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Controlling Fiscal Corruption
Author:
Sheetal K. Chand null

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Mr. Karl Ove Moene null

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Series:
IMF Working Papers
Volume/Issue:
Volume 1997: Issue 100
Language:
English
Publication Date:
01 Aug 1997
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451852363.001
ISBN:
9781451852363
ISSN:
1018-5941
Pages:
17
Keywords:
WP; tax collector; tax income; Fiscal performance; corruption; incentives; tax evasion; Ghana; tax authority; constituted revenue authority; tax collectors choice; clearance certificate; tax officer; revenue improvement; tax collectors increase; tax ratio; Bonuses; Tax administration core functions; Civil service
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IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
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This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.
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Cover IMF Working Papers
IMF Working Papers
ISSN:
1018-5941
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund