Angelucci, M., S. Estrin, J. Konings, and Z. Zólkiewski (2001). “The Effect of Ownership and Competitive Pressure on Firm Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from Bulgaria, Romania and Poland,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 2985.
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)| false ( Angelucci, M., S. Estrin, J. Konings, and Z. Zólkiewski 2001). “ The Effect of Ownership and Competitive Pressure on Firm Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from Bulgaria, Romania and Poland,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 2985.
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Coricelli, F., and S. Djankov (2001). “Hardened Budget Constraints and Enterprise Restructuring: Theory and an Application to Romania,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 2950.
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The author wishes to thank Timothy Lane, Franek Rozwadowski, and Jerry Schiff for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks are extended to Gjorgji Nacevski for guidance provided regarding Macedonia’s institutional characteristics and accounting standards, and to the personnel at the payments bureau who kindly prepared the datasets used in this paper. An earlier version of the paper appeared in IMF Country Report No. 03/136, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, May 2003.
FYR Macedonia has had unemployment rates of over 20 percent since the 1980s. The lowest rate of the last 12 years was registered in 1990—23½ percent of the labor force.
Sector prices at the two-digit code level are used given that firm-specific prices are not available.
Regional dummy variables were tested but found not to be statistically significant.
The sector-related binary dummies identify (i) low labor skill (LL) and low capital intensity (LK) firms, (ii) high labor skill (HL) and low capital intensity firms, and (iii) high labor skill and high capital intensity (HK) firms.
The data in the figure are different from the specification of the dummy variable; the former reflect sector averages for labor skill and capital intensity over the whole period, the latter reflects the labor skill and capital intensity of firms for each year in the sample.
The differences across firms are captured by the constant term in the fixed-effects model (with the limitation that the conclusions derived apply only to firms in the sample; see Greene, 1990), but are assumed to be randomly distributed in the random-effects model.
The unbalanced panel dataset includes surviving manufacturing firms of any size and includes firms for which data for the period 1994-2000 might be incomplete. The panel includes a total of 13,500 firms and there is an average of 3.8 years of data per firm.
What precludes investors from taking value maximizing ownership positions? If profit gains from high ownership concentration are possible, then each firm converges to its most efficient level of ownership concentration. However, the presence of high transaction costs and asymmetric information could constitute a disincentive for equity investment.
Since 2001 the Central Share Registry has been the responsibility of registering shareholders.