Cover IMF Working Papers
A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Author: Ms. Yan M Sun
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2002: Issue 212
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Dec 2002
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874907.001
ISBN:
9781451874907
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
19
Keywords:
WP; exchange rate; exchange rate regimes; political economy; budget constraint; regime choice; exchange regime; incumbent government; incumbent's regime policy; choice of a government; Exchange rate arrangements; Exchange rate flexibility; Inflation; Conventional peg
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Download PDF (534.2 KB) Download Epub
Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelection.
Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund

dimension badge: