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)| false Rebucci, Alessandro, 2002, “ The Determinants of the Chilean Peso/US Dollar Spot Rate Under the Free Floating Regime: Is There an ‘Argentine Factor’? Is There Evidence of Shift-Contagion?” in Chile: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/163 ( Washington: International Monetary Fund).
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The author is grateful to Luis-Oscar Herrera, Martin Kaufmann, Saul Lizondo, Steven Phillips, Francisco Nadal-de Simone, Alessandro Rebucci, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Raimnundo Soto, two anonymous referees and especially Rodrigo Valdés for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Monica Espinosa and Veronica Astorga of the Central Bank of Chile for help with obtaining interest rate data.
The meeting, usually on a Tuesday or Thursday, starts at 4:00 p.m. A press statement is typically published around 7:00 to 7.30 p.m. Since February of 2000, the schedule of policy meetings has been made public six months in advance.
Namely, on March 2, 2001. See below for a discussion of this policy action.
In the early 1990s, United States policy actions were announced between scheduled Board meetings, but in the period relevant for this study (1999-2003), this did not happen.
See Morandé and Tapia (2003) on the development of the monetary policy regime in Chile over the 1990s.
After the switch to free floating, the Central Bank of Chile intervened a number of times during two time periods: from mid-August 2001 until the end of 2001, in response to the Argentina crisis (see Central Bank press release, August 16, 2001) and during a four month period beginning in mid-October 2002, again in reaction to financial market turbulence in the region (press release, October 10, 2002). Only one of the policy actions in our sample (January 10, 2002) occurred during these announced intervention periods. It did not coincide with an actual intervention episode, and the results are not affected if this policy action is excluded.