India: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix

This paper discusses the intermediation of financial saving in India and the implications for growth. Recent studies linking financial sector development and growth in India are reviewed. The following statistical data are also provided: employment and labor statistics, agricultural production and yields, index of industrial production, saving and investment, price developments, balance of payments, official reserves, reserve money, monetary survey, central and state government operations, indicators of financial system soundness, financial performance of Indian commercial banks, and selected monetary and exchange rate indicators.

Abstract

This paper discusses the intermediation of financial saving in India and the implications for growth. Recent studies linking financial sector development and growth in India are reviewed. The following statistical data are also provided: employment and labor statistics, agricultural production and yields, index of industrial production, saving and investment, price developments, balance of payments, official reserves, reserve money, monetary survey, central and state government operations, indicators of financial system soundness, financial performance of Indian commercial banks, and selected monetary and exchange rate indicators.

I. Financing Growth in India1

A. Introduction

1. India has yet to reap the full benefit of financial sector reforms undertaken during the past decade due to the continued preemption of private saving by the public sector. Large fiscal imbalances have required a readily available source of funds, facilitated by statutory preemptions of financial flows and public ownership of commercial banks. Captive savings schemes, directed credit programs, and government-guaranteed loans put a further squeeze on available resources for the private sector. Real-financial linkages in India have taken on greater relevance in recent years, in view of the slowdown in growth since the late 1990s. The slowdown, which has been attributed to cyclical and exogenous as well as structural factors,2 has been accompanied by stagnation in domestic saving and weakening of investment demand.

2. This paper looks at the intermediation of financial saving in India and the implications for growth. Section B presents a brief review of recent studies linking financial sector development and growth in India. Section C gives an overview of financial sector reforms and then outlines ways the government preempts savings. Section D looks at trends in saving and uses a flow of funds approach to summarize the behavior of sector financial flows since the early 1990s.

uA01fig01

India: Fiscal Deficits, Investment, and Growth, 1991/92–2002/03 1/

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Indian authorities CEIC; and staff estimates.1/ Sector data on investment available through 2001/02 only, private sector investment excludes households.

B. Financial Development and Economic Growth

3. Recent studies suggest a strong link between the level of saving and the efficiency of financial intermediation and economic growth in India. In general, the studies lend support to the view that the government’s large preemption of saving and intervention in the financial sector act to constrain efficient intermediation, and in turn dampen growth.

  • Bhattacharya and Patel (2002 and 2003) argue that (i) the density of government ownership in India’s financial sector reduces the profit-maximizing incentive for lenders to require optimal co-financing from borrowers, and (ii) the absence of effective bankruptcy procedures forces intermediaries to rollover substandard debt or convert it to equity. Combined with financial bailouts and regulatory forbearance for public intermediaries, these policies give rise to “aggravated moral hazard.” Under these circumstances, financial intermediaries continue to lend to loss-making firms to limit nonperforming assets (NPAs), which constrains available funds for profit-making firms. They attempt to link a rise in the density of government involvement in the financial sector starting in the mid-1990s with a fall in an index of effective co-financing (as measured by the ratio of equity to total debt).

  • Banerjee and Duflo (2002) consider whether firms are credit constrained in India, based on how they react to changes in directed lending programs. They posit that credit constrained firms would tend to use their new ability to access directed credits to expand production, while unconstrained firm would simply use them to substitute for other sources of credit. In examining small borrower-level data from public sector banks (PSBs) during the late 1990s, they indeed find evidence of credit constraints among small firms, suggesting that firms are willing but unable to borrow more at the market rate of interest.

  • Bell and Rousseau (2001) examine whether financial intermediaries played a key role in influencing India’s economic performance since independence. Their findings suggest that credit availability is critical to changes in economic structure and to growth, reinforcing the view that preemption of resources by the government can have serious detrimental effects on growth.

  • Related studies suggest a positive relationship between growth and saving in India.3 Higher (per capita) growth and income are found to lead to increased domestic saving, which in turn is largely used to finance domestic investment.4 Athukorala and Sen (2002) determine that the level of investment and its efficiency have been important factors in determining growth in post-independence India up to the mid-1990s. A noteworthy finding in the context of recent budget developments and increasing fiscal imbalances is that public dissaving is found to be only partially offset by private saving, thus rejecting full Ricardian equivalence.

C. Financial Intermediation and Savings Preemption in India

4. India has made considerable progress in strengthening and deepening its financial system since the early 1990s, when policymakers began to open the financial sector to greater competition and reduce the system of controls in place since the 1960s. Among the early achievements were the re-entry of private and foreign banks (following bank nationalization in 1969), capital market development, and interest rate liberalization. Statutory preemption of banks’ resources has been eased through large reductions in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR).5 Progress has also been made in shifting the regulatory and supervisory framework away from administrative to market-based controls, most notably for commercial banks. Banks and other financial institutions (FIs) are still hindered by large NPAs, but recent moves by the government aimed at introducing a securitization and reconstruction framework for impaired assets and streamlining the bankruptcy procedures are expected to gradually allow these institutions to free up resources and better manage risk. Regulatory oversight of the equity market has also been strengthened in recent years following several major market scandals, but the debt market remains comparatively unregulated, despite a surge in private placements in the mid-to-late 1990s.

5. As a result, by most measures, India has witnessed a steady rise in the level financial intermediation, but the efficiency of intermediation remains constrained by government intervention in the financial sector. While the government has eased substantially many direct controls over the financial sector in the past decade, policies remain in place to directly influence the allocation of financial resources. With rising budget deficits, government market borrowing also began to increase substantially, from 3 percent of GDP in 1996/97 (on a gross annual basis) to an estimated 7½ percent of GDP in 2002/03. The government’s preemption of saving is facilitated by the following:

uA01fig02

India: Change in Government Domestic Liabilities and Government Market Borrowing, 1991/92–2002/03

(In percent of GDP) 1/

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by Reserve Bank of India; and Fund staff estimates.1/ For fiscal year beginning April 1.
  • The commercial banking sector remains concentrated in the hands of PSBs, with these banks tending to play a larger role in financing the public sector than their private counterparts. The share of PSB assets in total commercial bank assets has fallen moderately—from 89 percent at end-1991/92 to 81 percent at end-2001/02 (Table I.1). However, this does not factor government’s ownership (either direct or indirect) in other FIs,6 or PSBs’ stake in some private banks. In addition, compared with private (domestic and foreign) banks, PSBs hold a larger share of total assets in government securities and have more than three times the concentration of loans to public sector undertakings (PSUs) in their portfolios than private banks. Bhattacharya and Patel (2002) argue that these public institutions have failed to intermediate efficiently owing to a lack of proper incentives, evidenced by portfolio cross-contamination and reinforced by greater regulatory forbearance (than private institutions).7 Aside from this, the ability of banks and other FIs to effectively lend is also constrained by comparatively large NPAs as a share of outstanding loans—at 11 percent at PSBs (and considerably higher at the term-lending public FIs), compared with 8¾ percent at private banks at end-2001/02, but down from 16 percent at end-1997/98. The Narasimham Committee II (1998) on financial sector reforms recommended a reduction in the government’s minimum ownership stake in PSBs (currently 51 percent), but no progress has been made in this area.

  • Small savings schemes, which offer savers administered (and relatively high) interest rates and favorable tax treatment, are used to meet the government’s financing needs.8 Given the size and attractiveness of the schemes, they tend to limit banks’ flexibility to change their deposit and lending rates, which potentially distorts financial flows and lowers risk tolerance. Small saving schemes (mainly post office deposits, national saving certificates, and the public provident fund) had an outstanding balance equivalent to 12½ percent of GDP at end March 2003, up from 8¼ percent of GDP just five years earlier.

  • The SLR for banks is relatively high among the small number of countries that still use this type of liquidity requirement. Banks currently hold about 40 percent of prescribed liabilities as central and state government securities and other SLR-approved investments, well about the 25 percent statutory minimum. More generally, government and other approved securities comprise around 30 percent of total commercial bank assets (highest among the PSBs) and rising.9 In view of declines in treasury yields since mid-2001 (by approximately 500 basis points), banks have realized large gains from their government securities holdings (which were equivalent to 21 percent of GDP at end-2002/03, up from 12 percent of GDP at end-1997/98). However, interest rate risk looms large for a number of banks (especially PSBs) in the event of a sizeable rate backup, which could dampen future profits and further constrain lending.10

  • Other government preemptions take the form of directed credit programs and government guaranteed loans. Directed credits in the form of priority sector loans accounted for more than one-third of total outstanding advances of scheduled commercial banks (SCBs)11 at end-2001/02, down only slightly from a decade earlier. In part, this reflects an expansion of the official definition of the priority sector intended to make this a less binding requirement. However, it remains true that a much larger share of priority advances (15½ percent) were considered nonperforming compared with nonpriority advances (10 percent) as of end-March 2001. The Narasimham Committee II also recommended reducing priority sector loans from 40 percent of net bank credit to 10 percent, and simultaneously narrowing the focus of these loans to small farmers and other targeted low-income groups (Table I.2). Banks and development finance institutions (DFIs) also accounted for roughly 40 percent of government guaranteed lending (total state government were guarantees equivalent to 8 percent of GDP at end-March 2001), with loans concentrated in the power and agricultural infrastructure sectors.12 While the default rate is currently low, the combination of government guarantees and reported NPAs at PSBs and DFIs (equivalent to around 3 percent of GDP at end-March 2002) creates a large quasi-fiscal liability, which could have implications for future public saving.

  • Prescribed investment patterns typically require nonbank FIs also to maintain large holdings of central and state government securities and other approved investments (Table I.3). The Life Insurance Corporation (LIC)—India’s large and dominant term life insurer—held an estimated 21 percent of government securities issued as of end March 2002, representing 76 percent of the LIC’s total investments.13 Other approved investments have concentrated in public securities issued to fund heavy industry and infrastructure projects, a number of which have had low overall rates of return.

uA01fig03

India: Trends in Small Savings, 1991/92–2002/03 1/

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by Reserve Bank of India; and Fund staff estimates.1/ For fiscal year beginning April 1.
uA01fig04

India: SLR and Bank Securities Holdings, 1991/02–2002/03

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by Reserve Bank of India; and Fund staff estimates.1/ Government and ether approved securities holdings of scheduled commercial banks through 2001/02 only.2/ On the basis of banks’ gross demand and time liabilities through 2001/02 only.3/ For most of the period, SLR is computed as the ratio of government and other approved securities to net domestic demand and time liabilities.
Table I.1.

India: Financial Intermediation Indicators 1/

article image
Sources: Reserve Bank of India (RBI); Bombay Stock Exchange, and Fund staff estimates.

On a fiscal year basis beginning April 1.

Based on data from RBI’s summary tables on banking statistics through 1999/2000 and staff estimates thereafter. Excludes priority sector advances made through Rural Infrastructure Development Fund and other indirect means

Excluding regional rural banks.

Table I.2.

India: Priority Sector Lending Targets for Scheduled Commercial Banks

(Except regional rural banks)

article image
Source: Compiled from Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular on Lending to Priority Sector (November 2002).

Includes small business and transport operators, retail trade, professional and self-employed persons, housing and education loans, and micro credit.

Indirect finance to agriculture includes deposits held by banks in the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund maintained by NABARD.

Under the DRI scheme, concessional rate of interest (4 percent per annum) provided to select low-income groups.

Shortfalls in achieving target/sub-targets can be met through interest-bearing deposits for one year with Small Industries Development Bank of India.

Table I.3.

India: Prescribed Investment Patterns for Nonbank Financial Institutions

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Source: Compiled from Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 2001–02 Annual Report (India).

Minimum holding as a percent of total investment, unless otherwise indicated.

Maximum holding.

D. Trends in Saving and Financial Flows

6. While household saving continued to rise during the 1990s, domestic saving remained stagnant largely because of widening fiscal deficits (Table I.4). From a cross-country perspective, the overall saving rate in India still compares reasonably well with other low-income countries in the region, but it has not kept pace with those countries experiencing more rapid growth, because of low public saving (Table I.5). In fact, domestic saving (both total and financial) began to show signs of a trend decline in the late 1990s—the first in more than two decades.14

uA01fig05

India: Domestic Saving, 1971/72–2001/02

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Central Statistical Organization and Reserve Bank of India; CEIC; and Fund staff estimates.
Table I.4.

India: Sources of Growth, Saving, and Investment 1/

article image
Sources: Central Statistical Organization; CEIC; and Fund staff estimates.

On a fiscal year basis beginning April 1.

Includes statistical discrepancy on consumption

Includes statistical discrepancy on gross capital formation.

Table I.5.

Regional Comparison of Growth, Saving, and Investment 1/

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Source: WEO; and staff estimates.

Ratio of GDP per capita relative to India.

Excludes highest and lowest observation for each period.

7. As a result, a greater burden has been placed on household financial saving to finance investment. Focusing on 2001/02 (the latest available data), an estimated 87 percent of household financial saving was used to finance the gap between public sector investment and saving by 2001/02, up from 65–70 percent in the mid-1990s. Another 10 percent of household saving was used to finance the private corporate saving-investment gap, but down from 50 percent in the mid-1990s. Reflecting a small current account surplus (the first since the late 1970s), the remaining 3 percent of household financial saving was net saving abroad. Looking at trends over the past decade, the following is also observed:

uA01fig06

India: Domestic Saving by Sectors, 1971/72–2001/02

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Central Statistical Organization and Reserve Bank of India; CEIC; and Fund staff estimates.1/ Public saving less saving by departmental and non-departmental enterprises.
uA01fig07

India: Uses of Household Financial Saving, 1971/72–2001/02

(In percent of household financial saving)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2003, 261; 10.5089/9781451818574.002.A001

Sources: Central Statistical Organization and Reserve Bank of India; CEIC; and Fund staff estimates.1/ Household financial saving includes statistical discrepancy. Private corporate and public are net investment (investment less saving), and foreign is the current account balance.
  • Public sector dissaving was 2½ percent of GDP by 2001/02, compared with saving of 1½ percent of GDP in the early and mid 1990s. Of this, general government dissaving was even larger (at 5¾ percent of GDP in 2001/02).

  • Private corporate saving (as well as private corporate investment) peaked at nearly 5 percent of GDP in 1995/96—nearly double the rate in the early 1990s. Since then, it has declined somewhat to 4 percent of GDP in 2001/02. However, during the same period, private investment decreased by 4 percentage points of GDP to 5 percent of GDP in 2001/02. Some of the pullback in private investment reflects adjustment to boom years in the mid-1990s, but it is clear that there has been a trend decline in investment since the late 1990s. This coupled with reduced financial flows to the corporate sector suggests that crowding out is occurring in India despite recent declines in interest rates

8. Looking ahead, the saving rate would also appear to be insufficient to meeting the government’s growth targets. Under the Ninth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1997/98–2001/02), real GDP growth averaged 5½ percent a year. While this compares reasonably well with the growth performance in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, it fell well short of the plan target of 6½ percent. Both saving and investment stagnated during the Ninth FYP, with gross domestic saving (excluding saving in physical assets) averaging 13½ percent of GDP a year. Under the Tenth FYP, real GDP growth is targeted at 8 percent, underpinned by gross domestic saving (excluding physical assets) equivalent to 18¼ percent of GDP a year.15 Nearly half of this projected rise in saving is expected to come from the public sector. In addition, foreign saving, which has averaged roughly 1 percent of GDP since the 1990s, would be expected to rise to 3 percent of GDP, financed by portfolio flows and FDI, although these would need to rise considerably from current levels.

9. Flow of funds data support the above analysis.16 Focusing on financial flows between 1991/92–1995/96 and 1996/97–2001/02—roughly corresponding to the periods of accelerating and decelerating growth observed over the past decade, as well as to the last two FYPs—the following is observed:17

India: Net Financial Flows by Sector, 1971/72–2002/02 1/

(Annual average for period, in percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Central Statistical Organization; Reserve Bank of India; and staff estimates.

On a fiscal year basis beginning April 1.

A positive sign signifies that a sector’s investments in financial assets and net increases in the value of those assets exceeds the funds made available to a sector ever the specified period.

Gross saving by government administration (center and state governments).

India: Household Sector Financial Flows, 1971/72–2001/02 1/

(Annual average for period, in percent of GDP)

article image
Sources: Central Statistical Organization; Reserve Bank of India; and staff estimates.

On a fiscal year basis beginning April 1.

A positive sign signifies that a sector’s investments in financial assets and net increases in the value of those assets exceeds a funds made available to a sector over the specified period.

Includes statistical dicrepancy.

  • The household sector continues to provide the bulk of net financial flows, consistent with its share of domestic saving. A rising share of funds was intermediated through bank deposits, small savings schemes, and life and pension funds in the second half of the 1990s compared with the first half of the 1990s. As noted earlier, these balances are largely pre-empted by the government. At the same time, net flows to corporate, foreign, and other securities (including mutual funds) declined during the second half of the 1990s.

  • The private corporate sector’s receipt of net financial flows continued to rise through the first half of the 1990s, but not in the second half. Through the first half of the 1990s, the trend reflects a sharp easing of regulatory restrictions on capital market financing and financial repression arising from lending rate caps. Supporting this view, Joseph et al (1999) note that despite a widening gap between private corporate saving and investment, gradual financial liberalization starting in the 1980s allowed medium to large scale firms to meet their financing needs more through external (i.e., outside the firm) versus internal sources of funds. However, the second half of the 1990s has seen some reversal in the private corporate sector’s use of external funds, with new issues of corporate securities (debt and equity) declining from 4 percent of GDP a year in the first half of the 1990s to 2½ percent of GDP a year in the second half.18 19

  • The public sector continued to be a dominant recipient of net financial flows in the 1990s. Net issues of government securities and receipt of small savings were equivalent to nearly 60 percent of the households’ total gross provision of funds during the first half of the 1990s, up from 45 percent in the first half of the 1990s. Comparing the public and private corporate sectors (excluding banks and FIs), net flows to the former exceeded those to the latter by an average of 3½ percent of GDP a year in the first half of the 1990s, but by the second half of the 1990s, the difference increased to 5 percent of GDP a year.

E. Conclusion

10. Efforts in India over the past two decades to raise saving rates and improve financial intermediation have met with considerable success, and compare well with other countries in the region. Gross domestic saving rose steadily through the mid-1990s, propelled in large part by household financial saving, partly reflecting rising income growth, higher real interest rates, and newly available savings instruments. Until the mid-1990s, annual increases in household saving were more than adequate on average to offset the decline in public saving, which nonetheless remained generally moderate owing to some measure of fiscal restraint. Foreign saving also stayed modestly positive. Household saving was sufficient to provide increasing flows to the private corporate sector.

11. Notwithstanding these gains, the deterioration in fiscal situation starting in the mid to late 1990s and the maintenance of an apparatus for pre-empting saving has dampened some of the potential gains from financial sector reform and deepening. Since the early 1990s, direct controls over the pricing of financial products have been eased substantially, the range of financial products and services expanded rapidly, and the regulatory and supervisory framework strengthening considerably. However, significant controls (both direct and indirect) remain over the quantity of financial resources freely available to the private sector through the government’s still heavy preemption of savings, which has become ever present and increasingly binding under the present fiscal stress. While easy monetary conditions and the low interest rate environment has brought some measure of relief, evidence in this and other studies points to some reduced financial flows and credit constraints facing the corporate sector, which may act to reinforce the trend slowdown in growth through weakened investment demand.

References

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  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo, 2002, “Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program,unpublished monograph (May).

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  • Bell, Clive, and Peter L. Rousseau, 2001, “Post-Independence India: A Case of Financed-Led Industrialization?,Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 65, Issue 1 (June), pp. 153175

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  • Bhattacharya, Saugata, and Urjit R. Patel, 2002, “Financial Intermediation in India: A Case of Aggravated Moral Hazard?,paper presented at Third Annual Conference on the Reform of India Economic Policies, Stanford University (June).

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  • Joseph, Mathew, Rupa N. Nitsure, and Madan Sabnavis, 1999, Financing of Indian Firms: Meeting the Needs and Challenges of the Twenty-First Century in India: A Financial Sector for the Twenty-First Century, eds. by James A Hanson and Sanjay Kathuria, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 164201.

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1

Prepared by David Cowen.

2

See Chapter II on recent trends in growth and investment in India—Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix (IMF Country Report No. 02/193).

4

Other factors found to influence the level of saving in India include real interest rates (+), financial deepening (+), and the terms of trade (−).

5

The Reserve Bank of India has reduced the CRR steadily from 15 percent of a bank’s net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) as late as April 1997 to 4½ percent since June 2003. The SLR has stayed at 25 percent of NDTL since October 1997, but is down from a peak of 38½ percent in the early 1990s.

6

These institutions include all-India development banks and specialized financial institutions; the Life Insurance Corporation, Unit Trust of India (mutual fund), National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, and National Housing Bank; and state-level finance and development corporations

7

Cross-contamination is identified by Bhattacharya and Patel (2002) as having two main sources: (i) development finance institutions (DFIs) mobilizing funds through the sale of bonds to other public intermediaries and onlending them to public undertakings, and (ii) PSBs and DFIs subscribing in each other’s paper, which is counted as part of Tier II capital.

8

Around 60 percent of the current balances in small savings schemes enjoy some form of favorable tax treatment (the exceptions being the Indira Vikas Patra and Kisan Vikas Patra schemes).

9

Other approved investments include bonds, debentures, or commercial paper of government banks, FIs, and corporations established or constituted under the Companies Act.

10

See Patnaik and Shah, 2002, “Interest-Rate Risk in the Indian Banking System,” ICRIER Working Paper No. 92 (December).

11

Comprising public sector banks, private sector banks, and foreign banks (branches and subsidiaries), as well as regional rural banks.

12

See “Report of the Group to Assess the Fiscal Risk of State Government Guarantees,” Reserve Bank of India, July 2002.

13

Central, state, and other approved securities, as well as state electricity boards’ bonds, comprised nearly 85 percent of LIC’s total investments at end-March 2002.

14

Gross domestic financial saving is defined as gross domestic saving less household saving in physical assets. Total saving by households (which largely comprise individual households and nongovernment noncorporate firms) is divided into saving in financial assets and in physical assets (i.e., household investment).

15

See Report of the Working Group on Domestic and Financial Saving for the Tenth Five-Year Plan, September 2001.

16

Data on the flow of funds are compiled from the national income accounts and supplemented with flow of funds data compiled by the RBI through 1995/96.

17

These two periods are also referred to as the first and second half of the 1990s.

18

Based on data from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).

19

Shirai (2002) suggests that some of the reduced funding flows in the second half of the 1990s reflects the impact of tightened capital market regulations starting in the mid-1990s, in particular on low-quality firms, forcing them to rely more on internal sources of funds. Under these conditions, large profitable, low-risk, and export-oriented firms were found to more ably substitute bank loans for equity finance.

India: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
Author: International Monetary Fund
  • View in gallery

    India: Fiscal Deficits, Investment, and Growth, 1991/92–2002/03 1/

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

  • View in gallery

    India: Change in Government Domestic Liabilities and Government Market Borrowing, 1991/92–2002/03

    (In percent of GDP) 1/

  • View in gallery

    India: Trends in Small Savings, 1991/92–2002/03 1/

  • View in gallery

    India: SLR and Bank Securities Holdings, 1991/02–2002/03

  • View in gallery

    India: Domestic Saving, 1971/72–2001/02

    (In percent of GDP)

  • View in gallery

    India: Domestic Saving by Sectors, 1971/72–2001/02

    (In percent of GDP)

  • View in gallery

    India: Uses of Household Financial Saving, 1971/72–2001/02

    (In percent of household financial saving)