Cover IMF Working Papers
Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea
Author: Mr. Ebrima A Faal
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2007: Issue 219
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Sep 2007
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451867831.001
ISBN:
9781451867831
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
16
Keywords:
WP; election; government; development expenditure; election period
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent governments, mainly in the form of increased development spending and overall primary expenditure, followed in some cases by retrenchment in post-election periods. These findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. It is noteworthy that revenue was not statistically significantly related to elections, either in the pre- or post-election period. In this regard, electoral swings in fiscal deficits reflect a preference for influencing expenditures rather than taxation.
Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund