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Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs
Author:
Mr. James M. Boughton
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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2003: Issue 191
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Sep 2003
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451859737.001
ISBN:
9781451859737
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
25
Keywords:
WP; country authorities; IMF policy conditionality; borrowing country; exchange rate; IMF; Ownership; Conditionality; Macroeconomic Policy; fund staff; country ownership; financing constraint; country's authorities; Capital inflows; Exchange rates; Poverty reduction; Depreciation
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IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund