Belarus: Selected Issues
Author:
International Monetary Fund
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Publication Date:
19 Feb 2002
eISBN:
9781451805062
Language:
English
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; Belarus; wage; subsidy; government; policy challenge; cost indicator; export growth; export transaction; system in Belarus; exports to CIS country; Multiple currency practices; Exchange rates; Real exchange rates; Real effective exchange rates; Global competitiveness
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This Selected Issues paper reviews the external competitiveness of the Belarusian economy, particularly in 2000–01. The analysis starts with an overview of developments in Belarus’ external current account. The paper then examines various competitiveness indicators, most importantly changes in external and internal real exchange rates, as well as labor cost measures. It reviews trade data by sectors to explain recent export performance. The paper also provides an overview of current wage policy and its macroeconomic effects.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper reviews the external competitiveness of the Belarusian economy, particularly in 2000–01. The analysis starts with an overview of developments in Belarus’ external current account. The paper then examines various competitiveness indicators, most importantly changes in external and internal real exchange rates, as well as labor cost measures. It reviews trade data by sectors to explain recent export performance. The paper also provides an overview of current wage policy and its macroeconomic effects.

II. An Assessment of Belarus’s External Competitiveness1

A. Introduction

1. The unification of exchange rates in September 2000 and an unexpected strengthening of Belarus’s external current account, especially in the first half of 2001, call for a review of the country’s external competitiveness. Belarus is a small, open economy. Trade volumes typically exceed GDP by more than 20 percent. Trade with Russia alone is equivalent to about 50 percent of GDP each year. At the same time, Belarus posted sizable deficits in its external current account from the beginning of data reporting in 1993 until 1999. A multiple currency practice was in place from January 1996 to September 2000. However, following an already more favorable export performance since 2000 and the unification of official exchange rates during the same year, Belarus’s external current account closed with a surplus at end-June 2001. This has raised expectations that Belarus’s external competitiveness may have improved recently.

2. This chapter reviews the external competitiveness of the Belarusian economy, particularly in 2000-01. The analysis starts with an overview of developments in Belarus’s external current account (Section B). Section C examines various competitiveness indicators, most importantly changes in external and internal real exchange rates, as well as labor cost measures. Section D reviews trade data by sector to explain recent export performance. Section E summarizes and concludes the chapter.

B. Recent Balance of Payments Developments

3. Belarus experienced current account deficits during 1993-2000 (Table 1), although the country’s external position improved markedly following the 1998 Russian crisis. The deficit reached its highest level (7 percent of GDP) in 1998, before dropping to about 2 percent of GDP in 1999-2000. A surplus of more than 4 percent of six-month GDP was recorded in the first half of 2001.

4. The recent strengthening of Belarus’s external current account is partly the result of sluggish domestic demand for imported goods. Annual average import growth (in value terms) fell from almost 40 percent during 1994—97 to about 15 percent in 2000-01. This reflects a weakening of the Belarusian enterprise sector in recent years. Growth in industrial output fell steadily to less than 5 percent during January-September 2001, from 19 percent in 1997. Furthermore, enterprises report a sharp increase in inventories, noncash transactions and domestic arrears, as well as a significant deterioration in their financial position. Inventories of industrial goods climbed to almost 70 percent of monthly production in June 2001, from about 60 percent in January. Domestic barter also rose substantially: at end-May 2001 barter transactions accounted for almost 50 percent of GDP, compared to 40 percent in early 2000. Finally, about 40 percent of enterprises were nonprofitable at end-August 2001, while another 30 percent posted small profit margins.

Table 1.

Belarus: Balance of Payments, 1993-2001 (H1)

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Sources: Belarusian authorities; and EDSS data base.

All accumulation, repayment, and forgiveness of arrears.

Ratios for 1999 reflect the steep devaluation of the exchange rate.

5. The recent strengthening of Belarus’s external current account is also the result of improved export performance. While the Russian recovery explains some of these developments, export data warrant an assessment of the external competitiveness of the Belarusian economy. Exports of goods grew at a similar annual average rate as imports (almost 10 percent) during 1995-99. However, average growth during 2000-01 is expected to reach almost 20 percent, some 5 percentage points higher than average import growth during the same period. Developments in the services balance point in the same direction: net services exports are expected to grow by 6 percent in 2001, following almost 80 percent growth in 2000.

C. Competitiveness Indicators

6. This section calculates and analyzes trends in various measures of external and internal real exchange rates. The external real (effective) exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the (weighted) average price or cost index in the reporting country to the corresponding index in the partner countries. Several of those ratios are presented below. The analysis is extended by adding a number of internal real exchange rates, defined as the ratio of the price of nontradable to tradable goods in the reporting country. Finally, some key labor cost indicators are discussed.2

7. The external and internal real exchange rate series do not allow for a clear assessment of external competitiveness in Belarus due to sensitivity to exchange rate assumptions and price distortions. For example, an indicator could show improvement in external competitiveness when using the official exchange rate, but a deterioration when using the parallel market rate or a weighted average of the two. At the same time, distortions in the domestic price system may explain why changes in the internal real exchange rate based on manufacturing and agriculture prices (thus avoiding the exchange rate altogether) indicate an improvement in Belarus’s international trade competitiveness. To clarify this picture, the final set of indicators tries to assess Belarus’s external competitiveness on the basis of labor costs. They all show a weakening of the country’s external position.

External real exchange rates

8. Changes in the real exchange rate of the Belarusian rubel against the Russian ruble and the dollar may serve as a first approximation to assessing changes in Belarus’s external competitiveness. However, due to a multiple currency practice from January 1996 to September 2000, the analysis separates movements in the official exchange rate from the parallel market rate until exchange rate unification in September 2000. The official rate was less favorable for external trade prior to unification, effectively imposing a tax on the export sector.

9. Figure 1 suggests a weakening of Belarus’s position in world and—even more so—regional trade since 1999, following initial gains from the steep devaluation of the Belarusian rubel during the Russian crisis. The parallel market rate of the Belarusian rubel has steadily appreciated in real terms against the Russian ruble and the dollar, since shortly after the crisis. Moreover, the Belarusian rubel appreciated faster against the Russian ruble than the dollar. However, developments may have been more favorable since the exchange rate unification. The real appreciation of the unified Belarusian rubel rate slowed down after September 2000, coming to a standstill against the Russian ruble shortly thereafter.

Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Belarus: Real Exchange Rate Developments, January 1997-September 2001 1/

(Index, 1995=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: National Bank of Belarus; and Fund staff estimates.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation.2/ The parallel market exchange rate is the offshore rate in Moscow until 1997 and the domestic noncash interbank rate outside the Belarus Currency and Stock Exchange fom 1998 until the unification of exchange rates in September 2000.

10. The hypothesis that Belarus gained competitiveness since 1998 cannot be rejected on the basis of the movements of various external real effective exchange rates. However, Belarus may have lost ground relative to its western competitors and trading partners. Figure 2 shows the monthly CPI-based real effective exchange rate (REER) for Belarus as calculated by the IMF Information Notice System (INS), using the official exchange rate.3 The graph indicates that in the aftermath of the Russian crisis the REER appreciated to record levels for about three months, but returned to 1998 levels by mid-1999. The appreciation of the real effective exchange rate peaked again in the spring of 2000, before the Belarusian authorities unified the official with the parallel market exchange rate. Following the unification, the depreciation of the official exchange rate brought the real effective exchange rate down, to a level close to the beginning of 1995.

Figure 2.
Figure 2.

Belarus: Official Exchange Rate in Real Effective Terms, November 1993-June 2001 1/

(Index, 1995=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: INS database.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation.

11. The results discussed in paragraph 10 above are not very sensitive to updating trade weights. The changes in the REER on the basis of 2000 trade weights look very similar to the ones shown in Figure 2, most likely due to the overriding importance of Russia as Belarus’s main trading partner. In effect, a series of the official exchange rate in real effective terms including Russia as the only trading partner would look very similar to Figure 2.

12. Belarus’s external competitiveness suffered less in western markets following the Russian crisis, at least until end-2000. Excluding Russia, real effective exchange rate movements against the dollar and the Deutschmark/euro were less pronounced (Figure 3). During the first six months of 2001, however, the REER against the dollar and the Deutschmark/euro started to appreciate, when the overall trend was in the opposite direction.

Figure 3.
Figure 3.

Belarus: Real Effective Exchange Rate against Western Trading Partners, January 1994 - June 2001

(Index, 1995=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: INS database; and Fund staff estimates.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation

13. Using a basket of Belarus’s main competitors and weights that reflect their relative importance (Table 2), the path of the REER again looks almost identical to the one reflecting the updated trade weights. This outcome is not surprising, since Belarus’s main trading partners are also its main competitors.

Table 2.

Belarus: Main Competitors

article image
Source: Belarusian authorities.

14. The positive effect of the exchange rate unification on Belarus’s competitiveness during 2000 was probably more limited than suggested by Figures 2 and 3 because the official exchange rate was not used for many international current transactions. While the surrender requirement ensured that about a third of the transactions was converted at the official exchange rate, foreign exchange proceeds from the remaining 70 percent was either kept in foreign currency and/or exchanged at the parallel rate. Nevertheless, the exchange rate unification appears to have helped Belarus’s export performance since early 2000.

15. Other competitiveness measures are clearly needed before firmer conclusions can be drawn. First, while the INS calculations above are CPI-based, the price system in Belarus remains distorted, with some price controls still in place. Furthermore, more than 20 percent of exports and about 15 percent of imports were traded under barter agreements during the first six months of 2001, generally involving discounts on registered prices (of which many are subject to minimum export price regulations), further distorting the picture. Second, the official exchange rate was only one of the two main exchange rates used in international current transactions until September 2000.

16. In view of these difficulties, this chapter examines other measures of external competitiveness. The first additional measure involves the calculation of a real exchange rate using the GDP deflator and the parallel market exchange rate. This will be compared with a measure using the same price index ratio but the official exchange rate instead. The advantage of the GDP deflator is that it eliminates imported inflation to a greater extent than the CPI; the latter generally includes a larger number of imported goods. This comparison may also reveal the sensitivity of any conclusions to the exchange rate used.

17. Figure 4 shows that movements in the REER during 1995-2000 are relatively robust regarding a change in price index, but highly sensitive to the choice of exchange rate. The Belarusian rubel appreciated in real terms against the currencies of the country’s main trading partners during 1993-98 (with the exception of 1997), when the official exchange rate is used. The real appreciation tapered off in 1999. The year 2000 witnessed a small depreciation in real terms, confirming earlier results.

Figure 4.
Figure 4.

Belarus: Different Exchange Rates in Real Effective Terms using the GDP Deflator, 1993-2000 1/

(Index, 1995=1)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: WEO database; and Fund staff estimates.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation.

18. Using the parallel market exchange rate, however, the Belarusian rubel depreciated sharply in real terms during 1995-98 (Figure 5). Moreover, while developments in the official exchange rate were favorable for the export sector during 1999-2000, the parallel market exchange rate appreciated by almost 100 percent in real terms during the same period. According to Figure 4, Belarus’s external competitiveness has deteriorated significantly since 1998. This result is confirmed when using a weighted average of both exchange rates, to account for the 30-percent surrender requirement.

Figure 5.
Figure 5.

Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using Manufacturing versus Agriculture Prices, 1993-2001 Q1 1/

(Index, 1995=100)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: Belarusian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation.

Internal real exchange rates

19. Another indicator of changes in external competitiveness is the internal real exchange rate, using more disaggregated price level data, in an attempt to avoid the shortcomings of the CPI. One of the measures presented below also circumvents the use of exchange rate data, eliminating another source of large distortions due to multiple currency practice. The internal real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the price of nontradable to tradable goods in Belarus. Movements in this ratio importantly affect the allocation of resources between these two categories of goods, and influence Belarus’s external competitiveness. More precisely, if the relative price of nontradables increases, resources will be shifted to that sector, resulting in a deterioration of export competitiveness.

20. It has been common practice in the literature to use the price indices of manufacturing and agriculture as proxies for the prices of tradables and nontradables, respectively.4 Figure 5 shows the movements in the real exchange rate defined as the ratio of the price index of both product groups. Ignoring exchange rate movements in the calculation of this indicator, the evolution of this internal real exchange rate is significantly smoother than changes in any of the external real effective exchange rates. At the same time, this indicator suggests that a period of continued real appreciation came to a halt in 2000. More significantly, Belarus’s competitiveness improved significantly during the first quarter of 2001. The plotted series would therefore support the view that Belarus gained external competitiveness recently, similar to the REER calculations based on official exchange rate data.

21. However, since agricultural products may be tradable goods, the literature suggests several other approximations to measuring price changes of tradables compared to nontradables. One is to take, on an annual basis, world market producer prices as a measure for the price of tradables and the domestic CPI and PPI as a proxy for the price of nontradables. Adopting a methodology recently used for Ukraine, the index for the world market price of tradables is calculated as a weighted average of the producer price indices of the five major industrial economies (the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan), using the SDR weights during 1996-98 (Table 3).5

Table 3.

Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate (RER), 1994-2001

(Index, 1995=100)

article image
Sources: Belarusian authorities; Fund staff estimates and projections; and WEO database.

Using the parallel market exchange rate.

SDR-weighted average. During the period January 1, 1996 - January 1, 1999, the weights in the SDR basket were: 39 percent for the U.S. dollar, 21 percent for the German mark, 18 percent for the Japanese yen, and 11 percent each for the French franc and the pound sterling.

22. Following this methodology, and at the same time using the parallel market exchange rate, Belarus gained external competitiveness during 1994-98 but lost most of these gains thereafter, with the index approaching 1995-levels during 2001 (Figure 6). This behavior is also broadly similar to the external real exchange rate estimates when they are based on the parallel market or weighted average exchange rate (Figure 4). The results are not very sensitive to using the CPI compared to the PPI, although the latter produces worse outcomes; the country mainly trades in industrial products that are included in the PPI but not in the CPI.

Figure 6.
Figure 6.

Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using World Market Producer Prices, 1995-2001 (est.) 1/

(Index, 1995=1)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Source: Belarusian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.1/ An increase indicates an appreciation.

Labor costs

23. If one were to look at movements in wages in dollar terms as a first approximation to assessing changes in the country’s external competitiveness on a cost basis, a loss of competitiveness is found (Table 4). Together with Lithuania, Belarus is the only country in the sample of Table 2 where wages in dollar terms more than tripled during 1994—2000. Furthermore, although wages in dollar terms were initially lower in Belarus than in Russia and in Ukraine, they have exceeded wages in Russia since 1999, and in Ukraine since 1995. Using the parallel market exchange rate, the rise in labor costs is less pronounced but still very significant. While dollar wages in Russia fell by almost 20 percent during 1993-2000, they rose by more than 130 percent in Belarus (more than 230 percent when using the official exchange rate). Therefore, the evolution of wages in dollar terms seems to support a loss in competitiveness in recent years. Labor and/or total factor productivity are not likely to have increased sufficiently to support such large wage increases. Belarus’s external competitiveness is likely to have suffered further in 2001, an electoral year. The President promised to raise average wages by end-year to $100 economy-wide. In the public sector, they reached $88 in September, while they rose to $97 economy-wide at the same time. This reflects an increase in wages in dollar terms of almost 30 percent compared to December 2000.

Table 4.

Belarus: Average Monthly Wage, 1993-2000

(In U.S. dollars; unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Source: WEO database; OECD database; and Fund staff estimates.

Percentage change for 2000 over 1994.

At the official exchange rate.

At the parallel market exchange rate.

24. Unit labor cost is one of the preferred indicators of competitiveness and is measured by dividing wages by output. Accurate calculations of unit labor cost for Belarus are difficult because of data shortcomings. Staff estimates indicate that the unit labor cost index for Belarus rose by almost 20 percent during 1994—2000 (Table 5)—only Latvia and Turkey observed sharper increases. Russian unit labor cost, by contrast, fell by about 20 percent during the same period. The unit labor cost index for Belarus for 2001 is expected to rise by at least 20 percent compared to 2000. The second labor cost indicator therefore confirms the evidence of a loss of external competitiveness.

Table 5.

Belarus: Unit Labor Cost, 1993-2000

(Index numbers; unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Source: WEO database; OECD database; and Fund staff estimates.

Percentage change for 2000 over 1994.

25. Detailed productivity data are not available for Belarus. Staff estimates of average productivity suggest that it has been rather volatile and below 1995-levels until 2000, in dollar terms and measured at the parallel exchange rate (Figure 7). The lowest level was reached in 1998. At the same time, quickly rising unit labor costs suggest that wages in Belarus have been growing faster in recent years than average productivity.

Figure 7.
Figure 7.

Belarus: Average Productivity, 1993-2000

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 2002, 022; 10.5089/9781451805062.002.A002

Sources: WEO database; and Fund staff estimates.

D. Export Performance by Sector

26. Strong export growth in 2000-01 remains puzzling in light of evidence suggesting a loss of competitiveness. While the Russian recovery is likely to have contributed to Belarus’s improved trade balance in 2000, disaggregation of trade data may provide further insights. A review of trade data for 2000–01 does not provide any evidence of external competitiveness gains. On the contrary, exports to CIS countries have not even managed to regain pre-crisis levels in traditional export industries.

27. Trade data for 2000 are in line with results from the real exchange rate and labor cost analyses above; they do not provide evidence of competitiveness gains during that year. Non-oil exports to non-CIS countries stagnated,6 while export growth to Russia and the CIS could be attributed mainly to a recovery in Russia. Furthermore, the recovery was limited to the country’s traditional industries, where it continues to have a quasi-monopolistic position in the region (Table 6). While non-oil exports to non-CIS countries were affected by the Russian crisis earlier than exports to CIS countries, they recovered quickly to above-crisis levels in 1999. However, these exports remained flat in 2000. This suggests that Belarus may initially have gained some external competitiveness from the steep devaluation of the Belarusian rubel during the crisis period. However, the level of exports could at best be maintained throughout 2000, in line with preliminary results from section C above. With respect to non-oil exports to CIS countries, Belarusian exports to the region fell significantly short of pre-crisis levels. Furthermore, growth mainly results from sales of the textiles (fibers), machinery (refrigerators and TV sets), vehicles (tractors and tucks), and—to a lesser extent—cement industries, the pillars of the old Soviet production system in Belarus. Therefore, trade data do not support the view that Belarus became more competitive relative to regional trading partners in 2000.

Table 6.

Belarus: Exports by Sector, 1997-2000

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Source: Belarusian authorities.

28. Trade data for 2001 confirm this picture (Table 7). Export growth is explained by intensifying trade with CIS countries and is again restricted to Belarus’s traditional export sectors, while exports to non-CIS countries dropped compared to 2000. More importantly, growth seems to be slowing down in those sectors that face increasing competition from abroad, particularly durable consumer goods and textiles. Furthermore, most of the export growth in the first quarter is reportedly explained by a small number of large and exceptional export transactions.

Table 7.

Belarus: Exports by Type of Product, 2000-01

(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

article image
Source: Belarusian authorities.

E. Summary and Conclusion

29. Cost-based measures of external competitiveness indicate that Belarus’s economy has been losing ground against its main competitors in recent years. While wages in dollar terms were below the levels in Russia and Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s, accelerated wage increases eroded any initial advantage, and are likely to have contributed to a substantial weakening of Belarus’s external position since the late 1990s. A basic estimate of average productivity suggests that there is little room for (further) real appreciation. On the contrary, a real depreciation seems to be warranted against the background of rising wages, although the demand for Belarus’s traditional export goods remains relatively price-inelastic, limiting potentially damaging effects of a less flexible exchange rate policy. Indicators of external competitiveness based on price data point strongly in the same direction, when using the parallel market exchange rate. In that case, both external and internal real exchange rate measures signal a significant appreciation during 2000-01. Trade data support this outcome. Favorable export performance during 2000-01 seems to be exceptional (and partly related to the end of the Russian crisis). Furthermore, Belarus’s exports typically benefit from Russia’s growth performance only in those industries where the country has a quasi-monopolistic share in the markets of Russia and other CIS countries.

30. In contrast, competitiveness indicators based on price data point to a moderate improvement of Belarus’s external position when using the official exchange rate or domestic prices only. However, the latter is likely to result from distorted price and exchange rate data, reflecting extensive price and exchange controls.

References

  • Berengaut, J. and others, forthcoming, “Recovery without Reforms? An Interim Assessment of Ukrainian Output Developments, 2000-01,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

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  • Gelb, Alan and associates, 1988, “Oil Windfalls. Blessing or Curse?”, The World Bank and Oxford University Press (Washington).

  • Lipschitz L. and D. McDonald, 1991, “Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: A Clarification of Concepts and some Measurements for Europe”, IMF Working Paper 91/25 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

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  • Marsh, Ian W. and Stephen P. Tokarick, 1994, “Competitiveness Indicators: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment”, IMF Working Paper 94/29 (Washington: International Monetary Fund)

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1

Prepared by Joerg Zeuner.

2

For a review of various external competitiveness indicators, see Lipschitz and McDonald (1991), and Marsh and Tokarick (1994).

3

The country weights used by the INS reflect the relative shares in Belarus’s trade in 1995.

4

See, for example, Gelb and associates (1988).

6

About 60 percent of Belarus’s crude oil imports are re-exported as refined products.

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Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Belarus: Selected Issues
Author:
International Monetary Fund
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2002: Issue 022
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
9781451805062
ISSN:
1934-7685
Pages:
120
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451805062.002
  • Figure 1.
    View in gallery
    Figure 1.

    Belarus: Real Exchange Rate Developments, January 1997-September 2001 1/

    (Index, 1995=100)

  • Figure 2.
    View in gallery
    Figure 2.

    Belarus: Official Exchange Rate in Real Effective Terms, November 1993-June 2001 1/

    (Index, 1995=100)

  • Figure 3.
    View in gallery
    Figure 3.

    Belarus: Real Effective Exchange Rate against Western Trading Partners, January 1994 - June 2001

    (Index, 1995=100)

  • Figure 4.
    View in gallery
    Figure 4.

    Belarus: Different Exchange Rates in Real Effective Terms using the GDP Deflator, 1993-2000 1/

    (Index, 1995=1)

  • Figure 5.
    View in gallery
    Figure 5.

    Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using Manufacturing versus Agriculture Prices, 1993-2001 Q1 1/

    (Index, 1995=100)

  • Figure 6.
    View in gallery
    Figure 6.

    Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using World Market Producer Prices, 1995-2001 (est.) 1/

    (Index, 1995=1)

  • Figure 7.
    View in gallery
    Figure 7.

    Belarus: Average Productivity, 1993-2000

Figure 1.

Belarus: Real Exchange Rate Developments, January 1997-September 2001 1/

(Index, 1995=100)
Figure 2.

Belarus: Official Exchange Rate in Real Effective Terms, November 1993-June 2001 1/

(Index, 1995=100)
Figure 3.

Belarus: Real Effective Exchange Rate against Western Trading Partners, January 1994 - June 2001

(Index, 1995=100)
Figure 4.

Belarus: Different Exchange Rates in Real Effective Terms using the GDP Deflator, 1993-2000 1/

(Index, 1995=1)
Figure 5.

Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using Manufacturing versus Agriculture Prices, 1993-2001 Q1 1/

(Index, 1995=100)
Figure 6.

Belarus: Internal Real Exchange Rate using World Market Producer Prices, 1995-2001 (est.) 1/

(Index, 1995=1)
Figure 7.

Belarus: Average Productivity, 1993-2000