Front Matter Page
Institute for Capacity Development and African Department
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Empirical Analysis
A. Trend-Cycle decomposition
B. Assessing the cyclicality of fiscal policy
C. Results
III. The model
A. Standard RBC setup
B. The government
IV. Theoretical Results
A. Calibration
B. Impulse-response functions
C. Standard data filtering and the mismeasurement of cyclicality
V. Conclusion
References
Appendix
A. Sources of Heterogeneity in the Degree of Counter-cyclicality
A.1. Learning
A.2. Government degree of impatience
A.3. Endogenous persistence
A.4. Endogenous tax rules
A.5. Model-based country comparison
Tables
1. MG Regressions: Dependent Variable gt
2. CCEMG Regressions: Dependent Variable gt 1985-2009
3. Regressions with debt: Dependent Variable gt 1985-2009
4. Conditional correlations
5. Parameter Estimation Results
Figures
1. GDP Trend-Cycle Decomposition in Selected Countries
2. β2, β3 and GDP per capita
3. Future debt ratios weighting schemes
4. Dynamic responses to -1 percent technology shock: Without debt
5. Dynamic responses to -1 percent technology shock: With debt (assuming ω1,t)
6. Dynamic responses to -1 percent technology shock: With debt (assuming ω2,t)
7. Dynamic responses of the debt ratio
8. Conditional correlations: Debt versus output stabilization
9. Output and government spending unconditional correlations
10. The effect of learning on the impulse-response functions
11. The effect of learning on beliefs about transitory and permanent components
12. The profiles of the discount function
13. The effect of government aversion on the impulse-response functions
14. Real rigidities and government spending cyclicality
15. The effect of learning on the impulse-response functions
16. Transitory shock: U.S. versus Morocco