Front Matter Page
Research Department
Contents
I. Introduction
II. From the Late 1970s to Oechsli (1981)
III. Developments During the Debt Crisis
A. A Better Understanding of the Problem
Collective Action Problems and the Allied Rank Case
Debt Overhang and “Market-Based” Debt Reduction
The Costs of Default and Incentives to Repay
B. Initiatives Within the Existing Statutory Framework
C. New Statutory Proposals
IV. After Mexico: The IMF as an International Bankruptcy Court?
V. Orderly Workouts Without a Bankruptcy Court
VI. Proposals During 2000–2001
VII. Comparing Ideas, 1976–2001: A Synthesis
A. The Basic Conundrum: Collective Action Problems and Moral Hazard
B. Dealing With Creditor Incentives: Competing Approaches
C. What About Debtor Incentives?
VIII. Conclusion
Figure 1. Comparison of Main Proposals for Improved Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures
References