Guinea-Bissau
Recent Economic Developments
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This report describes recent economic and financial developments in Guinea–Bissau, focusing on 1994 and early 1995, and provides statistical coverage from 1990. In 1994, the rate of growth of aggregate economic output exceeded that of the population, the pace of consumer price inflation abated to historic low, and both the fiscal and external current account positions showed further improvement. At end-1994, the economic and financial situation of Guinea–Bissau remained characterized by large domestic and external imbalances, as well as by a heavy burden of external debt service obligations.

Abstract

This report describes recent economic and financial developments in Guinea–Bissau, focusing on 1994 and early 1995, and provides statistical coverage from 1990. In 1994, the rate of growth of aggregate economic output exceeded that of the population, the pace of consumer price inflation abated to historic low, and both the fiscal and external current account positions showed further improvement. At end-1994, the economic and financial situation of Guinea–Bissau remained characterized by large domestic and external imbalances, as well as by a heavy burden of external debt service obligations.

GUINEA-BISSAU - Basic Data 1/

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Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.

Numbers may not total because of rounding.

Current budget, excluding scheduled external interest payments.

I. Introduction

This report describes recent economic and financial developments in Guinea-Bissau, focusing on 1994 and early 1995, and provides statistical coverage from 1990.

As discussed below, in 1994 the rate of growth of aggregate economic output again exceeded that of the population, the pace of consumer price inflation abated to an historic low, and both the fiscal and external current account positions showed further improvement. On the other hand, the rate of monetary expansion accelerated toward the end of the year, leading to a spurt in inflation, as well as a more rapid rate of depreciation of the Guinea-Bissau peso in early 1995. The relaxation in the monetary and credit policy stance was attributable in part to the political transition in the aftermath of the country’s first multiparty elections, which were concluded in August.

At end-1994, the economic and financial situation of Guinea-Bissau remained characterized by large domestic and external imbalances, as well as by a very heavy burden of external debt service obligations.

II. Production, Expenditure, and Prices

1. Overview

In 1994, real GDP is estimated to have increased by almost 7 percent, thanks mainly to a strong improvement in net agricultural exports and buoyant commercial activity (Table 1). This strong performance permitted the continuation of the annual gains in real per capita income that have been achieved since 1990, despite a relatively high population growth rate of 2 ½ percent (Chart 1). Also, the overall improvement in net exports contributed to positive domestic savings, possibly for the first time. Following the sharp deceleration in the rate of monetary growth in 1993, the rate of domestic inflation—as measured by the consumer price index (CPI)—again declined in 1994, to 15 percent (on a period average basis), from 48 percent in 1993.

Table 1.

Guinea-Bissau: Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1990–94

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Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.
CHART 1
CHART 1

GUINEA-BISSAU SELECTED NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND PRICE INDICATORS 1990–94

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 120; 10.5089/9781451815689.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.

2. National accounts

In 1994, Guinea-Bissau’s domestic imbalances were less pronounced than in previous years. Although gross domestic expenditure again exceeded GDP—by some 17 percent—consumption declined to about 97 percent of GDP, from 100 percent in 1993, thus allowing for positive domestic savings (Table 2). Investment also fell relative to GDP, to 20 percent from 25 ½ percent in 1993, reflecting largely the virtual depletion of cashew nut stocks. The external resource gap was thus narrowed to 17 ½ percent of GDP in 1994, from 25 ¾ percent in 1993. The change in the GDP deflator (at market prices) was 23 percent, down from 53 ¾ percent in 1993.

Table 2.

Guinea-Bissau: National Accounts, 1990–94

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Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.

3. Production

Guinea-Bissau’s economy is heavily dependent on a large primary sector, mainly subsistence agriculture, and a sizable services sector, including public administration, which accounted for 44 percent and 38 percent of GDP, respectively, in 1994 (Table 3). Industry and construction, together, accounted for only another 18 percent of output.

Table 3.

Guinea-Bissau: Nominal Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1990–94

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Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.

In 1994, primary sector output expanded by slightly more than 6 percent, associated with an above-average crop year for staples and increased traders’ demand for cashew nuts, following the termination of minimum export shipping requirements (Table 4). Cashew nut exports increased to a record 46,460 metric tons, with almost half of this accounted for by a virtual depletion of stocks (Table 5). Fishing activity by domestic operators is estimated to have increased for all species, although exports remained negligible, reflecting the cessation of operations of the previous major exporter—Estrela do Mar—a joint venture between the governments of Guinea-Bissau and the former Soviet Union (Table 6). Manufacturing output increased by less than 2 percent in 1994, reflecting the precarious situation of domestic industry, which consists largely of state enterprises that are being closed or downsized. However, wood processing showed a strong rise, with sawn wood increasing by 28 percent (Table 7). Commercial activity grew by 16 percent in 1994, owing to the successful cashew nut campaign and increased retail trade. Electricity and water production is estimated to have grown slightly, reflecting the ongoing rehabilitation of Bissau’s public utility (Table 8).

Table 4.

Guinea-Bissau: Output of Main Crops, 1990–94

(In thousands of metric tons)

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Source: National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
Table 5.

Guinea-Bissau: Stocks, Production, and Uses of Cashew Nuts, 1990–94

(In metric tons)

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Source: National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
Table 6.

Guinea-Bissau: Industrial and Artisanal Fishing, 1990–94

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Source: National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
Table 7.

Guinea-Bissau: Manufacturing Production in Major Industries, 1990–94

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Source: National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
Table 8.

Guinea-Bissau: Electricity and Water Production, 1990–94

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Source: National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

4. Prices

The CPI for Guinea-Bissau is very limited in that it comprises only three commodity groups—foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco—and covers only the capital city of Bissau. Moreover, the basket weights date back to a 1986 consumption survey and appear to be seriously biased by the large relative weight of the tobacco component. 1/, In any case, the rate of inflation as measured by the CPI decelerated to an historic low of 15 percent in 1994, reflecting both fiscal and monetary tightening through most of the year, as well as a slower pace of depreciation of the peso (Table 9). However, monetary slippages in late 1994 appear to have rekindled inflation, which reached almost 12 percent during the first four months of 1995, compared with a negative 1 percent for the corresponding period in 1994.

Table 9.

Guinea-Bissau: Consumer Price Indices, 1990-April 1995

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Source: Directorate-General of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

The CPI covers only Bissau and three commodity groups (weights in parenthesis) - food (0.830), beverages (0.061), and tobacco (0.109).

Average inflation during last 12 months.

Change from December 1994.

III. Public Finance

1. Main developments

During 1994, government budgetary revenues increased by more than 1 percentage point of GDP to 11 ⅔ percent (Table 10 and Chart 2). At the same time, total expenditure and net lending declined from 39 ⅔ percent of GDP in 1993 to 33 ¼ percent of GDP in 1994, owing mainly to a slowdown in public investment. As a result, the overall fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis and excluding grants) fell to 21 ½ percent of GDP, from 29 ⅓ percent in 1993. Although the Treasury stepped up cash payments on external debt service and initiated reschedulings with creditors, in 1994 there was another large accumulation of external payments arrears on a net basis. On the other hand, domestic arrears were reduced, and the Government built up a net creditor position vis-à-vis the banking system.

Table 10.

Guinea-Bissau: Central Government Operations, 1990–94

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Source: Directorate-General of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance.

Including privatization receipts.

Use of proceeds from previously disbursed foreign loan contracted by the Central Bank and assumed by the Treasury in 1994.

Current budget, excluding scheduled external interest payments.

CHART 2
CHART 2

GUINEA-BISSAU SELECTED FISCAL INDICATORS 1990–94

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 120; 10.5089/9781451815689.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities.

2. Revenues

Tax collections in 1994 rose strongly by 71 percent, boosted by a surge in customs revenues, which increased by 83 percent (Table 11). Although improved customs assessment procedures were partly responsible for this gain, the main contributing factor was the record cashew nut exports, which enabled export tax collections to more than triple, despite a reduction in the cashew nut export tax rate from 18 percent to 13 percent. In contrast, taxes on income accounted for less than 8 percent of budgetary revenue (i.e., excluding grants), as the formal sector’s personal and corporate income tax bases remained very narrow. Similarly, taxes on consumption accounted only for about 7 percent of revenue, as many informal domestic transactions remained outside the web of taxation. With respect to consumption taxes, that on rice was raised to 14 percent to bring total tax levies on imported rice to 20 percent by end-1994. Nontax revenues increased by 27 percent, mostly on account of the higher domestic currency value of fishing license receipts. In 1994, no privatization revenues accrued to the Treasury.

Table 11.

Guinea-Bissau: Central Government Revenue, 1990–94

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Source: Directorate-General of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance.

In order to expand the tax base and improve fiscal administration, the authorities took measures in the context of the 1995 budget: a taxpayer number identification system was introduced; customs collections procedures were made more stringent by requiring the payment of the consumption tax on oil products simultaneously with customs duties; and the number of tariff exemptions was reduced by 60 percent.

During 1994, external grants accruing to the Government’s capital budget declined by US$6 million, to US$34 million, including donor support for the logistics of the first national multiparty elections.

3. Expenditure

In 1994, government current expenditure declined in relation to GDP by ⅓ of 1 percentage point. The nominal wage bill was virtually stable relative to its 1993 level, reflecting the downsizing of the civil service and a salary freeze in effect since 1993 (Table 12). Transfers to public enterprises were increased sharply to help strengthen the capital position of some of the companies, in line with the strategy to reform the state enterprise sector. Scheduled interest payments were again the largest component of current expenditure at about 37 percent of the total.

Table 12.

Guinea-Bissau: Central Government Expenditure, 1990–94

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Source: Directorate-General of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance.

In view of the prevalent poverty in Guinea-Bissau—per capita income is estimated at only some US$235—and associated unfavorable social indicators, the Government endeavored to keep social expenditures in 1994 at about 23 percent of current expenditure (excluding interest payments), and, simultaneously, priority was given to investment in health and education. In contrast, military expenditures were kept at 9 percent of current expenditure (excluding interest payments), or less than 1 percent of GDP, in line with the ongoing streamlining of the armed forces.

Government capital outlays increased by less than 3 percent in 1994, as the Government dissociated itself from donor-financed projects carried out through nonofficial domestic entities. However, no information is available on the sectoral distribution of public investment during 1994. Net government lending was positive again in 1994, as the Government failed to recover balances owed by domestic operators from the sale of merchandise provided through external aid.

4. Arrears accumulation and other financing

In view of the heavy external debt service burden confronting Guinea-Bissau, in 1994 the Treasury continued to accumulate arrears—some US$18 million on a net basis. Guinea-Bissau made cash payments in 1994 of US$6 million on 1994 maturities and of US$5 million on pre-1994 arrears. However, no major debt rescheduling agreement was formalized until a February 1995 Paris Club meeting. Debt relief granted during 1994 was less than US$300,000 (from France, Libya, and Sweden). 1/

In contrast, domestic arrears were reduced by PG 3 billion, as the Treasury endeavored to catch up on unsettled payments from previous years. The PG 25 billion in domestic arrears still outstanding at end-1994 related mainly to unpaid civil servant income supplements and purchases from suppliers.

In 1994, the Government built up a net creditor position vis-à-vis the banking system to the extent of some PG 90 billion by accumulating deposits generated by counterpart funds. Owing to the more selective and restrained public investment program, external loan disbursements fell from US$22 million in 1993 to US$17 million in 1994, thus rendering net foreign financing negative on the basis of scheduled amortization of US$28 million. An additional source of financing (PG 41 billion) became available when the Treasury assumed a medium- and long-term credit to the Central Bank, which had been disbursed previously but not fully utilized.

IV. Structural and Social Reforms

1. Introduction

The structural reform program under way in Guinea-Bissau is aimed at fostering market-driven economic efficiency by increasing the role of the private sector. This strategy has entailed a general liberalization of prices and regulations, as well as the downsizing of the extensive public administration and state enterprise sector. In this context, in 1991, the Government initiated an overhaul of the civil service as well as a privatization program. However, in view of the social realities, the Government has also been alert to the adverse effects of the transition process on the most vulnerable segments of the population and has sought to provide safety nets to the extent that resources allow. The Government is also aware of the potentially detrimental impact on future economic growth of an overexploitation of the country’s natural resource base, and has sought to enforce stricter environmental standards.

2. Civil service reform

In 1991, the Government launched a broad civil service reform program with three major objectives: (i) to reduce significantly the size of the civil service; (ii) to increase the efficiency of public administration by upgrading the qualifications and working conditions for civil servants; and (iii) to enhance transparency in the salary structure by accounting for all direct remunerations and other benefits.

With regard to the reduction in the size of the civil service, the strategy was to encourage voluntary departures by offering separation incentives to lower-ranked civil servants, who account for the larger part of the overstaffing in public administration. For these staff, the severance pay package (in the US$1,000–2,000 range during 1992–94) averaged the equivalent of about two years’ salary, and employee interest was considerable. At end-1994, some 2,549 workers, or some 11 percent of the estimated 23,000 workers on the government payroll at end-1991 (including military and paramilitary personnel), had left the civil service under the voluntary departure program, with 1,043 departures in 1992, 742 in 1993, and 764 in 1994 (Table 13). A census of the public administration was initiated in early 1995, which should allow a more adequate monitoring of the size of the civil service in the future.

Table 13.

Guinea-Bissau: Civil Service Employment and Developments Under the Voluntary Departure Program, December 1992-June 1995

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Sources: Directorate-General of the Civil Service, Ministry of the Civil Service and Labor; and Directorate-General of Public Accounting and Budget. Ministry of Finance.

The military personnel assigned to the Presidency are accounted for under the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In the absence of detailed information, all Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Home Affairs staff are counted as military personnel.

However, the Government has encountered more difficulties in implementing the other two components of the civil service reform. In particular, revision of the salary structure has been slow, owing mainly to problems with standardizing total benefits across different personnel categories, and, in some cases, between staff in the same category. As to career development and the improvement of working conditions, staff training and equipment upgrade programs are envisaged but have not yet been implemented, owing to a lack of resources.

3. Reform of the public enterprise sector

Following the termination of central planning, in 1990, Guinea-Bissau launched a reform program for the state enterprise sector geared to making public companies financially autonomous and to privatizing them as soon as practicable. At the same time, the Government sought to improve the institutional and legal framework for private sector development and for public enterprises that remained state-owned.

The Government’s initial strategy was to select a few enterprises for sale, with the expectation that resources thus generated would help meet the financial restructuring needs of other public enterprises. The first group of public enterprises for sale consisted of ten companies, and, as of end-May 1995, all but one (CICER—brewery) had been privatized, put up for tender, or placed under private management (Table 14). In addition, specific operations of two public enterprises were spun off into joint ventures (GUINÉ-TELECOM and GUIPORT) with majority private sector positions. Five other companies had no viable prospects for privatization and were liquidated, closed, or merged.

Table 14.

Guinea-Bissau: Status of Public Enterprise Reform, June 1995

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Source: Managing Unit for the Reform of Public Enterprises (UGREP), Ministry of Finance.

Three types of private management arrangements have been employed: (i) leasing under which profits/losses accrue to the Lessee; (ii) management contracts, under which profits/losses accrue to the State; and (iii) concession contracts, which are joint ventures for extended periods with the State holding a minority position

Following a loss of momentum in late 1994 in the aftermath of the national elections, the pace of the divestment program was stepped up in early 1995 with the opening of tenders for three enterprises (CMV—automobile maintenance; FOLBI—wood products; and SOCOTRAM—wood processing) and the liquidation of two more (GUINEMAR—shipping; and JAPG—port authority). Before the end of the year, two more enterprises are scheduled to be put up for tender and seven more to be liquidated.

As for the public enterprises remaining in the government portfolio, there has been an attempt to enhance their efficiency through private management contracts. However, this has only occurred for three hotels and for the Bissau utilities company. For the most part, enterprises continue to be run by appointed civil servants or managers with little or no professional accountability. As a result, the financial situation of these enterprises continues to be difficult, and in some cases they have all but ceased operations.

4. Poverty and social adjustment measures

According to the World Bank, the results of a household survey conducted in 1991 indicated that 49 percent of Guinea-Bissau’s population were living in poverty, with 26 percent of the population living in extreme poverty. 1/ Poverty was overwhelmingly a problem in rural areas, where 85 percent of the poor lived. The average poor household was relatively large, with a high dependency ratio (eight or more people), and had little or no access to utilities, medical care, schools, or public transportation.

Lacking the resources to set up direct income transfers to the poor, the Government has sought to alleviate poverty by giving priority to expenditure in the social areas, with a view to providing wider access to basic services—health, education, and safe water. In this context, priority is being given to improving the quality of primary health care and education, while, for access to safe water, the Government, with UNDP and World Bank support, is seeking to rehabilitate existing urban systems and expand the rural networks. 2/

At present, social safety nets in Guinea-Bissau are in place for only a few vulnerable groups: departing civil servants, who receive benefit packages for voluntary separations; and schoolchildren, teachers, and hospital patients, who receive free meals under a food supplement program.

As for food security, the Government, with assistance from the World Food Program, monitors the situation closely, and emergency food aid has been mobilized on occasion. Rice remains the basic food staple in Guinea-Bissau, and, although its price has been liberalized, the Government tries to keep it affordable by dissuading merchants from speculative hikes, and, when food aid in kind is available, by conducting sales to the public.

5. Environmental priorities

Guinea-Bissau has valuable natural resources that could provide a much higher living standard for its population. Irrigated agricultural land is plentiful and rainfall is abundant, and the country’s maritime platform is rich in sea life, including several commercially valuable fish and crustacean species. There are relatively untouched ecosystems of great importance, especially the mangroves and wood forests of the mainland and the unique marshy islands of the Bijagós archipelago. However, some of these resources are coming under strong pressure from economic interests and the subsistence needs of the population. In particular, two areas of immediate concern have emerged: excessive fishing and deforestation.

While local fishermen employ artisanal methods that do not threaten the renovation of stocks, foreign operators exploit Guinea-Bissau’s offshore waters virtually unchecked under licensing agreements that the Government has considerable difficulty in monitoring. As a result, the commercial exploitation of some species is not sustainable. These problems were highlighted in a recent report issued by the USAID-sponsored Trade and Investment Policy Support Project (TIPS), which also pointed out that the financial counterparts paid for the fishing licenses were too low and other environmental safeguards inadequate. 1/ With this in mind, the Government is trying to negotiate licenses on better terms and has achieved some success recently in the context of negotiations with the European Union. As for coastal monitoring, the situation is expected to improve with the recent activation of a patrol boat and the prospective commencement of regional patrolling operations.

The other major environmental problem—deforestation—has resulted from the expansion of agriculture, the pressing need for firewood in urban centers, and the emergence of small wood processing and log exporting companies. Deforestation, in turn, is causing a rise in salinity in the rivers, estuaries, and coastal waters that serve as breeding grounds for sea life, thus aggravating the fisheries situation. The Government will address these issues in the context of a national environment strategy currently under preparation. For the time being, government actions include an ongoing national survey of forest resources and the application of cost recovery criteria for logging permits.

V. Money and Banking

1. Banking system

Guinea-Bissau’s banking system consists of the Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB) and two private commercial banks—the Banco Internacional da Guiné-Bissau (BIGB), established in 1990, and an agency in Bissau of the Portuguese bank Banco Totta & Açores (BTA), established in 1992. A third bank, Banco de Crédito Nacional (BCN), was set up as a public commercial bank in March 1990 mainly to monitor the recovery of the medium-term portfolio of the former Banco Nacional, which was closed in mid-1991 and subjected to a liquidation process. The BCN liquidation committee ceased its operations at end-1993, and its responsibilities were transferred to a recovery unit in the Treasury.

2. Monetary developments. 1994–95

After a successful tightening of the monetary and credit policy stance during 1993 and most of 1994, a surge in credit to the economy late in the year led to an annual expansion in broad money of almost 49 percent, well in excess of the estimated 31 percent growth of nominal GDP (Table 15 and Chart 3). The growth in credit to the economy, most of which was recorded in November and December, more than offset the sharp decline in net bank claims on the Government of almost 33 ¼ percent in terms of beginning-of-period broad money. This contributed importantly to an increase in net domestic assets of 54 ¾ percent, in terms of the beginning-of-period broad money, although the largest part of that increase resulted from the impact on other items net of the 25 percent depreciation in the Guinea-Bissau peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar during 1994. The net foreign assets position of the banking system deteriorated sharply by about 58 ½ percent in terms of beginning-of-period broad money, but this was due mostly to a reclassification of some medium- and long-term liabilities as short-term. In fact, gross official foreign reserves grew to US$18 million, from US$14 million at end-1993. Foreign currency deposits accounted for about one third of broad money, which resulted in a endogenous linkage between broad money and the depreciation of the peso. When the excessive pace of monetary expansion during the last two months of 1994 became apparent in early 1995, the BCGB took corrective actions by raising both interest rates and reserve requirements.

Table 15.

Guinea-Bissau: Monetary Survey, 1990-March 1995

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

Revised since issuance of SM/95/185.

During 1994, the Treasury assumed all of the Central Bank’s medium- and long-term liabilities to official creditors (PG 110 billion), and the Central Bank reclassified its remaining (commercial) medium- and long-term liabilities (PG 85 billion) as short-term.

CHART 3
CHART 3

GUINEA-BISSAU SELECTED MONETARY INDICATORS 1990–94

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 120; 10.5089/9781451815689.002.A001

Source: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities.

The most significant development in the central bank accounts in 1994 was the elimination of medium- and long-term external liabilities, which were either transferred to the Treasury (PG 110 billion) or reclassified under short-term liabilities (PG 85 billion) (Table 16). The Treasury continued to build up deposits in the Central Bank to the extent that it became a net creditor to the banking system, despite a sizable rise in loans.

Table 16.

Guinea-Bissau: Summary Accounts of the Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau, 1990-March 1995

(In billions of Guinea-Bissau pesos; end of period)

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

Revised since issuance of SM/95/185.

During 1994, the Treasury assumed all of the Central Bank’s medium- and long-term liabilities to official creditors (PG 110 billion), and the Central Bank reclassified its remaining (commercial) medium-and long-term liabilities (PG 85 billion) as short-term.

During 1994, the commercial banks sharply expanded their loan portfolios, in particular credit to private enterprises, which increased by 61 percent, largely in connection with trade financing (Table 17). The net foreign assets position of the commercial banks fell from US$10 million to US$5 million. Deposits in the commercial banks increased by 48 percent. Some outstanding credit was recovered and the expansion in deposits was slowed in early 1995, following the Central Bank’s tightening of policies.

Table 17.

Guinea-Bissau: Summary Accounts of the Commercial Banking System, 1990-March 1995

(In billions of Guinea-Bissau pesos; end of period)

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

Revised since issuance of SM/95/185.

3. Interest rates and reserve requirements

In response to moderating price pressures, the Central Bank reduced interest rates four times during 1994, and, at end-December, the benchmark six-month deposit rate stood at 25 percent, down from 40 percent one year earlier (Table 18). Throughout the year, real interest rates remained positive and reached more than 20 percentage points during the second quarter. However, the acceleration of inflation in early 1995 led the Central Bank to effect a small rate rise in April.

Table 18.

Guinea-Bissau: Interest Rates and Required Reserve Ratios for Commercial Banks, 1990-June 1995

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

With the termination of credit ceilings for the two commercial banks, the Central Bank has sought to control the money supply through more active use of required reserve ratios. Thus, in early 1995, the Central Bank made required reserve ratios uniform at 17 percent for domestic and foreign currency deposits and subsequently increased this rate to 20 percent. Also, given the lack of compliance with required reserve ratios in the past, the Central Bank recently raised the penalty rate on shortfalls in excess of two weeks from 2 to 5 percentage points above the one-year commercial bank lending rate. At the same time, to compensate banks for the opportunity cost of the high reserve ratios, the Central Bank began paying interest at the six-month deposit rate on excess reserves.

VI. External Trade and Payments

1. Current account

In 1994, Guinea-Bissau recorded a significant improvement in its external current account position, which, including official transfers, showed a surplus (about US$9 million) for the first time (Table 19 and Chart 4). Excluding official transfers, the current account also improved, with the deficit narrowing to 18 ½ percent of GDP in 1994, from 28 ½ percent in 1993, owing to a doubling of export receipts to US$33 million and a small reduction in imports. These favorable trade developments occurred despite the fact that, in U.S. dollar terms, cashew nut prices fell by 9 percent and average import prices rose by almost 5 percent, leading to a terms of trade deterioration of some 16 ½ percent (Table 20). However, no progress was made in export diversification, as cashew nuts accounted for 93 percent of all exports (Table 21). Food imports declined by US$9 million, while the import bill for other categories increased (Table 22). Guinea-Bissau’s major trading partner was Portugal, which accounted for 36 percent of exports and 41 percent of imports; India was the top export destination for unprocessed cashew nuts and accounted for 48 percent of all exports (Table 23).

Table 19.

Guinea-Bissau: Balance of Payments, 1990–94

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Source: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities.
CHART 4
CHART 4

GUINEA-BISSAU SELECTED EXTERNAL INDICATORS 1990–94

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 120; 10.5089/9781451815689.002.A001

Sources: Data provided by the Guinea-Bissau authorities; and staff estimates.
Table 20.

Guinea-Bissau: Trade and Exchange Rata Indicators, 1990-June 1995

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Sources: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB); and IMF Information Notice System.

From December 1994.

Table 21.

Guinea-Bissau: Merchandise Exports, f.o.b., 1990–94

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).
Table 22.

Guinea-Bissau: Merchandise Imports, c.i.f., 1990–94

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).
Table 23.

Guinea-Bissau: Direction of Trade, 1990–94

(In percent of total)

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

Net services also improved, by almost US$4 million, relative to 1993 (Table 24). However, large debits for nonfactor services, particularly for technical assistance and freight and insurance, caused the nonfactor services deficit to remain at about US$24 million. The factor services balance improved slightly on account of higher fishing license fees and lower scheduled interest payments.

Table 24.

Guinea-Bissau: Factor and Nonfactor Services, 1990–94

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Source: Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

External grants rose from US$44 million in 1993 to US$54 million in 1994, thanks to donor support for the 1994 elections and high levels of assistance from nongovernmental organizations, which donated more than US$8 million (Table 25). As to the composition of external grants, project assistance (US$44 million) and support for the elections (US$4 million) accounted for the larger part, while balance of payments support and food aid amounted to only about US$2 million each. By source, the largest amounts came from Sweden (US$10 million) and the European Union (US$8 million).

Table 25.

External Grant Disbursements, 1990–94

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Source: Directorate-General of External Financing, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

Not included in the Public Investment Program.

Not included in the Public Investment Program, except for SNV disbursements.

2. Capital account and reserves

In 1994, net external medium- and long-term financing was negative, as scheduled amortization payments of about US$28 million exceeded the US$17 million in inflows for project and balance of payments support. Moreover, a US$30 million outflow in short-term capital (including errors and omissions) is estimated to have occurred in response to the surge in domestic credit late in the year and ensuing pressure on the peso.

The overall balance of payments in 1994 recorded a deficit of US$32 million, which was financed by a net accumulation of US$26 million in debt service arrears and by a decline of US$6 million in the Central Bank’s net reserve position. Regarding the latter, at end-1994, the Central Bank had gross reserves of US$18 million against foreign liabilities of almost US$43 million. The commercial banks maintained a positive net foreign assets position through 1994.

3. External debt and debt service

With official external debt liabilities at end-1994 of US$813 million—more than three times gross domestic product—Guinea-Bissau is, in relative terms, one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world. Moreover, since the early 1980s, annual debt service obligations in excess of total exports of goods and nonfactor services have resulted in the accumulation of more than US$300 million in payments arrears, despite occasional debt relief concessions (Table 26).

Table 26.

External Debt and Arrears Outstanding, 1993–94

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

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Sources: Directorate-General of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance; and Central Bank of Guinea-Bissau (BCGB).

At end-1994, Guinea-Bissau’s multilateral debt accounted for almost half of its total debt, and the International Development Agency (IDA) was the single largest creditor, with outstanding loans of just below US$200 million. Among bilateral creditors, the largest creditors were Portugal, Russia, and Italy. In the latter part of the year, the Treasury initiated contacts with its bilateral and multilateral creditors with the aim of obtaining concessional rescheduling/refinancings of debt arrears and current maturities.

During 1994, the Central Bank eliminated all of its medium- and long-term external liabilities (excluding those to the Fund) by reclassifying them as short-term or by transferring them to the Treasury. At end-December, the Central Bank’s short-term external debt stood at about US$42 million, almost all of which was arrears. Roughly half of that amount was owed to foreign central banks, largely the BCEAO (US$12 million) and the Bank of Portugal (US$5 million), and the other half to commercial creditors.

As part of its strategy to regularize relations with creditors, in 1994, Guinea-Bissau made cash payments of almost US$12 million for current debt service and arrears settlement. In deciding which debts to service, the Treasury and the Central Bank sought to pay as many creditors as possible, so as to initiate rescheduling negotiations with those creditors. However, Guinea-Bissau received little debt relief during 1994, as the major creditors awaited the eventual Paris Club meeting of February 1995. As a result, Guinea-Bissau accumulated US$26 million in arrears.

In February 1995, the Paris Club granted Guinea-Bissau its third concessional debt rescheduling since 1987. This time, Guinea-Bissau obtained the new, maximum concessionality “Naples terms.” The rescheduling provides for a 67 percent reduction in the net present value of Guinea-Bissau’s debt service flow for all eligible pre-cutoff-date arrears and current maturities during 1995-97. 1/ In addition, Guinea-Bissau also obtained a nonconcessional rescheduling over ten years for post-cutoff-date arrears owed to Italy. Guinea-Bissau is seeking comparable relief from non-Paris Club bilateral as well as multilateral creditors. Since the Paris Club meeting, the formal bilateral agreement with Switzerland has been finalized as has been a trilateral agreement between Guinea-Bissau and The Netherlands and Switzerland providing for the clearance of arrears to the African Development Bank and African Development Fund and the servicing of 1995–97 maturities to these institutions. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau is negotiating the settlement or refinancing of commercial debt owed by the Central Bank and the Treasury.

4. Exchange rate developments

After holding relatively steady against most major foreign currencies through May 1994, the peso depreciated sharply during the rest of the year. Thus, for 1994 as a whole, the peso fell by almost 22 percent against the U.S. dollar on a period average basis and by 25 ½ percent on an end-of-period basis. In 1993, the respective rates of depreciation were 31 ¼ percent and 24 ½ percent. During the first six months of 1995, the peso depreciated by an additional 15 percent on an end-of-period basis against the U.S. dollar. The rate of depreciation in the trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate during 1994 was less pronounced, at 13 percent, reflecting the devaluation of the CFA franc in January. Although no real effective exchange rate is calculated for Guinea-Bissau, 2/ the pace of depreciation in 1994–95 has exceeded that for domestic inflation as measured by the CPI.

5. Exchange and trade system

In early 1994, the foreign exchange market was unified when the Central Bank adopted a policy of adjusting, as necessary, the official exchange rate so as to keep it within 2 percent of an average of the freely determined rates quoted by the two commercial banks, an exchange bureau, and the informal market. To date, the Central Bank has strictly adhered to this policy. The U.S. dollar serves as the intervention currency, and the official and the commercial rates are subject to a maximum 2 percent spread between buying and selling rates. The Central Bank occasionally intervenes in the market through sales of foreign currencies to commercial banks.

Major changes to the exchange and trade system during 1994 consisted of the abolition of minimum shipping requirements for agricultural exports and the reduction in the special tax on cashew nut exports from 18 percent to 13 percent.

APPENDIX I

Guinea-Bissau: Summary of Tax System, May 1995

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Sources: Directorate-General of Taxes and Contributions and Directorate-General of Customs, Ministry of Finance.

Bibliography

Fund sources:

  • Fund sources, SM/95/185, Guinea - Bissau-Staff Report for the 1995 Article IV Consultation. July 28, 1995.

  • Fund sources, SM/95/57, Guinea - Bissau-Report on External Debt Renegotiation. March 23, 1995.

  • Fund sources, EBS/94/247, Guinea - Bissau-Request for Arrangements Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. December 22, 1994.

  • Fund sources, EBD/94/171, Guinea-Bissau - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility - Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper (1994–97). October 24, 1994.

  • Fund sources, SM/94/38, Guinea-Bissau - Recent Economic Developments. February 11, 1994.

  • Fund sources, SM/94/18, Guinea-Bissau - Staff Report for the 1993 Article IV Consultation, January 14, 1994.

World Bank sources:

  • World Bank sources, Social Indicators of Development 1995. June 1995.

  • World Bank sources, Report No. 14331-GUB, Republic of Guinea-Bissau - Transport and Urban Infrastructure Project. Staff Appraisal Report. May 31, 1995.

  • World Bank sources, Report No. 13155-GUB, Republic of Guinea-Bissau - Poverty Assessment and Social Sectors Strategy Review. Vols. I, II, and III, June 3, 1994.

Official sources:

  • Official sources, Sintese da Conjuntura Económica. Ministério das Finanças and Banco Central da Guiné-Bissau (BCGB), April 1995.

  • Official sources, Orcamento Geral do Estado 1995. Ministério das Finanças, February 1995.

  • Official sources, Anuário 1993. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Rural e Agricultura, August 1994.

Other sources:

Other sources, Novas Orientações de Politica Pesqueira Nacional. Trade and Investment Policy Support Project (TIPS), Bissau-Seattle, October 25, 1994.

1/

A new CPI based on a nationwide consumption survey carried out in 1992 is currently being constructed.

1/

A bilateral rescheduling agreement with Portugal was also concluded in July 1994, covering outstanding arrears and 1994 maturities of approximately US$70 million. However, the Portuguese Treasury and the Guinea-Bissau Government agreed in February 1995 to replace this agreement with another of similar coverage in the context of the Paris Club meeting.

1/

The poverty test employed for these estimates was “total real per capita expenditure” in 1991. The poverty and extreme poverty lines were defined respectively at two thirds and one third of the mean per capita household expenditure of PG 201,626 (US$55) in 1991.

2/

UNDP, United Nations Development Program.

1/

USAID, United States Agency for International Development.

1/

See Guinea-Bissau - Report on External Debt Renegotiations (SM/95/57).

2/

The absence of nontradables and of manufactured traded goods in Guinea-Bissau’s CPI renders it inappropriate for the purpose of computing real effective exchange rates.

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Guinea-Bissau: Recent Economic Developments
Author:
International Monetary Fund