People’s Republic of China-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region1: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix

This Selected Issues paper analyzes the long-term fiscal policy in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the anticipated structural changes in the economy. The paper examines the factors that contributed to the stability of the banking system in Hong Kong SAR by assessing the roles played by banks, equity markets, and debt markets. The study describes a procedure to extract the probability distribution of future exchange rate movements based on currency option data. The paper also provides a statistical appendix report of the country.


This Selected Issues paper analyzes the long-term fiscal policy in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the anticipated structural changes in the economy. The paper examines the factors that contributed to the stability of the banking system in Hong Kong SAR by assessing the roles played by banks, equity markets, and debt markets. The study describes a procedure to extract the probability distribution of future exchange rate movements based on currency option data. The paper also provides a statistical appendix report of the country.

II. How Hong Kong SAR Banks Survived the Asian Crisis1

A. Introduction

1. Banking sector problems were a common thread among the crisis countries in Asia. Weaknesses in the financial sector were one of the main factors leading to the crisis, and were exacerbated by the ensuing economic disruption and output declines. Since 1997, Hong Kong SAR banks were hit by a series of negative shocks—major speculative attacks on the currency and financial markets, interest rate hikes, large capital outflows, sharp asset price declines, and output contraction. However, the deterioration of bank portfolios was less pronounced than in other Asian countries, where full-blown banking crises developed. The asset quality and profitability of Hong Kong SAR banks remained strong, even compared to Singapore and Taiwan Province of China banks, which were less affected by the crisis.

2. This paper examines the factors that contributed to the stability of the banking system in Hong Kong SAR. Sound banking and prudent macroeconomic policies differentiated Hong Kong SAR from other countries in the region. The main distinguishing features were low corporate leverage; strong legal system and banking regulations; prudent bank management; lack of government influence over lending decisions; relatively good accounting standards and disclosure requirements; competent supervision; and a stable exchange rate. In addition, Hong Kong SAR banks had already prepared for the transfer of sovereignty to the Mainland in 1997 by increasing their liquidity. The confluence of these factors created an environment in which financial institutions had the incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking, evaluate credit prospects impartially, and maintain high liquidity and capital ratios, which helped in limiting the impact of the crisis on Hong Kong SAR banks.

B. Pre-Crisis Similarities and Post-Crisis Divergence

3. Based on standard macro indicators, Hong Kong SAR did not differ significantly from the other Asian countries prior to the crisis. It had relatively strong reserve position, and external and fiscal accounts; however, it had experienced rapid credit growth, significant real exchange rate appreciation, and an asset price bubble (Table II. 1)2. The increase in property prices in Hong Kong SAR during the pre-crisis period of rapid economic growth was one of the fastest in the world. Residential prices in 1997 were four times higher than in the early 1990s. According to a study by Duenwald et al. (2000), a property price bubble of some 45 percent had developed by mid-1997. The run up in stock prices was also faster that in the rest of the countries—stock prices in Hong Kong SAR have doubled between 1995 and mid-1997.

Table II.1.

Early Warning Indicators of Banking Crisis

article image
Sources: CEIC; IFS; and staff estimates. Property prices refer to residential property prices.

The percentage rate of change of the real exchange rate between the end of 1996 and the average over 1988–90.

Lending boom is defined as die growth of the private credit-to-GDP ratio between 1993 and 1997.

4. Bank-level indicators also gave mixed signals before the crisis. Returns on assets in most countries were relatively strong, although differences in accounting standards make cross-country comparison difficult. However, there was a rise in foreign borrowing across all countries, and bank exposure to the booming asset markets increased. Hong Kong SAR bank loans to the property sector, at 50 percent of domestic loans, were by far the highest in the group. Indirect exposure was even larger than 50 percent, since property is the most common collateral for all types of loans. Equity was also accepted as collateral in most countries, making collateral valuations dependent on the level of the stock market as well.

Bank Profitability: Return on Assets

article image
Source: Fitch IBFA Bankscope.

5. The post-crisis deterioration of bank portfolios in Hong Kong SAR was relatively less pronounced, despite an asset market collapse and a prolonged recession. While there is an overall positive relationship between the depth of the recession and bank performance measures (Table II.2), Hong Kong SAR is a clear outlier. Despite an acute recession and deep declines in asset prices, Hong Kong SAR banks stand out as the best performers in the group, with strong profits and reasonably good asset quality; especially when compared to Taiwan Province of China3 and Singapore—both of which were less affected by the crisis, had good macroeconomic and banking fundamentals, and registered continued strong growth. In contrast, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia experienced a full-blown financial crisis with sharp increase in nonperforming loans and negative returns. Government interventions were necessary to revive the financial systems.

Table II.2.

Severity of the Crisis

article image
Sources: CEIC; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; IFS; and staff estimates.

Percent of total loans, includes loans in asset mangement companies.

U.S. dollars per unit of local currency, January 1997 = 100.

C. Surviving the Crisis: Good Policies, Good Banking, or Good Luck?

6. How Hong Kong SAR banks were able to survive the crisis relatively unscathed remains puzzling. Property price adjustments of similar magnitude have led to serious banking crisis in Japan, the Nordic countries, and the United States in the last two decades. Banks also underwent substantial balance sheet adjustments as capital outflows from the Hong Kong SAR banking sector amounted to 35 percent of GDP in 1998.4 Furthermore, Hong Kong SAR banks also faced the failure of GITIC, a large investment trust company in the Mainland, at the end of 1998. This section argues that conservative banking practices, sound macroeconomic policies, and generally favorable external environment were crucial factors in the survival of Hong Kong SAR banks. The structure of the banking sector, characterized by large foreign ownership and dominance of internationally diversified banks, also helped (see Box II.1 for general description of the banking system).

Good Policies

7. Good macroeconomic policies were important in safeguarding the banking sector in Hong Kong SAR. In contrast to other countries with previously fixed exchange regimes, strong reserve position and a fiscal surplus allowed Hong Kong SAR to defend its currency under significant speculative pressures. The collapse of the currencies in the region (Table II.2) made impossible the repayment of their large foreign-denominated debts and led to a sudden deterioration in bank portfolios. The historical credibility of the currency board in Hong Kong SAR had led to the virtual equalization of domestic and U.S. interest rates, so most domestic loans had been extended in local currency and there was little foreign currency mismatch at a bank level (Table II.3). That underpinned public confidence in the banking system in the period of exchange rate pressures.

Table II.3.

Hong Kong SAR: Performance Ratios of the Banking Sector

(In percent)

article image

As a percentage of total loans for use in Hong Kong SAR.

As a percentage of total external claims of Hong Kong SAR.

8. The authorities’ timely actions during the crisis helped contain the damage to banks’ balance sheets.

  • Through a controversial intervention in the stock market, speculation was discouraged and interest rates came down fairly quickly.

  • In June 1998, the Hong Kong SAR government announced that local corporations will be exempt from paying profits tax on interest income derived from HK$ deposits, which induced firms to repatriate offshore deposits, partially offsetting the capital outflow.

  • The HKMA introduced a number of technical reforms to strengthen the currency board system and minimize its susceptibility to speculative attacks in 1998. The introduction of a discount window facility improved liquidity management in the banking system and reduced interest rate volatility in the interbank market. New regulations were put in place to limit manipulation of the stock market (see SM/99/04,1/8/99, for details).

9. Hong Kong SAR has a modern regulatory system, strong bankruptcy law, and efficient enforcement procedures. The Hong Kong SAR legal system for debt recovery is tailored after the English legal system which provides strong protection of creditor rights. In cross-country comparisons of legal systems, Hong Kong SAR is rated highly in terms of efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, and lack of corruption. Foreclosure procedures in Hong Kong SAR are very efficient. In most cases, foreclosures are completed within 3 to 6 months. That has contributed to the relatively low default rates on collaterahzed loans (default rate on mortgages has remained under 1 percent). The favorable operating environment, based on market principles and the rule of law, has allowed banks to build high quality portfolios which increased their resilience to shocks.

Rule of Law

article image
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).The scores are on a scale of 1 to 10. The maximum score is 10.

10. Prudential regulations and accounting standards in Hong Kong SAR have been continuously upgraded. A serious banking crisis in the mid-1980s prompted the authorities to amend the Bank Ordinance and increase the powers of bank supervisors in 1986. Further revisions were introduced after one bank (BCCI) failed, and a series of bank runs occurred in 1991. HKMA has been entrusted with the supervisory power since its establishment in the early 1990s. Its staff consists of highly qualified professionals, often with extensive international experience.5 Data provision for supervisory purposes is of generally high quality and frequency (Box II.2). Given the high concentration of loans to the property sector, the monetary authorities have suggested guidelines according to which the loan-to-value ratio for new loans should be 70 percent or less. All banks had adhered to these limits and that mitigated the shock from the collapse in asset prices. The average loan-to-value ratio for all outstanding mortgage loans has stayed in a comfortable 60–62 percent range since 1998.

11. The supervisory body stepped up its oversight activities during the crisis. On-site examinations of all local banks were performed semi-annually in 1998 and 1999, and there was continuous off-site monitoring. Due to an upgrade in reporting requirements in 1994, banks were already providing financial data to the supervisors on a regular basis, including standard classification of loans, which made it easier for the authorities to identify problem areas and weaker banks and concentrate resources on them. Banks were encouraged to classify loans based on the soundness of the borrower, not only on the basis of interest accrual. They were also required to provision adequately for classified loans. Although there is no formal consolidated supervision across financial markets, there has been continuous exchange of information between the banking and securities market regulators. The recent establishment of the Council of Financial Regulators provides an official forum for discussion and oversight of cross-market linkages.

12. A well developed equity market partially compensated for the decline in bank lending after the crisis. That prompted the authorities to emphasize further the development of financial infrastructure since the crisis. Steps have been taken to encourage the growth of a debt market and to reduce the costs of issuing equity. Another major benefit of more diversified financial markets is likely to accrue from the higher accounting standards, better transparency, and improved corporate governance required for the development of capital markets.

Good Banking

13. Hong Kong SAR has a tradition of conservative banking practices and strong market discipline. Banks have historically been prudently run and profitable, with high returns on equity and healthy interest margins (Table II.3). Banks were well capitalized, with high liquidity ratios and good asset quality. This provided them with the necessary cushion to absorb unexpected shocks. Market discipline on the sector is strong—there are 19 publicly traded local banks and bank-holding companies, regularly followed by analysts, representing 83 percent of the assets of all local banks. Larger banks often issue bonds and subordinated debt which also subjects them to market scrutiny. The large number of small, mostly family-owned, financial institutions have been conservatively managed, and depositors can easily switch to another institution if a bank is perceived to be weak.

14. Moral hazard in the banking sector is minimal. There are no government-owned banks and no directed lending in Hong Kong SAR in contrast to all other countries in the sample. No formal safety nets exist (a deposit-insurance scheme is now being contemplated), and the perception of implicit government insurance is limited to banks which may be too big to fail. Under the currency board, the HKMA has limited powers to act as a lender of last resort. The monetary authorities have repeatedly made public statements that they will only act as a lender of last resort in cases where a bank failure threatens the stability of the system, and will not intervene to rescue individual banks. This threat was at least partially credible since the authorities allowed the failure of BCCI in 1991, although depositors eventually recovered their deposits in full. During the banking crisis of the 1980s, the government did not intervene explicitly except in the case of two banks. Large banks effectively acted as a lender of last resort and took over smaller ailing banks. In the few bank runs that occurred in the 1990s, the authorities issued statements of support, but no liquidity support was needed. Since 1995, a law was accepted that gives priority to small depositors in cases of bank liquidation.

15. Relatively low corporate leverage was a key factor contributing to the resilience of Hong Kong SAR. Compared to Asian countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Hong Kong SAR has the lowest debt-to-equity ratio, the lowest total debt-to-asset ratio among the Asian countries, and one of the highest coverage ratios—measured as profits to interest expenses (Chart II.1). The financial strength of the large corporate borrowers was crucial in weathering the liquidity squeeze after the crisis—loan recalls by banks were financed largely by liquidation of overseas corporate assets. Local banks recalled loans equivalent to 18 percent of GDP and reduced lending to local corporates by 12 percent of GDP.

Chart II.1.
Corporate Leverage Indicators, 1997

(Measured for the median of all traded companies)

Source: Bloomberg.

16. Conservative lending practices also aided in limiting the deterioration in bank portfolios. Hong Kong SAR is a highly open economy, heavily influenced by external developments, and with relatively volatile asset prices. Banks have adjusted by choosing a relatively low risk profile, high liquidity and capital ratios. Two recent studies provide qualitative ranking of regulatory strength and bank soundness across Asian countries as of 1997 (Table II.4 and Caprio, 1998). The presented indicators of bank strength, prudential norms, and corporate leverage are highly correlated with the severity of banking crises across Asian countries and can complement macroeconomic indicators in an early warning system.

Summary Measures of Bank Strength

article image
The score for each category represents the relative ranking of the country among a group of twelve.Lower total score signals relatively stronger position.Source: Gerard Caprio (1998).
Table II.4.

Comparison of Prudential Norms Across Asia (Required and Actual Practices) Using the CAMELOT Framework

article image
Source: Roy Ramos, Asia Banking Survey, March 1, 1999, Goldman Sachs.

17. Reporting standards and transparency of the financial condition of banks are the best in the region. Annual financial statements are released to the public both for listed and nonlisted banks and, according to market analysts, the statements are informative about the true condition of the financial institutions since accounting norms are relatively good. Good accounting standards and disclosure rules can improve transparency, mitigating information problems inherent in financial intermediation, and enhance market discipline. While periods of euphoria and strong credit growth seem to be a cyclical phenomena in countries of all stages of economic development, cycles may be less extreme and crises can be avoided as better transparency allows investors to make informed and timely decisions.

18. The dominant banks in Hong Kong SAR were sophisticated international financial institutions with diversified portfolios and good risk management systems. They were in a better position to respond to an unexpected liquidity shock than the local banks in other countries in the region. The large Hong Kong SAR corporates were also diversified, with significant foreign investments, including investments in the Mainland which was little affected by the crisis. Their revenues remained relatively stable and they were able to partially offset the liquidity squeeze by issuing bonds and equity. For the more vulnerable small firms, the exposure to the banking system was limited.

Good Luck

19. The regional exposure of Hong Kong banks to the hardest hit Asian countries was limited. Total claims on ASEAN-4 and Korea were only 8 percent of assets in 1997. That differentiated Hong Kong SAR from Singapore banks—the other traditionally strong banking system in Asia—which had expanded significantly their regional operations just prior to the crisis, and subsequently experienced higher levels of nonperforming loans. Direct exposure of Hong Kong SAR banks to the stock market was also limited—for most banks, loans to stock brokers comprised a small share of the portfolio and had been granted on conservative loan-to-value ratios.

20. In the run up to 1997, Hong Kong SAR banks had prepared for potential economic disruptions from the expected handover to the Mainland. They kept relatively large share of liquid assets and followed conservative lending practices based on prudent collateral valuation. The handover went smoothly, with no negative market reaction. The excess liquidity, though, helped banks handle the unexpected shock of the Asian crisis. The close economic relations with the Mainland played an overall stabilizing role. The Mainland’s exports remained robust after the turmoil, stimulating the recovery of Hong Kong SAR. Loans to the Mainland remained of relatively good quality until the failure of GITIC in late 1998, which affected only a few individual banks that had significant exposure. The total exposure of the banking sector to ITICs was small and has been further reduced in the last two years.

Hong Kong SAR Banks’ Exposure to ITICs

(Percent of assets)

article image
Source: HKMA.

D. Concluding Remarks

21. Good banking practices and regulations contributed to the resilience of the system, but a stable corporate sector, sound macro policies, and favorable external environment also played a crucial role in cushioning the shock and supporting the recovery. There is tentative evidence that economies with the most effective regulatory and executive systems fared best during the crisis. Correlations between measures of corporate indebtedness and asset quality across countries are large and statistically significant. Conservative banking practices, lack of exposure to the most affected countries, and internal stability due to good economic policies were also important. Hong Kong SAR’s recovery was helped by strong external demand for the Mainland’s exports which provided stable cash flow for many firms and enabled them to continue servicing their debts.

22. The Asian crisis experience also revealed some weaknesses of Hong Kong SAR’s banking sector. The lending boom preceding the crisis was associated with a shift away from traditional relationship banking. Lending based on implicit guarantees has manifested itself in lending to Mainland companies. The failure of GITIC served as a wake-up call that loan decisions need to be based on the intrinsic financial strength of the borrowers. Accounting standards and disclosure requirements for borrowers, although the best in the region, are still below the best international standards (see Chapter III in this publication). As a result, banks are biased toward collateral-based lending. Many of the smaller banks lack modern risk management systems. The supervisory authorities make continued efforts to strengthen the regulatory framework and enhance the ability of banks to respond to shocks in the future. Recent initiatives include an upgrade in disclosure requirements and corporate governance rules for financial institutions, implementation of a risk-based supervisory framework, and promotion of the idea for a credit reference agency for small and medium enterprises.

Structure of the Banking Sector

The banking sector plays an important economic role in Hong Kong SAR—banks are the major source of finance for both large and small domestic companies. Hong Kong SAR is also a regional center for arranging syndicated loans for companies in other countries. Bank assets of locally incorporated institutions exceeded 250 percent of GDP in 1999, and total bank assets exceed 500 percent of GDP. Foreign ownership of banking assets is greater than 50 percent. The dominant local banks are also large internationally active banks. The table below lists the total number of authorized institutions (AIs) that provide banking services.

Number of Authorized Institutions at Year-End

article image
Source: HKMA.

Licensed banks, restricted license banks (RLBs), and deposit-taking companies (DTCs) comprise the authorized banking institutions. Non-authorized institutions are representative offices of overseas banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, securities brokers, finance companies. The main difference between the licensed banks and the RLBs and DTCs is in the minimum amount and maturity term of deposits they are allowed to take. Only the licensed banks are allowed to offer savings and checking accounts. Licensed banks and RLBs have access to the Real Time Gross Settlement system. Both domestic and foreign financial institutions may apply for a license subject to minimum asset requirements.

The small local banks perform mostly traditional deposit-taking and lending activities, while the large international banks are active in the syndicated loans market and offer asset management services. Concentration of lending to the construction and residential property sectors is high (more than half of all loans - Table II.3). Exposure to the emerging markets is relatively limited. Local banks have been traditionally well capitalized and profitable. Efficiency is good as demonstrated by a cost-to-income ratio of about 37.

Despite the large number of banks, the sector is very concentrated and has a quasi-oligopolistic structure—there is one dominant local banking group and a few foreign banks holding significant share of the market (see concentration ratios in Table II.3). Some researchers have argued that the cartel on deposit rates, in existence since mid-1960s, has contributed to limiting competition (see Chan and Khoo, 1998). Indeed, interest margins in Hong Kong SAR have been fairly high by developed countries standards, which accounts for the traditionally strong profitability of banks. However, entry into the sector is free, and large deposits have not been subject to the interest rate rules. To alleviate any competition concerns, the HKMA plans to liberalize the remaining restrictions on deposit rates by mid-2001.

Summary of Bank Regulations

Exchange Controls: None

Reserve Requirements: None

Capital Adequacy

The minimum required risk-weighted capital-adequacy ratio is 8 percent. The HKMA may impose stricter requirements for individual banks. There is a quarterly capital-adequacy ratio reporting system.


AIs must maintain an average liquidity ratio (liquid assets to liquid liabilities) of not less than 25 percent in each month.

Deposit Insurance

None. The Legislative Council in 1995 adopted a rule according to which in the case of liquidation of a bank, deposits up to HK$ 100,000 per person will be paid out with priority over other claimants. However, this rule does not guarantee payment and does not set a time frame for the process. A proposed deposit insurance scheme is currently under public consultation—the proposed coverage is HK$100,000 per depositor, funded by a flat fee of 10 basis point per annum on covered deposits.

Interest Rate Controls

Caps on deposit rates existed on small deposits since 1964. In 1994 and 1995, interest rates on time deposits of more than 6 days were deregulated. The controls on rates on time deposits less than 7 days were eliminated in July 2000. The restrictions on savings and current accounts will likely be lifted in mid–2001, and that will complete the deregulation of deposit rates. The DTCs, which are only allowed to take time deposits of HK$100,000 or more, have not been subject to the interest rate restrictions.

Lending Restrictions

  • Loans to a single borrower or related parties are limited to 25 percent of capital.

  • Country exposure limits: None.

  • Open foreign exchange positions: The maximum aggregate overnight open position is 15 percent and the limit for a single currency is 10 percent of capital.

  • Equity market exposure: AIs may not hold equities in excess of 25 percent of capital.

  • Sectoral exposure limits: There are no formal limits on sectoral exposure. The only sector to which banks have significant exposure is property. The voluntary guideline for a maximum loan-to-value ratio for housing loans is 70 percent (60 percent for luxury housing).

Public Disclosure Requirements

Audited annual financial statements are disclosed publicly by all listed locally incorporated institutions (biannual nonaudited statements are also available). Biannual financial disclosure was recently introduced for nonlisted local institutions in line with the frequency of disclosure by listed local institutions and AIs incorporated outside of Hong Kong SAR. The HKMA provides detailed guidelines for the information that must be included in the statements, which are generally in line with the international best practices.


This chapter was prepared by Dora Iakova (ext. 35365).


The empirical literature on early warning indicators of banking crisis is still in its early stages, however, there is an emerging consensus on a core set of variables that can signal buildup of vulnerabilities. Macro indicators with significant predictive power include real exchange rate appreciation, high credit growth, large ratio of broad money to reserves, asset prices boom, and large and persistent current account deficits. Bank level indicators include declining profitability, increase in the sectoral concentration of loans, and a rise in net foreign borrowing. See Demiriguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999); Kaminsky (1999); Hilbers, Lei, and Zacho (2000); Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) and references therein.


However, by late 2000, the rise in NPLs in Taiwan Province of China’s banking sector attracted market concerns.


Source: HKMA, Analysis of 1998 Balance of Payment Statistics. The total outflow from the banking system in 1998 was HK$1,191 billion (94 percent of GDP), however more than half of it was accounted for by a reduction in the round tripping of Euroyen loans by Japanese banks. Another portion of the outflow was due to the withdrawal of local placements by international banks related to the repatriation of offshore HK$ deposits by local corporations following changes in tax rules. Both events had no significant effect on liquidity in the local markets. 1998 was the first year for which balance of payment statistics for Hong Kong SAR were compiled.


Hong Kong SAR authorities have been active participants in various international committees and organizations entrusted with setting the standards for financial supervision like the Basle Committee, IOSCU, and the recently established Financial Stability Forum.


  • Caprio, Gerard, Jr., 1998, “Banking on Crisis: expensive lessons from Recent Financial Crisis,World Bank Working Paper no. 1978 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Chan, B. and T. Khoo, 1998, “An Analysis of the Deposit-Taking Market of Hong Kong”, Review of Industrial Organization 13, pp. 651667.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Demiriguç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, 1998, “The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries”, Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 45, pp. 81109.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Demiriguç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, 1999, “Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility—A Multivariate Logit Approach,IMF Working Paper 99/147 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Duenwald, C., Sanjay Kalra, and Dubravko Mihaljek, 2000, “Property Prices and Speculative Bubbles—Evidence from Hong Kong SAR,IMF Working Paper 00/2 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1998, “Leading Indicators of Banking Crisis: Was Asia Different?,IMF Working Paper 98/91 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hilbers P., Qin Lei, Lizbeth Zacho, 2000, “Real Estate Market Developments and Financial Sector Soundness,IMF Working Paper (forthcoming) (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Kaminsky G., 1999, “Currency and Banking Crises: The Early Warnings of Distress,IMF Working Paper 99/178 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-do-Silances, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, 1998, “Law and Finance,Journal of Political Economy.

  • Roy, Ramos, 1999, “Prudential Norms and CAMELOTII,Goldman Sachs Investment Research.