Cover IMF Working Papers
Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises
Author: Jihad Dagher
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2018: Issue 008
Language:
English
Publication Date:
15 Jan 2018
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484337745.001
ISBN:
9781484337745
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
89
Keywords:
WP; central bank; financial market; political economy; banking sector; Financial Regulation; Financial Crises; Boom-Bust Cycles; Glass-Steagall Act; financial bubble; ruling party; share price; joint stock; crony capitalism; plain vanilla; stock index; bubble company; joint-stock bank; incumbent governments policy; government sponsorship; Housing; Global financial crisis of 2008-2009; Banking crises; Global; South America
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IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund