Back Matter

References

  • Balcerowicz L., 2010, “Sovereign Bankruptcy in the European Union in the Comparative Perspective”. Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 10-18. December.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bardozzetti A. Dottori D., 2012, “Collective Action Clauses: How Do They Weigh on Sovereigns?Bank of Italy Working Papers, forthcoming.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bi R. Chamon M. Zettelmeyer J., 2011, “The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failure in Sovereign Bond Restructurings”. IMF Working Paper No. 11/265. November.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bedford P. Irwin G.,Reforming the IMF’s Lending-into-Arrears Framework. Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 4. April.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bini Smaghi L., 2010, “Sovereign Debt and the Global Economy”. Dinner Speech at the Joint ECB-JIE Conference on “What Future for Financial Globalization”. Frankfurt am Main, September 9.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bini Smaghi L., 2011a, “Eurozone, European Crisis and Policy Responses”. Speech at the Goldman Sachs Global Macro Conference – Asia 2011. Hong Kong, February 22.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bini Smaghi L., 2011b, “Private Sector Involvement: From (Good) Theory to (Bad) Practice”. Speech at the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee. Berlin, June 6.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bini Smaghi L., 2011c, “The European Debt Crisis”. Speech at the Atlantik-Brücke Meeting of Regional Group Frankfurt/Hesse. Frankfurt am Main, 17 October.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Borensztein E. Panizza U.,The Costs of Sovereign Default”. IMF Working Paper No. 08/238. October.

  • Boughton J.M., 2001, “The Silent Revolution. The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989”. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Boughton J.M., 2012, “Tearing Down Walls. The International Monetary Fund, 1990-1999”. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bradley M.H. Cox J.D. Gulati M.,The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market”. Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series Paper No. 120.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bradley M.H. Gulati M., 2012, “Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis”. Mimeo. May.

  • Buchheit L.E. Gulati M. (2000), “Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges”. UCLA Law Review No. 48, pp 5984.

  • Buchheit L.E. Gulati M. (2002), “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will”. Georgetown University Law Center Working Paper No. 34.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Buchheit L.E. Gulati M., 2010, “How to Restructure Greek Debt”. Duke Law Working Papers No. 47.

  • Buchheit L.E. Lastra R., 2007, “Lending into Arrears – A Policy Adrift”. The International Lawyer, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 939955.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bulow J. Rogoff K.S., 1989, “LDC Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?American Economic Review, Vol. 79, pp. 4350.

  • Cohen D. Portes R., 2006, “Toward a Lender of First Resort”. IMF Working Paper No. 06/66. March.

  • Committee on the Global Financial System – CGFS, 2011, “The Impact of Sovereign Credit Risk on Bank Funding Conditions”. CGFS Papers No. 43. July.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dell’Ariccia, G. Schnabel I. Zettelmeyer J., 2002, “Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test”. IMF Working Paper No. 02/181. October.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Díaz-Cassou J. Erce-Domínguez A. Vázquez-Zamora J.J., a, “Recent Episodes of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: A Case-Study Approach”. Banco de España, Documentos Ocasionales No. 0804.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Díaz-Cassou J. Erce-Domínguez A. Vázquez-Zamora J.J., b, “The Role of the IMF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Implications for the Policy of Lending Into Arrears”. Banco de Espana, Documentos Ocasionales No. 0805.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Drage J. Hovaguimian C., 2004, “Collective Action Clauses (CACs): An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues”. Bank of England, Financial Stability Review. December.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Draghi M., 2011, “Interview with the Financial Times”. December 14 (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp111219.en.html).

  • Eaton J. Fernandez R., 1995, “Sovereign Debt”. NBER Working Paper No. 5131. May.

  • Eaton J. Gersovitz F., 1981, “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48, pp. 289309.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Eichengreen B., 2003, “Restructuring Sovereign Debt”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 7598.

  • Eichengreen B. Portes R., 1995, “Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors”. Center for Economic Policy Research, London. September.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Elderson F. Perassi M., 2003, “Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Foreign Bonds: Towards A More Harmonised Approach”. Euredia, Vol. 2, pp. 239264.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Central Bank, 2005, “Managing Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies – Experience with the Involvement of Private Sector Creditors”. Occasional Paper No. 32. July.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Council, 2003, “Statement by the Chairman of the EU Council of Economic and Finance Ministers to the IMFC”. Brussels, April 12.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Council, 2010, “European Council, 16-17 December 2010, Conclusions”. EUCO 30/10. Brussels, December 17.

  • European Council, 2011, “European Council, 24-25 March 2011, Conclusions”. EUCO 10/11. Brussels, March 25.

  • Friedman B.M., 2000, “Debt Restructuring”. NBER Working Paper No. 7722.

  • Gelpern A., 2003, “How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt”. International Financial Law Review, May, pp. 1923.

  • Gelpern A., 2005, “After Argentina”. Institute for International Economics Policy Briefs in International Economics No. 05-2. September.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Gelpern A. Gulati M., 2011, “Sovereign Snake Oil”. American University Washington College of Law Legal Studies Research Papers No. 2011-05.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Giordano R. Tommasino P., 2009, “What Determines Debt Intolerance? The Role of Political and Monetary Institutions”. Bank of Italy Working Paper No. 700. January.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Gola C. Spadafora F., 2011, “Financial Sector Surveillance and the IMF”. In: The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Emerging Financial Markets. Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Vol. 93, pp. 255310. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Gray R., 2004, “Collective Action Clauses: The Way Forward”. Paper presented at the conference on “Sovereign Debt: The View from the Legal Academy”. Georgetown University Law Center. Washington, D.D., February 26–27.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Group of Seven, 2002, “Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors”. Washington, D.C., April 20.

  • Group of Ten, 1996, “Report of the G-10 Working Party on the Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises”. May.

  • Group of Ten, 2002, “Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses”. September.

  • Group of Ten, 2004, “Follow-Up Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses”. March, unpublished.

  • Group of Twenty, 2009, “London Summit – Leaders’ Statement”. London, April 2.

  • Group of Twenty-Four, 2003, “Briefing Paper on Sovereign Debt Restructuring No. 5”. April.

  • Group of Twenty-Two, 1998, “Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises”. October.

  • Gugiatti M. Richards A., 2004, “The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds”. Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 815836.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hagan S., 2005, “Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt”. Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, pp. 299402.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Haldane A. G. Penalver A. Saporta V. Shin H. S., 2005, “Analytics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring”. Journal of International Economics, Vol. 65(2), pp. 315333.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Häseler S., 2009, “Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds – Whence the Opposition?Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 882923.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Institute of International Finance, 2005, “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”. Washington, D.C., March.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Institute of International Finance, 2012, “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets – Update”. Washington, D.C., October.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1970, “Payments Arrears in Current International Transactions”. Paper prepared by the Exchange and Trade Relations Department and the Legal Department in consultation with the Area Departments, the Research Department and the Treasurer’s Department, SM/70/139. Washington, D.C., July 2.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1980, “Review of Fund Policies and Procedures on Payments Arrears”. Paper prepared by the Exchange and Trade Relations Department in collaboration with Legal and Other Departments, EBS/80/190. Washington, D.C., August 26.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1983, “The Chairman’s Summing Up at the Conclusion of the Discussion on the Decisions on the Amount of Access in Individual Cases”. EBM/83/167. Washington, D.C., December 2.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1984, “Decision on Certain Aspects of the Policy on Enlarged Access, the Access Limits under Special Facilities, and the Rate of Remuneration”. Decision No. 7600-(84/3). Washington, D.C., January 6.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1989a, “Fund Involvement in the Debt Strategy – Further Considerations”. Paper prepared by the Exchange and Trade Relations Department in consultation with other Departments, EBS/89/96. Washington, D.C., May 12.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1989b, “Arrears to Credit and Debt Strategy. The Chairman’s Summing-Up – Fund Involvement in Debt Strategy”. Executive Board Meeting 89/61. Washington, D.C., May 23.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1994, “Need as a Condition for the Use of Fund Resources”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department and the Legal Department, SM/94/299. Washington, D.C., December 16.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1998a, “Fund Policy on Sovereign Arrears to Private Creditors”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments, SM/98/8. Washington, D.C., January 9.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1998b, “Concluding Remarks by the Chairman on Fund Policy on Sovereign Arrears to Private Creditor”. Executive Board Meeting 98/20. Washington, D.C., February 27.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1999, “IMF Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments. Washington D.C., April-June.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2000, “Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund”. Prague, September 24.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2001, “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises – Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds”. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments. Washington, D.C., June 27.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002a, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Domestic Economy – Experience in Four Recent Cases”. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., February 21.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002b, “Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts – Encouraging Greater Use”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review, International Capital Markets and Legal Departments in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., June 6.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002c, “Access Policy in Capital Account Crises”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Treasure’s Department in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., July 29.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002d, “Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors – Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion”. Paper prepared by the International Capital Markets, Policy Development and Review, and Legal Departments, SM/02/248. Washington, D.C., July 30.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002e, “IMF Board Discusses the Good-Faith Criterion under the Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors”. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/107. Washington, D.C., September 24.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002f, “Reforming the IMF: Progress since Prague 2000”. Issues Brief No. 02/04. Washington, D.C., December 5.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003a, “Access Policy in Capital Account Crises – Modifications to the Supplemental Reserve Facility and Follow-up Issues Related to Exceptional Access Policy”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Treasurer’s Departments in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., January 14.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003b, “Review of Access Policies under the Credit Tranches and the Extended Fund Facility”. Paper prepared by Policy Development and Review and Treasurer’s Departments in Consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., January 14.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003c, “IMF Concludes Discussion on Access Policy in the Context of Capital Account Crises; and Review of Access Policies in the Credit Tranches and the Extended Fund Facility”. Public Information Notice No. 03/37. Washington, D.C., March 21.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003d, “Reviewing the Process for Sovereign Debt Restructuring within the Existing Legal Framework”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review, International Capital Markets, and Legal Departments in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., August 1.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003e, “The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt – Assessing the Benefits, Risks, and Feasibility of Aggregating Claims”. Paper prepared by the Legal Department. Washington, D.C., September 3.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003f, “Argentina – Request for Stand-By Arrangement and Request for Extension of Repurchase Expectation”. IMF Country Report No. 03/392. Washington, D.C., December.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2003g, “IMF Approves 15-Month Extension and US$6.6 Billion Augmentation of Brazil’s Stand-By Credit”. Press Release No. 03/217. Washington, D.C., December 15.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2004a, “Recent Development in Sovereign Debt Litigation and Implications for Debt Restructuring and Debt Relief Processes”. Paper prepared by the Legal Department in consultation with the Policy Development and Review, International Capital Markets, and Research Departments, IMF Archives. Washington, D.C., March.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2004b, “Review of Exceptional Access Policy”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Finance Departments in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., March 23.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2005, “Review of Access Policy in the Credit Tranches, the Extended Fund Facility and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and Exceptional Access Policy”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Finance Departments. Washington, D.C., March 14.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, a, “Review of Access Policy in the Credit Tranches and Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and Exceptional Access”. Prepared by the Policy, Development and Review and Finance Departments. Washington, D.C., February 1.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, b, “Staff Guidance Note on Debt Sustainability Analysis for Market Access Countries”. Paper prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. Washington, D.C., July 3.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2009a, “Review of Fund Facilities – Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options”. Paper prepared by Legal, Monetary and Capital Markets, Research, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Departments, in consultation with other departments. Washington, D.C., February 6.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2009b, “GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality: Reform Proposals”. Paper prepared by the Finance, Legal, and Strategy, Policy and Review Departments, in consultation with the other departments. Washington, D.C., March 13.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2009c, “IMF Overhauls Non-concessional Lending Facilities and Conditionality”. Public Information Notice No. 09/40. Washington, D.C., April 3.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2009d, “The Flexible Credit Line – Guidance on Operational Issues”. Paper prepared by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department in consultation with other departments. Washington, D.C., November 2.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2010a, “Greece: Staff Report on Request for Stand-By Arrangement”. IMF Country Report No. 10/110. Washington, D.C., May 5.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2010b, “Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund”, Thirty-Fifth Issue. Washington, D.C.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2011a, “Fiscal Monitor”. Washington, D.C., April.

  • International Monetary Fund, 2012a, “A Survey of Experiences with Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Restructurings”. Paper prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Washington, D.C., June 5.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2012b, “2011 Review of Conditionality – Overview Paper”. Paper prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department in consultation with other Departments. Washington, D.C., June 19.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2012c, “Fiscal Monitor”. October.

  • International Monetary Fund – Financial Stability Board, 2009, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps”. Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October 29.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Krueger A., 2001, “International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring”. Address to the National Economists’ Club. Washington D.C., November 26.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Krueger A., 2002, “A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring”. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C., April.

  • Leipold A., 2011, “Thinking the Unthinkable. Lessons from Past Sovereign Debt Restructurings”. The Lisbon Council e-brief, Issue No. 12/2011.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lerrik A., 2005, “A Leap of Faith for Sovereign Default: from IMF Judgment Calls to Automatic Incentives. Cato Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 2531.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Maris P.V., 2010, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Legal and Economic Analysis of a Multi-faceted and Conveniently Forgotten Topic”. Law and Policy Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, June, pp. 3157.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Martha R.S.J., 1990, “Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The Case of the International Monetary Fund”. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4, October, pp. 801826.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Mauro P. Yafeh Y., 2003, “The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders”. IMF Working Paper No. 03/107. May.

  • Oechsli C. G., 1981, “Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act”. Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 305341.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Panizza U. Sturzenegger F. Zettelmeyer J., 2009, “The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default”. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 651698.

    • Crossref
    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Quarles R., 2010, “Herding Cats: Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt – The Genesis of the Project to Change Market Practice in 2001 Through 2003”. Law and Contemporary Problems No. 73.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Reinhart C.M. Rogoff K. Savastano M.A., 2003, “Debt Intolerance”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, pp. 174.

  • Reinhart C.M. Rogoff K., 2009, “This time is different. Eight Hundred Centuries of Financial Folly”. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ritter R., 2009, “Transnational Governance in Global Finance. The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”. ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 103. April.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Rogoff K., 2003, “Emerging Market Debt. What Is the Problem?Speech given at the IMF Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism Conference. Washington D.C, January 22.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Rogoff K. Zettelmeyer J., 2002, “Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001”. IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 49, No.3, pp. 470507.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Roubini N. Setser B., 2004, “Bailouts or Bail-Ins: Responding to the Financial Crises in Emerging Markets”. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Washington, DC.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Sachs J., 1995, “Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?Frank D. Graham Lecture, Princeton University. April.

  • Simpson L., 2006, “The role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns”. G24 Discussion Paper No. 40. May.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Skeel D.A., 2012, “Rules-Based Restructuring and the Eurozone Crisis”. In: F. Allen, E. Carletti, and G. Corsetti (Eds.), “Life in the Eurozone with or without Sovereign Default”, European University Institute (Florence, Italy) and Wharton Financial Institutions Center, University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, USA).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Spadafora F., 2003, “Official Bailouts, Moral Hazard and the ‘Speciality’ the International Interbank Market”. Emerging Markets Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 167198.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services, 2012, “S&P Statement on Greece”. February 27.

  • Steneri C., 2003, “Voluntary Debt Reprofiling: The Case of Uruguay”. Paper prepared for the fourth UNCTAD Conference on Debt Management. Geneve, November.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Tarullo D.K., 2005, “The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring”. Chicago Journal of International Law (summer), pp. 289311.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Taylor J.B., 2002a, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective”. Remarks at the Institute for International Economics conference on “Sovereign Debt Workout: Hopes and Hazard”. Washington D.C., April.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Taylor J.B., 2002b, “Using Clauses to Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workout: Progress and Next Steps”. Remarks at the EMTA Annual Meeting. December.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Taylor J.B., 2006, “Interview”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Region., June.

  • Taylor J.B., 2007, “New Rules for the International Monetary Fund”. In: J.B. Taylor,Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World”. W.W. Norton & Co., pp. 98132.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Taylor J.B., 2010, “Globalization and Monetary Policy: Missions Impossible”. In: J. Gali and M.J. Gertler (Eds.), “International Dimensions of Monetary Policy”, University of Chicago Press, pp. 609624.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Visco I., 2010, “Comment on ‘Sovereign Bankruptcy in the EU: A Comparative Perspective’ by Leszek Balcerowicz”. Lectio Marco Minghetti 2010, Istituto Bruno Leoni. Rome, October 26.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Visco I., 2011, “The New EU Economic Governance and Market Discipline”. Remarks at the Brussels Economic Forum 2011, “Rethinking Economic Policy in Europe – A New Era of EU Economic Governance”. Brussels, May 18.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
^

Bank of Italy;

*

Bank of Italy and International Monetary Fund. The authors are grateful to Giorgio Gomel, Alessandro Leipold, Marino Perassi, and Ignazio Visco for their helpful advice on an earlier draft of the paper. For their useful comments, the authors would also like to thank Tamon Asonuma, Fabrizio Balassone, Wolfgang Bergthaler, James Boughton, Thanos Catsambas, Varapat Chensavasdijai, Katharine Maria Christopherson Puh, Marika Cioffi, Stijn Claessens, Andrea Colabella, Carlo Cottarelli, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Damien Eastman, Andrew Giddings, Raffaela Giordano, Lorenzo Giorgianni, Manuela Goretti, Kajal Jagatsing, Mariusz Jarmuzek, Sebastiano Laviola, Ross Leckow, Claudia Maurini, Francois Painchaud, Francesco Paternò, Hoang The Pham, Helmut Reisen, Gabriele Semeraro, Claudio Visconti, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown. All remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ only and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Italy or the International Monetary Fund.

1

Sovereign debt crises might involve either a pre-emptive debt restructuring negotiated by a sovereign without suspending the servicing of its debt or an outright default, usually followed by restructuring. Crisis management and crisis resolution are notions often used interchangeably in the literature: for example, the IMF’s lending framework is generally referred to as a crisis resolution tool. We adopt a narrower definition of crisis resolution that refers to those situations involving either a pre-emptive debt restructuring or an outright default. Accordingly, in our interpretation crisis management generally deals with situations that involve an IMF-supported adjustment program but no restructuring/default of sovereign debt.

2

We focus on Fund lending on non-concessional terms, i.e. to both advanced and emerging market countries that typically have access to international capital markets. The IMF also has lending facilities on concessional terms for Low Income Countries (LICs).

3

The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets were developed under the aegis of the Institute of International Finance and the Banque de France; they have a voluntary nature and are based on four pillars: transparency and timely flow of information; close debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to avoid restructuring; good faith actions during debt restructuring; and fair treatment of all parties. An Addendum to the Principles was drawn up on the basis of the lessons from Greece’s debt restructuring of March-April 2012 (IIF, 2005 and 2012; Ritter, 2009).

4

This literature is extremely vast. See, for example, the seminal papers of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989). For comprehensive reviews, see Eaton and Fernandez (1995), Friedman (2000), Borenstein and Panizza (2008), and Panizza et al. (2009).

5

In 2010, Argentina offered to restructure the debt held by holdouts from its 2005 bond exchange. That offer was accepted by 66 per cent of the holdouts, bringing total creditor participation (from the combined 2005 and 2010 restructurings) to 93 percent.

6

An exit consent is a written permission for an amendment that is tendered along with the acceptance of an exchange offer (i.e. the consent is given as a bondholder exits the bond). This technique encourages full creditor participation in a bond exchange involving instruments that do not contain CACs, because it allows a simple majority to modify (with the issuer’s consent) non-payment terms of the old (tendered) bonds in order to make them less attractive. See, for example, Buchheit and Gulati (2002). Steneri (2003) illustrates the use of exit consent in the case of Uruguay.

7

The Mexican crisis had a major impact also on Fund surveillance over the financial sector. See Gola and Spadafora (2011).

8

The Preferred Creditor Status (PCS) occupies an especially important place in the Fund’s lending framework, as it represents a key prerequisite of all forms of Fund financing and, more generally, an element for the overall functioning of the international financial system as a whole. It allows the Fund to provide financing to a sovereign when other creditors are not willing to do so and at non-market interest rates, i.e. without imposing risk premia or requiring collateral (Martha, 1990).

9

The LIA policy was formally approved in 1989 and subsequently amended in 1998, 1999, and 2002. See IMF (1970, 1980, 1989a, 1989b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2002d, and 2002e). For critical reviews of the existing version of the policy, see Lerrick (2005), Gelpern (2005), Simpson (2006), Buchheit and Lastra (2007), Bedford and Irwin (2008), and Diaz-Cassou et al. (2008a, 2008b).

10

These were conventional stand-by or extended arrangements where the beneficiary country expressed its intention not to draw, although Fund resources could be made readily available in case of actual balance-of-payments pressures, and provided that the country continued to observe the other conditions of the arrangement. Precautionary arrangements soon became a popular form of IMF monitoring with standard (i.e. ex post) conditionality that went beyond bilateral surveillance without necessarily involving Fund financing. The bulk of these arrangements remained well below the normal access limits to IMF resources, and they did not pose particular problems to the prevailing lending framework. It was only at the beginning of the 2000s that a demand emerged for high-access precautionary arrangements, highlighting the need to specify the rationales of these programs and to ensure their consistency with the overall lending framework (see Section 5.1).

11

For a discussion of the Fund’s access policy in a historical perspective, see Boughton, 2001 (Chapter 17) and IMF, 2001b (Chapter II).

12

In practice, however, the Fund’s willingness to lend is rarely disputed. Tarullo (2005) points to some anecdotal and empirical evidence on the IMF’s (moderate) institutional bias, in favor of lending to a country in crisis, grounded in political economy considerations. Gelpern (2005) notes that this bias is especially strong and justified when a country has met all the macroeconomic and structural conditions at the core of an IMF program.

13

In the words of John Taylor (2006), “…one of the problems with the IMF was that there was too little systematic behavior. Will they bail out a country or won’t they? When will they? Which country? On what does it depend?”

14

The lack of predictability was most evident in the case of Russia, where the IMF increased its financial support to the country in July 1998 and then, one month later, decided to remove it. The author regards this surprise move as a reason for the global contagion at the time (Taylor, 2010, p. 617).

15

At the time of the SBA approval in September 2003, Fund staff was satisfied that the authorities had met the good-faith criteria of the LIA policy as: (a) the authorities indicated that they wished to complete a debt restructuring by mid-2004; (b) they committed to keep Fund staff informed about progress towards such an agreement; and (c) the authorities had taken steps to begin engaging creditors in a collaborative process (IMF, 2003f, p. 25).

16

In April 1999, the Board had revisited the criteria underpinning the LIA policy, with a view to ensuring the Fund’s ability to provide timely financing to its members. The revision was triggered by a perception that its criteria appeared to be too restrictive, emphasizing specifically the risk that, in some instances, creditors (particularly bondholders) could exercise a de facto veto over Fund lending (IMF, 1999). A good faith criterion was thus introduced, calling on the debtor to make a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with creditors. This criterion was the object of far-reaching changes in 2002, as it was developed into a detailed set of principles and procedures to guide the conduct of debtor-creditor negotiations (IMF, 2002d).

17

“Enhanced delineation of [the circumstances that would justify exceptional access] is warranted, with emphasis on a positive assessment of prospects for debt sustainability” (IMF, 2002c, p. 7).

18

“The reason why the …[EAP]… was acceptable to IMF shareholders, management, and staff was that there was a procedure (the CACs) that countries could use to restructure their debt without large-scale borrowing from the IMF. In technical terms, the CACs solved the time inconsistency problem”. Taylor (2010, p. 618).

19

In May 2010, Greece’s quota in the Fund was SDR 823 million. It increased to SDR 1,102 million when the 2008 Quota and Voice Reforms became effective on March 3, 2011.

20

In the related discussion, a few Executive Directors suggested further narrowing the definition of capital account crises that could warrant exceptional access by establishing a formal criterion relating to problems of contagion or the potential for systemic effects.

21

Similarly, a member that did not meet the systemic criteria should not on this basis be denied exceptional access, if the other substantive conditions established above are satisfied.

23

Although, according to some authors, CACs could in principle be designed to replicate some features of a system of corporate bankruptcy, including debtor-in-possession financing (see Maris, 2010, p. 45).

24

This reluctance may be explained by several factors, including a decrease (until recently) of requests for financial assistance from Fund members; concerns about fueling moral hazard; hurdles in securing political consensus at the national level on the use of taxpayers’ money for multilateral institutions; and the fact that general increases in IMF quotas are frequently associated with adjustments in their distribution, with an impact on countries’ relative voting power at the Fund.

25

“Protection from the risk of holdout litigation won’t minimize the risk of a sovereign restructuring leading to costly spillover into the rest of the economy. It won’t make any easier to prevent a sovereign debt restructuring from triggering a collapse in the banking system, particularly when local banks are the sovereign’s major creditors” (Roubini and Setser, 2004, p. 334).

You Never Give Me Your Money? Sovereign Debt Crises, Collective Action Problems, and IMF Lending
Author: Mr. Marco Committeri and Francesco Spadafora