IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Superior information exchanged over the course of lending relationships generates bank-client specificities to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. Consequently, banks obtain higher profits from more captured borrowers than from borrowers with financing alternatives. We refer to this as a “flight to captivity” effect. Negative shocks, associated with monetary contractions or foreign entry, cause a reallocation of bank credit away from more transparent borrowers and toward more opaque, more captured borrowers. The paper applies these ideas to the analysis of bank behavior in transition economies after financial liberalization and monetary policy contractions.