Algeria: Recent Economic Developments
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In 1994–98, Algeria was successful in restoring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms. The fiscal position deteriorated in the first part of 1999, owing to low oil prices. Executive Directors supported the reform program introduced in early 2000, and welcomed its emphasis on accelerating reform of the banking and public sector companies but stressed the need for detailed implementation plans. The economic environment should be improved to promote private economic activity, including domestic and foreign investment. The authorities are urged to accelerate trade liberalization.

Abstract

In 1994–98, Algeria was successful in restoring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms. The fiscal position deteriorated in the first part of 1999, owing to low oil prices. Executive Directors supported the reform program introduced in early 2000, and welcomed its emphasis on accelerating reform of the banking and public sector companies but stressed the need for detailed implementation plans. The economic environment should be improved to promote private economic activity, including domestic and foreign investment. The authorities are urged to accelerate trade liberalization.

I Introduction

1. Owing in large part to its steadfast implementation of Fund-supported programs in 1994–98, Algeria’s macroeconomic performance has improved dramatically. During the 1990–94 period, annual real growth was negative, averaging -0.9 percent; the performance was even worse in the nonhydrocarbon sector. During the same period, inflation remained in the two-digit range (about 27 percent on average for the consumer price index).1 In comparison, average annual growth reached 3.4 percent in 1995–98 (Table 7), and average inflation was about 9 percent (and even close to 5 percent in 1997–98). In 1999, growth remained close to its recent trend and inflation fell to 2.6 percent. However, such a growth rate is not sufficient to reduce unemployment and absorb the new entrants into the labor force. As a result, the unemployment rate, which was estimated at 26.4 percent in 1997, may now hover around 30 percent.

2. The Algerian economy remains heavily dependent on developments in the hydrocarbon sector, which accounts for about one-quarter of GDP (Table 6), two-thirds of government revenue, and virtually all export receipts. As a result, fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices have a major impact on the overall macroeconomic situation. In 1998 and during the first half of 1999, the Algerian economy was adversely affected by the decline in international oil and gas prices.2 The decrease in the value of hydrocarbon exports contributed to a deterioration in the current account position of some 9 percentage points between 1997 and 1998 (Table 5). Similarly, the fiscal position changed from a significant surplus in 1997 (2.4 percent of GDP) to a large deficit in 1998 (3.9 percent of GDP).3 Owing to measures implemented in late 1998 and during the first half of 1999, such as letting the nominal exchange rate ease vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and freezing budgetary allocations, and to a turnaround in oil prices in the spring of 1999, the fiscal position improved by more than 3 percentage points of GDP in 1999 and recorded a small deficit (0.5 percent of GDP). Meanwhile, the current account of the balance of payments returned to balance.

3. After the substantial fiscal consolidation of the 1994–97 period, fiscal policy has remained prudent. The overall fiscal balance shifted from a deficit of 8.7 percent of GDP in 1994 to a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 1997. A key explanatory factor for this strong performance was the increase in hydrocarbon revenue. Yet, discretionary revenue and expenditure policy measures also played an important role. Fiscal policy in 1998–99 remained prudent (see above). Nevertheless, the reduction in the tax effort in 1999 will have to be addressed in the near future. Besides, fiscal policy remains burdened by quasi-fiscal deficits resulting from losses in the economic public sector and contingent liabilities in social security institutions.

4. Monetary policy has been successful in taming inflation, but market forces could play a more important role in its operations. As mentioned above, inflation, which was still in the two-digit range in the mid-1990s, has receded steadily in recent years. The monetary authority is firmly committed to keeping it low, with a medium-term target of about 3 percent. Although significantly modernized in the 1990s, the monetary policy operating framework could be further improved by letting market forces play a greater role in the formation of interest rates and by increasing its transparency.

5. Despite substantial reform during the 1990s, the banking sector still needs further restructuring. Government-owned banks have been repeatedly restructured since 1991. Yet, their operational efficiency remains mediocre at best and there are still serious doubts regarding their profitability and solvency, the latter hinging on the large share (about 20 percent) of claims on the government in their balance sheets and the implicit government guarantee on nonperforming loans to public enterprises. Banking supervision has also been somewhat strengthened.

6. The performance of the industrial public sector remains poor. Despite substantial restructuring during the past four years that led to massive layoffs, public enterprises are still in a difficult situation. The 1998 industrial production rebound proved short-lived and the disappointing 1999 performance indicates that further restructuring is needed.

7. Algeria’s external position has improved, but remains highly sensitive to oil prices fluctuations. The external debt to GDP ratio declined from about 72 percent in 1996 to about 59 percent in 1999, owing to increasing net amortization with the end of the consolidation periods of previous debt reschedulings. The latter also implied during the same period an increase to about 40 percent in the debt service to exports ratio. The 1998–99 fall in hydrocarbon prices, with foreign exchange reserves dropping by about US$4 billion in 18 months, showed that Algeria’s external position has remained fragile.

II. Real Sector Developments

A. Overall Developments

8. After a sharp increase in 1998 (5.1 percent), economic activity slowed down to 3.3 percent in 1999, despite a 6.2 percent increase in the hydrocarbon sector GDP. In 1998, growth performance improved due mainly to a rebound in agricultural and industrial production. In 1999, nonhydrocarbon sectors grew by only 2.5 percent (compared to 5.5 percent in 1998). In particular, growth in the agricultural sector decreased to 2.7 percent (from 11.4 percent in 1998), while growth in the industrial sector dwindled to about 1 percent (8.4 percent in 1998).

9. The recent growth performance was insufficient to allow for a decrease in the unemployment rate. The latter stood at 26.4 percent in 1997 (latest year for which statistics are available). With the main engine of growth being in the recent past the highly capital-intensive hydrocarbon sector and in a context of layoffs in the wake of public enterprise restructuring, it is very likely that the unemployment rate has still increased.

10. Inflation performance has improved significantly since the mid-1990s. The low inflation level (about 5 percent, as measured by the consumer price index) attained at the end of the Fund-supported program period was maintained throughout 1998. Reflecting in part a drop in food prices, inflation decreased markedly in 1999 to an annual average of 2.6 percent.

Agriculture

11. In 1999, agriculture contributed to about 11 percent of total value added; its share of total employment was about 24 percent in 1997 (Table 19).4 Production in this sector over the recent past has been affected by large variations in weather conditions. Agricultural output increased by more than 11 percent in 1998, after an even larger decrease in 1997 due to a severe drought. The increase in production was much more modest in 1999 (2.7 percent), because of disappointing cereal crops which suffered once again from a lack of rainfall in some parts of the country.

12. Domestic production is insufficient to cover consumption needs. This is particularly true for cereals, for which only 10 percent of domestic demand was satisfied by domestic supply in 1997,5 and to a lesser extent for milk. Total food imports currently account for about a quarter of total merchandise imports; this share has barely changed since the beginning of the 1990s.

13. Crop yields are particularly low in Algeria. For cereals, crop yields are usually below 1,000 kilograms per hectare (Table 12). Their average over the 1990–99 period was 867 kilograms per hectare, against respectively 1,027 and 1,254 kilograms per hectare in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia, and 5,115 kilograms per hectare in the United States.6

Land use and institutional framework

14. Algeria enjoys a land area of 2.4 million sq. km, making it the second largest country in Africa. Yet, only a very limited part of it is suitable for cultivation. Arable land only represents a small fraction of this surface (about 8.2 million hectares, or 3.4 percent of the total land area) and has only slightly increased since the beginning of the 1990s (Table 11). An important share of cultivated land is devoted to cereals (about 43 percent in 1998); fodder and fruit productions occupy respectively about 6 percent and 5 percent of the total surface. Most of the arable land suffers from a lack of rainfall. However, irrigated areas only make up about 7 percent of the cultivated land; they are essentially used for vegetable and tree crops. The development of irrigation is thus high on the authorities’ agenda.

15. About one-third of arable land is still publicly owned, yet privately managed. State farms (Domaines agricoles socialistes) were dismantled in 1987 and transformed in smaller structures either collectively managed (Entreprises agricoles collectives (EACs)) or individually managed (Entreprises agricoles individuelles (EAIs)). The land remained possession of the state but the farmers were given 99-year leases to exploit it. They had the obligation to keep it during the first five years. After this period, they could hand over the lease to their heirs, or enter into a partnership, or renounce their right to cultivate the land. The farmers were (and are still) otherwise free to choose what they would cultivate and sell (and at what price). There is no rent or dividend paid to the state for these leases. Farmers just have to pay the land tax, as private owners do.7 Over time, EACs have tended to lose their collective character and have rather become groups of individual units, so that their status has become ambiguous.

16. Privately-owned land totals about 5 million hectares, or about two-thirds of arable land. With the help of the World Bank, the status of about one-half of it has been cleared in land registers. Despite these favorable evolutions, land ownership issues still hamper the development of private agriculture. For instance, farmers hardly get loans when they do not own the land. The authorities are aware of this phenomenon; but past policy statements have overall tended to nuance its importance and sometimes to blame banks for being overly cautious.

17. Through a program introduced in 1998, the government plans to expand cultivated land by offering concessions on pieces of its private domain. Applicants must meet three criteria; their projects must be: (i) profitable; (ii) ecologically sustainable; and (iii) socially acceptable. 600,000 hectares are already available for this program and could lead to the creation of 50,000 concessions, each employing 10 people on average. In a few years, the cultivated land area could eventually increase by 1.5 million hectares (18 percent) owing to this scheme. The authorities have also endeavored to develop Saharan agriculture; the results, however, have proved modest up to now, because of very high transportation and irrigation costs.

18. Aid to agriculture has been scaled down since 1994–95 with the freeing of agricultural input prices and the liberalization of most output prices. However, the authorities regard an active sectoral policy as still necessary to keep the threat of desertification in check, increase productivity, and facilitate farmers’ insertion in the economy. A large part of the government’s support to agriculture will be distributed from 2000 on through the newly created Fonds national de la regulation et du developpement agricoles (FNRDA). The FNRDA replaces the former Fonds de garantie desprix agricoles and Fonds national de developpement agricole. It is managed by Caisse nationale de mutualite agricole and indirectly financed by budgetary allocations to a special account. Agriculture production is subsidized through different channels: grants for the acquisition of equipment goods; interest subsidies on loans8 (in some cases, interest payments may be entirely taken over by the government); and the price support mechanism. Minimum prices indeed remain for domestically produced wheat and are usually somewhat higher than international prices. The budgetary cost of the price support system was about DA 8 billion in 1999.

Recent developments

19. Cereal production was the most affected by the spring 1999 drought. It fell by almost a third, from an excellent 1998 crop slightly exceeding 3 million tons.9 At about 2 million tons, it was 16 percent below its average level of the 1990s. Although cereal production only accounts for about 15 percent of total agricultural production, its large swings explain much of the changes in agricultural production in 1998 (sharp rebound) and 1999 (much lower growth).

20. Other crops did not suffer much from the drought in 1999, except for pulses whose production dropped by about 15 percent. Vegetable production, which makes up about 11 percent of total production, was almost stable, while date production (about 5 percent of the total) increased by about 10 percent. Date crop was thus more than double its 1990 level, owing to a simultaneous increase in yields (by about 55 percent over the period) and cultivated area (33 percent). Dates rank first among nonhydrocarbon export products.

21. Animal production accounts for about 50 percent of agricultural production. The Algerian herd was roughly stable during the 1990s at about 22 million heads (Table 13). It is composed of sheep (about 80 percent), goats (14 percent), and cattle (6 percent). Domestic demand for meat and poultry is overwhelmingly met through domestic production; in this sector, the self-sufficiency ratio (SSR)10 was close to 98 percent in 1997. Meat production grew on average at about 2 percent a year during the 1990s. Red meat production increased by slightly more than 3 percent in 1999, while chicken meat production recorded a 25 percent jump. As a result of disrupted input supply from public enterprises, egg production suffered a dramatic decline until 1996, when it reached a trough (40 percent below its 1990 level). Since then, it has continuously increased at a fast pace, including in 1999 (9 percent).

22. Milk production increased substantially during the 1990s, with a sharp acceleration at the end of the period. Consequently, the sector’s SSR rose from 36 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 1997. Given the 30 percent production increase in 1999, this ratio is now probably above 50 percent.

23. Fishery remains marginal in Algeria (3 percent of agricultural production) despite a likely large development potential given Algeria’s access to the Mediterranean. Most fisheries are individual enterprises and use small fishing boats. However, in 1999, private investors created a larger company (Union Peche) and acquired larger trawlers. The authorities have tried to develop this activity, notably through the modernization of ports. They have also allowed, since 1994, foreigners to fish in Algerian waters.

B. Hydrocarbon Sector

Overview

24. The hydrocarbon sector dominates the Algerian economy. In 1999, it accounted for 28 percent of GDP, close to the average for the Gulf countries. Moreover, with an average annual real growth rate of 5.5 percent over the past five years, hydrocarbons have been the driving force of economic growth. Likewise, hydrocarbons, either through exploration and development or the expansion of production capacity, account for about one-fourth of gross investment in the economy, and the bulk of foreign direct investment. On the external side, hydrocarbons represent the main source of foreign exchange earnings accounting for about 95 percent of total merchandise exports. The hydrocarbon sector is also providing nearly 60 percent of total fiscal revenue directly to the treasury.

25. By end-1998, Algeria ranked 15th in the world in terms of oil reserves and 8th in terms of gas reserves. Algeria’s proven recoverable reserves of crude oil were estimated at 9.6 billion barrels in 1998, and at the current extraction rate would be depleted in about 35 years. Algeria possesses sedimentary basins that probably contain larger reserves of crude oil than current estimates suggest. Recoverable reserves may rise in future years as a result of new discoveries and continued implementation of enhanced recovery systems. Proven natural gas reserves amount to 36 billion barrels of oil equivalent, and at current extraction rates would not be exhausted for at least 70 years. Algeria also has reserves of condensate and liquefied petroleum gas. Total recoverable hydrocarbon reserves in tons of oil equivalent are broken down as follows: 57 percent for natural gas; 28 percent for crude; 9 percent for condensate; and 6 percent for liquefied petroleum gas.

The institutional framework

26. The hydrocarbon sector remains highly concentrated around a limited number of parastatals. Sonatrach (Sociéte nationale pour le transport et la commercialisation des hydrocarbures), the predominant state-owned enterprise in the hydrocarbon sector, is also the largest Algerian enterprise in terms of employment, with a work force of about 35,000 at end-1998. Sonatrach’s activities include petroleum exploration, oil and gas production and marketing, and pipeline transportation. Oil refining is under the responsibility of Naftec (Entreprise nationale de raffmage des produits pétroliers) while domestic distribution of petroleum products is managed by Naftal (Entreprise nationale de commercialisation et de distribution de produits petroliers) which were both spun off from Sonatrach in the early 1980s. Domestic marketing of natural gas and electricity is the responsibility of Sonelgaz (Societe nationale d’electricite et de gaz). In addition, several public enterprises are involved in hydrocarbon-related activities such as drilling and petroleum engineering, petroleum production, and maritime transportation of hydrocarbon products.

27. The petroleum code, established by the 1986 hydrocarbon law, allowed foreign participation in oil exploration under the terms of concession agreements, service contracts, or production-sharing contracts. For the first time, foreign companies were permitted to repatriate their profits. Nevertheless, the government’s right to acquire a majority interest in any joint venture was maintained. The 1991 amendments to the 1986 law extended some of these provisions to joint ventures in oil production and in the development and exploitation of gas fields. Moreover, foreign companies were granted fiscal status in Algeria, enabling them to avoid double taxation, and Sonatrach’s transportation monopoly was terminated.

28. A decree of April 6, 1996, introduced the following changes as regards the participation of foreign companies in the oil and gas sector:

  • A foreign company is no longer required to form a commercial company subject to Algerian law with its head office in Algiers if it sets up a joint stock company with Sonatrach.

  • In the case of a field not yet developed or underdevelopment, the foreign company has to pay a special bonus to obtain access to known reserves.

  • If a foreign company or consortium finances a pipeline, priority will be given to transporting hydrocarbons from the field (s) operated by that company or consortium in association with Sonatrach.

29. The foreign partners of Sonatrach have the right to use the proceeds of gas exports covered by joint marketing agreements with Sonatrach. The foreign partners are not required to repatriate in Algeria their share of proceeds from these sales.

Production and exports

30. The exploitation of hydrocarbon resources generates five different types of fuels, which are consumed domestically and/or exported: (i) crude oil, for which production is limited by Algeria’s OPEC quota, set at 788,000 barrels a day in March 2000; (ii) refined petroleum products; (iii) natural gas, which can be transported through pipelines or converted into liquefied natural gas; (iv) condensate, which is a by-product of natural gas production; and (v) liquefied petroleum gas, which must be separated into butane and propane (Tables 8 and 9). The domestic market consumes about 20 percent of Algeria’s total hydrocarbon sales.

31. Reflecting the diversification strategy pursued by Sonatrach, the product mix has evolved through time, with the share of crude oil declining at first in favor of refined products, and later in favor of gas. By 1998–99, the share of gas products in total export receipts had increased to an average of 34 percent, with a corresponding decline in the contribution of petroleum products to 66 percent. Three factors contributed to this evolution. First, gas production and exports more than doubled between 1986 and 1999 as a result of further increases in gas liquefaction capacity and in pipeline capacity, particularly during the 1996–99 period. Second, the growth of crude oil output has been restrained by OPEC quota agreements in 1998–99. Third, increases in domestic consumption of refined petroleum products, in the context of unchanged production levels, have reduced export capacity of these products.

32. Two major gas pipelines are used to facilitate exports to Europe. The Maghreb- Europe gas pipeline (GME) to Morocco, Spain, and Portugal was completed in 1996 and has a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters per year. The capacity of the Trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline (TME) to Italy has recently been expanded to 25 billion cubic meters per year.

33. The expansion of the TME, the construction of the GME, and the revamping of the liquefied natural gas facilities has helped to boost Algeria’s gas exports considerably. Together with new gas production facilities that came on stream in 1997 and 1998, Algeria was able to increase gas exports (including liquefied natural gas) to about 76 billion cubic meters in 1999 as compared with 32 billion cubic meters in 1994.

Investments in the oil sector

34. Algeria has witnessed significant foreign and domestic investment in the energy sector over recent years, notwithstanding political uncertainties and the civil strife. State-owned oil company, Sonatrach, and its partners have made plans to invest more than US$20 billion to boost oil production capacity to 1.3-1.5 million barrels a day by 2003, from current capacity levels of about 900,000 barrels a day. Further investments have also been planned for the country’s petrochemical and refining industries. The number of new discoveries has increased in recent years from a cumulative of 20 in 1986-89, to 34 in 1990–94, and to 46 in 1995–99.11

Implications for macroeconomic policy

35. The presence of a large natural resource sector has been an important element in shaping the structure and management of the Algerian economy. For instance, it weakened incentives to develop tradable production outside the hydrocarbon sector, and influenced the design of the tax structure by reducing the necessity to develop alternative revenue sources.

36. Indeed, Algeria’s dependence on hydrocarbon revenue as the major source of foreign exchange also has important macroeconomic implications since the volatility of international oil prices has translated into the volatility of important macroeconomic aggregates. Movements in international energy prices have generated corresponding variations in the value of exports, government revenues, and the availability of foreign exchange.

37. Links between macroeconomic aggregates, on the one hand, and international oil prices, on the other hand, have operated through a number of channels. With respect to the impact on growth, oil price variations have affected both demand and supply. In the face of adverse price (or output) developments in the hydrocarbon sector, negative wealth effects are likely to have somewhat reduced consumption demand, reinforced by a compression of government expenditure and lower investment outlays.

38. Through the budget’s dependence on revenue from the oil sector, fluctuations in oil prices had important direct implications for public expenditure management through 1999. Favorable oil prices were often partly seen as signaling permanent increases in income, and contributed to higher levels of public expenditure that were difficult to reduce once the boom had proven only temporary.

C. Industry

39. Algeria embarked in the 1970s in an import-substitution strategy, which led to the rapid development of a concentrated public manufacturing sector. This sector was sheltered from external competition and heavily dependent on imported raw materials, equipment, and spare parts. It had to face two major policy changes over the past decade: first, the compression of imports at the beginning of the 1990s that created input shortages; second, the subsequent liberalization of external trade, that exposed it to foreign competition. As a result, the manufacturing sector has considerably shrunk as share of GDP, from above 12 percent in 1993 down to about 9 percent in 1999. The manufacturing sector is still dominated by public enterprises, which make up about 75 percent of industrial production, but the private sector seems to have recently gained momentum.

Industrial sector reform

40. Until the beginning of 1994, resource allocation in Algeria was governed mostly by administrative decisions and direct state controls on prices, production, and credit Efforts had been made prior to 1994 toward the restructuring of public enterprises. In particular, most public enterprises had been granted legal and financial autonomy while being financially rehabilitated through debt forgiveness by the treasury.12 These reforms, however, proved insufficient for two main reasons. First, they could not prevent the accumulation of further losses by public enterprises given that many of these enterprises could not initially set their prices freely and continued to enjoy easy access to commercial bank credit. Second, initial reforms did not involve physical restructuring of public enterprises. These shortcomings were subsequently addressed mainly by liberalizing prices and subjecting most public enterprises to harder budget constraints. Moreover, for the largest loss-making enterprises,13 a ceiling was imposed on their access to commercial bank credit, while medium-term plans were drawn to cut operating losses by imposing better inventory control and cost management procedures. By end-1996, all these enterprises had been granted autonomy in conjunction with the completion of their financial restructuring and the signing of performance contracts with their managers.

41. Public enterprise restructuring led to the creation in 1995 of 11 holdings regrouping enterprises by broad economic branches. Local public enterprises, previously supervised by regional authorities, were regrouped under five additional holdings. The mission of these holdings was to restructure and privatize public enterprises under the guidance of the Conseil national des participations de I’Etat (CNPE, chaired by the Prime Minister). Following external audits, public enterprises were classified in three categories: (i) those to be closed; (ii) those to be restructured; and (iii) those to be sold quickly. Restructuring was nevertheless given priority over privatization. By end-1999, about a thousand small enterprises/units14 had been shut down and 450,000 employees had been laid off. Other restructuring measures included corporatization, financial restructuring, labor shedding, spinning-off, and outsourcing of noncore activities.

42. Government disengagement from productive activities called for the adoption of a comprehensive legal framework to privatize public enterprises. The 1995 privatization law, which complemented measures introduced in 1994, allowed 100 percent private ownership in most public enterprises, except those in the financial, hydrocarbon, mining, and telecommunication sectors. The law proved too constraining for investors, by imposing rigid payment requirements and employment obligations. This text was amended in 1997 to provide more flexibility. Payment in several installments was authorized and employment obligations for the buyer were lifted.15 Several privatization modalities are available: public offering of shares through the stock exchange, sale of assets or shares through competitive bidding, and negotiated direct sales to investors.

43. At end-1999, no majority privatization had taken place though the preparatory work had accelerated after June 1998. At that time, a decree was issued with a list of 88 enterprises (and 350 subsidiaries) to be privatized. Some of them were put out for sale.16 According to the authorities, the process was hindered by ownership issues and the lack of solvent domestic demand. Besides, the examination of bids proved time-consuming given the large number of control steps aiming at ensuring transparency. There were three partial privatization in 1999 through public offerings of shares: Eriad-Setif (food processing), Saidal (pharmaceuticals), and El Aurassi Hotel floated 20 percent of their capital on the newly created Algiers Stock Exchange. Some assets were also sold through tenders. The chemical-pharmaceutical holding had for instance about 1,200 public pharmacies in its portfolio; 483 of them had been put out for sale, and 106 had already been sold by end-1999. In early 2000, a joint venture was formed between a public company and a European investor to manufacture soap and detergents in Algeria.

Recent developments

44. After a significant decline during the mid-1990s, industrial production recovered sharply in 1998 (8.4 percent). The recovery was broadly based, affecting the private sector (5 percent) but most notably the public sector (9.2 percent). In the latter, for which the statistical coverage is much better, production increase was particularly strong in chemicals (16.3 percent); food processing (14.2 percent); and steel, mechanical, and electrical construction (11.8 percent). Two sectors still registered a decline: leather products and wood and paper products (Table 14).

45. However, the 1998 recovery proved short-lived. In 1999, industrial production barely increased. Though the private sector continued to expand at a faster pace (8 percent), production declined in the public sector (-0.8 percent). In the latter, production actually decreased in all sectors except steel, mechanical, and electrical construction, for which output was boosted (8.5 percent) by the renovation of furnaces in the El Hadjar steel complex. Other sectors’ performance ranged from a slight decrease (food processing, chemicals, and construction materials) to a large drop (textiles, wood and paper products, and leather products). The latter sectors have seen their production decline almost continuously over the past decade; between 1989 and 1999, their production fell by more than 60 percent (and even by 80 percent for leather products).

46. It remains difficult to assess the situation of public enterprises at end-1999. According to the holdings, their financial situation has improved over the past two years. In particular, their operating profits would have substantially increased owing to better inventory management and labor retrenchment. Yet, the situation of some large enterprises (that were part of the 23 mentioned above) is still a matter of concern. A handful of them concentrate a large part of banks’ nonperforming loans and still need to be restructured.

D. Labor Market

Labor market policy

47. In response to high unemployment, numerous employment programs have been designed and implemented; a large number of them have been especially targeted at the young unemployed. The Emplois salaries d’initiative locale (ESILs) aim at providing low- skilled youth with minimum qualification and experience to enhance their employability. The ESILs work through subsidies that give businesses incentives to hire the unemployed. There were about 150,000 beneficiaries in 1998 (about 72,000 in full time equivalent). The efficiency of this scheme has, nevertheless, been debated because of potential windfall effects (firms might use it to hire employees they would have hired). One of the weaknesses of this program is that between 1990 and 1998, for the million jobs that benefited from this scheme, the retention rate17 at the end of the subsidy period was only 2 percent.

48. Unemployment is also high among the most educated young people. To remedy this situation, the authorities created a specific scheme in 1998 (Contrats pré-emploi, CPEs). In this scheme, firms may hire unemployed skilled youth at no cost for one year; these workers will indeed receive a monthly allowance from the government amounting to the minimum wage. There were about 5,000 beneficiaries in 1998 and twice as many during the first half of 1999.

49. A micro-enterprise scheme targeted at the youth, in which more attention is paid to projects’ profitability than in previous similar programs, was introduced in 1997. This scheme is managed by Agence nationale pour le soutien à I’emploi desjeunes (ANSEJ), which is in charge of a first analysis of the projects and of deciding whether they can be submitted to banks. Even in case of a positive answer by ANSEJ, banks still have the option of denying the youth’s financing request. A personal financial contribution is required from the applicant. The ANSEJ’s contribution may take various forms: (i) an interest subsidy on the bank’s loan; (ii) an advance that must be repaid after the loan is paid off; and (iii) a subsidy if the project is deemed promising enough. This scheme has up to now not been evaluated. According to the authorities, 16,000 projects were implemented in 1998 and could lead to about 47,000 job creations.

50. Two public works schemes, whose main goal is to fight poverty, also contribute substantially to active labor market policies. The Indemnite d’activités d’intér…t général (IAIG) is designed to provide compensation to the poor able to work. They can be hired at about half the minimum wage (DA 2,800 a month), on the basis of an eight-hour work day, in community-based activities, such as reforestation and street cleaning. The modest remuneration was designed to ensure self-targeting of those with low reservation wages. In practice, the full minimum wage is sometime paid especially in urban areas. At end-September 1999, there were about 135,000 beneficiaries of IAIG (against about 500,000 in 1996). The targeting of this program seems perfectible; in particular, it is not clear that it benefits the most disadvantaged. Whereas IAIG mainly targets the poor, the travaux d’utilité publique à haute intensité de main d’oeuvre (TUP-HIMO) targets the unskilled unemployed; they are offered temporary jobs paid at the minimum wage in labor-intensive community- based activities, such as road maintenance. The labor content of TUP-HIMO projects tends to be higher than in IAIG projects. There were about 129,000 beneficiaries of TUP-HIMO at end-September 1999.

51. Algeria has also a large vocational and technical training system, which provides about 290,000 places to train skilled workers and technicians using institution-based training and apprenticeships. Yet, the dropout rate is high (18 percent) and proposed qualifications could better match market needs. Agence nationale pour l’emploi (ANEM) is in charge of placement services. According to the authorities, its functioning needs to be assessed in order to improve its performance.

52. In 1994, two schemes were created to help workers laid off for economic reasons: unemployment insurance and early retirements. They currently cover about 250,000 people. They are theoretically available to both the public and private sectors; in practice, they are essentially used in the context of public enterprise restructuring. The unemployment insurance’s revenues derive from payroll taxes paid by both employers (2.5 percentage points of taxable wage) and employees (1.5 percentage point).18 Besides, every time they fire an employee the employers are required to pay an initiation fee to the insurance company amounting to up to one year’s salary (depending on seniority); moreover, the employee will receive a severance package equal to 3 months of salary. Unemployment benefits start after three months on the dole, with a replacement rate of 80 percent, and are phased out over time.

53. The dismissal of workers is possible in severe disciplinary cases. In economic cases, no prior administrative authorization is needed, but the decision can be brought to a labor tribunal. Labor shedding is possible for restructuring public enterprises, but only as a last resort, that is when collective negotiations (arbitrated by labor inspectors) have failed to provide an alternative (reduction of wages and/or working hours, early retirement…).

Recent labor market developments

54. According to the latest census, Algeria’s population at mid-1998 was 29.3 million. Population growth has steadily decreased in the recent decades, to an annual average of 2.3 percent during the 1987–98 period. Yet, owing to higher rates recorded in the 1970s and 1980s, the age structure of the population remains young (48 percent of the population is under the age of 20), even though less than 10 years ago (about 55 percent in 1987). As a result, the labor force has been growing faster than the population at a rate of nearly 4 percent a year in 1981–95, and at an estimated 3 percent at the end of the 1990s.

55. The latest employment survey dates back to September 1997. At that time, total labor force stood at 7.7 million, or 27 percent of the population (Table 19). This low activity rate is attributable to the large school enrollment and still low participation of women, despite its steady increase. Indeed, the participation rate rose from 36 percent of all persons 15 years to 64 years of age in 1977 to about 48 percent in 1997 on account of both rising male and female participation rates.

56. As the pace of employment creation since the mid-1980s was insufficient to absorb the large number of new entrants in the labor force, unemployment escalated from 10 percent in 1985 to 26.4 percent in 1997, when 5.7 million Algerians were employed and 2 million unemployed. No data is available for the more recent past. Yet, it seems very likely that unemployment has increased since 1997. Indeed, the most dynamic part of the economy since then has been the hydrocarbon sector, which is highly capital-intensive. In the nonhydrocarbon sector, average growth during the 1997–99 period was, at about 2.5 percent a year, significantly below the labor force growth rate. Meanwhile, public enterprise restructuring led to about 450,000 layoffs.

57. The structure of employment in 1997 stands out by the substantial proportion of self-employment (about 28 percent), which reflects a large distribution sector and the importance of agriculture. Employment in general government made up 23 percent of the total, while the share of the broad public sector (including public enterprises) was slightly above 50 percent.

58. Information on wages is scarce, except for the legally binding minimum wage (salaire national minimum garanti, SNMG). SNMG was raised to DA 6,000 a month in September 1998. It was previously raised from DA 4,000 to DA 4,800 in July 1997, then to DA 5,400 in January 1998. This 50 percent increase in 15 months aimed to offset the adverse impact of high inflation on SNMG’s purchasing power during the previous years. Indeed, SNMG remained fixed at DA 4,000 from January 1994 to July 1997. Meanwhile, consumer prices recorded a cumulative increase of about 85 percent.

59. Civil servants’ wages are set by the “tripartite” committee, which includes the government, the labor union (Union Generate des Travailleurs Algériens) and employers. The tripartite’ decisions do not legally apply to public enterprises which are free to negotiate wages at their level; yet, they are often used as a reference (Table 18). The private sector is just bound to apply the minimum wage. Civil servants’ wages were raised by 10 percent in July 1997, by 5 percent in January 1998, and by 5 percent again in September 1998. There was no increase in 1999.

E. Inflation

60. Until the beginning of 1994, Algeria had a generalized system of subsidies. Its elimination required a major liberalization of the price system as well as substantial increases in administered prices. In 1994, prices of all inputs for agriculture and housing construction were freed, and controls on retail prices and profit margins were lifted for most goods and services except for a limited number of products, including a few essential food staples, energy products, and public transportation fares that remained subsidized. The generalized subsidies on these goods were eliminated over the following two years as prices were raised toward their opportunity cost. Over 1994–96, prices of subsidized food and petroleum products had to be increased on average by almost 200 percent to reach their opportunity cost. For petroleum products, the implicit subsidy should have been eliminated, as the transfer price from the national oil company to the refineries was set at the world price level, with adjustments every six months in line with international oil prices and exchange rate developments. However, the adjustments have been interrupted since late 1997. As of end-1999, some prices remained administered, mainly in the transportation and energy sectors; their weight in the consumer price index was about 13 percent.19

61. As a result of the impact of the large depreciation of the Algerian dinar and adjustments of administered prices, CPI 20 peaked at almost 30 percent in 1994 and 1995. It then decreased almost continuously to about 19 percent in 1996 and further to about 5 percent in 1997 (Table 16). Inflation decreased from 5.0 percent in 1998 to 2.6 percent in 1999. A large part of the 1999 decrease seems attributable to food and beverages prices that constitute by far the main item of the CPI (with a 44 percent weight). Their average increase in 1999 was only 1.2 percent, as compared to 5.7 percent in 1998; consequently, their contribution to disinflation was about 2 percentage points. This sharp slowdown in domestic food prices mirrored the fall in international prices of basic foodstuffs.21

III. Public Finance

A. Introduction

62. A substantial fiscal consolidation was achieved during 1994–97 in conjunction with the implementation of Fund-supported programs. The overall fiscal balance shifted from a deficit of 8.7 percent of GDP in 1993 to a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 1997 (Chart 1). A key explanatory factor for this strong performance was the increase in hydrocarbon revenue (from 16 percent of GDP in 1993 to 21.4 percent of GDP in 1997), which was mainly due to the recovery in oil prices and the depreciation of the Algerian dinar.

Chart 1.

Algeria: Fiscal Developments, 1993–99

(In percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

A04ct01
Sources: Algerian authorities; and Fund staff estimates. 1/ Including net lending, special accounts, and operations of the Rehabilitation Fund. 2/ Indirect taxes on petroleum products and dividends from oil companies are classified as hydrocarbon revenue.

63. Discretionary revenue and expenditure policy measures also played an important role. This resulted in a major turnaround in the central government primary nonhydrocarbon balance, which improved by about 7 percentage points of nonhydrocarbon GDP between 1993 and 1997 (Table 1).22 In particular, in 1994–96 fiscal policy was contractionary, mainly through expenditure restraint, which lowered the noninterest expenditure ratio by 7 percentage points to 36 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP in 1996. In addition, nonhydrocarbon tax revenues increased by about 2 percentage points of nonhydrocarbon GDP. In 1997, fiscal policy was somewhat loosened as the increase in expenditure more than offset further strengthening of the tax effort.

Table 1.

Algeria: Summary of Central Government Operations, 1993–99

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Sources: Algerian authorities and Fund staff estimates

64. Fiscal policy in 1998–99 remained prudent. Due to a drop in world oil prices, the overall balance reached a deficit of 3.9 percent of GDP in 1998 before improving by 3.4 percentage points of GDP in 1999 (Tables 20-22). Similarly, the primary balance deteriorated by about 6 percentage points of GDP between 1997 and 1998, before recovering partially in 1999. However, the primary nonhydrocarbon deficit as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP improved by about one percentage point over the same period. This reflected the authorities’ decision to react to the fall in world oil prices by containing public expenditure.23,24

65. Government saving declined significantly in 1998–99. Because of the drop in world oil prices and despite the containment of capital expenditure, government saving declined from 9.7 percent of GDP in 1997 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 1998 before recovering to 5.3 percent of GDP in 1999 (Chart 2).

Chart 2.

Algeria: Fiscal Indicators, 1994–99

(In percent of GDP)

A04ct02
Source: Algerian authorities; and staff estimates.

B. Revenue Developments in 1998–99

66. Revenue developments were affected by weak world oil prices in 1998 and the first half of 1999; tax effort declined. Budgetary revenues in Algeria in 1998–99 averaged about 28 percent of GDP (Table 24). While this ratio compares favorably with other middle income countries, more than 60 percent of these revenues emanated from hydrocarbon receipts25 (Chart 3). As a result, revenue developments are particularly sensitive to changes in world oil prices and exchange rate fluctuations (Chart 4). For example, a 10 percent change in the exchange rate of the dinar against the U.S. dollar would result in a variation of about 2 percent of GDP in total revenue, with more than 80 percent of it due to the effect on hydrocarbon revenues and the rest to the response of taxes on imported goods. Similarly, a US$1 per barrel fluctuation in world oil prices would result in a loss or gain in budgetary receipts on hydrocarbon exports equivalent to about 1 percent of GDP.26

Chart 3.

Algeria: Composition of Revenue and Expenditure, 1999

A04ct03
Sources: Algerian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.
Chart 4.

Algeria: Hydrocarbon Revenue, Fiscal Balance, and Oil Prices, 1994–99

A04ct04
Sources: Algerian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

67. Hydrocarbon revenue recovered in the second half of 1999. After a substantial increase between 1994 and 1997, hydrocarbon revenue decreased from 21.4 percent of GDP in 1997 to 15.3 percent of GDP in 1998, before recovering to 18.5 percent of GDP in 1999. These fluctuations were largely due to changes in world oil prices. In particular, the revenue drop of 28 percent in nominal terms between 1997 and 1998 reflected a fall in the average world oil price of US$6.5 per barrel, which was only partially offset by an increase in export volume. The recovery of 38 percent in nominal terms in 1999 was due both to the rebound in world oil prices in the second half of the year27 and to an average annual depreciation of about 13 percent of the Algerian dinar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Fluctuations in oil prices did not affect domestic hydrocarbon revenue in 1998–99 because the transfer price from Sonatrach to the refineries has not been adjusted since late 1997.28 This resulted in an implicit higher taxation of domestically consumed oil products in 1998, which reverted to an implicit subsidy in the second half of 1999.29 Finally, the oil price drop weakened the financial position of Sonatrach in 1998–99. As a result, dividends paid by the oil company to the government in 1999 were substantially lower than anticipated in the budget law, and Sonatrach had to borrow from the banking system to comply with tax payments.

68. No nhydrocarbon revenue performance deteriorated. After a constant increase from 14.8 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP in 1993 to 17.2 percent in 1997, the share of nonhydrocarbon revenue in nonhydrocarbon GDP declined by about 2 percentage points in 1998–99, reflecting mainly changes in the tax system (see below) and increased tax evasion (Table 2).

Table 2.

Algeria: Central Government Nonhydrocarbon Revenue, 1993–99

(In percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP)

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Sources: Algerian authorities and Fund staff estimates.

69. Tax revenue as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP decreased from 16.2 percent in 1997 to 13.5 percent in 1999, the lowest point in the decade. The deterioration concerned both direct taxes and taxes on goods and services. While until 1997 numerous new taxes were introduced—including: the VAT (1992), the corporate and personal income tax (1992) and the taxation of capital (1993)—and measures were adopted to broaden the tax base, since 1998 the tax reform has concentrated mainly on lowering tax rates. Similarly, during the latter period and in contrast to the program period, no new measures were passed to streamline tax exemptions.

70. Direct tax revenue dropped in 1999. After a decline as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP in the early 1990s reflecting the weaknesses of both individual and corporate income taxes, direct taxes recovered slightly in 1996–98, mainly on account of the positive real growth of the nonhydrocarbon sector. But in 1999, they fell by almost 20 percent in nominal terms compared to 1998. This drop, which affected both personal and corporate income taxes, was partially explained by the lowering of tax rates. In particular, the 1999 budget law reduced the normal corporate income tax rate from 38 percent to 30 percent, and the rate on reinvested profits from 33 percent to 15 percent. In addition, the top marginal personal income tax rate was reduced from 50 percent to 40 percent and income brackets were revised with the objective of reducing the average income tax rate. Other factors contributed to explain lower tax yields including: (i) the still weak financial situation of public enterprises, which in 1998 accounted for 75 percent of corporate income taxes; (ii) tax evasion, which had been favored by a rumor on a possible tax amnesty, expected to be granted by the new president; and (iii) numerous tax exemptions granted in application of the investment code and programs introduced in recent years to promote economic activity and reduce the unemployment rate, in particular among the young population.

71. Revenue from taxes on goods and services also decreased in 1999. Their share over nonhydrocarbon GDP had increased from 5.9 percent in 1993 to 7.6 percent in 1997, partially due to measures introduced during Fund-supported adjustment programs, which included, in particular, a reform of the taxation of domestically consumed petroleum products. Since 1998 this trend has been reversed and in 1999, taxes on goods and services fell by about 3 percent in nominal terms compared to the previous year. The shortfall was particularly marked for VAT receipts on domestic transactions, which dropped by almost 15 percent in nominal terms, while the VAT base, as measured by the nominal nonhydrocarbon GDP excluding the agricultural sector, increased by about 7 percent in 1999. The performance of VAT receipts on imported goods was somewhat more satisfactory with a small increase in nominal terms. However, total imports increased by more than 17 percent in dinar terms between 1998–99 and changes in the import structure were marginal. Two main factors seemed to explain these shortfalls: (i) reduction of VAT rates for some goods and services (e.g., hotels and tourist services); and (ii) increased tax evasion. In addition, with the 1999 budget law, all suppliers of the hydrocarbon sectors have been exonerated from the VAT. While this measure aimed at avoiding increasing tax credits and does not directly reduce tax receipts, it is likely to encourage nontransparent practices and, therefore, to affect tax performance.

72. Revenue from taxes on international trade decreased in 1999 as a share of imports. Receipts from custom duties increased as a share of total imports from 14.9 percent in 1994 to 15.7 percent in 1997, despite the reduction in tariff protection.30 Factors that contributed to this included the elimination of some tax exemptions and the reduction in rate dispersion. Since 1998 the trend has been reversed and in 1999 the share dropped to 13.5 percent. The fall in the average effective tariff rate does not seem to reflect changes in the tariff structure. In fact, the average weighted statutory rate for custom duties has remained at about 16 percent between 1997 and 1999 despite: (i) further changes in the rates; and (ii) a redistribution of goods across rates aiming at increasing effective protection. Possible explanations include: (i) increased tax exemptions granted to imports of equipment goods; and (ii) delays in tax payments. Information concerning the latter is not available. As for custom duties exemptions, Table 3 shows that about 35 percent of imports paid in 1999 lower than statutory duties, which amounts to an estimated loss of custom revenue of about 1 percent of GDP. Table 3 also indicates that most exemptions concern capital goods, for which collection rates are less than 50 percent, but also that many food and consumer goods imports enter at reduced duties.

Table 3.

Algeria: Import Taxes Indicators, 1998–99

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Sources: Algerian authorities and Fund staff estimates.

73. Nontax revenue as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP accounted for only about 5 percent of the nonhydrocarbon revenue in 1998 in line with the average for the 1994–97 period. In 1999, this share increased to about 12 percent of GDP reflecting higher dividends paid by the Bank of Algeria to the government.

C. Expenditure Developments in 1998–99

74. Over 1998–99, expenditure contracted as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP. From 1997 to 1998, government expenditures decreased from 44.3 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP to 41.2 percent (Table 4),31 reflecting a tightening of both capital and current expenditures. In 1999, higher current expenditures were almost offset by lower capital expenditures.32

Table 4

Algeria: Central Government Expenditure, 1993–99

(In percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP)

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Sources: Algerian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Including net lending and operations of the Rehabilitation Fund.

Excluding the compensation for commercial bank’s foreign exchange losses on principal payments of external debt contracted on behalf of the treasury.

75. The share of current spending over nonhydrocarbon GDP at end-1999 was similar to its 1997 level. However, current expenditure over total expenditure increased constantly from about 75 percent in 1997 to 81 percent in 1999, mainly reflecting an expanding wage bill and current transfers, as well as lower capital expenditures in 1999 (Chart 5).

Chart 5.

Algeria: Personnel Expenditure and Current Transfers, 1994–99

(In percent of total expenditure)

A04ct05
Source: Algerian authorities. 1/ Including Mudjahidin’s pensions.

76. After a constant decline in 1994–96, reflecting a tight income policy,33 the wage bill rose by about half a percentage point of nonhydrocarbon GDP between 1996 and 1999 due to: (i) a 20 percent nominal wage increase granted in steps in 1998; (ii) a small net recruitment; and (iii) a drift of about 3 percent per annum.34 In terms of its share in total expenditure, the wage bill increased from about 27 percent in 1997 to about 30 percent in 1999.35

77. Including Mujahidin pensions, current transfers, which averaged about 17 percent of total expenditure in 1994–96, increased to 21 percent by 1999. In addition, their composition changed. In particular, after the elimination of food subsidies, which was almost entirely completed by end-1996, the share of “other transfers” in total transfers more than doubled to 45 percent in 1999. While in 1999 the increase partly reflected one off-spending, including security and election-related expenditure, little information is available on the content of other transfers.

78. Capital expenditures declined both as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP and as share of total expenditure. Their nominal increase was limited to 5 percent in 1998, thus resulting in a decline of about 1 percent in real terms. In 1999, they dropped by about 12 percent in nominal terms compared with 1998.36

79. Capital expenditures are now considerably lower than in the early 1990s. In particular, after their surge in 1993, capital expenditures were reduced as a share of nonhydrocarbon GDP by about 1.5 percentage points in 1994–96. They rose again in 1997, before a new drop. In 1994–96 the decline in capital expenditure in real terms reflected the recognition of the low social rate of return of past investment. In 1998–99, it was due to weak project implementation and the authorities’ decision to freeze capital expenditures to adjust the fiscal stance in a context of lower oil prices, declining tax effort, and limited access to foreign financing (see below).

80. Nonbudgetary expenditures37 were virtually zero in 1998–99 following the closure of the Rehabilitation Fund at end-199638 and the elimination of net lending to public enterprises. However, the lack of adequate provisions for transfers or loans to public enterprises in a context in which, despite significant progress, several large public enterprises continued to experience financial difficulties, has resulted in an accumulation of quasi-fiscal deficits (see Section IV. A). Fiscal policy remains also burdened by contingent liabilities in social security institutions.39

81. The functional composition of expenditure did not change significantly; however spending on housing increased.40 As shown in Chart 6, most expenditure categories saw their share in total expenditure decrease slightly between 1997 and 1998 (see also Table 25). In particular, the share of social sectors (education, health, and other social sectors) decreased by about 1 percentage point to reach 38 percent of total expenditure in 1998. Housing was the only sector that registered a marked increase with its share more than doubling to about 8 percent of total expenditure. This increase reflected the high priority attached by the government to the housing problem and the effects of the housing reform, which included higher budgetary provisions for the construction of social housing (Table 29). In addition, since 1998, a new system of up-front housing subsidies for low-income households has been introduced.

Chart 6.

Algeria: Expenditure by Functional Classification, 1997–98

A04ct06
Sources: Algerian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

Budget financing

82. The overall fiscal deficit in 1998–99 was financed primarily by the banking system. This reflected the still limited development of the domestic treasury bill market, the government’s desire to limit the increase in the stock of domestic public debt, as well as limited availability of foreign financing.

83. Bank financing increased in 1998–99. After two years of fiscal surpluses in 1996 and 1997 when the treasury was able to reduce its liabilities to the banking system,41 a substantial borrowing requirement reappeared in 1998 and 1999. In particular, the liabilities to the central bank, which were reduced in the previous two years, increased significantly. Because of the strict limits imposed by the law on central bank financing of the treasury, this borrowing took place mainly by using external debt rescheduling proceeds accumulated by the treasury in a blocked account at the central bank. In addition, the practice of early repayments of restructuring treasury bonds to commercial banks was interrupted.

84. The treasury’s liabilities to the nonbanking sector increased by DA 20 billion and DA 25 billion in 1998 and 1999 respectively, after a reduction in 1996 and 1997. This was mainly due to a limited repayment of treasury bills issued to the housing bank (CNEP) in exchange for its nonperforming loans to public developers, and to an increase in negotiable treasury bills held by nonbank financial institutions.42 Net foreign financing was negative both in 1998 and 1999, reflecting limited access to foreign borrowing and a substantial increase in debt service following the end of the consolidation periods of previous debt rescheduling agreements.

IV. Financial Sector

A. Banking System

85. As of end-1999, the banking system was composed of the Bank of Algeria,43 17 commercial banks, and 10 other financial institutions. There were six public banks44 (including CNEP, the former savings and loan institution which was transformed in a commercial bank in 1997). Private banks—domestic or foreign—have been allowed to enter the market since the beginning of the 1990s. One of them—El Baraka Bank—follows Islamic banking principles and was chartered as soon as 1990. The other private banks were chartered between 1997 and 1999. Public banks still dominate the banking sector. Their share of total assets and deposits is about 95 percent.45 They have a large network of about 1,050 branches altogether,46 and about 30,000 employees (5 percent of total employment).

86. Since 1991, government-owned banks have been repeatedly restructured. Indeed, despite the introduction of market-based reforms in the early 1990s, they have lacked the institutional framework and the experience to promote efficient financial intermediation. Moreover, they have been burdened by a legacy of compulsory lending to public enterprises (Table 33) and sectoral credit specialization, which have considerably weakened the quality of their portfolios. A cleaning up of their balance sheets had to be done several times in the 1990s, under various modalities:

  • Substitutions of government bonds47 for nonperforming loans to public enterprises took place in 1992–93 for a substantial amount (about 23 percent of GDP), By using external debt rescheduling proceeds, the treasury repaid most of these bonds ahead of schedule by 1996. A second loan-bond swap took place in 1997 in favor of Bank of BADR, BNA,48 and CNEP.49 The cost of this second debt takeover by the treasury was equivalent to about 8.5 percent of GDP. Similar swaps also took place in 1991 and 1998 (amounting to a cumulated 3 percent of GDP). The bonds issued by the treasury have most often not been serviced in cash; accrued interest was capitalized and thus increased treasury’s debt owed to banks by about 4 percent of GDP over the 1996–99 period.

  • Over 1991–97, public banks received DA 168 billion in cash (about 11 percent of GDP) to compensate them for foreign exchange losses incurred on past external borrowing contracted mostly on behalf of the state.

  • Between 1991 and 1997, government-owned banks had to be recapitalized several times, either with cash transfers or government bonds, to comply with capital adequacy ratios (see below). The cumulated cost of these operations was about 5 percent of GDP.

87. The recapitalization of each bank was accompanied in the mid-1990s by the signing of performance contracts between the government and bank managers. Performance contracts held bank managers directly and solely responsible for respecting the capital adequacy ratios established by the Bank of Algeria. The banks, in turn, were being provided with increased autonomy with respect to operational decisions, notably the allocation of credit. In the context of the bank-enterprise mechanism (dispositif banques entreprises) commercial banks started in 1996 to reschedule some of the debt of certain public enterprises by converting short-term overdrafts into medium-term loans. These debt-restructuring operations were conditioned upon the liquidation of a number of nonviable units within otherwise viable enterprises, the implementation of performance contracts by public enterprise managers, and equity participation from banks.

88. Meanwhile, banking supervision has been somewhat strengthened. In the previous system of public bank monopoly, little attention was indeed paid to prudential regulation since there was an implicit government guarantee. Starting in 1994, efforts were aimed at ensuring that commercial banks conformed to upgraded standards for banking operations and accounting, and that they initiated a program of internal and financial restructuring. All existing banks were required to reapply for certification with the Bank of Algeria, which started imposing reserve requirements and an increasingly stringent capital/risk-weighted assets ratio.50 In addition, in 1995 the Bank of Algeria started implementing new prudential regulations to limit risk concentration and establish clear rules for loan classification and provisioning. In particular, banks are now required: (i) to limit overdrafts to the equivalent of 15 days of turnover (compared with 45 days previously); (ii) not to record overdue interest payments as revenues; and (iii) to establish provisions for off-balance sheet claims.

89. Despite these efforts, public banks’ operational efficiency remains mediocre at best. They fail to provide some basic banking services to large segments of the population. This is attested by the fact that households are still reluctant to become customers of public banks for basic banking services. Indeed, most of them use CCP (the postal system’s financial arm) for fund transfers and cash withdrawals. For a significant part, this reluctance stems from the severe shortcomings of the payments system.

90. There are still serious doubts regarding government-owned banks’ profitability and solvency. Returns on assets and on equity are particularly low in international or even regional comparison. This phenomenon has various causes. First, yields on assets are poor. This is partly due to the capitalization of interests due on government bonds (see above). In this regard, these banks have suffered from their continued financial support, sometime at the behest of past governments, to loss-making public enterprises. However, losses on credit extended to the private sector have also been significant, pointing to a possible lack of expertise and loose internal controls. Second, the cost of banks’ resources is high relative to lending rates. Given the low mobilization of savings in the banking system and the reluctance of households to hold sight accounts in public banks, the latter have to resort extensively to resources, such as central bank refinancing, whose cost sometimes exceeds the yield of some assets (such as business equipment loans, whose rates do not appear market-determined). In this context, banks’ compliance to capital adequacy ratios hinges on the large share (about 20 percent) of claims on the government51 in their balance sheets and the implicit government guarantee on nonperforming loans to public enterprises.

B. Financial Markets

91. The secondary market for treasury bills began operating in March 1998. Securities are traded twice a week in a facility provided by the treasury. These securities currently are:

  • Short-term treasury bills, with maturities ranging from 13 to 52 weeks;

  • Medium-term treasury notes, with a 2-year maturity.52

92. The market is accessible only to primary dealers (Specialistes en valeurs du Trésor, or SVT). These are generally banks or institutional investors. The system’s central depository is the Bank of Algeria.

93. The Algiers Stock Exchange, which opened in July 1999, is still modest in size. Three public companies were subsequently listed, after they were authorized to float 20 percent of their capital:

  • Eriad-Setif, a food-processing enterprise.

  • Saidal, a pharmaceutical enterprise.

  • El Aurassi Hotel.

  • Besides, bonds issued in 1998 by Sonatrach,53 the state-owned oil company, were listed as well.

94. The Algiers stock market is managed by Societe de gestion de la bourse des valeurs (SGBV), which is controlled by the market’s brokers-dealers (Intermediaries en operations de bourse, IOB). It is supervised by a securities and exchange commission (Commission d’organisation et de surveillance des operations de bourse, COSOB), which is in charge of protecting investors and ensuring a smooth and transparent functioning of the market.

C. Monetary Policy

95. For a large part, the Law on Money and Credit, adopted in 1990, laid the groundwork for the current monetary framework. In 1992, the Bank of Algeria ceased to impose credit ceilings on commercial bank lending and started relying on central bank refinancing of the economy.54 In 1994, the Bank of Algeria introduced a remunerated reserve requirement on commercial banks.55 Repurchase auctions to provide liquidity to commercial banks were introduced in 1995. These aimed at increasing the role of interest rates by allowing competitive market practices to prevail and by ensuring greater transparency regarding the criteria for credit allocation. Finally, open market operations were formally introduced in 1996.

96. In the recent past, the relative importance of the various monetary policy instruments has varied with banks’ refinancing needs. Banks’ liquidity substantially improved in 1996 and 1997, and to a lesser extent in 1998. Meanwhile, the supply of loanable funds by nonbank financial institutions (mainly insurance companies) on the money market increased markedly. As a consequence, banks’ refinancing requests to the central bank were quite limited during this period. This led to a decrease of Bank of Algeria’s claims on deposit money banks, which reached a low point in mid-1998. At that time, about 90 percent of central bank refinancing was granted through the rediscount window. The situation reversed during the second half of 1998: banks’ refinancing demand increased sharply due to liquidity problems in the wake of falling hydrocarbon prices. By the end of 1999, Bank of Algeria’s claims on deposit money banks had almost doubled, at about DA 310 billion. The importance of the rediscount window was considerably less: the amounts granted through this scheme had decreased in nominal terms and represented about 40 percent of the total. In the meantime, the share of refinancing extended through liquidity auctions rose from about 10 percent to about 30 percent, and the share of the overdraft facility from 0 percent to 30 percent. Open market operations remained only marginal all over the period, owing in part to the limited supply of tradeable securities available to deepen the market.

97. Market forces still play an insufficient role in monetary policy operations. In practice, a substantial part of banks’ refinancing remains granted through the rediscount window, which rate is clearly set by the Bank of Algeria and the interest rate of liquidity auctions does not fully play the key role of reflecting the monetary policy stance which it was supposed to play. The Bank of Algeria accordingly plans to continue to reduce the relative importance of the rediscount window in the coming years. This should be facilitated by a new regulation, adopted in early 2000, tightening paper eligibility criteria and reducing the rate of rediscounting (the percentage of the paper’s face value that is actually rediscounted). Besides, the frequency of liquidity auctions was raised to twice a month at the end of 1999.

98. The monetary policy framework used by the monetary authority could be more explicit. The final objective is a low level of inflation in the medium term; this level is not specified but considered to be about 3 percent. The Bank of Algeria currently uses an intermediate monetary target (on broad money), which is nevertheless not systematically released to the public. External communication on this intermediate target only happens when Bank of Algeria’s officials are asked to testify before Parliament or the Conseil national economique et social (a consultative body).

99. The choice of the right intermediate target in Algeria is uneasy. Targeting the exchange rate or inflation does not seem appropriate in this country at the moment. As an economy highly dependent on oil prices, Algeria needs a lot of flexibility in its exchange rate policy. As to inflation targeting, rapidly changing economic structures have made inflation forecasting particularly difficult and uncertain, which could undermine the authority’s credibility if such a framework were to be adopted. Thus, the Bank of Algeria is left with two alternatives: an interest rate target, or a monetary target. The latter suffers a priori several drawbacks: monetary aggregates are available with a few-month lag, and monetary statistics are not comprehensive;56 monetary aggregates are potentially very sensitive to oil price variations and the decision of the government to sterilize their impact on foreign exchange reserves; in the context of a potentially unstable money demand, such an intermediate target could also lead to wide interest rate fluctuations. Yet, a monetary target remains useful in the short term. First, since most public banks may still not feel completely bound by hard budget constraints and seem relatively insensitive to refinancing interest rates,57 it could prove more effective for monetary control than an interest rate target. Second, the setting of the monetary target could be explained to the public relatively easily; this would thus enhance transparency.

D. Recent Monetary Developments

100. Money growth remained high in 1998. The 1997 money growth (18.2 percent) was mainly driven by a rapid accumulation of net foreign assets (Table 30). In 1998, the still large increase in liquidity (19.1 percent) was attributable to a large increase in net domestic assets as net foreign assets declined due to lower oil prices. In 1998, net domestic assets increased by DA 276 billion (37.7 percent) after a DA 50 billion decrease in 1997. The increase in domestic credit58 was exactly the same for both years (DA 108 billion). The divergence was thus entirely due to “other items net” which decreased by DA 158 billion in 1997 and then increased by DA 168 billion in 1998. This change corresponded to the sterilization of debt rescheduling proceeds in 1997 and to their use in 1998 to finance the turnaround in the fiscal position.

101. In 1999, money supply growth slowed down despite the surge in domestic credit. This deceleration, with a 14 percent increase, was mainly due to a further depletion of net foreign assets (minus DA 111 billion). Credit to the economy increased strongly in 1999 (see below), as well as credit to the government because of the use of the rescheduling proceeds and as a result of public banks accounting some nonperforming claims on public enterprises as claims on the government. As a whole, domestic credit growth exceeded 25 percent (DA 322 billion).

102. Commercial banks’ refinancing by the Bank of Algeria increased very rapidly in 1999 (about 36 percent between December 1998 and December 1999; see Table 31). Refinancing demand was fueled by the public bank’s operating inefficiencies (see above) and by a substantial increase in credit to the economy (about 28 percent on a year-on-year basis). About half of this increase is attributable to additional recourse to bank loans by the hydrocarbons sector, in order to cope with cash difficulties engendered by the fall in oil prices early in 1999. Loans to the public housing sector also fueled the increase in credit to the economy.

103. The data available for the very last months of 1999 and the first months of 2000 point to a reversal of this trend, with a significant decrease of commercial banks’ refinancing by the Bank of Algeria. This should probably be attributed to an improvement in the financial situation of the hydrocarbon sector, which was then benefiting from much higher export revenues.

104. The liquidity ratio has increased significantly since 1997. During the 1994–96 period, as a result of price liberalization and tighter monetary policy, prices increased sharply (and so did nominal GDP) while M2 growth was contained. Consequently, the liquidity ratio59 fell by almost 14 percentage points. Once the initial impact of liberalization on prices began to wane, disinflation was quick in 1997. Coupled with positive real interest rates, which made term deposits attractive, disinflation stimulated the demand for money. The liquidity ratio thus increased by 3.5 percentage points in 1997 and again by 7.1 percentage points to 46.3 percent in 1998. In 1999, in the absence of major changes in its main determinants, it remained close to its 1998 level (at 46.1 percent).

105. Owing to disinflation, nominal interest rates have substantially decreased during the past years. For instance, the rediscount rate, which stood at 13 percent at end-1996, was lowered to 11 percent in 1997 and 9.5 percent in 1998 (Table 34). It remained at this level until September 1999, when it was lowered to 8.5 percent.60 The other refinancing rates were brought down in a similar way, as were commercial banks’ deposit and lending rates.

106. Some of the indicators traditionally used to assess the monetary policy stance are not available or relevant in Algeria. The yield curve cannot be constructed with market interest rate61 or banks’ lending rates.62 The use of a monetary condition index63 seems irrelevant. First, the weight that should be given to the exchange rate is difficult to determine. Indeed, some imports are probably not very sensitive to exchange rate variations;64 as for exports, they are overwhelmingly (95 percent) composed of hydrocarbon products, for which prices are internationally set in dollar terms. Second, given that Algeria was some years ago a partly command economy, it would be difficult to assess monetary policy stance in the past since most prices (including interest rates) were administered. In other words, a reference period against which the current situation would be assessed could hardly be found.

107. In the Algerian context, the level of real interest rates may not be a reliable indicator of the monetary policy stance. To assess the level of real interest rates, it is necessary to have an idea of inflation expectations. One possibility is to use the monetary authority’s medium-term inflation target, i.e., 3 percent. With this assumption, the rediscount rate stood at about 5.5 percent in real terms at end-1999, and the average refinancing rate at about 9 percent.65 These levels are much higher than the recent trend in GDP growth rate. With such a gauge, monetary policy seemed thus rather restrictive in 1999, and this would vindicate the rediscount rate drop in January 2000. Yet, this result is debatable. Given Algeria’s recent experience with moderate inflation, it could be argued that inflation expectations are still higher than 3 percent, which would weaken the previous conclusion. The rapid increase in monetary aggregates since 1997 (see above) does not point either toward a restrictive monetary policy.

V. External Sector

A. Balance of Payments

Overall developments

108. Following the sharp fall in oil prices in 1998/99, the external current account swung from a surplus of 7 percent of GDP in 1997 to a deficit of 2 percent of GDP in 1998. As the capital account remained in deficit and the exceptional financing declined from US$3.6 billion in 1997 to US$1 billion in 1998 due to the end of the consolidation period under the second Paris Club rescheduling, international reserves fell to US$6.8 billion by end-1998, from a peak of US$8.9 billion in May 1998.

109. In 1999, the positive impact on the external position of the sharp recovery in oil prices during the second half of the year was attenuated by the lagged response of gas prices and a worsening of the capital account. As hydrocarbon export revenue recovered and imports grew modestly, partly due to a tight fiscal policy, the current account position moved back to a balanced position. The capital account deficit, however, widened from US$0.8 billion in 1998 to US$2.4 billion in 1999, reflecting limited access to new borrowing in the face of still large amortization obligations. Exceptional financing continued to fall to about US$0.4 billion. Official foreign reserves, therefore, decreased further to US$4.4 billion by end-December 1999, equivalent to about 4.6 months of imports of goods and nonfactor services (Table 35).

Exports

110. Following mainly large variations in hydrocarbon prices, hydrocarbon export value fell from a peak of US$13.2 billion in 1997 to US$9.7 billion in 1998 and then recovered to US$11.9 billion in 1999 (Table 37). The sharply higher prices for oil in the second half of 1999 boosted earnings from crude oil, condensates and refined products. Earnings from gas exports, however, posted only modest gains in spite of a substantial volume growth as the recovery of gas prices exhibited the usual six-month lag vis-à-vis oil prices. The price of Algerian crude, the Saharan Blend, averaged US$17.9 a barrel in 1999, up from US$12.9 per barrel in 1998, while the export price of natural gas in 1999 was 14.5 percent lower than in 1998.

111. Total hydrocarbon exports in volume terms increased significantly in 1999 (Table 36). Crude oil output averaged 758,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1999, down from 823,000 bpd a year earlier. However, the rise of gas export volumes in 1999 (about 46 percent) more than compensated the impact of OPEC’s restrictions on oil production in 1999. Gas output capacity and exports were boosted, in particular, by the coming on stream of two new projects: Tin Fouye Tabankort (TFT) and Hassi R’Mel Sud. Consequently, the composition of hydrocarbon exports continued to change toward a greater share of gas (Chart 7).

Chart 7.
Algeria: Composition of Hydrocarbon Exports, 1988–99

(In percent of total)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

112. Despite several years of economic reform and adjustment, nonhydrocarbon exports still represent less than 5 percent of total exports. Nonhydrocarbon exports peaked in 1997 at US$0.6 billion and then fell to US$0.4 billion by 1999; i.e., about 3 percent of total exports in the latter year (Table 41).66 In per capita terms Algeria has one of the lowest nonhydrocarbon exports among developing and transition economies. In 1999, Algeria’s nonhydrocarbon exports amounted to US$14 per capita as compared to US$200-650 in Tunisia and Morocco.67 Nonhydrocarbon exports consist mostly of semi-finished products, agricultural products and phosphates and the main markets are Spain (22 percent), Italy (16 percent), and France (12 percent).

Imports

113. After dropping significantly in 1997, imports rose to US$8.6 billion in 1998 and US$9.0 billion in 1999. Import volume also increased by 6.4 percent in 1998 and 2.0 percent in 1999, partly due to the modest recovery in domestic demand (Table 38). In constant dollar terms (1995 prices) average annual imports for 1995–99 were about 10 percent lower than in the first half of the 1990s, and 65 percent lower than in the 1980s when imports were boosted by the overvalue of the official exchange rate. The share of food imports, mainly cereal, declined slightly from 29 percent of imports in 1997 to 27 percent in 1999 (Table 41). The share of consumer goods in total imports remained relatively low at about 15 percent.

Services and transfers

114. The deficit on services, which was broadly stable in the previous two years, widened in 1999 to US$4.1 billion (Table 35). The US$0.3 billion increase in nonfactor services deficit reflected stagnant service exports (about US$0.7 billion) and higher than expected service imports (mainly freight, insurance, and foreign travel by domestic residents) at US$2.6 billion. Spending by Algerian residents on travelling abroad rose sharply from US$0.1 billion in 1997 to US$0.9 billion in 1999. The deficit in factor services in 1999 deteriorated by US$0.3 billion due in part to lower receipts from investment income, following the fall in the stock of official foreign exchange reserves. Interest payments fell by US$0.1 billion to US$1.85 billion as a result of the reduction in the stock of external debt and valuation effects. The share of the amount allocated to Sonatrach’s foreign partners68 rose from US$0.4 billion in 1998 to US$0.7 billion in 1999.

115. Transfers have declined from an annual average of US$1.1 billion in the previous two years to US$0.8 billion in 1999. Officially recorded transfers consist mostly of workers’ remittances from abroad (mainly from Europe). The drop in remittances in dollar terms reflects partly the depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.

Capital account and official reserves

116. Following the two debt reschedulings in 1994 and 1995, capital inflows declined markedly, in part because some official export credit agencies limited the amounts of new export guarantees available for Algeria. External borrowing, which had consistently exceeded US$6 billion annually in the late 1980s and early 1990s—when macroeconomic imbalances were rising—dropped to an annual average of US$1.8 billion in 1996–98 (Chart 8), when macroeconomic stability was restored. Algeria, however, received balance of payments support of more than US$21 billion between 1994 and March 1998, most of which from debt reschedulings with the Paris and London Clubs. The remainder was provided as balance of payments support by multilateral financial institutions, most notably the Fund, which provided about US$3 billion during this period.

Chart 8.
Algeria: Balance of Payments, 1986–99

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

A04ct08
Source: Algerian authorities.

117. In 1998, the capital account deficit continued to narrow for the third consecutive year. This reflected lower amortization obligations and, to a lesser extent, an increase in foreign direct investment, which almost doubled to US$0.5 billion in 1998. However, exceptional financing declined from US$3.6 billion in 1997 to US$1.0 billion in 1998 due largely to the end of the consolidation period under the 1995 Paris Club rescheduling.

118. In 1999, the capital account deficit widened by US$1.6 billion to US$2.4 billion, reflecting limited access to new borrowing and a large negative entry for errors and omissions.69 Direct investment remained at about US$0.5 billion and was nearly exclusively in the hydrocarbon sector. New borrowing fell sharply to about US$1.1 billion as compared to US$1.8 billion in the previous year. Exceptional financing continued to fall by about US$0.6 billion to US$0.4 billion as a result of the above mentioned 1995 consolidation period under the Paris Club rescheduling and in the absence of new exceptional financing, except for the purchase under the Fund’s Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF).70

119. Official reserves fell by US$2.4 billion in 1999, reducing the level of reserves to US$4.4 billion by end-December 1999 (Chart 8). The deterioration in the capital account deficit and the decline in exceptional financing more than offset the improvement in the external current account. Net outflow of resources (defined as debt service minus new borrowing minus exceptional financing) increased to US$3.3 billion from US$2.4 billion in 1998 and US$1 billion in 1997 (Chart 9).

Chart 9.
Algeria: External Debt, 1986–99
A04ct09
Source: Algerian authorities. 1/ Net transfers on external debt: drawings + IMF purchases + rescheduling—debt service.

B. External Debt

120. The stock of external debt declined gradually from a peak of US$33.7 billion in 1996 to US$30.5 billion in 1998. External debt to GDP ratio declined from about 72 percent in 1996 to 64 percent in 1998. The debt service to exports of goods and services ratio, however, increased from 29 percent in 1996/97 to 45 percent in 1998 reflecting the sharp fall in hydrocarbon exports in that year (Chart 9).

121. In 1999, Algeria’s outstanding external debt obligations decreased by US$2 billion to US$28.3 billion, of which US$15.2 billion had already been rescheduled. The decrease in the stock of total debt is due to net amortization and to the exchange rate valuation effect.71 External debt to GDP declined further in 1999 to 59 percent, and the debt service ratio, while still high at about 40 percent of exports of goods and nonfactor services, showed an improvement compared to 1998.

122. Of the total debt outstanding, 20 percent is owed to multilateral institutions, 67 percent to official creditors, and 13 percent to private creditors (Table 39). About 42 percent of the external debt is denominated in U.S. dollar, 38 percent in Euro, 13 percent in Yen, and the remaining 7 percent in other currencies. Over half of Algeria’s debt is at variable rates. Average maturity on new commitments was around 10 years during the past three years.

C. Trade Policy

123. Algeria’s tariffs ranges between 5 percent and 45 percent with 4 bands (5 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, and 45 percent). The average unweighted import duty is estimated at about 24 percent, including customs fees of 2 percent and 0.4 percent levied on all products. While this is slightly lower than in other countries in the region, it remains significantly higher than the average tariff rates in many Latin American and Eastern European economies.

124. At the start of its structural adjustment program in the mid-1990s Algeria made rapid progress in dismantling its trade barriers. Many nontariff barriers were removed and tariffs were lowered bringing Algeria from 10 in the Fund’s index of trade restrictiveness to 7 in 1998. However, the pace of lowering tariff protection has slowed down since 1997 and recent measures have partly reversed the progress achieved. In particular, minimum dutiable values have been applied on selected goods and many tariff positions have been changed in the budget laws for 1998, 1999, and 2000 with the effect of increasing effective protection.

125. The distortions created by the tariff regime can be measured by effective protection rates that compare value-added of an activity at domestic tariff-inclusive prices in relation to international prices. Effective protection in Algeria is high in labor- intensive sectors, such as textiles, and many food products. Duty reductions and exemptions on inputs further increase the effective protection enjoyed by the final products and dispersion of incentives between sectors.

126. Algeria applied to the GATT/WTO in 1987 and the first meeting of the working party took place in April 1998. Renewed interest in joining the WTO has been expressed by the new government. An EU association agreement is under negotiation.

D. Exchange Rate Policy

127. The external value of the Algerian dinar is set on the interbank foreign exchange market, which was established in early 1996. No margin limits are imposed on buying and selling exchange rates in the interbank foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange proceeds must be repatriated within 120 days. Petroleum companies are subject to the same rule, but proceeds may be deposited in a guaranteed account with a foreign correspondent bank of the BA. All export proceeds from crude and refined hydrocarbons, by-products from gas, and mineral products must be surrendered to the BA. Exporters of other products must surrender 50 percent of export proceeds; the remaining portion may be retained in a foreign currency account. Exporters may use the funds in these accounts for imports or other payments pertaining to their business, or they may transfer the funds to another foreign currency account. As oil exports proceeds from Sonatrach revert to the Bank of Algeria, the latter remains the largest supplier of foreign exchange, and hence plays a major role in the interbank market.

128. Settlements with countries with which no payments agreements are in force are made in convertible currencies. Resident travelers may export foreign currency withdrawn from their foreign currency accounts up to the equivalent of FF 50,000 a trip for an unlimited number of trips a year. There are no restrictions on the importation of foreign banknotes, but residents and nonresidents must declare them when they enter Algeria. The restrictions on payments for the current transactions, including tourism travel, were lifted in 1997, and Algeria accepted its obligations under Article VIII sections 2, 3 and 4 in September 1997.

129. During 1998 and early 1999, in the face of declining reserves, the authorities let the dinar depreciate; the dinar stabilized in the latter part of 1999 as hydrocarbon prices started recovering. Between October 1998 and June 1999, the Algerian dinar depreciated by 18 percent vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. By contrast, during the second semester of 1999, the dinar held fairly steady against the dollar as the fiscal and external situation benefited from the rebound of oil prices. For the year as a whole, the dinar depreciated by 13 percent against the U.S. dollar. Since the Euro depreciated vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar during this period, the nominal depreciation of the dinar against the main European currencies was modest. For instance, the dinar depreciated in 1999 by 8.5 percent against the French franc. Overall, during 1999, the dinar depreciated by about 7.5 percent in real effective terms.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table 5.

Algeria: Supply and Use of Resources at Current Prices, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 6.

Algeria: Sectoral Distribution of GDP at Current Prices, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 7.

Algeria: Sectoral Distribution of Real GDP Growth, 1995–99

(In percent)

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 8.

Algeria: Production, Exports, and Consumption of Petroleum Products, 1994–98

(In millions of tons)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

By-product of gas production.

Reflects change in inventories and errors of measurement.

Table 9.

Algeria: Production, Exports, and Consumption of Gas Products, 1994–98

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Net of gas reinjected into producing oil wells.

Equal to net production minus gas flared, gas used for lifting and for fuel gas, and other losses in the fields.

Reflects errors in measurement.

Table 10.

Algeria: Domestic Prices of Major Energy Products, 1994–99

(In dinars per liter; unless otherwise indicated)

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 11.

Algeria: Land Use Patterns, 1994–98

(In thousands of hectares)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Industrial tomatoes and tobacco.

Potatoes, tomatoes, garlic and onions, and watermelons.

Table 12.

Algeria: Crop Yields, 1994–98

(In kilogram per hectare)

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 13.

Algeria: Livestock, 1994–98

(In thousands of heads)

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 14.

Algeria: Index of Industrial Production in Public Enterprises, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 15.

Algeria: Production of Minerals, 1995–99 1/

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Excluding hydrocarbons.

In thousands of containers, each weighing 34 kilograms.

Table 16.

Algeria: Consumer Price Index, 1995–99 1/

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Includes 256 items and covers households in the area of Algiers.

Table 17.

Algeria: Income of Households, 1995–99

(In billions of dinars)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Includes social security contributions paid by employees.

Table 18.

Algeria: Gross and Net Wages in Public Enterprises, January 1994–December 1996

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 19.

Algeria: Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1994–97 1/

(In thousands; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Algerian authorities (ONS surveys).

Data are not strictly comparable over time, as surveys are conducted in different months and use different classifications.

Including military draft.

Employment data for 1997 include work at home. The unemployment rate is calculated according to the ILO definition.

Table 20.

Algeria: Summary of Central Government Operations, 1995–99

(In billions of dinars)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Covers expenditures for food subsidies, agricultural price support, and cash transfers for the poor.

Including special accounts, net lending and operations of the Rehabilitation Fund.

Including debt rescheduling proceeds blocked on account at the Bank of Algeria.

Includes external debt rescheduling proceeds.

Table 21.

Algeria: Composition of Central Government Revenue, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 22.

Algeria: Central Government Revenue, 1995–99

(In percent of GDP)

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Source: Algerian authorities
Table 23.

Algeria: Composition of Central Government Expenditure, 1995–99

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Sources: Algerian authorities and Fund staff estimates.

Excluding the compensation for commercial banks’ foreign exchange losses on principal payments of external debt contracted on behalf of the treasury.

Including net lending and allocations to the Rehabilitation Fund.

Table 24.

Algeria: Central Government Expenditure, 1995–99

(In percent of GDP)

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Sources: Algerian authorities and Fund staff estimates.

Including net lending and operations of the Rehabilitation Fund.

Excluding the compensation for commercial bank’s foreign exchange losses on principal payments of external debt contracted on behalf of the treasury.

Table 25.

Algeria: Sectoral Allocation of Budgetary Capital Expenditure, 1994–98

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Commitments under the 1997 budget law.

Table 26.

Algeria: Central Government Domestic Debt, 1995–99

(In billions of dinars; end of period)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Excluding the blocked account at the Bank of Algeria and other deposits.

Table 27.

Algeria: Rehabilitation Fund Operations, 1995–99

(In billions of dinars)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Interest payments on public enterprise debt purchased from the banks by the treasury.

Refers to the so-called Entreprises de revente en l’Etat. which have imported mostly essential consumer goods at the behest of the Government.

Table 28.

Algeria: Compensation Fund Operations, 1995–99 1/

(In billions of dinars)

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Source: Algerian authorities.

On a cash basis.

On an accrual basis; the reconciliation between accrual and cash basis is ensured by the amount carried over from one year to the next.

Table 29.

Algeria: Housing Supply, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian Ministry of Housing.
Table 30.

Algeria: Monetary Survey, 1995–99

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Source: Bank of Algeria; and Fund staff estimates.

Includes, as a net item, deposits of the BAD and ministries with the central bank.

This includes the impact of banks’ restructuring packages. The conversion of banks’ claims on public enterprises in banks’ claims on the government results, other things being equal, in a decrease in credit to the economy and an equal increase in credit to the government.

Table 31.

Algeria: Balance Sheet of the Bank of Algeria, 1995–99

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Source: Bank of Algeria.
Table 32.

Algeria: Distribution of Credit to the Economy by Maturity, 1995–99

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Sources: Bank of Algeria; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 33.

Algeria: Distribution of Credit to the Economy by Sector, 1995–99

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Sources: Bank of Algeria; and Fund staff estimates.
Table 34.

Algeria: Structure of Interest Rates, 1995–99

(In percent per annum)

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Sources: Algerian authorities: Bank of Algeria and Ministry of Finance.

Central bank overnight rate.

No interest is paid on sight deposits; interest on term deposits is subject to a 15 percent securities revenue tax, whereas government bond yields are tax exempt.

Free for banks to determine on the basis of Libor plus 150 basis points.

Table 35.

Algeria: Balance of Payments, 1995–99

(In billions of U.S. dollars; unless otherwise indicated)

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Sources: Bank of Algeria (through 1999 data); and Fund staff projections.

According to the information provided by the Bank of Algeria all official reserves are liquid.

Source: According to the Bank of Algeria, its actual data include short-term debt, use of Fund resources, and debt to Russia.

Table 36.

Algeria: Volume of Hydrocarbon Exports, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 37.

Algeria: Exports of Hydrocarbons, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 38.

Algeria: Trade Indices, 1995–99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 39.

Algeria: External Debt, 1994–98 1/

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Source: World Bank, Debtor Reporting System (DRS).

The World Bank’s DRS data which are used in this table may not correspond exactly to the external debt data published by the Algerian authorities

Suppliers’ credits comprise export credit guaranteed by an export credit agency as well as other supplier’s credit arranged directly with suppliers.

Table 40.

Algeria: Stock of External Debt, 1/ Disbursement of Loans, and Debt Service by Creditor, end-1997

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Source: Algerian authorities.

Excluding short-term debt of US$ 162 million.

According to the Bank of Algeria, its actual data include short-term debt, use of Fund resources, and debt to Russia.

Table 41.

Algeria: Breakdown of Imports and Exports, 1995-99

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Source: Algerian authorities.
Table 42.

Algeria: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates, 1990–99

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Source: IMF (Information Notice System).

Algeria: Summary of the Tax System, 1999

(All amounts in Algerian dinars)

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1

This is the consumer price index for the Algiers area.

2

Crude oil export prices declined from US$19.5 per barrel in 1997 to US$12.9 per barrel in 1998 before recovering to US$ 17.9 per barrel in 1999.

3

Close to two-thirds of the value of hydrocarbon exports goes to the government in the form of hydrocarbon revenues.

4

Latest year for which data are available.

5

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): Using 1997 tends to somewhat overestimate the dependency on imports, since cereal crops were especially affected that year by a severe drought.

6

Source: FAO.

7

In practice, the collection of this tax has proved difficult.

8

The authorities are also contemplating canceling the debt of the agricultural sector.

9

Or three times its 1997 level.

10

The SSR is the percentage of food demand met by domestic production. These estimates are computed from FAO data.

11

However, only four discoveries were made in 1999.

12

More precisely, banks’ nonperforming loans to public enterprises were swapped with government bonds. The government was thus provided with claims on public enterprises that it decided to cancel in most cases later on.

13

A list of 23 large public enterprises, whose large losses required special monitoring and restructuring, had been drawn in the early 1990s.

14

Most of them were small local enterprises.

15

Nevertheless, the authorities introduced financial incentives to induce the buyer to avoid layoffs.

16

Among them: about 20 hotels, 20 brick factories, and 4 breweries.

17

The retention rate is the percentage of ESIL employees that are kept by firms at the end of the subsidy periods.

18

These are the contribution rates that were applied in 1999 (i.e., before the 2000 shift of two contribution points from the unemployment insurance to the pension scheme).

19

The weights used in the consumer price index (CPI) are derived from the estimated structure of private consumption in 1989. As a result of price liberalization and changing consumer tastes, this structure has significantly changed during the past decade; but up to now, these weights have not been re-estimated.

20

Inflation is defined here as the annual average increase in the Algiers area’s CPI.

21

The corresponding International Financial Statistics index declined by 15.2 percent in 1999. The decline was even more pronounced in the case of beverages (-21.3 percent).

22

The primary nonhydrocarbon balance is defined as nonhydrocarbon revenue minus total expenditure, plus interest payments. Nonhydrocarbon revenue is defined as total revenue minus taxes and dividends paid by oil companies.

23

Comprehensive analysis of overall fiscal developments is still constrained by the lack of data, particularly with respect to special treasury accounts, the financial situation of public enterprises, local government, and social security operations. Accordingly, it is not possible to present consolidated accounts of the general government or the public sector.

24

The fiscal year in Algeria coincides with the calendar year and treasury operations are presented on a cash basis. Fiscal data on a payment order basis are also available. Yet, they suffer from major weaknesses and should, therefore, be treated with caution in the assessment of the government’s fiscal position. Fiscal data are provided for the central government and for extrabudgetary accounts on a net basis. The overall fiscal position described in this section is the consolidated position of the budgetary accounts, the extrabudgetary accounts, and the treasury’s net lending to the public sector.

25

The share of hydrocarbon revenue in total revenue increased constantly from 58 percent in 1993 to 64 percent in 1997. In 1999, it was back to 62 percent.

26

These estimates are based on 1999 data.

27

Because of a 6-month lag in the response of gas prices to changes in oil prices, the full impact of the recovery in oil prices on budgetary hydrocarbon receipts did not occur before late 1999.

28

Hydrocarbon revenues include three components: (i) taxation from oil companies on hydrocarbon exports; (ii) taxation from oil companies on domestically-sold oil products; and (iii) dividends paid by Sonatrach. In 1999 the three components represented 86.7 percent of the total, 8.5 percent and 4.8 percent respectively.

29

Under the Fund supported program an agreement was reached with the Algerian authorities to revise every 6 months the transfer price of crude oil from Sonatrach to the refineries to take into account developments in the world oil prices and the exchange rate between the Algerian dinar and the U. S. dollar, thus removing implicit subsidization of domestically consumed oil products.

30

The shares refer to fob imports. Between 1994 and 1997 the maximum tariff duty rate was lowered from 60 percent to 45 percent. The number of bands was also reduced.

31

Total expenditure refers to budgetary expenditure, net lending, special accounts, and the Rehabilitation Fund.

32

These lower capital expenditures, on a cash basis, could be due to delays in commitments (see below). Numerous payment orders would indeed have been issued only late in 1999, leading to payments in 2000.

33

During the period 1994–96, only two increases in nominal wages, each of 10 percent, were granted despite an annual average inflation of more than 25 percent during the same period.

34

In addition, personnel expenditure rose because of a one percentage point increase in social security contributions paid by employers.

35

The share of salary expenditure in total expenditure is higher if one takes into account that a large share of expenditure recorded ad “public services” are wages paid to public institutions such as hospitals and universities.

36

On a cash basis. The 1999 decrease could nevertheless reflect calendar effects related to commitments.

37

Nonbudgetary expenditures include the special treasury accounts, net lending by the treasury, and allocation to the Rehabilitation Fund.

38

The Rehabilitation Fund was created with the 1991 budget law to finance the restructuring of public enterprises and commercial banks. While it was formally closed at end-1996, disbursements ended in 1997 (Table 27).

39

The financial situation of the social security system seems indeed precarious. For instance, the national pension scheme (Caisse nationale de retraite, or CNR) recorded increasing deficits over the past years, since revenue only covered about 70 percent of expenditure. The transfer in 2000 of 2 percentage points of payroll taxes from the unemployment insurance (CNAC) to CNR might prove both insufficient to ensure the medium-term sustainability of CNR’s financial position and destabilizing for CNAC’s.

40

Data on the functional classification of expenditure for 1999 were not yet available at the time of the Article IV consultation discussions.

41

Repayments to the banking system also reflected external debt rescheduling proceeds.

42

The CNEP, although it was rechartered as a commercial bank in 1997, is still considered a nonbank in data on budget financing

43

With the passage of the law on money and credit in 1990, the Bank of Algeria was granted autonomy to conduct monetary policy.

44

Banque nationale d’Algerie (BNA), Banque exterieure d’Algerie (BEA), Banque de ragriculture et du developpement rural (BADR), Credit populaire d’Algerie (CPA), Banque de developpement local (BDL), and Caisse nationale d’epargne et de prevoyance (CNEP).

45

This is an estimate since, at end-1999, private banks’ and CNEP’s data were not included in the monetary statistics.

46

The Postal System (CCP) also has a large network of about 3,200 offices through which it collects deposits.

47

These bonds were nonnegotiable. They had a 12-year maturity and bore a 10 percent interest rate.

48

BADR and BNA had lent extensively to food and pharmaceutical importing agencies, to finance the foreign losses suffered by these agencies in the wake of the 1994 devaluation of the dinar.

49

CNEP was burdened with nonperforming loans to the housing sector.

50

This ratio was raised by steps from 5 percent in 1996 to 8 percent in 1999.

51

With a zero-weight risk.

52

There has been, up to now, only one issuance of these 2-year notes.

53

Sonatrach raised about DA 12 billion by issuing these 5-year bonds, bearing an interest rate of 13 percent.

54

However, it maintained ceilings on individual bank’s refinancing.

55

At 2.5 percent of deposits, excluding foreign currency deposits.

56

As already mentioned, as of end-1999, CNEP’s and private banks’ data were not included in monetary statistics. This is, nevertheless, expected to change in 2000.

57

This assessment derives from the observation that in 1999 banks resorted massively to the overdraft facility, despite its very high cost, for their refinancing.

58

An analysis of a breakdown of domestic credit data is hindered by the impact of banks’ balance sheets restructuring on monetary statistics. Indeed, when claims on the government are substituted for nonperforming claims on public enterprises, the stock of credit to the government is adjusted upwards and the stock of credit to the economy downwards for an equal amount (leaving thus domestic credit unchanged). Besides, the line “other items net” (part of net domestic assets) includes a special account at the Bank of Algeria used to sterilize external debt rescheduling proceeds. The variations of this account’s balance were very large until 1998.

59

Ratio of end-of-period broad money stock (Ml) to nominal GDP.

60

It was lowered again to 7.5 percent in January 2000.

61

The longest maturity for negotiable treasury bills is only 2 years.

62

There is no clear reference available for lending or deposit rates.

63

A monetary condition index is usually a linear combination of changes in a short-term real interest rate and in the real effective exchange rate.

64

For instance, capital goods imported by the hydrocarbon sector, or some food imports.

65

This much higher figure is due to the intensive use of the overdraft facility, whose rate should be punitive. If the overdraft were only marginally used, the average refinancing cost would be closer to 6 percent in real terms.

66

This decline resulted in large part to the expiration of specific contracts with Former Soviet Union countries.

67

Nonenergy exports in the case of Tunisia; nonphosphate and nonphosphate derivative exports in the case of Morocco.

68

The production share allocated to Sonatrach’s foreign partners is recorded in oil exports. This balance of payments’ entry is offset by a similar entry for factor services imports.

69

This was mainly due to a one-month lag between delivery and payment of hydrocarbon exports in a context of rapidly increasing oil prices.

70

SDR 223.5 million (equivalent to US$0.3 billion).

71

More than half of Algerian external debt is denominated in currencies different from the U.S. dollar. The appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis these currencies in 1999 has contributed to lowering the value of the stock of debt expressed in U.S. dollar.

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