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I prefer cooperation to coordination as it implies a less formal process.
See University of Toronto G8 Information Center for texts of the accords.
See Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1995) for early analysis of independent central banks. The move to inflation targeting was linked to the realization that monetary stimulus was time inconsistent in the face of a vertical long-run Phillips curve (Rogoff, 1985) and principal agent models originated by Coase (1937). The first inflation targeting central bank was New Zealand in 1990.
The European Commission website is a useful reference.
Barro (1974). Indeed, for a time there was a lively on “expansionary fiscal contractions” where the supplyside benefits of tighter fiscal policies more than fully offset the impact on demand. See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Ardagna (2009).
The most dramatic version of this debate is the refusal by the Greek government elected in late 2014 to accept the austerity plan agreed between the previous government and the troika (European Central Bank, European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund).
More generally, there can be an inverse relationship between the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. Monetary policy is most effective when financial markets are acting smoothly since it relies on asset prices to boost demand. For fiscal policy, on the other hand, financial market responses tend to diminish the impact from the direct boost to demand (Bayoumi and Sgherri, 2009).
The choice of the loation of the committee in or out of the central bank largely depends on the relative importance of the central bank in financial regulation and supervision.
Monetary stimulus takes time to take effect while fiscal stimulus generally requires political approval.
The concern that profligate fiscal policy could pose a burden on other members of the monetary union was the initial logic of the fiscal rules set up on the Maastricht Treaty forming European Monetary Union.