and a reduction of the national bank of Angola’s deficit. Reserve adequacy is an important factor for stable economic development and management. This note reviews some of the main challenges faced by Angola's policymakers in launching a credible subsidy reform, and also reviews the sources and uses of state oil revenue in Angola.

Abstract

Several years of high inflation rates have negatively affected economic conditions in Angola. Macroeconomic stabilization in Angola entails strict control over central bank credit to the government, an ending of the quasi-fiscal expenditures, and a reduction of the national bank of Angola’s deficit. Reserve adequacy is an important factor for stable economic development and management. This note reviews some of the main challenges faced by Angola's policymakers in launching a credible subsidy reform, and also reviews the sources and uses of state oil revenue in Angola.

V. Angola: Sources and Uses of State Oil Revenue48

102. This note reviews the sources and uses of state oil revenue in Angola. It describes the operation of production-sharing agreements (PSAs), in general, and the specifics of oil revenue flows in Angola. The note also discusses the challenges facing the Angolan authorities, and the national oil company (Sonangol) itself, regarding the management of oil revenues. These challenges are the result of the burden imposed on the national oil company to deliver non-commercial objectives that may impair on its profitability and the efficient management of Angola’s oil revenue. Two observations emerge from the analysis:

  • A significant portion of Angola’s oil revenue is represented by the state’s profit oil, rather than by tax payments from international oil companies (IOCs) to the state. Angola’s state profit oil, plus Sonangol’s taxes on its equity participation and signature bonuses, totalled some US$8.7 billion during 1998-2002, more than one-half of total general government oil revenue for the period.

  • Sonangol has a large number of non-commercial objectives that compete with its profit-maximizing goals and translate into significant quasi-fiscal operations undertaken on behalf of the government and a large number of Sonangol’s subsidiaries across the economy. A way forward should be to stop all quasi-fiscal operations and review whether Sonangol’s investments are profitable and/or could be undertaken by the private sector instead.

A. Production-Sharing Arrangements (PSAs): General Lines

103. PSAs were developed by Indonesia in the 1960s, and have become the dominant fiscal regime for oil and gas investments in developing/transition countries. PSAs can be contrasted with the other main type of fiscal regime: oil taxes and royalties.49

104. Under PSAs, the host state typically owns the oil and oil installations, and it contracts IOCs to provide capital and expertise, and thus to take risk. PSAs attempt to compensate IOCs adequately for their capital and risk, through a share in production, but retain the reward above that level for the host state. The host state generally retains a significant degree of control over the operations of the IOC contractor.

105. Tax and royalty regimes, by contrast, are designed to yield adequate tax revenue to the host state and leave the rest of the reward with the IOCs. Under tax and royalty regimes, IOCs own and control oil operations, subject to state regulation but not to direct intervention.50

106. PSAs were created as an instrument of “resource nationalism.” They were designed to reverse a perceived inequity in revenue shares between host states and oil companies during the colonial era. In recent decades, the design of tax and royalty regimes has caught up with PSAs and can provide the state with just as much control over the use the oil.

107. PSAs are arrangements for sharing production of the host state’s oil between the host state and IOCs operating a given concession. IOCs individually or in a group will form a venture to explore potential oil fields under that concession, develop any commercially viable discoveries, and extract oil (or gas) from them. Sometimes the host state will also participate directly in the equity of the venture, usually through the national oil company (NOC).

108. Frequently, IOCs pay signature bonuses at the time of agreeing the PSA.51 This brings forward the host state’s revenue by many years. Without signature bonuses, the host state would have to wait for revenue until oil production commences (which may, indeed, never happen if the commercial discoveries made are inadequate). Signature bonuses are essentially payments by IOCs to governments, although the payment is sometimes channelled through the NOC. In addition, other bonuses can be paid annually from the time commercial discoveries are made, or from the time production starts.

109. When production commences, the operating venture receives a portion of the oil to compensate it for its costs (“cost oil”). Production above this level (“profit oil”) is divided between the operating venture and the host state. The division of profit oil between the venture and the host state will be calculated according to a formula, which generally assigns a percentage to the host state that increases the more that IOCs have been remunerated for their capital and risk. The host state’s profit oil is essentially government revenue, but it may be channeled through the NOC. The operating venture’s profit oil will be divided among the partners according to their equity shares (including profit oil to the NOC if it is an equity partner).

110. In general, IOCs pay taxes on their profit oil to the host government (although sometimes the NOC will be liable for all profits tax and occasionally no profits tax is levied). Sometimes, partners will also pay a royalty to the host government based primarily on the volume of oil rather than on profits.

B. Angola’s Oil Revenue

111. Angola receives revenue from its PSA operations in several main forms: (i) signature and other bonuses, (ii) the government’s profit oil, (iii) Sonangol’s profit oil from equity participations, and (iv) IOC’s taxes on their profit oil. Furthermore, joint ventures or association contracts between Sonangol and oil companies yield important amount of royalties to the Angolan Treasury. These joint ventures include, in particular, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, which became a subsidiary of Chevron in 1984, and Petrofina and Texaco, which have been producing onshore in the Kwanza and the Congo basins.

112. In general, the Angolan PSAs and other contracts provide for a stable fiscal regime for IOCs defined at the time of signature, and legal protection against subsequent adverse changes in fiscal legislation (although Angola is not yet a signatory of international conventions that would make these rights enforceable outside Angola). Respect for this legal and contractual framework appears to have been important for Angola’s ability to attract substantial volumes of foreign direct investment in its oil sector, as will its continued observance (particularly as new legislation applicable to the oil industry is introduced).

113. Table V.1 shows the share of each of the various elements in total government receipts. For the period 1998-2002, estimates show that total state oil revenue was about US$15.1 billion, of which signature and other bonuses accounted for US$1.3 billion. According to these data, Sonangol handled—in its capacity of representative/concessionaire for the Angolan state in the oil business and as a direct equity partner in oil extraction—more than 50 percent of the total oil revenue (including bonuses) accruing to the government. The rest of the revenue (US$6.4 billion) was taxes paid by IOCs to the state on account of their oil activities in the country.

Table V.1.

Angola: State Oil Revenue Receipts, 1998-2002

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Angola’s Ministry of Finance; Sonangol; and IMF staff estimates.

Includes tax payments made to the treasury on account of oil income tax, oil transactions tax, and the oil production tax and royalties.

After Sonangol retains 10 percent of government profit oil.

Signature and other bonuses

114. Total signature bonuses paid by IOCs to the Angolan government during 1982-1999 are estimated at around US$1.2 billion (Table V.2). Bonus payments have increased significantly in recent years as IOCs compete aggressively for a limited number of oil fields. Also, the size of these payments can be interpreted as an indicator of the perceived attractiveness of the blocks in question.

Table V.2.

Signature Bonus Payments, 1982 and 1996-2001

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Angola’s Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.

115. Along with the signature bonuses, the newer blocks pay additional bonuses such as an exploration bonus, commercial discovery bonus, first oil bonus, and in some cases an annual production bonus. In more recent contracts, some bonus payments are being delegated for approved social and development projects. Compared with the signature bonuses, these others are quite small in magnitude. They range between US$25 and US$35 million per year.

116. Exploration bonuses are payable either in one lump sum—in the year that exploration commences or in the year that the contract is signed—or it is payable in annual installments (usually over four years), the first installment being due in the year the contract is signed.

117. Because information on blocks that have had commercial discoveries is difficult to source, therefore the payment dates for the commercial discovery bonuses are not always known. Production bonuses, also a feature of PSAs, have, however, not been factored into the calculation for the total bonuses as it is difficult to pinpoint when the payments are actually made.

118. The alleged lack of transparency about the signature and other bonus payments related to block 34 was clarified during the 2003 Article IV consultation discussions (Box V.1). Notably, the magnitude of the bonus payments was reconciled with the inflows into the government’s offshore oil bonus bank account (Conta Bonus Petrolifero). The highlights of the authorities’ explanation were as follows: (i) the two bidding rounds surrounding the bonuses payment for block 34, and (ii) the discounts applicable to payments due from Norsk Hydro and Shell. After accounting for (i) and (ii), the inflows into the Conta Bonus Petrolifero relating to block 34 totaled US$278.6 million in 2001.

Bonus Payments for Block 34

The authorities explained that the international bidding process on Angolan oil blocks usually involved major international oil companies (IOCs). Sonangol’s strategy is to limit the number of companies for each concession/block. Usually, the IOC with the most profitable (for the Angolan state) and sounder bid becomes the operator of the block. These bids include bonus payments and understandings about prospective investments. As there is uncertainty about the ultimate productivity of any block, the bidding process generally leads to a situation in which different bidders offer different prices for equivalent property shares. Also, what usually happens is that Sonangol’s share in the block is “carried” by the IOCs (i.e., the IOCs effectively lend Sonangol funds for its equity participation, to be repaid directly from Sonangol’s future equity from the block.)

In the case of block 34, there were two bidding rounds. The first round selected the operator of the block (Norsk Hydro), and fixed its participation in the concession (30 percent) and its contribution to the overall signature bonus payment (which totaled US$232 million according to the authorities). The second round divided the remaining concession among interested parties (Phillips, Braspetro, and Shell). Sonangol did not participate in the bidding process, although its share in block 34 was predetermined at 20 percent.

The bidding process yielded bonus payments (signature and other bonuses) of US$327.7 million, which were later adjusted downward by US$49 million: Norsk Hydro’s payment was reduced by US$19 million, due mainly to technological services provided to Sonangol; Shell’s payment was reduced by US$30 million as Sonangol settled an old debt to this company stemming from the operation of block 16 (see table below). All in all, the final inflows into the offshore bank account, Conta Bonus Petrolifero, were US$278.6 million.

Block 34: Bidding Process and Final Payment into Conta Bonus Petrolifero

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: Sonangol.

Oil Taxes and Royalties

119. Angola’s oil tax regime, applicable to Sonangol and IOCs, centers on the levying of the oil income tax (PIT), the oil transactions tax (PTT), and the oil production tax. The PIT is levied on profit oil. It has a basic rate of 50 percent and a variable surtax of 15.75 percent. Its tax base is reduced by applicable production incentives (in practice, adjusted to production costs) and investment incentives (a fraction of historic investment costs).

120. The PTT is a tax on gross profit, adjusted for tax incentives (i.e., production and investment incentives), arising from production in the Province of Cabinda under joint exploration arrangements with Sonangol; the tax rate is 70 percent. Finally, the oil production tax is a royalty on the value of oil, paid by IOCs operating in joint venture with Sonangol. Enterprises’ tax payments on account of the oil income tax and the oil transactions tax are deductible from the calculation base. The tax rate on oil businesses in Cabinda Province is 20 percent; the tax rate is about 17 percent in other provinces.

Government profit oil and Sonangol’s role

121. The most important primary legislation in Angola relating to the upstream oil and gas sector is Law No. 13/78 (General Law of Petroleum Activities). This law establishes the legal framework for upstream petroleum activities. In Article 1 the law makes clear that the state owns all the petroleum mineral rights, including offshore. In Article 2, the law provides that the state oil company, Sonangol, is the sole concessionaire with the rights for all exploration and production activities. Sonangol grants concessions to contractor groups (of IOCs and sometimes also Sonangol itself as an equity partner) that explore, develop, and produce oil on Sonangol’s behalf. Rights previously awarded to other companies were transferred to Sonangol after independence.

122. Sonangol handles a substantial portion of oil fiscal revenue. Under PSAs, signature and other bonuses are payable by the contractors to Sonangol. The state’s share of profit oil is also lifted by Sonangol directly, while contractor groups lift the volumes of cost and profit oil accorded to them under the PSAs. The legislation allows for up to 10 percent of the state profit oil to be retained by Sonangol to meet its costs as state concessionaire in the oil business. In practice, Sonangol takes the full 10 percent, but it claims that this still does not cover associated costs.

123. In the older PSAs the state’s share of profit oil increases in steps with cumulative production. The detailed terms vary significantly, especially with respect to the sharing when (cumulative) production is still relatively low. This may reflect perceptions of how costs and risks could vary in different blocks. When cumulative production exceeds 100 million barrels, the state’s share in all these contracts reaches its maximum. In some contracts, the shares for any production range vary with water depth.

124. In more recent agreements, the terms for sharing profit oil are related progressively to the achieved rate of return in the development area. Generally, the threshold rates of return are specified in money-of-the-day terms. In the rate of return calculation, explorations costs are not to be included. The details of the sharing vary from contract to contract. It is noteworthy that Sonangol always receives some share of the profit oil even when the achieved return is low. Sonangol’s share increases in proportion with the rates of return.

Sonangol’s profit oil from equity

125. Law No. 13/78 also provides that Sonangol can become an equity field participant. Sonangol has an exploration and production company for this purpose and participates in the development of several blocks (frequently “carried” by IOCs). The government is responsible for making decisions on this subject, and in recent licensing rounds it was decided that it was in the nation’s strategic interest that Sonangol should participate in deepwater blocks. It should be emphasized that these investments by Sonangol bear substantial opportunity costs in terms of public services and investments forgone (see Section C below).

126. Sonangol’s involvement in the industry as an equity partner has increased over the years, with its portfolio currently including stake holdings in numerous oil fields, including deepwater and ultra-deepwater blocks.52 As a partner in a joint venture or in a PSA, Sonangol receives a share of the profit oil in proportion to its extent of participation in the project. Sonangol’s profit oil is taxed under the oil income tax regime at a rate ranging between 50 percent and 65.75 percent, the same tax rate as that levied on IOCs.

C. Sonangol’s Noncommercial Objectives

127. This section takes a first step toward assessing whether the state’s role in the oil sector is managed in a way in which the Angolan Treasury and/or the overall economy forgoes revenue. In this regard, this section stresses the impact of noncommercial objectives imposed on Sonangol. These objectives include an array of quasi-fiscal and subsidiary operations that are not transparent; create a conflict of interest (when Sonangol as concessionaire gives preference to oil service and supply companies in which it owns a stake); and divert Sonangol from its core activities, and possibly incur losses. Most important, Sonangol’s subsidiary operations add to the opportunity costs of using oil revenue to finance Sonangol’s equity participation in PSAs rather than covering the delivery of government social programs in health and education, for example.

Sonangol’s quasi-fiscal operations

128. Sonangol has in some areas functioned as a treasury outside the Ministry of Finance, carrying out fiscal expenditures that subsequently have been netted out against oil tax obligations. Sonangol’s role as producer and distributor of petroleum products, and its access to foreign exchange, has enabled it to apply pressure so as to circumvent the regular payment system in order to gain expediency and, also, during the time of the civil war, opacity. In the case of servicing foreign debt, the oil-guaranteed loans stipulate that the loans be serviced by direct delivery of oil, making Sonangol inevitably an agent of the treasury.

129. Reliable data on the breakdown of quasi-fiscal expenditures by Sonangol prior to 2002 are hard to come by. In 2001, the authorities’ data indicate that Sonangol carried out quasi-fiscal expenditures on the order of Kz 1.6 billion and paid foreign debt on behalf of the government corresponding to approximately US$1 billion. However, during the same year Sonangol incurred tax arrears about Kz 13.5 billion (14 percent of overall expenditures, or 6 percent of GDP), indicating that the real level of quasi-fiscal expenditures was much higher. Similarly, in 2000 Sonangol paid foreign debt on behalf of the government in the amount of US$ 1.5 billion. However, a breakdown sufficient to identify the quasi-fiscal expenditures by Sonangol during 2000 has not been provided.

130. In 2002, the first year in which detailed data on Sonangol’s quasi-fiscal expenditures were provided, the overall level of expenditures carried out by Sonangol was estimated at Kz 28 billion (12 percent of overall government expenditures, or 6 percent of GDP). In addition, Sonangol paid US$1.2 billion in debt service on government loans. Figure V.1 shows the breakdown of quasi-fiscal expenditures (excluding debt service on behalf of the government) during 2002, as indicated by the 2002 fiscal declaration of Sonangol.

Figure V.1.
Figure V.1.

Distribution of Quasi-Fiscal Expenditures by Sonangol during 2002

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 292; 10.5089/9781451800524.002.A005

131. The main areas of Sonangol’s quasi-fiscal expenditures are subsidies on petroleum products, delivery of petroleum products to various state entities, and goods and services provided directly to state-owned enterprises and ministries. A short description of these operations follows:

  • Subsidies. Sonangol is the sole operator in both the production and distribution of refined petroleum products. The consumer level prices of these products (gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, etc.) are centrally determined, and Sonangol is compensated ex post by the difference between the cost of production and distribution, and the price charged at the retail level.

  • Delivery of petroleum products. Sonangol also, on account of the government, provides various state entities with petroleum products. Most important are the government-owned electricity, water and transport companies.

  • State enterprises. Sonangol has assumed certain financial responsibilities vis-à-vis the state-owned airlines companies, TAAG and SONAIR, consisting of, purportedly, service contracts on airplanes and payments of aircraft.

  • Government ministries. During 2002, Sonangol had expenditures corresponding to US$95 million on account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Expenditures on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been justified by the existence of readily available foreign exchange abroad. The Ministry of Territorial Administration is responsible for relations between the central government and the provinces.

132. The practice of regular and substantial quasi-fiscal expenditures by Sonangol has created problems and weaknesses for the overall budget execution system. Primarily, the lack of control by the treasury over all expenditures undermines fiscal discipline and transparency, and distorts the allocative efficiency of public expenditures. Furthermore, as Sonangol unilaterally withholds tax payments to make up for the quasi-fiscal expenditures, this also creates uncertainty about the revenue situation and the treasury’s cash position, making overall short-term macroeconomic policymaking more difficult. Finally, unregulated balances between the treasury and Sonangol, often without agreement on whether the amounts should be denominated in local or foreign currency, have, in light of the high levels of inflation, created disagreements between the two entities on the real value of the liabilities.

133. In the revised budget for 2003, the government, for the first time, included expenditures that are planned to be executed through Sonangol. The purpose is to give the treasury more control over the overall level of expenditures and over the allocation of public resources. It is of great importance that the activities of Sonangol be bound by the budget allocations. The next step to improve the budgetary system is to transfer, ex ante, the resources needed by Sonangol to carry out government activities, and to refrain from compensating the company for expenditures not included in the budget.

134. The annex to this note describes Sonangol’s numerous inter- and intra-industry interests. These interests range from asset ownership in the oil industry (i.e., oil extraction and services) to business interests in the air and sea shipping industry, insurance and retail banking, construction services, the telecommunications, and helicopter services.

135. A common approach has been to incorporate/link these subsidiary activities to Sonangol’s E.P.-Holding53 either fully or on an affiliated basis. This practice, however, creates conflicts of interest whenever Sonangol, as concessionaire, gives preference to oil service and supply companies in which it owns a stake. Problems reportedly exist in the area of preferential treatment to Sonangol’s subsidiaries and joint ventures in the procurement of goods and services to oil companies operating in Angola. This situation could have substantial revenue implications (i.e., reduced government profit oil and petroleum income tax) given the cost-raising effect of preferential procurement practices. The tax and pricing arrangements of the Sonangol subsidiaries/joint ventures are unclear.

136. Sonangol equity opportunity costs are not insignificant (Figure V.2). The data show that striking the right balance between the company’s investment requirements and other government spending would be a difficult task for years to come.54 Indeed, there is not enough oil revenue to finance (i) Sonangol’s equity participation in the oil and non-oil economy, (ii) sectoral investment needs for the reconstruction of the economy, (iii) the provision of basic public services, and (iv) the servicing of the external debt. In this regard, it would be important for the government to view proposed expenditures as part of a consolidated set of priorities rather than allowing decisions to be driven by those participants, such as Sonangol, who happen to be at the front end of the revenue chain.

Figure V.2.
Figure V.2.

Angola: Competing Demands for State Oil Revenue

(In millions of U.S. dollars; averages for 2003-05)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 292; 10.5089/9781451800524.002.A005

Source: IMF staff projections.1/ Excludes new refinery project and equity in LNG project.

137. The clash of multiple objectives for oil revenue raises a number of policy issues. Notably, it could be argued that under appropriate terms and conditions most oil-producing countries like Angola should have no problem in attracting private sector investment in the oil sector. Also, the development of PSAs has made it possible for governments to efficiently collect a major share of oil rents from the IOCs without investing themselves (through the NOC). In this regard, the Angolan authorities should take advantage of those contract modalities and, therefore, use their economic development efforts—and economic resources—to the foster growth of the non-oil economy, from which most of the Angolan population derives their livelihoods.

138. While the reform process might take some time, the good news is that Sonangol has taken some first steps to improve the transparency and accounting of its core and noncore (subsidiary) operations. Key areas of reform include the following: (i) enhanced reporting and the prospective external auditing of Sonangol’s upstream operations, and (ii) the reform of Sonangol E.P-Holding’s operations and the introduction of international accounting standards (IAS). In particular, throughout 2003, Sonangol will be working toward accounting consolidation of all its upstream operations.55 Although there are a number of legal and technical constraints to be removed, the expectation is that Sonangol will be able to generate consolidated financial accounts of its upstream operations by end-2003. Sonangol’s Action Plan for Accounting and Auditing indicates that the external auditing of those consolidated accounts could take place in the first quarter of 2004.

139. Also, Sonangol’s business strategy for the next decade assumes the transfer of businesses that are currently owned by Sonangol E.P.-Holding to Sonangol’s subsidiaries and the introduction of IAS for the whole business group. The plans are for Sonangol E.P-Holding to no longer be directly involved in economic development issues, but rather to become a “financial house,” in charge of overseeing the group’s business interests (conducted by Sonangol’s subsidiaries). Sonangol EP-Holding will be involved in major strategic decisions and capital budgeting. Part of the strategy of establishing subsidiaries on an arms-length basis is to enable Sonangol EP-Holding to dispose of noncore assets. The legal framework underpinning Sonangol’s business strategy is the New Accounting Law (Novo Piano Geral de Contabilidade) or Law No. 82/01 of November 16, 2001. In summary, the law establishes new obligatory accounting guidelines/standards for the preparation of companies’ financial statements. The new guidelines are in line with IAS.

ANNEX: Sonangol’s Web of Interests: A Summary Description

I. Sonangol’s Group Subsidiaries

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II. Sonangol’s Other Business Interests

i. Oil production sector
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ii. Oil distribution sector
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iii. Other business interests
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Source: Sonangol group’s internet site (www.sonangol.co.ao).

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table 1.

Angola: Basic Data, 1998-2002

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Sources: Angolan authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002; and UNDP, Human Development Report, 2002.

As a percent of broad money at the beginning of the period.

Increase = appreciation.

Imports of goods and nonfactor services.

Medium- and long-term debt service due in percent of exports of goods and services or government revenues in millions of U.S. dollars.

Table 2.

Angola: Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Activity, 1998-2002

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Sources: Angolan authorities; and staff calculations.

Liquefied petroleum gas.

Table 3.

Angola: Production of Selected Manufactured Products, 1996-2000

(In metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

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Source: Ministry of Planning.
Table 4.

Angola: Oil Production and Reserves by Oil Field, 1998-2002

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Source: Ministry of Petroleum.

At year’s end.

Includes reserves not yet developed.

Reserves already developed and ready for production.

Table 5.

Angola: Oil Balance, 1998-2002

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Sources: Ministry of Petroleum, Sonangol (state-owned oil company), National Bank of Angola, and staff estimates.

As reported in balance of payments. Other sources differ slightly.

Includes pipeline losses and field consumption, as well as any discrepancies.

As reported in balance of payments; excludes natural gas liquids.

Table 6.

Angola: Mining Production, 1998-2002

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Sources: Ministry of Petroleum; Endiama; and staff estimates.
Table 7.

Angola: Prices of Petroleum Products, 1998-2002

(End-of-period data)

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Sources: Ministry of Finance; and staff estimates.

Kwanzas per kilogram.

Liquefied petroleum gas.

Table 8.

Angola: Consumer Price Index in Luanda, December 1998- December 2002

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Source: National Institute of Statistics.
Table 9.

Angola: Average Exchange Rates, December 1998-December 2002

(Kwanzas per U.S. dollar, unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: National Bank of Angola.

Monthly averages of buying and selling daily average exchange rates in the interbank foreign exchange market.

Table 10.

Angola: Balance of Payments, 1998-2002

(In millions of dollars; unless otherwise noted)

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Source: National Bank of Angola.

Including late interest from 1999 onwards.

Medium- and long-term debt service due in percent of exports of goods and services.

In months of next year’s imports or medium- and long-term debt service. In 2002, using current year’s data.

Table 11.

Angola: Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1998-2002

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified; end of period)

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Source: National Bank of Angola.

Excludes medium- and long-term assets and liabilities.

In months of following year’s imports.

Table 12.

Angola: Direction of Merchandise Exports, 1998–2002 1/

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Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.

Data provided by partner countries.