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The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?
Author:
Mr. Marc G Quintyn
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Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini null

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Donato Masciandaro null

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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2011: Issue 261
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Nov 2011
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781463924560.001
ISBN:
9781463924560
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
47
Keywords:
WP; governance arrangement; central bank involvement; prudential supervision; supervision unification; supervisory governance; financial supervision; global crisis; supervisory architecture; macroprudential supervision; proactive supervision; involvement in supervision; banking industry; degree of supervision unification; governance indicator; governance work; Bank supervision; Basel Core Principles; Public sector; Europe; Global
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund