Macroeconomic Effects of Prelected Population Aging in Industrial Countries
  • 1 0000000404811396 Monetary Fund

The effects of population aging are examined with the aid of a theoretical model and simulations of MULTIMOD. An older population will consume more of aggregate disposable income, require higher government expenditure, and decrease labor supply. These effects should raise real interest rates and lower the capital stock and output. Effects on current balances will depend on the relative speed and extent of aging. Simulations of projected demographic changes suggest that by 2025, real interest rates would be increased by several percentage points and net foreign assets increased in the United States, and decreased in Japan and Germany, as a result.


The effects of population aging are examined with the aid of a theoretical model and simulations of MULTIMOD. An older population will consume more of aggregate disposable income, require higher government expenditure, and decrease labor supply. These effects should raise real interest rates and lower the capital stock and output. Effects on current balances will depend on the relative speed and extent of aging. Simulations of projected demographic changes suggest that by 2025, real interest rates would be increased by several percentage points and net foreign assets increased in the United States, and decreased in Japan and Germany, as a result.

I. Introduction

If current projections prove to be correct, the populations of most industrial countries will experience significant aging in the first few decades of the next century. Birth rates have already declined markedly from their high levels of the early postwar period, and are projected to decline further. Even though projections that far ahead are obviously subject to considerable uncertainty, a prospective increase in the average age of the population is to a large extent inevitable as the postwar “baby boom” generation moves through the age structure. Aging of the population can be expected to bring about major changes in the economy, associated with an increase in the number of dependents relative to those that are employed (the dependency ratio), and in some countries with very low birth rates, projected declines in the population. There is an especially large element of uncertainty relating to birth rate projections and to changes in population due to migration, but in any case, dependency ratios will almost certainly rise in the next three decades: a substantial rise in birth rates would if anything increase dependency ratios over this time period.

With the aging of the population, it is plausible to expect a decline in saving rates to the extent that “life cycle” motives for saving operate—that is, individuals save for retirement during the years in which they are employed, and dissave subsequently. 1/ In addition, the demand for social services will change, toward providing more medical services and pension benefits and away from spending on education. Finally, the presence of fewer individuals of working age will be associated with lower levels of employment and hence of output, ceteris paribus, than would otherwise be the case. What happens to per capita output will depend on the resulting capital stock per worker, as well as the proportion of the population in the labor force.

The macroeconomic effects of these changes can be expected to be substantial, and are the subject of this paper. Changes in saving propensities, government spending, and labor supply have implications for relative prices, real interest rates, and real exchange rates; these variables in turn feed back onto decisions to spend and produce. The paper is an attempt to gauge the global macroeconomic consequences of generalized aging of the population in industrial countries. To understand these consequences requires a multicountry macroeconomic model. A multicountry context is also important because some of the effects—e.g. on real exchange rates and on current account balances—depend crucially on the extent of aging in one country relative to that in other countries. In this paper, we use simulations of the Fund’s MULTIMOD model in order to gauge the effects of the demographic developments described above.

Aging of the population affects macroeconomic variables in the model through three channels. 2/ First, aggregate consumption relative to income is increased by a rise in the dependency ratio. Second, higher dependency ratios lower the labor force, which is associated with a decline in potential output. Third, an older population requires larger government expenditures on medical services and on pension benefits; however, this may be partially offset by a decline in education expenditures.

To date, a macroeconomic model framework has not been used to capture the general equilibrium, multicountry effects of demographic projections. There are a number of relevant studies of various features of the issue, however. Heller and others (1986) consider the effect of aging on social expenditures in the G-7 countries, and we will use their estimates below as input to our simulations. Heller (1989) examines the impact of aging on private saving, using several estimated consumption models; he also discusses implications for government budgets. The OECD has produced several studies of saving behavior, including effects of demographic factors (Dean and others (1989) and Herd (1989)), and has examined implications of aging for public finances (Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989)). In addition, Auerbach and others (1989) have studied the dynamics of the effects of aging on the economies of four industrial countries using a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model; however, that model considers each country in isolation rather than as part of a closed world system. Ritzen and van Dalen (1989) consider the optimal fiscal policy in the transition to an older population, using a single-country theoretical model. Lee and Lapkoff (1988) consider intergenerational transfer issues in an overlapping-generations context, but also do not treat multicountry issues. Horne and others (1989) examine the long-run relationship between dependency ratios and net foreign asset positions for the United States, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is important to make clear at the outset the limitations of our study. 3/ We do not examine issues related to intergenerational transfers, namely questions of equity, since this would require a more detailed model. Furthermore, the policy questions, for instance how should increases in government spending be financed, or whether incentives for private saving should be put in place today, are not treated here. We have not attempted to incorporate projections for aging in developing countries. Finally, we do not take into account effects of the age structure on labor force participation due to endogenous participation or retirement decisions, or changes in the growth rate of the population. 4/

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the OECD’s demographic projections, and presents the projections of expenditures on government services in Heller and others (1986). Section III details the model of private consumption that is embodied in MULTIMOD, and compares its estimate of the effect of demographic factors to those found in other studies. Section IV presents simulations of the effects of aging using MULTIMOD; the results are compared to the long-run effects that can be derived from a simple theoretical model that is the prototype for MULTIMOD. (Derivations are detailed in the Appendix.) Finally, Section V provides some concluding remarks.

II. Demographic Trends and Projections

In most industrial countries, the decade and a half following the the end of World War II saw very high birth rates, which have since moderated. The early post-war generation—often termed the “baby boom” generation—is now 30-45 years old; as a result a large fraction of the population is currently employed. However, when the baby boom generation retires in the years 2010-2025, there will likely be large declines in the number employed relative to those that depend on them—or on their own savings.

A measure of the age structure of the population is the dependency ratio, which can be calculated in various ways. Table 1 gives historical data and projections for one measure, the ratio of the young and of the old to those of working age (assumed to be between 15 and 64), as well as for population growth rates. 5/ The youth dependency ratio from 1965 to 1985 declined markedly; that ratio is projected to decline further in some countries (the United States, France), but generally to remain constant through 2025, at least if birth rates do not change substantially. In contrast, the elderly dependency ratio—roughly constant since 1965—is projected to rise in all countries by 2025. However, the extent of the rise varies greatly across countries.

Table 1.

Major Industrial Countries: Selected Demographic Variables; 1965-2025

(In percent)

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Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1964-84 and 1967-87, and Demographic Databank projections, Social Affairs, Manpower and Education Directorate, OECD.

Fund staff estimates for 1965-85.

A summary statistic of the importance of the age structure is the overall dependency ratio, given in the bottom panel of Table 1. This ratio captures the labor force implications of the fraction of the population that is either too young or too old to work. 6/ Whether the increase in the overall dependency ratio occurs because of an increase in the young or the old has implications for other variables, for instance medical care and education, as discussed below. It may also matter for the economy’s saving propensity; however, consumption equation estimates reported in Section IV below use the overall ratio, since there was no significant difference between the effects of youth and elderly dependency ratios.

Taking the year 1995 as a base (as is done in the simulations in Section V), changes in the overall dependency ratio to 2025 vary greatly across countries, though dependency ratios end up at similar levels in 2025. Increases of 13-15 percentage points are projected for Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany; moreover, a large part of the increase occurs by 2015 (especially in Japan). In contrast, the ratio for the United States increases by 7 percentage points by 2025, and is actually projected to be lower in 2015 than in 1995. Canada is projected to have a large increase, but only in the 2015-2025 period. Other industrial countries have more modest increases than Japan and Germany—in the order of 5-8 percentage points by 2025, with the changes occuring fairly gradually. Thus, both the extent of aging and the speed with which it occurs differ substantially among the major industrial countries. Projections for the smaller industrial countries (Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989)) also indicate significant increases in dependency ratios.

Heller and others (1986) have projected the change of social expenditures by governments on the basis of demographic projections similar to those in Table 1. They include in their study expenditures on education, medical care, pensions, unemployment compensation, and income maintenance for the poor, at both the general and local government levels.

We focus in this paper on three components of government spending which are closely related to demographic developments: medical expenses, education expenses, and pension benefit payments. We do not attempt to disaggregate revenues. however—for instance, by separating social security contributions from other taxes. whether social security programs are funded or unfunded and the resulting implications for the economy are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we simulate the model with a tax rate reaction function which tends to resist movements away from an exogenous government debt/GNP ratio. This rule prevents a snowballing accumulation of debt leading to eventual government default. Deficits do occur for a number of years as a result of demographic changes, but they are eventually eliminated.

Table 2 summarizes the projections in Heller and others (1986) as regards government spending on medical care, education, and pensions. The effects of demographic changes are calculated as the difference between the GNP share of spending on each category projected for 2000-2025, and its value in 1980 (a more recent year of historical data was not available in their study). The increases in government expenditure on medical care (as a percent of GDP) are large but not enormous. Moreover, except in Germay and Japan they are mostly offset by declines in projected education expenditures. In contrast, pension benefits (which are treated in the model as negative taxes) increase by between 5 and 10 percent of GDP for Germany, Italy, and Japan. By 2025, government spending in all three areas taken together increases by up to 10 percentage points of GDP; however, these increases differ markedly across countries. They are largest in Japan and Germany and smallest in the United States and Canada, as would be expected given the demographic trends discussed above.

Table 2.

Major Industrial Countries: Changes in Government Expenditures due to Demographic Changes, 2000-2025

(In percent of GDP)

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Source: Heller and others (1986), Table 14. “Baseline Economic and Demographic Scenario” relative to 1980 actual expenditures, as ratios to GDP. For medical expenditures, figures were obtained directly from Peter Heller.

III. Estimated Consumption Equation

This section describes the estimated consumption equation and compares the effect it attributes to the dependency ratio to those found in other studies. The starting point for the consumption equation is the intertemporal optimizing model of Blanchard (1985), as extended by Buiter (1988). This model makes consumption a function of financial and “human” wealth, that is, the expected value of lifetime ernings, discounted to the present. It is a useful tool for analyzing fiscal policy because it allows for an effect of the government bond stock on interest rates (provided the birth rate is non-zero); the model allows simple aggregation because of the assumption that the probability of death is the same for individuals of all ages. However, as noted by Blanchard (1985, p. 235), the model is not convenient for rigorously treating “saving for retirement” or for allowing for a path of labor income that abruptly drops to zero at a certain point. Moreover, it does not allow for constraints that individuals face on their borrowing. In our estimated model, we implement liquidity constraints in an error-correction framework, as in Davidson and others (1978) and Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981). We also add a dependency ratio to capture effects of differences in age structure on consumption and saving, admittedly in an ad hoc fashion. The data for human wealth used to estimate the consumption equation does not include adjustment for future demographic changes; rather, it is the discounted value of future disposable income, with expected disposable income the result of extrapolation using historical relationships (see Masson, Symansky, and Tryon (1989), Appendix I).

The equation was estimated using ordinary least squares with annual data from 1969 to 1987 pooled across the G-7 countries and the “smaller industrial country” block. The estimated equation, which is used in the simulations described below, is as follows:


R¯2=.641 SER = .026

where the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, and where C is real consumption expenditure, W is real wealth, RLR is the real long-term interest rate (expected inflation is proxied for estimation purposes by a centered 10 year moving average of actual inflation), YD is real, after-tax net domestic product, DEM3 is the overall dependency ratio (the ratio of dependents to the working age population), 7/ and DUM80 is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 after 1980. This variable was included because visual inspection of our population data indicated a break in that year, perhaps because of imperfect splicing of census data with earlier estimates. It is important to note that wealth includes the discounted present value of future (non-interest) disposable income, WH. 8/ Total wealth W is the sum of WH and the real value of financial wealth, held in the form of domestic outside money M, government bonds B, and net claims on foreigners NFA (in U.S. dollars—ER is the exchange rate):

W = WH + (M + B + NFA/ER)/P

The disposable income variable YD is constrained by the error-correction specification to have only transitory effects, as liquidity constraints are assumed to operate only in the short to medium term.

The estimated equation attributes a marginally significant positive effect on consumption of an increase in the overall dependency ratio. Including the youth and elderly dependency ratios separately did not significantly increase the explanatory power of the equation, hence they were constrained to have the same coefficient. It was also the case that the data could not reject the constraint of a common coefficient on the overall dependency ratio across countries. Some further estimation was done, after the above equation was incorporated into the model, in order to examine the robustness of the results. Using instrumental variables to estimate the equation 9/ yielded a somewhat larger and more significant effect of the dependency ratio, as well as a higher coefficient on YD and a lower one on RLR (in absolute terms). Adding the inflation rate (as in Bovenberg and Evans (1989)) in place of the post-1980 dummy variable however decreased the value of the coefficient on the remaining dependency ratio. It was also the case that differences in sample periods or countries included could make a non-negligible difference to the results. Nevertheless, we conclude that there is some evidence from our results that increases in the dependency ratio may have been associated historically with increases in consumption relative to income and wealth, a conclusion that emerges more strongly from the quarterly estimation using U.S. data of a similar specification by Bovenberg and Evans (1989). 10/

From our equation, a one percentage point increase in the dependency ratio is estimated to cause an increase in consumption in the post-1980 period of 0.16 percent in the short run and 1.4 percent in the long run (equal to .124 plus .032, divided by .113). It is of interest to compare these results to those found in other studies. Heller (1989) surveys saving equations that include estimated effects of dependency ratios. Though the definitions of variables differ, as do sample periods, a rough comparison can be made with the equation estimated for MULTIMOD, after converting it to a saving equation. The private saving rate (s) can be defined as C above, divided by private national income (Y), and subtracted from unity: s = 1 - C/Y. Therefore, MULTIMOD’s equation implies that the saving rate responds to the dependency ratio in the short run (for a given real interest rate and wealth/income ratio) as follows:


Table 3 gives estimates for MULTIMOD as well as four other models. 11/ It can be seen that MULTIMOD is near the center of the range of available estimates. Each estimate gives a powerful effect on saving of an increase in the elderly as a proportion of the working age population. 12/ It would seem therefore that there is considerable additional support for the hypothesis that the aging of the population projected for the next century is likely to increase consumption relative to income. However, it must be stressed that other studies (Aaron and others (1989), for instance, examining U.S. evidence), have failed to find a significant effect. The next section uses simulations of MULTIMOD to capture the implications of our estimated consumption equation for the effects of aging on macroeconomic variables, as well as effects through the other two channels mentioned above.

Table 3.

Long-Run Effects of an Increase in the Elderly Dependency Ratio on the Private Saving Rate in Various Models

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Source: Heller (1989) and Masson and others (1989).

IV. Simulation of the Effects of Population Aging

In order to study the macroeconomic effects of the demographic shifts discussed above we use simulations of MULTIMOD, which is a macro econometric model of the G-7 countries. 13/ The simulations take place over a horizon from the end of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections in 1995 to the year 2025. The baseline simulation of the model is an extension of the WEO baseline scenario, and is constructed by constraining growth rates of real variables to converge to potential output growth, while private and government saving rates remain constant at their 1995 levels. With respect to the demographic variables, the dependency ratio and the labor force participation rate are assumed to remain constant in each country throughout the baseline. It should be emphasized that we are not attempting to construct an ex ante forecast for the G-7 countries through 2025—we are only attempting to quantify the macroeconomic effects of aging over that horizon.

Demographic effects are captured in MULTIMOD using the dependency ratio defined above. This variable appears in the model in two equations for each industrial country: in the consumption function, as described above, and in the production function, in which the total labor force is set equal to the working age population times an exogenous participation rate. The working age population is determined by the total population, which is exogenous, and the dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is also exogenous, but we simulate the model with alternative paths for this variable to quantify the effects of the projected aging of the population. Finally, we include in the simulations the projected changes in government expenditure on goods and services and pensions, discussed above.

The basic alternative scenario we simulate with MULTIMOD allows the dependency ratio in each country to evolve along its projected path through 2025, rather than remaining constant as in the baseline scenario. The labor force participation rate is, however, assumed to remain on its baseline path. The shifts in the dependency ratios for each country are shown in Table 4. The table shows the deviation in the dependency ratio for each country from the baseline value, which is the 1995 ratio in each case. As described more fully in Section II above, two different periods can be identified: in the first, through 2010, there is differential aging in the industrial countries, while the average dependency ratio remains roughly constant. In the second period, the populations in all industrial countries except Japan age steadily, and dependency ratios rise substantially. In Japan the dependency ratio remains approximately at the same level above baseline.

Table 4.

Major Industrial Countries: Predicted Changes in Dependency Ratios, 2000-2025

(Deviations from baseline value, in percent)

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Source: See Table 1. The baseline assumes that dependency ratios stay constant from 1995 on. The G-7 average was used to project the “other industrial” dependency ratio. This gives projections similar to those in Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989).

1. Effects of aging on consumption expenditure

As discussed in the appendix, a shift in the dependency ratio affects the economy through several channels. The first channel we consider is through the effect on consumption expenditure: as the ratio of dependents to the working age population increases, consumption increases (for given income and wealth).

Table 5 presents the results of a simulation of the effects of a shift in dependency ratios over the period 1996-2025, 14/ operating only through the change in consumption behavior. In this simulation the labor force is held exogenous in each country, and no change is made to government expenditure. As shown in the table, the private saving rate in the United States is above its baseline level (which was assumed to be constant) throughout the simulation; it rises through 2015 (relative to baseline, it is 3 percentage points higher then), and then drops back somewhat, as the dependency ratio first falls, and then rises. The rise in the saving rate is mirrored in the movement of domestic demand, which is below baseline throughout the simulation, reaching its lowest level in 2010 before beginning to recover. The reduction in domestic demand is offset by an increase in demand for U.S. exports from abroad due both to lower saving rates abroad and to a real depreciation of the dollar. As a result real GNP in the United States is above baseline after 2005.

Table 5.

Demographic Shift: Consumption Effects

(Deviations from baseline)

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The increase in the saving rate initially leads to a modest increase in investment, but this effect is offset later on by an increase in the real interest rate resulting from higher aggregate demand. The government balance is largely unchanged, as a share of GNP, so the increase in private saving is manifested primarily in the current account, which improves by up to 3 percent of GNP over the simulation range. As a result, the net foreign asset position of the United States improves steadily, and is higher by more than 30 percent of GNP at the end of the simulation. 15/

In Japan, the private saving rate falls steadily through 2015 as a result of the aging of the population, leading to substantial increases in domestic demand. Real output is initially higher than in the baseline as a result of the increase in demand, but crowding out is virtually complete by 2010, when the real interest rate begins to rise above baseline. The real exchange rate appreciates by about 30 percent at its peak, and the current account is substantially lower, as a share of GNP, throughout the simulation. As a result, Japan’s net foreign asset position deteriorates substantially, by almost 60 percent of GNP by 2025.

In Germany, also, saving is lower and domestic demand is higher as a result of the demographic shift. The results for the external sector are, however, quite different: the real exchange rate appreciates very little, though the current account ratio falls substantially, by about 20 percent of GNP. The extent of the demographic shift is smaller in Germany than in Japan, which accounts for some of the difference. Also, imports of manufactures are a much larger share of GNP in Germany, so that a given change in the real exchange rate can crowd out a larger demand shift in Germany than in Japan. 16/

The effects of the demographic shift on the other industrial countries taken as a group are smaller in comparison. These countries include Canada, with demographic projections that resemble those for the United States, and European countries, with projections for aging that are closer to Germany’s, but less severe. The saving rate, domestic demand, and real output for other industrial countries taken together are all roughly unchanged for most of the period, though by 2025 the real interest rate rises significantly and output declines.

In MULTIMOD, foreign and domestic assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes, so that real interest parity holds. Differences in real interest rates across countries therefore reflect expected future appreciation or depreciation of the real exchange rate, and the overall level of real interest rates reflects global saving and investment (or aggregate demand and supply). From 2015 onwards the demographic shift is toward more aging in all industrial countries, leading to global excess demand, and higher real interest rates in all countries. Before 2015, it is the composition of global demand which is shifting, leading to changes in real exchange rates, while the global real interest rate remains (approximately) unchanged.

2. Effects of aging on production

Demographic shifts also operate through a change in the labor force, which, assuming that the participation rate is constant, changes one-for-one with the decline in those aged 15-64. Aging of the population reduces the labor force and thereby reduces potential output, leading to excess demand for domestic output. As a result, real output would also be expected to fall, and the real exchange rate to appreciate. The effect on real interest rates is ambiguous since on the one hand a reduction in supply creates excess (global) demand for goods, which tends to raise the real interest rate, and on the other hand a fall in the labor force tends to lower the marginal product of capital and hence tends to lower the real interest rate. In the long run, however, for a given saving rate a smaller labor force should lead to a proportionate contraction of the capital stock and output, leaving real interest rates unaffected.

Table 6 shows the results of a simulation in which the demographic shift affects only the total labor force in each country. The results are consistent with the analysis given above—in both Germany and Japan real output falls steadily relative to the baseline, while the real exchange rate appreciates. In both countries the real interest rate is initially below baseline, and then rises above baseline at the end of the simulation. In both countries also, the capital stock per worker is higher throughout, though investment as a share of GNP is below baseline.

Table 6.

Demographic Shift: Production Effects

(Deviations from baseline)

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In the United States until 2010, the demographic shift leads to a larger labor force (and therefore to higher output), a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and a lower real interest rate. After 2010 the dependency ratio begins to rise, and these effects are in large part reversed.

In the other industrial countries, there is no substantial effect until 2020, when real output drops off significantly and real interest rates rise. There is only a negligible effect on the current account position of these countries. In sum, for all countries the net foreign asset implications of aging are simulated to be considerably less important through their effects on production, reported here, than those operating through consumption.

3. Effects of aping on government expenditures

An increase in the elderly dependency ratio would be expected to increase government expenditures on medical care while a decline in the youth dependency ratio would lead to lower education expenditures. Furthermore, an increase in the number of retirees would increase payment of government pension benefits. Heller and others (1986) report projections for these components of government spending in individual G-7 countries for the years 2000, 2010, and 2025 (see Table 2 above); we interpolated these estimates to obtain an annual series. 17/ Table 7 reports the results of a simulation of the effects of these changes in government expenditure. In the United States, government expenditure is reduced throughout the simulation, relative to baseline, leading to a reduction in domestic demand of only a quarter of one percent in 2025. This is enough to lead to a slight reduction in Japanese output, despite the increase in government expenditure resulting from an increased dependency ratio in that country. In Germany real output rises slightly as a result of higher government expenditure, while output is lower in other industrial countries. In sum, though government debt rises substantially in Germany and Japan, effects on output and net foreign assets are relatively modest.

Table 7.

Demographic Shift: Government Expenditure Effects

(Deviations from baseline)

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4. Combined effects

The combined effects of the demographic shifts are shown in Table 8. (Appendix Table A1 shows the results for the smaller G-7 countries as well). The interpretation of the results is straightforward, since they are essentially a simple sum of the results for the three partial simulations just discussed. What is of interest is the magnitudes—the simulation shows that demographic shifts can be expected to have very substantial effects both on the global pattern of external balances over the next 35 years. In the United States, the net foreign asset position improves by over 35 percent of GNP in 2025, as compared, for instance, with an estimated net debtor position in 1995 of about 23 percent of GNP. 18/ In Japan and Germany, in 2025 the net foreign asset positions are lower by about 60 and 25 percent, respectively, as compared with assumed net creditor positions in 1995 of 26 and 38 percent of GNP. It is clear that the aging of the population in the industrial countries has the potential to generate large swings in foreign indebtedness over time, and that a simple extrapolation of present current account positions is likely to be well off the mark.

Table 8.

Demographic Shift: Combined Effects

(Deviations from baseline)

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The projected aging of the population also has significant implications for real GNP. In the simulation, the contraction in the labor force in the industrial countries after 2015 reduces real GNP in 2025 by 13 percent in Japan, by 6 percent in Germany, and by a somewhat smaller amount in the other industrial countries outside the United States. However, it should be noted that output per worker is higher in several countries, as is the capital stock per worker. In the United States aggregate output is roughly unchanged in 2025, and it is in fact higher for most of the simulation, as a result of the increase in the working age population in the early part of the next century.

Fiscal deficits do not evolve as dramatically as external positions in these simulations. The real cost to the world economy shows up in the effect on production through a lower labor force. Government financial positions do nonetheless weaken toward the end of the simulation period, as tax revenues fall and pension expenditures increase substantially in all industrial countries. In particular, government debt rises significantly in Japan and Germany.

V. Concluding Remarks

The paper has isolated some of the implications of the aging of the population that is projected for the next four decades. Using MULTIMOD to simulate the net effect of aging through three channels—reduced saving rates, a lower labor force, and higher government expenditure—suggests that macroeconomic effects may be substantial by 2025. Moreover, though some of the effects are common to all countries—higher real interest rates and lower output in the later years of our simulation period—some of the effects differ substantially, because of differences in the extent and speed of aging across countries. As a result, there are substantial long-run changes in current account and net foreign asset positions, in a direction that reverses recent tendencies among the three largest industrial economies.

A number of policy issues arise in the context of population aging; they are not, however, the subject of this paper. Governments can influence the capital formation by their expenditure and tax policies; a key question is whether the capital stock will be adequate to support a higher consumption ratio and greater demands for government medical services in the future. Questions of inter-generational equity are at the heart of the debate as to whether anticipated increases in government expenditure should be financed through government saving today, or through taxes on the working population in the next century. 19/ Another important question relates to the prospects for capital accumulation and sustained growth in developing countries when industrial countries are saving less.

It is important to stress once again the limitations and uncertainties associated with our analysis. The prospect of substantial migration within Europe and to North America makes any demographic projections 50 years in the future extremely tentative. Moreover, our model of household behavior is rudimentary, and the effects on consumption estimated over a historical period with a much younger population may not provide a good guide to the future. Other effects, which we have not considered, include an endogenous response of participation rates—for instance because of a rise in two wage-earner households or an increase in the average retirement age—and effects of the age composition of the working population on productivity levels. We have also not analyzed the effects of a continued slowdown of population growth—which, in itself, might be expected to lower real interest rates and increase the capital stock per worker (see the Appendix). Clearly, more research into these various questions is in order.

Appendix: Steady-State Effects of Demographic Changes

Table A1.

Demographic Shift: Combined Effects—Other G-7 Countries

(Deviations from baseline)

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