Iceland
Statistical Appendix
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In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries. Each report, prepared by a staff team after discussions with government officials, is published at the option of the member country.

Abstract

In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries. Each report, prepared by a staff team after discussions with government officials, is published at the option of the member country.

ANNEX I. Iceland: The Outlook for Growth

Growth prospects for the Icelandic economy, assuming continuation of a favorable external environment, are predicated importantly upon the government’s fiscal consolidation plans and the possible implementation of several power-intensive projects currently under consideration.

1. Baseline scenario and fiscal consolidation

Official projections suggest that in the absence of any policy measures to curb the fiscal deficit and abstracting from any new power-intensive projects--a baseline scenario--annual real GDP growth would average a little over 2 percent in the medium term; and that fiscal consolidation would raise average growth to close to 2 1/2 percent. Especially in view of the strong dependence of the fiscal outlook on growth prospects, this annex seeks to assess the realism of these projections, in particular from the supply side.

a. The output gap

The estimates reported below should be treated with caution, and are meant to be suggestive only. Potential output calculations in Iceland are complicated by the weight in output of the fishing and fish-processing sectors, which account for 15 percent of GDP, and whose output is influenced importantly by the state of fish stocks. As a result, applying a production function framework is a particularly complex exercise. Instead, a first estimate of the recent output gap was calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter on overall GDP for 1970-2000 (using baseline projections for the medium-term) (Chart 13). 1/ The gap is thus put at about 2 1/2 percent of GDP in 1994.

A rough check on this estimate is provided by tentative calculations of Okun coefficients. Though no estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) are available, most observers agree that there has been a structural shift since the days when Icelandic unemployment was a mere 1 percent of the labor force, and that the cyclical component of unemployment is currently quite small--as suggested for instance by the recent rebound in wage inflation and the emergence of unrest in the labor market. With unemployment in 1994 at 4 3/4 percent, if the NAIRU was of the order of 4-4 1/4 percent and the gap 2 1/2 percent, as suggested above, the resulting Okun coefficient (the ratio of the output gap to the labor market gap) would be in the range of 3-5--toward the higher end of the range typically estimated in other industrial countries. Indications that both the labor force and working hours are low relative to trend would tend to confirm that cyclical variations in these elements are, together with unemployment, contributing importantly to the output gap, and raising the Okun coefficient. Indeed, tentative calculations using a Cobb-Douglas production function suggest that cyclical variation in total labor input alone may have contributed some 1 1/2 percentage points to the output gap in 1994, leaving a plausible 1 percentage point of the estimated 2 1/2 percent gap to be accounted for by underutilization of capital. 1/

If the output gap was about 2 1/2 percent in 1994, actual growth in 1995 3 1/4 percent, and potential growth in 1995 about 2 percent (see below), the estimated output gap for 1995 would be modest, at a little less than 1 1/2 percent.

b. Medium-term scenarios

In the medium-term projections, the difficulties associated with the weight of the fishing sector in the economy are to some extent obviated by the fact that, in both the baseline and the fiscal consolidation scenarios, the sectoral composition of growth is expected to be fairly balanced as between fish and non-fish sectors. Efforts to engender a recovery of fish stocks in Icelandic waters largely predetermine an expected revival of activity in fish and fish-processing sectors. Cod catch quotas were reduced drastically over the last decade to reverse the effects of overfishing in Icelandic waters. 2/ It is expected that as fish stocks recover, it will be possible to raise catch quotas gradually from the current level of 155,000 tons to 300,000 tons over the course of a decade, though the increases are expected to be available only after 1998. This will allow increased marine production by an annual average of 1 3/4 percent over 1996-1999. The sector is thus not expected to exert a very substantial drag on the overall growth rate.

Factor supplies for the extension of the current recovery will come in part from labor force growth projected at about 1 percent a year. However, growth of potential output would also require higher investment levels. In the baseline scenario, a rising fiscal deficit, the need to maintain a small current account surplus, and a likely slow rise in private savings will permit only meager investible resources for capital formation (Table A25). 1/ Indeed, on this basis staff estimates suggest the investment rate is likely to remain stagnant near its current levels of 15 percent, permitting a rise in the capital stock of only 1 percent a year. All in all, potential output would be growing by about 2 percent a year. 2/ Official projected GDP growth rates of just over 2 percent would be sufficient to track this trend growth while allowing for a very slow narrowing of the output gap.

The authorities expect the fiscal consolidation scenario to entail a temporary slowdown of growth in 1996-97, as a result of the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus. However, increased public savings would permit, on the estimates of Table A25, a gradual rise in the investment ratio to 18 percent of GDP by 1999. Stronger investment would add about 1/2 percentage point to potential growth by the end of the projection period, compared with the baseline scenario. The growth rates in the official projections would reflect a gradual absorption of slack after 1997.

These estimates would thus tend to confirm that the medium-term growth rates projected by the authorities, and underlying the fiscal consolidation plans, are broadly realistic.

2. Power-intensive projects

The existence of vast untapped reserves of geo-thermal energy makes Iceland eminently suitable for setting up power-intensive projects. Of the several such projects under consideration, an agreement in principle was reached between the Government of Iceland and Alusuisse-Lonza Holding Ltd. in early November on the expansion of the capacity of the existing aluminum smelter by 60 percent to a little over 160,000 tons.

The expansion envisages additional total investment of about US$260 million (ISK 16 1/2 billion) in 1996-97, equivalent to 2 percent of GDP per year. Of this total expenditure, a large part will be on imports; according to the National Economic Institute, the addition to domestic demand will be around ISK 2 billion per year, and this is expected to raise real GDP growth by 0.7-0.9 percentage points per year over the 1996-97 construction phase. The project will create labor demand of 900 man-years with the peak demand of 400 coming in the second quarter of 1997. It is expected that this can be readily accommodated as there is enough room in the construction industry; in addition, the current power-generation capacity is adequate for the project. The unemployment rate is expected to be, on average, lower by 0.3 percentage point. At a price between US$1650-2000 per ton, additional exports will amount to about ISK 6 1/2-8 billion a year (around 4 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services). The trade balance and the current account are expected to be weaker by 1 percent of GDP in 1996-97, though stronger by about 0.2 percent of GDP thereafter as the higher exports from the smelter come on-line. The current account regains balance by end-decade. National income would be higher by over a percentage point over the medium-term.

Other power-intensive projects currently under discussion include an additional 40,000 ton capacity expansion of the existing smelter, bringing the total capacity of the smelter to 200,000 tons per year by the end of the decade. 1/ Iceland Alloys is also considering a 60 percent capacity expansion of its ferro-silicon plant which would entail an investment of US$50 million and generate increased exports of US$18-24 million per year. In addition, a U. S. firm is considering a 60,000 ton smelter; it has already garnered the necessary assets but is in the process of choosing a suitable site from among several countries, including Iceland. Besides an investment of US$150 million in the plant itself, the project would require additional investment in power generation to the tune of US$150 million. The simultaneous undertaking of these investment expenditures would generate additional demand of about 3-4 percent of GDP during the construction period. This would add substantially to pressures on domestic resources, strain the labor market, and raise the possibility of an overheated economy in the construction phase. In addition, once the new exports came on stream, and even taking account of factor incomes remitted abroad, these projects would add significantly to national income and might thereby put substantial pressure on the nontradable sector in their operation phase as well.

CHART 1
CHART 1

ICELAND OUTPUT GROWTH

(Annual percentage change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
CHART 2
CHART 2

ICELAND INFLATION

(Twelve-month percent change)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
CHART 3
CHART 3

ICELAND EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: National Economic Institute.
CHART 4
CHART 4

ICELAND EXTERNAL SECTOR

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
CHART 5
CHART 5

ICELAND COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS

(In percent of total exports)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
CHART 6
CHART 6

ICELAND TREASURY FINANCES

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Finances.
CHART 7
CHART 7

ICELAND RECENT BUDGETARY DEVELOPMENTS

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Finances.
CHART 8
CHART 8

ICELAND OVERALL FISCAL POSITION

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Finances.
CHART 9
CHART 9

ICELAND INTEREST RATES AND FOREIGN RESERVES

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Sources: Central Bank of Iceland; International Financial Statistics
CHART 10
CHART 10

ICELAND INTEREST RATES AND FOREIGN RESERVES

(In percent of GDP)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Sources: Central Bank of Iceland.1/ Against the official currency basket—up to September 6, 1995: ECU=76%, US$=18%, JPY=6%; trade-weighted basket thereafter.
CHART 11
CHART 11

ICELAND EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS

(In billions of krónur)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland: and staff calculations1/ First estimates for 1995:03.2/ including financial institutions.
CHART 12
CHART 12

ICELAND EXTERNAL DEBT

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Source: Central Bank of Iceland.1/ Including financial institutions.
CHART 13
CHART 13

ICELAND OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE, AND WORKING HOURS

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1996, 017; 10.5089/9781451819199.002.A001

Sources: National Economic Institute; and staff calculations.1/ For manual workers.

Statistical Appendix

Table A1.

Iceland: GDP and Expenditure Components 1/

article image
Source: National Economic Institute.

Volume changes axe based on 1990 prices.

Official estimates and forecasts as of October 1995.

Change as a percentage of GNP of previous year.

2.5 percent if a reduction in exports of old ships and aircraft is excluded.

GNP adjusted for changes in terms of trade.

Table A2.

Iceland: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1/

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Source: The National Economic Institute.

Volume changes are based on 1990 prices.

Official estimates and forecasts as of October 1995.

Including aquaculture.

Table A3.

Iceland: Gross Domestic Product by Sectors

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Source: National Economic Institute.
Table A4.

Iceland: Fish Catch and Marine Production

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Source: The national Economic Institute.

Official estimates and forecasts as of October 1995.

Catch values deflated by domestic fish prices.

Table A5.

Iceland: Export Production and Merchandise Exports

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Source: National Economic Institute.

Official estimates and forecasts as of October 1995.

Table A6.

Iceland: Balance of Payments on Current Account

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Including compensation of employees.

Table A7.

Iceland: Merchandise Trade by Commodity

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Source: Statistical Bureau of Iceland.

Official estimates as of October 1995.

Table A8.

Iceland: Merchandise Trade by Area

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Source: Statistical Bureau of Iceland.
Table A9.

Iceland: Trade in Services

(In millions of krónur)

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Sources: National Economic Institute; Central Bank of Iceland.

Including compensation of employees.

Table A10.

Iceland: Unemployment, Wages, and Prices

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Source: The National Economic Institute.

Official estimates as of October 1995.

Planned hiring less layoffs.

Relative to the consumer price index.

Table A11.

Iceland: Selected Short-term Interest Rates

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Annual average and end of month figures.

End of period figures.

Central Bank’s bids on the Icelandic Stock Exchange.

Table A12.

Iceland: Selected Long-term and Deposit Money Banks’ Interest Rates

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Sources: Central Bank of Iceland; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.

End of period figures.

Annual average or end of month figures.

Central Bank’s bids on the Icelandic Stock Exchange.

Market makers’ bids on the Icelandic Stock Exchange.

Table A13.

Iceland: Monetary Survey

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Deposits of public depository funds and Investment Credit Funds.

Table A14.

Iceland: Accounts of the Central Bank

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
Table A15.

Iceland: Credit System

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
Table A16.

Iceland: Balance of Payments en Capital Account

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Equivalent to changes in the central bank’s net international reserves (minus sign indicating a decrease).

Table A17.

Iceland: Foreign Reserves of the Central Bank

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
Table A18.

Iceland: Gross External Debt

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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Ratio of end of period outstanding debt to GDP of current year.

Table A19.

Iceland: Treasury Budget

(Cash basis)

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Source: Ministry of Finance. Treasury Finances.

Budget Proposal for 1996, October 1995.

Taxes counted under “revenues”, but not yet paid.

Table A20.

Iceland: Treasury Revenue and Expenditure by Category

(Cash basis)

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Sources: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Finances.

Budget Proposal for 1996. October 1995.

Table A21.

Iceland: Central Government and Social Security Finances

(Accruals basis)

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Source: National Economic Institute.

In 1986 the Treasury wrote off a claim on the public electricity company amounting to ISK 5.1 billion. In the Icelandic version of the accruals accounts, the write off was counted as an expenditure in 1986.

Table A22.

Iceland: Local Government Finances

(Accruals basis)

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Source: National Economic Institute.
Table A23.

Iceland: General Government Finances

(Accruals basis)

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Sources: National Economic Institute.

In 1986 the Treasury wrote off a claim on the public electricity company amounting to ISK 5.1 billion. In the Icelandic version of the accruals accounts, the write-off was counted as an expenditure in 1986.

Table A24.

Iceland: Treasury Debt and Lending

(In millions of krónur. end of period)

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Source: Ministry of Finance, Treasury Finances.

Budget Proposal for 1996. October 1995.

Ratio of end of year outstanding debt or lending to current year GDP.

Table A25.

Iceland: Medium-Term Growth Prospects

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Sources: Icelandic authorities, and staff estimates.

Treasury saving and investment based on official baseline scenario. Staff baseline yields slightly higher total gross investment in 1998-99.

Staff estimates.

Based on the authorities’ targets for the treasury balance.

1/

The detrending parameter λ is set at the usual value of 100. Although the procedure makes the estimate of the output gap dependent on the assessment of the medium-term outlook, projections are included because the filter is known to display strong end-sample bias. The baseline projections are chosen because, with low investment, they more closely approximate the conditions of recent years and are thus likely to yield more appropriate potential growth rates for the recent period.

1/

In this calculation the labor share in GDP is put at 0.62, and the NAIRU is taken to be 4 1/4 percent for 1994. The deviation of labor force from trend is estimated by smoothing the labor force using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Given the timing and length of the Icelandic recession, it is particularly difficult to distinguish the cyclical and trend components of the recent decline in working hours for manual workers (which is assumed also to have taken place elsewhere in the economy). Trend working hours for manual workers in 1994 are assumed to be 47 hours a week, down from about 48 hours a week observed in the 1980s, reflecting a secular trend similar to that in other countries, but above the level of 46-46.5 hours observed since 1988.

2/

Despite the fall in catch quotas, diversification to other (and high value added) species and possibilities of fishing outside of Icelandic waters have moderated the fall in total fish catch value added. In addition, actual catch has typically exceeded total allowable catch.

1/

A small current account surplus is considered appropriate for Iceland in light of its rather high external debt and a population that is projected to age relatively rapidly over the next fifty years. A slow rise in private savings is assumed to result from household debt consolidation, although the private saving rate is already high compared with its pre-downturn levels in the 1980s.

2/

The calculations again assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 0.62. Total factor productivity growth is estimated to have slowed sharply from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. In this projection it is set at the rate reached toward the end of this period (0.9 percent a year).

1/

This further expansion would raise real GDP growth by 0.3-0.4 percentage points over a two-year construction phase.

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Iceland: Statistical Appendix
Author:
International Monetary Fund