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Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State
Author:
Christian Harm null

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Mr. Joshua Charap
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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 1999: Issue 091
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Jul 1999
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451851496.001
ISBN:
9781451851496
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
24
Keywords:
WP; maximization problem; combat technology; interest group rent-seeking; government objective; rent-seeking activity; Corruption; dictatorship; anarchy; governance; palace revolution; gang member; Public sector wages; Personal income
Legal-disclaimer:
IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund