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Who Controls the Budget: The Legislature or the Executive?
Author:
Mr. Ian Lienert
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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2005: Issue 115
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Jun 2005
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451861341.001
ISBN:
9781451861341
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
26
Keywords:
WP; budget proposal; government coalition; State budget law; political party; majoritarian government
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's budgetary powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-standing traditions all influence the relative budgetary powers of executives and legislatures. Differences in the legislature's budgetary authority in twenty-eight countries with five different forms of government are examined. It is concluded that differences in budgetary powers within a particular form of government are as great as those between different forms of government.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund