Appendix 1. A Conditional Cash Transfer Program Simulation for Senegal
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)| false de Brauw, Alan, and Hoddinott, John, 2008, “ Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to be effective?: The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico,” IFPRI discussion papers 757, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
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The authors are grateful to David Coady for his invaluable input and feedback. We also thank Kossi Assimaidou and Benedict Clements for very useful suggestions and comments. Responsibility for remaining errors and omissions lies with the authors.
The estimation of the indirect price effect on other goods and services assumes that all cost increases are pushed forward onto output prices. Since much of the cost increases come through trade and distribution margins, which are non-traded, this is probably a good approximation. A more detailed description of the model and its applications to other countries is presented in Coady and others (2006).
Appendix Table 1 presents a tabulation of household survey answers on the revenue module that relate to household sales of grain products produced. We use these data, in spite of having a large number of missing values which we account as zero values (no production/sale). Under this approach, some missing values that could simply reflect poor quality data could result on an underestimation of the impact of price changes on producers of grain products.
The shares reported in Table 3 reflect only consumption generated by purchases of these products (i.e., do not include consumption of products self-produced by each household or gifts). These shares are subsequently used to compute the welfare impact of a price increase.
This should be interpreted as an upper-end estimate, with foregone revenue for VAT and excises amounting to 1.3 percent of GDP.
This plan identifies the following key obstacles facing the agricultural sector: (i) a lack of clear property rights holding back investment in agricultural production; (ii) poor agricultural inputs such as low-quality seeds; (iii) a lack of proper irrigation schemes; (iv) a lack of access to agricultural machinery and technical know-how about more advanced farming techniques. To address these obstacles, the plan highlights the following policy measures as crucial: Clarify property rights. The government has adopted a comprehensive law to clarify land rights. A swift and rigorous enforcement of this law is an important measure to create the incentives to invest in farming. Increase agricultural productivity. Greater emphasis should be given to helping farmers apply more advanced farming techniques, including better irrigation techniques.
School feeding programs are typically pursuing three core policy objectives: (i) they can motivate parents to have their children attend school regularly; (ii) they can improve the nutritional status of school age children over time; and (iii) they can improve cognitive functions and academic performance of children, World Bank (2008).
Several types of subsidies can help poor households maintain a minimum standard of living, such as tuition related interventions, targeted bursaries, textbook-related interventions, school transport related interventions, etc. See Grosh and others (2008) for a discussion of principles and country experiences with different types of subsidy programs.
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that have either a full program or a pilot CCT include: Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and Ethiopia (United Nations, 2009 and references therein). See Rawlings (2004) and World Bank (2009) for a review of experiences with CCTs in other regions.
The Institute of Statistics reported that in 2003, only 35.3 percent of Burkinabe had access to health services.
The Institute of Statistics shows that 27.5 percent of students that were not in school in 2003 reported the reason to be the high cost of school fees.L’Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD), 2004, Analyse descriptive des résultats de l’Enquête burkinabè sur les conditions de vie des ménages (EBCVM).
Proxy-means targeting usually identifies poor households on the basis of a household welfare score. For this a set of observable criteria that characterizes poor households must be chosen (see Appendix 1 for a simulation of a proxy means-testing program).
The positive impact of enforcing conditions versus that of a simple cash transfer in Mexico and Ecuador for example has been documented by de Braw and Hoddinott 2008, and Schady and Araujo 2006, respectively.
Destitute households comprise usually one member only, who is either disabled or elderly. Very poor households are typically female-headed, renting a 8-10-square meter house without latrine. They live on a very low income from unskilled, irregular daily labor. Children who live in these households do not go to school, and health care is provided by traditional healers, with medicine bought on the street. Poor households are typically male-headed, owning a 10–30-square meter house with a latrine. At least two active adults provide a low and irregular income as daily workers. Access to health care is limited, and medicine is bought on the street. The household often own assets such as sleeping mats, a radio, and/or a bike.
Senegal has similar direct and indirect energy subsidies in place as Burkina Faso, notably a direct subsidy for butane gas, and an excise tax exemption for lamp oil. Moreover, the country suspended taxes and customs duties on rice, wheat, powdered milk, and bread.