Arrow, K. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation. In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System. Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress.
Benigno, G., Chen, H., Otrok, C., Rebucci, A., and Young, E. R. (2017). Optimal capital controls or exchange rate policies? a pecuniary externality perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Bernanke, B. (2013). Monetary policy and the global economy. Speech at Conference in Honor of Mervyn King, London School of Economics, March 25.
Bhagwati, J. and Ramaswami, V. K. (1963). Domestic distortions, tariffs and the theory of optimum subsidy. Journal of Political Economy, 71(1):44–50.
Buch, C. M. and Goldberg, L. (2016). Cross-border prudential policy spillovers: How much? how important? evidence from the international banking research network. NBER Working Paper, 22874.
Caballero, R. J., Farhi, E., and Gourinchas, P.-O. (2015). Global imbalances and currency wars at the zlb. NBER Working Paper, 21670.
Caballero, R. J. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2003). Excessive dollar debt: Financial development and underinsurance. Journal of Finance, 58(2):867–894.
Correia, I., Farhi, E., Nicolini, J. P., and Teles, P. (2013). Unconventional fiscal policy at the zero bound. American Economic Review, 103(4):1172–1211.
Corsetti, G., Dedola, L., and Leduc, S. (2011). Optimal monetary policy in open economies. In Friedman, B. M. and Woodford, M., editors, Handbook of Monetary Economics, volume 3B. Elsevier.
Costinot, A., Lorenzoni, G., and Werning, I. (2014). A theory of capital controls as dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation. Journal of Political Economy, 122(1):77–128.
Eggertsson, G. B. and Woodford, M. (2003). The zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2003(1):139–211.
Farhi, E. and Werning, I. (2012). Dealing with the trilemma: Optimal capital controls with fixed exchange rates. NBER Working Paper, 18199.
Farhi, E. and Werning, I. (2016). A theory of macroprudential policies in the presence of nominal rigidities. Econometrica, 84(5):1645–1704.
Feenstra, R. C. (1984). Voluntary export restraint in U.S. autos, 1980-81: Quality, employment, and welfare effects. In Baldwin, R. E. and Krueger, A. O., editors, The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, pages 35–60. University of Chicago Press.
- Search Google Scholar
- Export Citation
)| false ( Feenstra, R. C. 1984). Voluntary export restraint in U.S. autos, 1980-81: Quality, employment, and welfare effects.In editors, Baldwin, R. E.and Krueger, A. O., The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, pages 35– 60. University of Chicago Press.
G-7 (2013). Official Statement on Exchange Rates. February 12, 2013, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/027.aspx.
Geanakoplos, J. D. and Polemarchakis, H. M. (1986). Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete. Cowles Foundation Paper, 652.
Ghosh, A. R., Qureshi, M. S., and Sugawara, N. (2014). Regulating capital flows at both ends: Does it work? IMF Working Paper, 14/188.
Greenwald, B. C. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(May):229–264.
Hart, O. (1975). On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete. Journal of Economic Theory, 11:418–443.
Jeanne, O. and Korinek, A. (2010). Excessive volatility in capital flows: A Pigouvian taxation approach. American Economic Review, 100(2):403–407.
Kemp, M. C. and Wan, H. Y. (1976). An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions. Journal of International Economics, 6:95–97.
Korinek, A. and Serven, L. (2016). Undervaluation through foreign reserve accumulation: Static losses, dynamic gains. Journal of International Money and Finance, 64:104–136.
Krugman, P. R. (1998). It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998(2):137–187.
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (2002). Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2):503–535.
Ostry, J. D. and Ghosh, A. R. (2016). On the obstacles to international policy coordination. Journal of International Money and Finance, 67:25–40.
Ostry, J. D., Ghosh, A. R., and Korinek, A. (2012). Multilateral aspects of managing the capital account. IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/10.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1995). Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination. In Grossman, G. and Rogoff, K., editors, Handbook of Development Economics, volume III. Elsevier.
Rodrik, D. (2008). The real exchange rate and economic growth: Theory and evidence. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008:365–412.
Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S., Blanchard, O., and Cottarelli, C. (2008). Fiscal policy for the crisis. IMF Staff Position Note, 08/01.
Suranovic, S. M. (2016). International Trade Theory and Policy. Institute of International Economic Policy, George Washington University. http://internationalecon.com/Trade/tradehome.php.
A Mathematical Derivations of Main Results
B Further Derivations for Examples in Section (2) (Online)
This appendix presents more detailed derivations of some of the results described in Section 2 as well as a careful mapping of the examples considered into the general model of Section 3. For Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we have described this mapping in the main text.
C Simple Example of Efficiency and Policy Cooperation (Online)
This appendix illustrates, in a simple and teachable manner, both our basic efficiency result and how deviations from the three efficiency conditions lead to Pareto inefficient equilibria that call for global cooperation. We do so in a multi-country setting that builds on the simple example of current account intervention in a single country that we developed in Section 2.2.