Cover IMF Working Papers
Buy Book in Print
Sanctions and Civil Conflict
Author:
Mr. Dmitry Gershenson
Search for other papers by Mr. Dmitry Gershenson in
Current site
Google Scholar Close
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2001: Issue 066
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 May 2001
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451848793.001
ISBN:
9781451848793
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
37
Keywords:
WP; defeat income; victory income; challenger group; Sanctions; Conflict; Surrender; apartheid government; Castro regime; challenger's victory; Personal income; Consumption; Defense spending; Africa
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Download PDF (949.8 KB) Download Epub
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases.
  • Collapse
  • Expand
Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund