This Selected Issues paper reviews public service reform in Ghana. The paper highlights that a range of public service reform initiatives have been undertaken in Ghana since the early 1980s. The public service in Ghana is composed of centrally managed agencies, ministries, subvented agencies, district assemblies, and state enterprises. The civil service, which covers the centrally managed agencies, ministries, and local government, accounts for only about 20 percent of total public sector employment as a result of the spin-off in the 1980s of the internal revenue, customs, education, and health services as subvented agencies.

Abstract

This Selected Issues paper reviews public service reform in Ghana. The paper highlights that a range of public service reform initiatives have been undertaken in Ghana since the early 1980s. The public service in Ghana is composed of centrally managed agencies, ministries, subvented agencies, district assemblies, and state enterprises. The civil service, which covers the centrally managed agencies, ministries, and local government, accounts for only about 20 percent of total public sector employment as a result of the spin-off in the 1980s of the internal revenue, customs, education, and health services as subvented agencies.

V. Trends in Cocoa World Markets and Options to Strengthen Ghana’s Competitive Position34

A. Introduction

100. In the 1964/65 crop, season, Ghana’s cocoa production reached its peak at 581,000 metric tons. At that time, Ghana was the largest world producer of cocoa accounting for 38 percent of world production. Since then, Ghana’s cocoa production plummeted, bottoming in 1983/84 when production was only 160,000 metric tons and market share was 10 percent. From 1983/84 onwards, Ghana’s production began to recover, although in 1997/98 it was still two-thirds of its 1964/65 peak. This chapter summarizes world cocoa trends in the last decade, as well as the reforms being implemented by Ghana to modernize its cocoa sector and avoid a further erosion of its market share. The chapter focuses in particular on the similarities and differences with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana’s neighbor and the largest world producer of cocoa. The paper concludes with a discussion of next steps and options, which the Ghana authorities will need to consider to ensure the long-run success of its cocoa industry.

B. Cocoa Trends in the Last Decade35

101. During the 1987-97 decade, world cocoa production had a generally upward trend increasing on average by about 4 percent a year (Figure 13). Ghana’s production followed closely world trends, and therefore Ghana’s share of world production remained unchanged at 13 percent. The same is not true, however, of Ghana’s main competitors. Côte d’Ivoire, the world largest cocoa producer, saw its share of world production increase steadily from 21 percent in 1987 to 38 percent in 1997 (Figure 14 and Table 15). Indonesia, the fastest growing cocoa producer during the decade, expanded its production at an average annual rate of 21 percent, increasing its share of production from 2 percent in 1987 to 11 percent in 1997.

Figure 13.
Figure 13.

World Cocoa Trends, 1987-97

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Source: FAO Yearbook.
Figure 14:
Figure 14:

Share of World Cocoa Production

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Source: FAO Yearbook.
Table 15.

World Cocoa Production, 1987-1997

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Source: FAO Yearbook; International Financial Statistics; and data provided by the Ghanaian and Ivoirien authorities.

The data is for the crop year beginning in the year reported at the top of each column.

Includes stabilization margins.

102. The rapid increase in the market shares of Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia during 1987-97 is remarkable because international price developments were not particularly favorable during the period. World cocoa prices tend to have ten-year cycles with recent troughs taking place in the second year of each decade. Therefore, the first half of the 1987-97 decade was one of declining prices, while the second half benefited from increasing prices (Figure 15). In spite of the upward price trends since 1992, by 1997 world cocoa prices were still 15-19 percent below their levels in 1987. Clearly, factors other than world prices were playing an important role in sustaining the rapid expansion of the cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia, while maintaining Ghana’s growth barely in line with world production.

Figure 15.
Figure 15.

World Cocoa Prices, 1987-97

(In U.S. cents per pound)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics

103. While cocoa production has given rise to many econometric studies, it is not easy to identify precisely the factors behind the relative expansion in cocoa production during the last decade. Price effects, for example tend to affect production with long delays because of the time it takes for a cocoa tree to begin production. Moreover, a cocoa tree once it reaches maturity it will continue to produce even when given only minimal care. Comparative advantage in production is likely to play a role in making cocoa production more profitable in a country than in another. Data on cocoa yield per hectare show that during 1987-97 Indonesia and Côte d’Ivoire had yields per hectare that were on average 2 to 3 times higher than those in Ghana (Figure 13). These differences are explained mostly by the use of high yield hybrid varieties, but also by better husbandry.36

104. However, higher yields are no guarantee of success in world cocoa markets and by themselves can not explain why the production in certain countries had grown faster than in others. Malaysia and Brazil have yields per hectare that are close to those in Indonesia and Côte d’Ivoire, respectively, but have lost significant market share during this decade (from 25 percent of world production in 1987 to 14 percent in 1997). The main problem in these countries seems to have been a profit squeeze resulting from declining cocoa prices and competition from alternative opportunities for the use of the factors of production, particularly labor, that had been employed in cocoa production. The outbreak of cocoa diseases also played a role in the decline of cocoa production in Brazil and Malaysia. Nevertheless, available evidence points to the importance of underlying economic incentives—such as production costs, domestic producer prices, and profitability of alternative crops—in determining production levels, albeit not necessarily in the short term.

105. Assuming that prices of cocoa are determined in world markets, and abstracting differences in quality, the nominal price paid to cocoa farmers depend mainly on marketing, extension services, financial costs, and taxes.37 Data for 1995 indicate that different countries chose to distribute cocoa proceeds in markedly different ways among producer payments, marketing costs, and taxes (Table 16). The producer share in cocoa revenue is much lower in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana than in any of the other producers listed below, all of which have more liberal cocoa marketing systems. Moreover, both marketing costs and taxes were higher in these two countries than in any of the other five countries. The next section compares production incentives, marketing arrangements and other production characteristics between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in more detail.

Table 16.

Distribution of Cocoa Export Proceeds, 1995

(in percent)

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Source: Varangis and Schreiber (1996); and Fund staff estimates for Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.

C. Comparisons with Côte d’Ivoire38

106. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are neighboring countries, but have different marketing systems, although in both countries the government still has a predominant role in managing the system.

107. Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa production increased at an average annual rate of 10 percent during 1987-97; while Ghana’s production increased at an average annual rate of only 3 percent only during the same period. As Figure 16 shows, marked changes in Côte d’Ivoire’s production took place in 1988 and in 1995 and explain much of the performance for the decade. The increase in 1988 seems to have its origins earlier in the eighties, when higher producer prices and government incentives convinced Ivoirien farmers to use higher yielding hybrid varieties. Output tended to stagnate in the first half of the nineties, as an overvalued exchange rate and sharply lower farmgate prices eroded producer incentives. The CFA devaluation and rising world prices for cocoa reinvigorated production in the 1995/96 season.

Figure 16.
Figure 16.

Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana: Production Trends, 1987-98

(In thousands of metric tons)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Sources: FAO Yearbook

108. Ghana’s production fell dramatically in the seventies and the first half of the 1980s owing to excessive taxation, and misguided economic policies. For example, in the 1983/84 crop season, the share of taxes in cocoa export revenue was as high as 44 percent. From 1986 onward, however, Ghana’s production has had a steady, if unspectacular growth, helped by policy reforms aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability and farmers’ incentives (see Section D below).

109. Figure 17 compares export and producer prices between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana during the period 1987/88-1997/98. The comparison is subject to some uncertainty because Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa export proceeds were only available in CFA francs and their conversion to US dollars depends on the exchange rate used. For this study, it was assumed that ⅓ of the crop was exported in a calendar year and ⅔ in the next calendar year; the exchange rate used took this factor into consideration. Two main conclusions can be reached from these comparisons.

Figure 17.
Figure 17.

Cocoa Prices, 1987/88-97/98

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Sources: Data provided by the Ghanaian and the Ivoirien authorities and staff estimates

110. First, despite the premium that Ghana’s cocoa is supposed to command in world markets, the average price obtained by Côte d’Ivoire was often higher than that of Ghana in the last decade. This result is surprising, but may be the result of better timing of cocoa sales, or better ability to negotiate high prices owing to Côte d’Ivoire’s higher market share. It raises doubts about the cost-effectiveness of Ghana’s stringent quality controls, and about Ghana’s strategy to sell cocoa for delivery later in the crop season—assuming that this is done to fetch higher export prices.

111. Second, producer prices in Ghana have been consistently below those in Côte d’Ivoire during the 1987-95 period (Figure 17), despite the fact that Ghana’s cocoa normally fetches a premium in world cocoa markets on account of its higher quality.39 Only since then has Ghana’s producer prices exceeded those in Côte d’Ivoire. It is worth mentioning, however, that even in recent years it is not clear that the higher producer prices translate into higher incentives to produce cocoa in Ghana than in Côte d’Ivoire. Costs of production are likely to be higher in Ghana than in Côte d’Ivoire, because Cocobod’s insistence on quality control forces farmers to invest more time in readying the crop for purchase. Further, Ghana may have been disadvantaged by the pattern of exporting cocoa in smaller batches later in the season with the result that higher storage costs have to be paid. Since yields are lower and quality controls stricter in Ghana, cocoa farmers there may still have lower profits per unit sold than in Côte d’Ivoire.

112. In a recent study, Aleš Bulíř (1998) showed that the cocoa production trends in Ghana can be reasonably explained by price incentives: the real international price for cocoa, the real producer price, and the smuggling incentive, which is measured by the differential between the Ghanaian and Ivoirien producer prices in US dollar terms (see Box 2). These results suggest that an important part of the explanation for relative production trends may be found in differences in real producer prices and, in the case of neighboring countries such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, in relative producer prices.

Cocoa Production and Tax Revenues

From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, the officially recorded production of cocoa in Ghana declined by 60 percent Aleš Bulíř (1998) tests whether price incentives could explain this trend. He uses three variables to measure price incentives: the real international price, the real producer price, and the differential between Ghanaian and Ivoirien producer prices in US dollar terms (the smuggling incentive). He concludes that, while there is little evidence of domestic short-term substitution between cocoa and other crops, the real international price and the smuggling incentive contribute significantly to explain cocoa production in Ghana.

Other points made in the paper:

  • The taxation of cocoa producers in Ghana has been generally higher than in most other cocoa producing countries.

  • The producer-international price ratio has been generally below the levels in other producer countries; producer prices in Brazil and Malaysia and, up to 1993, in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire averaged 60-80 percent of international prices.

  • Bulíř concludes that lower producer prices will only temporarily boost government revenue. The revenue impact of lower producer prices dissipates completely after two years; after that, government revenue will decline from its initial level as supply continues to drop.

  • If the farmers’ share of international price stabilizes in 1996-2000 at 55 percent (compared with a baseline scenario in which the farmers’ share stabilizes at 50 percent), and assuming the smuggling incentive is zero, then, ceteris paribus, the supply of cocoa would rise to 440,000 metric tons in 2000 from 320,000 in 1995. As a result government revenue would increase by about 15 percent between 1996 and 2000. However, too high an increase in the producer price would not raise supply by much in the medium term and would be detrimental to government finances. For example, raising the farmers’ share to 65 percent would increase the annual supply only to about 460,000 metric tons, and government revenue would decline by 30 percent when compared with the baseline scenario.

  • The speed of adjustment to long-run price changes is high: more than one-third of the deviation from the long-term equilibrium in the previous year translates into the current supply decisions made by farmers.

Source: Bulíř (1998).

113. Since producer prices tend to be higher in Côte d’Ivoire than in Ghana, Ghanaian farmers have diverted some of their crop across the border to Côte d’Ivoire helping boost its neighbors’ production statistics. Bulíř (1998) estimated that smuggling may have reduced Ghana’s officially recorded supply of cocoa by as much as 40,000-60,000 metric tons, while similarly raising Côte d’Ivoire’s supply. Ghana’s reluctance to increase domestic producer prices is explained by its dependence on cocoa taxes for a significant share of fiscal revenue and the fact that the Cocobod would need to streamline its operations and shed personnel, if it were to reduce its marketing costs. Table 17 provides an overview of the key differences between the marketing arrangements used in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana during 1987-97.

Table 17.

Cocoa Marketing Systems in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana

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Source: Varengis and Schreiber (1996), and IMF staff.

D. Ghana Cocoa Reforms, 1987-97

114. The government has pursued reforms since the mid-1980s to reverse the decline in cocoa production that reached its all-time low in 1983/84. To encourage recovery, cocoa producer prices were raised by about 185 percent between the 1983/84 and the 1990/91 crop years, while improvements were made in the availability of inputs and extension services. Real price increases were achieved through a steady rise in the share of the cocoa export price paid to producers, specifically, from 25 percent in the 1986/87 crop year to 56 percent in the 1998/99 crop year. Moreover, the Ghanaian authorities seem to be following closely developments in cocoa marketing across the border in Côte d’Ivoire and making sure that smuggling incentives are minimized. In fact, since 1994/95 crop season, the distribution of cocoa export revenue among producers receipts, marketing costs, and taxes has been almost exactly the same as in Côte d’Ivoire (Figure 18).

Figure 18.
Figure 18.

Cocoa Cost Structure, 1987/88-97/98

(In percent of export revenue)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1999, 003; 10.5089/9781451814750.002.A005

Sources: IMF staff estimates.

115. In order to achieve the targeted increase in the farmers’ share in cocoa revenue, the government had to take steps to upgrade the efficiency of the cocoa marketing and distribution system, including reductions in the operating costs of the Cocobod. In 1987, the staff of the Cocobod was reduced by nearly 12,000, in part by limiting its role in road haulage and construction and maintenance of cocoa feeder roads. By 1990, the share of haulage provided by the Cocobod was reduced to no more than 10 percent, with the private sector and railways increasing their participation. Simultaneously, the Cocobod embarked on a program to further reduce its staff during 1992-94, resulting in a reduction of its labor force by about 5,000. To further help reduce marketing costs—thereby allowing producers’ share of cocoa revenue to rise—the government in March 1992 permitted private traders to compete with the Produce Buying Company (PBC) in the purchasing of cocoa. Nevertheless, the PBC still accounts for about 70 percent of domestic crop purchases.

116. In 1995, in its request for the current three-year ESAF arrangement, the government signaled its intention to remove the Cocobod’s monopoly in cocoa exporting, while retaining its quality control function. A study was commissioned by the government and financed by the World Bank to examine the scope and pace of the cocoa sector reforms (LMC International (1996)). The study recommended a gradual approach to liberalization of cocoa marketing in Ghana. It proposed that the producers’ share in export revenue be increased to about 65 percent in two years by withdrawing the Cocobod and its subsidiaries from the domestic purchases of cocoa beans, and by transferring extension services from the Cocobod to the Ministry of Agriculture (and the absorption of these services into the budget). The report claimed that any effort to increase the producers’ share beyond 65 percent would require a reduction in cocoa taxes.40 It recommended that Cocobod’s control of exports be maintained based on the perception that its removal might adversely affect quality control, reliability of deliveries, forward sales, and the predictability of export receipts and taxes.

117. The government has continued moving ahead cautiously toward greater liberalization of the cocoa sector while assessing its options to maintain the competitiveness of Ghana’s cocoa. It has agreed to increase the farmers’ share in the f.o.b. price of cocoa to 56 percent for the 1998/99 crop, to 58 percent for the 1999/2000 crop and to 60 percent for the 2000/01 crop. It has directed the Cocobod to prepare a two-year program of cost-cutting measures to support at least one half of the intended increase in the producers’ share. The PBC will be offered for sale early in 1999 in a manner designed to foster competition in the domestic cocoa purchasing market. The Government is also unifying the extension services of the Cocobod and the Ministry of Agriculture, although costs associated with the reorganization of these services, including retrenchment, remain an obstacle that the government hopes to resolve with World Bank assistance.

E. Next Steps and Conclusions

118. Ghana’s cocoa production is growing less than that of its close competitors. Moreover, Ghana remains significantly more dependent on cocoa for foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue than its competitors and, therefore, more vulnerable to errors in its cocoa sector strategy. These factors call for the government to carefully assess its options, design a strategy, and implement it forcefully. The government has indicated that it plans, with World Bank assistance, to conduct a major workshop on cocoa sector reforms in January 1999, with the objective of developing its strategy to deepen the cocoa sector reforms. The workshop will have work groups dealing with issues related to production, marketing, finance and infrastructure, and taxation and pricing.

119. Ghana’s competitors are continuing their reforms, making it crucial for Ghana to accelerate its own reforms so as to strengthen its competitive position. Building on the reforms undertaken since the early 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire will further liberalize cocoa marketing beginning in October 1999, with the aim of strengthening the role of the private sector and increasing producers’ income. The key elements of the reform schedule include the abolition of the indicative producer price, the elimination of the administrative price schedule (barème) and the stabilization system, and the liberalization of exports. These reforms are being supported by ongoing efforts to strengthen producer organizations and provide support to young farmers and women to ensure that these groups take full advantage of the liberalized system. The stabilization fond (CAISTAB) will be restructured and its mission will be limited to ensuring quality control, preparing statistics on production and exports, and monitoring marketing and stocks.

120. As LMC International Ltd (1996) states, “Given the weaknesses identified in Ghana’s current marketing arrangements, no sustainable argument for maintenance of status quo can be made.” There is therefore an urgent need for action in this area. Some tentative conclusions can already been drawn and could serve as a starting point for the deliberations at the forthcoming workshop on cocoa.

121. First, the experience of Ghana’s competitors suggests that marketing costs can be reduced from their current level of 14-15 percent of the f.o.b. price to 10 percent. The first priority of the cocoa reforms should therefore be to lower marketing costs rapidly to not more than 10 percent of the f.o.b. price. Further reductions beyond this point would be more difficult to achieve.

122. Second, cocoa taxes are important for fiscal revenue in Ghana, and therefore reductions in cocoa taxes will need to be considered carefully. While initial tax reductions may not have a significant impact on fiscal revenue (see Bulíř (1998)), further reductions certainly will. Thus, the timetable for reduction in cocoa export taxes would need to be closely coordinated with other revenue-enhancing tax reforms.

123. Third, quality control has resulted in a premium for Ghanaian cocoa in the world market. However, this premium is declining and is not clear that it would continue to be a net advantage in the future. Quality control is likely to decline with liberalization as it has happened in other countries. Increasingly, importers are carrying out their own tests on the commodities they buy irrespective of official certificates, Therefore, Ghana will need to ponder what changes in quality control procedures it should introduce to ensure that the benefits from quality control exceed its costs.

124. Fourth, Ghana normally ships cocoa later than Côte d’Ivoire. In doing so it incurs higher storage costs. Available evidence seems to indicate that ensuring shorter times between domestic purchases and shipments is likely to result in a net profit for Ghana. Also, there is no reason why cocoa storage operations should be undertaken by the Cocoa Board. Both these aspects of cocoa marketing need to be re-examined urgently.

125. Fifth, cocoa sales to domestic processors have tended to be below world prices representing an implicit subsidy. There seems to be no justification for this practice. The authorities could discontinue the subsidies and use the savings to increase producers’ prices.

126. Sixth, the Cocobod has an arrangement with a large European cocoa processor to process cocoa beans into cocoa liquor, which is then delivered in liquid form to chocolate manufacturers in Europe. This aspect of Ghana’s cocoa marketing has been criticized by traders, processors and manufacturers outside Ghana for its lack of transparency, and may need to be reconsidered.41

127. Seventh, a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of forward sales needs to be made. It is true that it may initially be more difficult to sell cocoa forward in a situation of many exporters. CMC’s good reputation as a counter-party is well deserved and it may take time for other Ghanaian cocoa exporters to establish similar reputations. The reduction in the share of the crop sold forward will increase uncertainty for producers, taxes and balance of payment forecasts. These difficulties need to be seen in perspective, however. Most commodity markets are not dominated by forward contracts, and still are able to function effectively.

128. Eighth, Ghana meets its financing needs for cocoa exports and domestic purchases through a syndicated loan in the international market. Liberalization of cocoa exports and marketing would mean that individual exporters and traders will need to find their own financing. Importers are likely to finance most of the exports, but domestic marketing will have to be done through the domestic banking sector. Since domestic banks may need to look for new loans anyway as the fiscal deficit declines, there is no reason to believe that this financing will not be forthcoming. It is true, however, that overall interest costs may be higher in the case of liberalization than under present conditions.

129. Ninth, as Varangis and Schreiber (1996) point out, the government should begin implementing a program to prepare the sector for further reforms. It could provide training of local operators to improve their knowledge of world cocoa markets; it could set up or strengthen professional associations dealing with cocoa trade, including farmers’ associations and their management; and it could provide increased market information to all participants in the cocoa economy.

Ghana: Summary of Tax System, May 1997

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Sources: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, African Tax Systems, and information provided by the Ghanaian authorities.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table 18.

Ghana: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1993-97

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Sources: Statistical Service; and staff estimates.

Revised estimates.

Estimates.

Including restaurants and hotels.

Table 19.

Ghana: Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Category, 1993-97

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Sources: Ghana Statistical Service.
Table 20.

Ghana: Composition and Growth of Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1993-97

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Sources: Ghana Statistical Service.

Including restaurants and hotels.

Table 21.

Ghana: Composition and Growth of Gross Domesitc Product by Expenditure Category, 1993-97

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Sources: Statistical Service; and staff estimates.

Total investment expenditure published by the GSS is smaller than the staffs estimate; it differs by the amount of government domestic investment expendiutre on commitment basis and by the estimate of foreign financed investment expenditure.

Table 22.

Ghana: Saving and Investment, 1993-1997

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Sources: Ghana Statistical Service.
Table 23.

Ghana: Cocoa Bean Production, Consumption, Prices, Payments to Fanners, and Export Receipts, 1985/86-1997/98

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Source: Cocoa Board.

Includes sales to processing companies; most of the processed products are then exported.

Including bonus payments until 1986/87, but excluding bonus payments thereafter.

Main crop.

Midcrop.

Table 24.

Ghana: Operations of the Cocoa Board, 1990/91-1997/98

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Source: Cocoa Board.

Crop year ending September 30.

Mainly discount charges on bills drawn to finance the purchases of cocoa, export duty, and operations of the Cocoa Board

Includes provision for doubtful debts and depreciation. Includes all other Cocoa Board costs in 1992/93.

Includes outlays for produce inspection, research, construction of feeder roads, and subsidies for insecticides and spraying. Includes a provision of 8.5 billion cedis for retrenchment in 1993/94.