IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
This paper shows how cryptocurrency markets can fuel cross-border capital flight by serving as marketplaces that match counterparts with and without (illicit) access to FX. In countries where international transactions are restricted, crypto exchanges effectively allow domestic agents to pay a premium to buy foreign currency. The counterparts to these transactions are agents with access to FX, who sell crypto holdings purchased abroad. A stylized model illustrates that restricted foreign currency amid economic imbalances incentivizes these transactions via persistent crypto premia in local relative to global markets. We analyze relative crypto pricing data in several country case studies, providing empirical support that crypto markets serve as marketplaces for capital flight that already took place, rather than a novel channel for capital flight. We make available a novel dataset on crypto market premia, which we propose as indicators of excess demand for foreign currency and capital control intensity. The dataset will be posted along with this paper and updated periodically.