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The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management
Author:
Mr. Luc E. Leruth
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,
R. Parisnull

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Mr. I. Ruzickanull

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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2000: Issue 051
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Mar 2000
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451847109.001
ISBN:
9781451847109
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
28
Keywords:
WP; forest management; environmental damage; pollution tax
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
Volume 2000: Issue 051