Czech Republic: Selected Background Studies

This paper examines a few selected aspects of adjustment and restructuring in the Czech enterprise sector. It examines financial performance of the Czech enterprise sector, drawing on data reported by nonfinancial enterprises to the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) in 1993. The findings reveal that significant progress has been made in the nonfinancial aspects of adjustment, but a large part of the enterprise sector has been slow to adopt measures to achieve sustainable financial viability.

Abstract

This paper examines a few selected aspects of adjustment and restructuring in the Czech enterprise sector. It examines financial performance of the Czech enterprise sector, drawing on data reported by nonfinancial enterprises to the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) in 1993. The findings reveal that significant progress has been made in the nonfinancial aspects of adjustment, but a large part of the enterprise sector has been slow to adopt measures to achieve sustainable financial viability.

V. Banking Sector Problems as a Magnet for Capital Inflows 1/

1. Introduction

A basic requirement for effectively dealing with the problems associated with capital inflows is to focus the policy response to the underlying causes of the inflow. For example, in an economy with a fixed exchange rate, a positive interest differential drawing capital flows from abroad may reflect endogenous factors (e.g., overly tight monetary policy) or, alternatively, exogenous factors (e.g., weaknesses in the intermediation process that push up domestic interest rates). If the latter are indeed important, the usual financial policy responses may need to be supplemented with structural measures.

There are at least two reasons for looking to banking sector problems as a cause of capital inflows in the Czech Republic. First, high domestic lending rates seem to be more connected with high intermediation costs than with restrictive monetary policy. The latter explanation is unconvincing for a number of reasons, not least because inflation has been persistently in double digits and real bank deposit rates persistently negative for several years. In contrast, the spread between bank lending and deposit rates has been high by any measure, and indeed double that in neighboring countries such as Germany and Austria. The size and structure of capital inflows suggests that the influence of high intermediation costs can only have grown over time (Chart 5.1). Not only has the volume of direct foreign borrowing by Czech enterprises nearly doubled each year in recent periods, but also the effective cost of such funds has declined with falling demand from lenders for local credit guarantees; typically, guarantee fees cost 2-4 percent per year. Moreover, the access of medium- and smaller-sized companies to foreign credits has also expanded, as indicated by the decline in the loan concentration ratio. Section 2 examines some of the factors contributing to the high spreads.

CHART 5.1
CHART 5.1

CZECH REPUBLIC: SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN BORROWING BY ENTERPRISES

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 085; 10.5089/9781451809992.002.A005

Source: Czech National Bank.

A second clue pointing to banking sector problems as a source of capital inflows is the stark difference in the maturity structure of domestic and foreign borrowing. Foreign credits are mostly long term, with more than two thirds of the net inflow in 1993 and 1994 being of over 5 years maturity (and one third being of over 10 years maturity). In contrast, domestic bank loans are concentrated at the short end of the maturity spectrum--which would not seem consistent with longer-term financing needs of enterprises in the midst of restructuring. Section 3 discusses the dimensions and forces behind the reluctance of domestic banks to lend long term.

2. Spreads in the banking sector

At first glance, average nominal lending rates of 13-14 percent prevailing in the Czech banking system do not appear very high when viewed against an underlying inflation of about 10 percent; real interest rates on new loans averaged a reasonable 3 percent through most of 1994 (Chart 5.2). However, given that depositors were remunerated at substantially negative real rates, banks would have had considerable room for lowering average loan rates while still earning a positive real return. In fact, this has not been the case, as high costs and low profitability have kept domestic bank lending rates up.

CHART 5.2
CHART 5.2

CZECH REPUBLIC: LENDING AND DEPOSIT RATES

(In Percent)

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 085; 10.5089/9781451809992.002.A005

Source: Czech National Bank.1/ CPI inflation over the previous 12-month period, adjusted for VAT increase.

Although bank spreads have fallen from about 8-9 percent in 1993 to below 6 percent in the first quarter of 1995, they remain relatively high. For example, spreads in the Czech Republic are roughly twice the average level in European OECD countries (Table 5.1). To be sure, too much weight should not be placed on cross-country comparisons, as there are important differences in accounting conventions (e.g., inclusion of net interest income from securities in the case of OECD comparators) and market practices (e.g., loan fees are less common in the Czech Republic). Even so, the high spread relative to other countries is certainly suggestive of underlying problems in the banking system.

Table 5.1.

Average Bank Spreads in Selected Countries

(In percent)

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Sources: The Czech National Bank; and T. Timmermans, “Competitiveness of the Belgian Banking Sector,” paper presented at a seminar at the Czech National Bank, Prague, May 15-16, 1995.

Table 5.2 identifies some of the main components of the spread using the 1994 consolidated income statement of the banking system and of major bank groupings. Five broad variables affecting the spread are singled out: administrative costs, loan-loss provisioning, taxes, the after-tax profit margin, and other net earnings (fees from trading and guarantees, income from securities, etc.). 1/ The first four add to spreads, while the last tends to lower it; in addition, a sixth variable, an arithmetic adjustment, is necessitated by the algebra.

Table 5.2.

Sources of Bank Spreads in 1994 1/

(In percent)

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Source: Staff estimates based on data provided by the Czech National Bank.

The components of the spread, including the “arithmetical adjustment,” are explained in the main text. Data on bad loans and provisions exclude the foreign branches of Czech banks.

For illustrative purposes, estimate A assumes that actual receipts are proportional to risk weighted assets. Estimate B is based on the share of “loss loans” only.

Includes the Consolidation Bank. The large negative arithmetical adjustment arises from the fact that loans--nearly twice as high as primary deposits--are largely funded in the interbank market.

By far, the most striking result is that provisioning plays as large a role as administrative costs in explaining the total spread: at a level of 4.5 percent of loans, it is equivalent to nearly three quarters of the total spread. The cost of provisioning stands out across all segments of the banking system, though least so in the case of foreign banks and branches (who are still relatively minor figures in overall bank intermediation).

A certain amount of caution in attributing a causal role to provisioning is, however, necessary: although provisioning for past bad loans is clearly an accounting cost, economic theory does not provide a clear rationale for its contribution to bank spreads. It could be argued, for example, that fixed costs such as provisioning are irrelevant to the price of bank intermediation, as profit maximization only involves marginal costs and revenues. While inconsistency with standard models of profit-maximizing behavior should not be ruled out in a transition economy, a case could also be made for including provisions in a profit-maximizing model by viewing provisioning as a proxy for current risks, rather than a mere fixed cost from the past. In an uncertain environment, recent experience with the cost of bad loans--and a large part of bad loans in the Czech Republic are of relatively recent vintage--is probably as good a guide as any for determining the average premium to be charged for risk.

Although Table 5.2 gives the impression that direct taxes are largely irrelevant to spreads, the fact remains that banks face severe tax distortions that could add significantly to bank margins. The most important of these is the taxation of accrued--as opposed to actually received-- interest; Czech tax accounting does not distinguish between the two, and so overstates taxable profits. In addition, beyond a certain level, provisioning is not deductible as a cost for tax purposes. One way of illustrating the impact is to estimate the difference in “break-even” spreads banks need to charge in distorted and undistorted regimes. 1/ On this basis, plausible parameter values for the Czech Republic suggest that tax distortions could, in theory, add some 2-3 percentage points to lending rates, with most of the effect arising from the taxation of unreceived interest income on nonperforming loans.

In practice, actual tax payments have been relatively low, amounting to only 0.5 percent of loans for the banking system as a whole. Although all of it may be deemed “excessive,” in the sense of taxing unreceived income, the overall figure is not quantitatively worrying. The reason that the effect of the distortion has been so low is simply that a very large number of banks have recorded zero to negative profits even on the basis of accounting practices that overstate profits. Data on unreceived interest is not available, but two illustrative calculations of “true” profits are shown in Table 5.2 for various segments of the banking sector. The first assumes that banks only receive payments on a risk-weighted average of loans (using the CNB’s risk weights described in Chapter IV, section 5); the second assumes that only “loss loans”--i.e., in arrears for over 1 year--fail to deliver an income stream. The calculations suggest that the banking system as a whole may be running a loss rather than a small profit, principally on account of medium and small (private) banks; even the profit margin of the potentially oligopolistic “big four” is, on this basis, quite modest (between 0 and 1 percent).

As the incidence of new bad loans falls over time and the need for provisioning for past mistakes declines, an improvement in bank profitability is likely--at which point the effects of tax distortions on spreads can rise significantly. 1/ Accordingly, the Government forwarded legislation to Parliament in June 1995 aimed at giving banks greater latitude in writing-down bad loans against provisions; (up until now, writeoffs have been extremely rare as they must await the final outcome of bankruptcy proceedings in courts). This seemingly cosmetic measure--a mere balance sheet cancellation of assets (bad loans) against liabilities (provisions)--has, in fact, important tax implications for banks: once a loan is written off the books, it ceases to accrue interest for tax purposes. As such, the proposed measure could greatly reduce the potential effect of tax distortions in raising bank spreads.

3. Long-term lending and maturity transformation

A striking feature of bank lending in the Czech Republic is the sharp reduction in the average maturity of loans over the past several years, with the share of long-term loans in total lending falling steadily from over 42 percent at end-1991 to just 29 percent at end-1994. Not only did the relative share of long-term loans fall, but the absolute availability of long-term loans declined even more dramatically. Over the three years to end-1994, a period during which the stock of total bank credit grew by about 25 percent in real terms, real long-term credit declined by over 25 percent. Significantly, this erosion in the availability of long-term finance coincided with a pick up in the demand for long-term funding by restructuring enterprises and by the large number of start-up businesses following the economic reforms begun in 1991. To the extent that a large part of capital inflows is long-term borrowing by Czech enterprises, it is clear that they represent a market response to lagging domestic supply of long-term finance. Indeed, direct loans from abroad have been the only source of net increase in long-term lending in recent years (Chart 5.3).

CHART 5.3
CHART 5.3

CZECH REPUBLIC: STRUCTURE OF BANK LOANS AND DEPOSITS

Citation: IMF Staff Country Reports 1995, 085; 10.5089/9781451809992.002.A005

Sources: Czech National Bank; and staff estimates.1/ Ratio of long-term loans to sight and short-term deposits, in percent.2/ Foreign loans estimated on the basis of cumulative CNB approvals of long-term (over 5 year) financial credits. (Disaggregated data on actual drawings is not available but, in practice, total drawings closely follow approvals.)

It is common for bankers in the Czech Republic to point to the relatively short maturity of bank deposits as a rationale for avoiding longer-term lending. Sight and short-term deposits are, indeed, the dominant source of funding, accounting for over 70 percent of deposits. Long-term deposits, by contrast, are a mere 5-6 percent of total deposits, while bank financing through bonds is still in its infancy (although such activity began picking up in 1994). These arguments have a certain validity in terms of cautious banking practices, but overall do not constitute a convincing explanation for the banks’ reluctance to lend long term: after all, a standard function of banks in developed economies is precisely to parlay short-term deposits into longer-term loans to businesses (with due regard for the need for liquidity). The spread earned by banks is partly compensation for the risk of undertaking such maturity transformation.

However, Czech banks as a whole have been moving in the other direction, i.e., they have been reducing the mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities. If one uses the ratio of long-term loans to short term and sight deposits as a crude measure of maturity transformation, the effort of banks in providing this intermediary service can be seen to have declined by nearly 40 percent during 1991 and 1994 (Chart 5.3). Instead, such maturity transformation as does occur, is from short-term deposits to medium-term loans.

It is difficult to identify empirically the reasons for such declining maturity transformation, although the generally uncertain environment of transformation, the lack of transparent accounting practices, and limited banking expertise all make risk assessment more difficult and so contribute to a general aversion for long-term commitments. Shorter maturities, on the other hand, carry a high “option value” for banks in an environment of economic restructuring, providing them--at rollover dates--the opportunity to reassess loans after the passage of time and the resolution of uncertainties.

It is also important to ask whether or not there are regulatory impediments to maturity transformation. Table 5.3 lists three key ratios routinely monitored by the Banking Supervision Department of the CNB, together with the normative view (the rating) attached to each. Of these, the only one with the potential to interfere seriously with maturity transformation is the first, namely the limit on the ratio of long-term assets to long-term liabilities. 1/ The definition and ratings for this ratio are structured in such a way as to discourage banks from using short-term (less than 1 year) resources to fund loans with maturity of more than 1 year. However, both the banking system as a whole and major bank groupings have operated well within the norms. The only exception has been the (small) group of foreign bank branches, who in any case are technically able to meet the criterion by virtue of their capital backing abroad. Overall, prudential regulations do not seem to impose any binding limit on maturity transformation.

Table 5.3.

Indicators of Bank Liquidity Monitored by the CNB, 1993-94

(End of period, in percent)

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Sources: Data provided by the Czech National Bank; and staff estimates.

Assets of more than 1 year maturity/(liabilities of more than 1 year maturity + capital); in this illustrative calculation, capital has not been included.

Ratio of cumulative net position up to 3 months (excluding 80 percent of deposits) to total assets.

Ratio of interbank liabilities to total liabilities.

APPENDIX

Table 1.

Czech Republic: Gross Domestic Product, 1990-94 1/

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

The data are official estimates, and differ from those shown in Table 5 in SM/95/167.

Table 2.

Czech Republic: Gross Domestic Product by Origin, 1990-94

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Estimates. Disaggregated GDP at constant prices not available due to lack of data on sectoral deflators.

Includes mining, manufacturing industry, electricity, gas, and water.

Accommodation in hotels included in community, social and personal services in 1990 and 1991.

Includes real estate, renting and business activities in 1992, 1993 and 1994.

Table 3.

Czech Republic: Agricultural Production, 1991-94

(Annual percentage change; at constant prices)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Preliminary data.

Table 4.

Czech Republic: Production and Yields of Selected Agricultural Crops, 1991-94

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.
Table 5.

Czech Republic: Industrial Production, 1991-94 1/

(Annual percent change, at constant prices)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

In enterprises employing 25 workers or more.

Comparable disaggregated data are not available for 1991 because of changes in the classification scheme.

Table 6.

Czech Republic: Electricity Production and Consumption, 1991-94

(In millions of kilowatt hours)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Estimate.

Table 7.

Czech Republic: Energy Balance Sheet, 1991-93

(In millions of tons of coal equivalent)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Includes energy used in power and public heating stations and transmission and other losses.

Table 8.

Czech Republic: Civil Employment in Large Enterprises by Sector, 1991-94 1/

(In thousands, annual averages)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Includes only enterprises with 25 or more employees.

Table 9.

Czech Republic: Civil Employment by Sector, 1991-94 1/

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

Includes private entrepreneurs and workers in enterprises of all size groups.

Table 10.

Czech Republic: Average Monthly Earnings, 1991-94 1/

(In koruny)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

In 1991, for entrepreneurial sphere and for all budget sphere organizations with 100 or more employees; since 1992, organizations with 25 employees or more.

In 1994, classification of branch of activity is by enterprise, while in 1991-93, it is by establishment.

Table 11.

Czech Republic: Quarterly Average Monthly Earnings, 1992-94 1/

(In koruny)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

In organizations with 25 employees or more.

In 1994, classification of branch of activity is by enterprise, while in 1992-93, it is by establishment.

Table 12.

Czech Republic: Developments in Wholesale and Consumer Prices, 1991-95 Q1

(Average 1994 = 100)

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Source: Data provided by the Czech Statistical Office.

1993 constant weights.

Table 13.

Czech Republic: Summary of Fiscal Operations, 1993-95 Q1

(In billions of koruny)

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Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Finance; and staff estimates.

Includes expenditures financed from transfers from the National Property Fund which substitute for normal budgetary expenditures.

Nonbudgeted expenditures financed from state financial assets and liabilities accounts at the central bank.

Privatization revenues include only the transfers from the National Property Fund to and spent by the central government in the current year.

Includes liabilities associated with the takeover of nonperforming loans from the banking system. The counterpart assets are not included.

Table 14.

Czech Republic: Operations of the General Government, 1993-95 Q1 1/

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Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Finance; and staff estimates.

Includes operations of the central state budget, local authorities, operations of the extrabudgetary and health funds, and fiscal operations of the National Property Fund.

Includes balance of the Fund for Market Regulation in Agriculture and transfers to nonprofit organizations.

Includes only privatization revenues provided to the Government by the National Property Fund to finance budgetary and quasi-budgetary operations.

Table 15.

Czech Republic: Operations of the Central State Budget, 1993-95 Q1

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Sources: Data provided by the Ministry of Finance; and staff estimates.

Includes property, gift and inheritance tax, motor vehicle tax, and carryover from 1992.

Includes transfers to the health fund on behalf of nonproductive individuals.

Includes transfers to local authorities, subsidized organizations, and extrabudgetary funds.

Includes expenditures of the Ministry of Defense, civil defense expenditures, and local authorities.