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For insightful comments we thank Alberto Bisin, Marcos Chamon, Daniel Heymann, Boyan Jovanovic, Ricardo Lagos, Pablo Ottonello, David Pearce, Francisco Roch, Tom Sargent, Andrés Schneider, Ennio Stacchetti, Federico Sturzenegger, Martín Uribe, as well as seminar participants at NYU, UTDT, UdeSA, IIEP, and the IMF.