Front Matter Page
European Department
Authorized for distribution by James Daniel and Jörg Decressin
Contents
I. Introduction
II. National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms
A. National Reforms
B. EU Reforms
III. Measuring the Private Value of Control
IV. Data and Methodology
A. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics
B. Empirical Strategy
V. Main Findings
A. Voting Premiums Across Time and Countries
B. Have Reforms Reduced the Private Benefits of Control?
C. Have Reforms Brought About Convergence in Corporate Control?
VI. Conclusions
Tables
1. Italy: National Corporate Reform
2. Germany: National Corporate Governance Reforms
3. France: National Corporate Governance Reforms
4. EU Corporate Governance Reforms
5. Number of Dual-Class Firms by Country
6. Voting Premium: Summary Statistics
7. Voting Premiums Year Effects
8. Voting Premium Distributed Year Effects
9. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, by Year
10. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms Compared to Control Groups: A Summary
11. Voting Premiums: Year Effects, Accounting for Product Market Reforms
12. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, Accounting for Product Market Reforms, by Year
13. Distribution Characteristics of Voting Premiums, Pooled for All EU Countries
Figures
1. Dynamic of the Voting Premiums Acorss Countries, 1992–2007
2. Reform Efforts: Number of Important Corporate Governance Reforms Per Year
3. Number of National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms
4. Convergence in Voting Premiums Across Countries
5. Distribution of Voting Premium Across EU Countries, by Year
References