Front Matter
Author:
Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396 International Monetary Fund

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Mr. Alain Ize
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Miguel A. Kiguel https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396 International Monetary Fund

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Front Matter Page

Monetary and Financial Systems Department

Contents

  • I. Introduction

  • II. Can Liquidity Be Borrowed?

    • A. Self-Insurance versus External Insurane

    • B. Private Insurane

    • C. Public Insurance

    • D. Taking Stock

  • III. The Case for Liquidity Requirements

    • A. Background

    • B. Some First Principles

    • C. Policy Implications

  • IV. Should Circuit Breakers Be Institutionalized?

    • A. Why Circuit Breakers?

    • B. Which Deposits Should Be Subjected to the CBR?

    • C. Who Should “Pull the Trigger” and When?

    • D. What Happens the Day After?

  • V. Conclusions

  • References

  • Table

  • 1. International Reserves

  • Figure

  • 1. Liquidity Premium

  • Boxes

  • 1. The Argentine Contingent Credit Line

  • 2. The Mexican Contingent Credit Line

  • 3. Introducing CBR-Type Measures Under Crises

  • 4. CBR and Suspension of Convertibility in the Free Banking Era

  • 5. A More Recent Example of Pre-Programmed CBR: The Chilean “Narrow Bank” Safety Net

  • Appendix

  • I. A Model of Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) and Bank Demand for Dollar Liquidity

  • Collapse
  • Expand
Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies
Author:
Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati
,
Mr. Alain Ize
, and
Miguel A. Kiguel