Front Matter Page
Fiscal Affairs Department
Authorized for distribution by Michel Lazare
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Contrasts and Similarities of Constitutional Powers
A. Unwritten Versus Written Constitutions
B. Parliaments Elected and Unelected
C. Constitutional Provisions for the Political Executive
D. Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Budget
III. British Influences on the Main Laws Supporting Tanzania’s Budget System
A. The Main Laws Underlying the Two Budget Systems
B. Other Laws Underlying the Budget System
C. The Financial and Accounting Regulations
IV. Weak Budgetary Powers of Parliament in Both Countries
A. Parliament Approves Annual Estimates Only
B. Budget Amendment Powers are Extremely Limited
C. The Opposition Plays a Very Minor Role
D. Votes of Confidence Pose Threats for Government, but are Rarely Used
V. Budgetary Powers of the Executive
A. Budgetary Powers of the Political Executive are Strong in Both Countries
B. H.M. Treasury and Tanzania’s Ministry of Finance have Strong Budget Powers
C. “Accounting Officers” are Critical Players in the Chain of Accountability
VI. Influences on External Audit Arrangements
VII. Ongoing Evolution and Performance of the Two Countries’ Systems
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Tables
1. Structure of Two Parliaments
2. Main Provisions of Tanzania’s 1977 Constitution
Figures
1. Separation of Political Powers and Control of Executive by the Legislature
2. Index of Legislature’s Budget Authority
3. Fiscal Balances: Tanzania and 15 Other Countries
4. Fiscal Balances: United Kingdom and 15 Other Countries
Boxes
1. United Kingdom: The Plowden Report and Treasury Powers
2. United Kingdom: Responsibilities of Accounting Officers
3. United Kingdom: Evolution of External Audit Arrangements
4. Tanzania: Constitutional Provisions for the Controller and Auditor General
Appendices
I. Indices on the Separation of Powers and the Control by the Legislature
II. Tanzania: Index of Legislature’s Budgetary Powers
Bibliography