Front Matter
Author:
Sven Jari Stehn 0000000404811396 https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396 International Monetary Fund

Search for other papers by Sven Jari Stehn in
Current site
Google Scholar
Close
and
Mr. David A Vines
Search for other papers by Mr. David A Vines in
Current site
Google Scholar
Close

Front Matter Page

Fiscal Affairs Department

Authorized for distribution by Steven Symansky

Contents

  • I. Introduction

  • II. The Model

    • A. Consumers

    • B. Price Setting

    • C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy

    • D. The System

    • E. Social Welfare

    • F. Policy Objectives

    • G. Calibration

  • III. Solving for Optimal Policy

    • A. Cooperative Policy

    • B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion

  • IV. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available

    • A. Cooperative Policy

      • 1. Commitment

      • 2. Discretion

    • B. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority

      • 1. Nash

      • 2. Fiscal Leadership

      • 3. Robustness

  • V. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are not Available

    • A. Cooperative Policy

      • 1. Commitment

      • 2. Discretion

    • B. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority

      • 1. Nash

      • 2. Fiscal Leadership

    • C. Robustness

  • VI. Optimal Institutions

    • A. A Debt Penalty

    • B. A Conservative Central Bank

  • VII. Conclusion

  • Appendix

    • A. Social Welfare

    • B. Policy Myopia

    • C. Solving the Model

      • 1. Optimal Cooperative Policy

      • 2. Optimal Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion

  • References

  • Tables

  • Table 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock

  • Figures

  • Figure 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy

  • Figure 2. First-period responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy for different degrees of fiscal myopia (p)

  • Figure 3. First-period responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy with a myopic government (p = 0.75) for different calibrations

  • Figure 4. Optimal policy without lump-sum taxes with a myopic government (p = 0.75) and a debt penalty

  • Figure 5. Optimal policy without lump-sum taxes and a myopic government (p = 0.75) for different degrees of monetary conservatism (η)

  • Collapse
  • Expand
Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt
Author:
Sven Jari Stehn
and
Mr. David A Vines