Cover IMF Working Papers
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?
Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ms. Enrica Detragiache
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 2000: Issue 003
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Jan 2000
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451841893.001
ISBN:
9781451841893
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
29
Keywords:
WP; bank deposit; insurance scheme; insurance system; insurance dummy; G28; G21; E44; deposit insurance; design feature; design variable; deposit insurance variable; deposit insurance design; insurance design; Deposit insurance; Banking crises; Bank deposits; Moral hazard; Bank soundness; Africa; Global
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IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund

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