Arab donor countries contributed slightly less than $100 billion8 to developing countries and multilateral aid agencies during the 1973–89 period (Table 1). Some Arab donors provided financial aid to developing countries before 1973, but the amounts were rather modest. Net disbursements have been closely correlated with economic developments in the Arab donor countries. In line with the major increase in oil prices in 1973–74, they increased from $2.6 billion in 1973 to $8 billion in 1975, paused at an average level of about $7.5 billion annually in 1976–77, then rose again to their highest level (about $11 billion) in 1980 and in 1981.

Arab donor countries contributed slightly less than $100 billion8 to developing countries and multilateral aid agencies during the 1973–89 period (Table 1). Some Arab donors provided financial aid to developing countries before 1973, but the amounts were rather modest. Net disbursements have been closely correlated with economic developments in the Arab donor countries. In line with the major increase in oil prices in 1973–74, they increased from $2.6 billion in 1973 to $8 billion in 1975, paused at an average level of about $7.5 billion annually in 1976–77, then rose again to their highest level (about $11 billion) in 1980 and in 1981.

In the wake of deteriorating conditions in the oil market and decreasing accumulated reserves over the years, levels of financial assistance began to decline in 1982, reached a low of $300 million in 1988, and were negative in 1989. The very low levels in 1988 and 1989 are a reflection of reflows of principal payments of aid extended in the previous years, of heavy military expenditures because of conflicts in the area, and essentially of the cessation of large amounts of general support assistance to Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic under the Baghdad pledge. At the Arab summit meeting in Baghdad in 1978, Arab donors had pledged an annual amount of $3.5 billion for Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Palestinians for a ten-year period. The number of contributing countries declined over the years, but Saudi Arabia, which had committed $1 billion annually, paid its share in full and Kuwait, which had committed $550 million, honored most of its commitment. New commitments in 1988 (and 1989) were relatively small and in no way compensated for the cessation of the large sums pledged in Baghdad.9

About 85 percent of those contributions were extended on concessional terms and qualified as official development assistance (ODA).10 The remaining 15 percent were extended on nonconcessional terms. These ratios are, however, approximative; little information is available on nonconcessional flows, because donor countries do not publish these data. In particular, no breakdown by donor country could be obtained from 1979 on. The aggregate numbers on nonconcessional flows presented in this paper are essentially based on secondary sources and thus highly incomplete. Estimates of bilateral nonconcessional development flows nonetheless display a somewhat similar pattern to bilateral concessional flows, growing strongly from 1973 to 1976, receding from 1977 through 1979, jumping again from 1980 to 1982, and then falling to much lower levels since 1983, including negative flows in 1985, 1987, and 1988.11 Multilateral nonconcessional flows consist essentially of contributions to the various IMF facilities and repayments thereof.

Between 1973 and 1984, Arab donors were the second largest concessional donor group in the world behind the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)12 countries and ahead of the CMEA13 donors (Table 2). The share of Arab donors in total disbursed ODA increased from 17 percent in 1973 to an average of about 23.5 percent between 1974 and 1981, and then started falling gradually to a low of 2.8 percent in 1989.

As a share of GNP, however, the Arab donors remain the most generous among all donors. Arab concessional aid accounted for an average of 4.72 percent of their combined GNPs between 1973 and 1978, and then started to decline slowly to a low of 0.84 percent of GNP in 1988, in view of both the reduced aid flows during the 1980s and the much larger nominal GNPs of the Arab donors (Table 3).14 In comparison, ODA of DAC countries fluctuated between 0.30 percent and 0.38 percent of their GNPs between 1973 and 1989.

The decision of Arab donors to use their enhanced financial resources very early on to help less fortunate developing countries was a distinctive phenomenon in the history of development aid. Despite heavy dependence on oil as a main source of income and the absence of a diversified industrial economy or an agricultural sector that would reduce their own reliance on food imports, Arab donor countries consistently achieved levels of aid far above the UN target for net disbursements of 0.7 percent of GNP.

The four oil producing Arab states—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—provided, on average, more than 90 percent of net Arab aid. Saudi Arabia’s share alone grew from an average of about 52 percent of total net disbursements during 1973–79 to an average of about 70 percent in 1980–89. Kuwait has been the second largest donor over this period, followed by the United Arab Emirates. Aid from the other Arab donors (Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and Iraq) fluctuated sharply from one year to another between 1973 and 1981 but generally fell to much lower levels after 1981. In particular, Iraq’s net aid disbursement was negative between 1983 and 1988 because of its war with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Concessional aid flows by Arab donors display three main characteristics. First, with the exception of Algeria, Arab donor countries from the very beginning have extended the major part of their concessional development assistance bilaterally. The share of bilateral aid remained above 90 percent during 1973–81, except for the years 1976–78, when important payments to the Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt (GODE) were categorized as multilateral contributions. With the decrease in absolute amounts of aid since 1982 and the desire of Arab donors to continue fulfilling their commitments to multilateral organizations, the share of bilateral concessional assistance fell to an average of about 84 percent for 1982–89.

Second, a major part of Arab assistance has been in the form of grants.15 This reflects the philosophy permeating a large part of the Arab aid, namely, of making both significant and unconditional contributions that allow developing countries to set up their own policies for economic and social development. The philosophy of assistance given by the Arab oil exporting countries to the Third World springs from the basic Islamic philosophy of giving help and assistance based on soft conditions and without looking into economic returns. The basic philosophy of giving assistance is to help development in the recipient countries and to bring them together for a better cooperation and understanding among themselves.16

Third, the majority of Arab aid was provided to Arab countries, and that aid was largely influenced by political developments in the Arab world. Between 1975 and 1979, about $2 billion was granted to Egypt through GODE, but aid was halted when most Arab donor countries severed political relations with Egypt. A large volume of grants has been extended as general support assistance for Arab countries under resolutions adopted at Arab summit meetings.17 At the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in 1974, oil exporting Arab countries agreed to extend support to Egypt, Jordan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. The largest amount of general support assistance, in principle $3.5 billion annually, was pledged at the Arab summit meeting in Baghdad in 1978 to enhance the steadfastness of the Confrontation States.18 Also, contributions to Iraq in the 1980s to help finance the conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran have adversely affected other development aid flows.19 The recent invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing conflict will undoubtedly have major repercussions on the volume and direction of Arab aid for the years to come.

National Aid Agencies

Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have established national aid agencies to administer their project assistance. Kuwait actually has two agencies: the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, set up in 1961, and the General Board for the Gulf and Southern Arabia, in 1966. Abu Dhabi established the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development in 1971. The Iraqi Fund for External Development and the Saudi Fund for Development were set up in 1974. Though the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not possess an aid agency, project loans are usually channeled through the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, which handles some of the functions of an aid agency.

Although their role and importance differ significantly from one country to another, the national aid agencies are primarily concerned with project assistance. One exception is the Iraqi Fund, which also administers nonproject aid. The Iraqi Fund, however, halted assistance after 1982 in line with a general decline in Iraqi aid after the start of the war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. All national aid agencies also administer project loans or project-related grants on behalf of their governments.

The Kuwait Fund extends all of Kuwait’s loans to developing countries. From a modest 2.6 percent of Kuwait’s total net disbursements of concessional assistance in 1973, it grew to an average of about 25 percent in the late 1970s and to a peak of about 44 percent in 1986, as the Kuwait Fund relied essentially on selffinancing from its own resources, whereas direct aid by the Government of Kuwait fell to much lower levels. The Kuwait Fund also extends a small amount of nonconcessional assistance. The Saudi Fund, which extends only concessional aid, has played a modest role in Saudi Arabia’s total concessional assistance, contributing only 2 to 7 percent of that total. The assistance provided by the Abu Dhabi Fund consists of about three quarters concessional aid and one quarter nonconcessional; its concessional aid accounted for less than one tenth of the United Arab Emirates’ net ODA, except for 1982–84, when it averaged about 15 percent of total.20 The main reasons for the less prominent role of the aid agencies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are (1) the high share of cash grants extended, which are disbursed by ministries of finance over which the aid agencies have no influence; and (2) project assistance extended through their ministries of finance as well as their aid agencies.21

Coordination and Cofinancing with Other Aid Agencies

The rapid rise in the volume of Arab aid and the growing number of Arab aid agencies with limited staff resources in the mid-1970s induced Arab aid officials to coordinate their activities.22 The Coordination Group of Arab Aid Agencies was established in 1975, with the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) assuming the functions of the Coordination Secretariat. It currently has ten members, six national agencies (the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Iraqi Fund, the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund, the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, and the Qatar Development Account) and four multinational institutions (AFESD, BADEA, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund). Meetings at the director of operations level are held twice a year, and meetings at the head of agency level are called when the need arises. Between 1975 and 1989, the directors of operations met 29 times. Since 1978, the Secretariat has also compiled and disseminated information on the commitments made by member institutions. Some coordination of Arab aid agencies with other donors also takes place, although to a lesser extent. There are occasional coordination meetings with DAC member countries, the Commission of the European Economic Communities, the UN agencies, and other multinational aid agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank.

Coordination has involved harmonizing operational procedures, exchanging information on new projects, cofinancing a large number of projects, and jointly appraising and supervising missions. Also loan agreements have been standardized for all Arab Funds. These procedures have enabled the Arab aid agencies to increase the volume of commitments, broaden the geographic coverage of their activities, and economize staff resources.23

The high and growing share of cofinanced projects is attributable to several factors. First, the rising cost of projects makes it imperative for the borrowers to explore the various sources of finance. This tendency also suits the donors for cost sharing and diffusing risk involved in financing infrastructure projects. Second, the sophisticated nature of modern projects also requires the active cooperation of financial and technical aid. Third, the introduction of a variety of instruments under the World Bank Pilot Scheme instituted in 1983 has enabled the large number of financial agencies to participate in project financing according to their suitability.24 Although the funds committed to such projects vary by agency and by year, on average more than 50 percent of the national agencies’ annual commitments have been cofinanced in recent years.25 Cofinancings occur not only among Arab agencies but also with traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, in particular with the World Bank.

Another area for coordination is the problem of repayment arrears that most national and multilateral Arab institutions have experienced over recent years. At the meeting of the Heads of Institutions of the Coordination Group of Arab Aid Agencies, held February 13, 1989, in Kuwait, the problem of overdues was discussed and a decision was taken to establish a regional office to follow up on arrears.

Multilateral Contributions

Contributions to regional and multilateral organizations by Arab donor countries constituted about 18 percent of total Arab contributions between 1973 and 1989, about two thirds of which was extended on concessional terms (Table 1). In volume terms, the major donor of concessional multilateral assistance was Saudi Arabia, contributing 57 percent of the total, followed by Kuwait (20 percent), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (7 percent), the United Arab Emirates (7 percent), Algeria (4 percent), Iraq (3 percent), and Qatar (2 percent). Among individual country programs, Algeria (54 percent) provided the highest share of multilateral contributions as a percentage of total concessional assistance, followed by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (36 percent), Kuwait (22 percent), Qatar (17 percent), Iraq (14 percent), United Arab Emirates (11 percent), and Saudi Arabia (10 percent).

The largest beneficiaries of concessional multilateral contributions by Arab donors have been the Arab regional aid institutions, which indeed depend solely on contributions from Arab states. They received 60 percent of total Arab concessional multilateral contributions between 1973 and 1989. The largest amounts have been paid to GODE (16 percent), because of the very large amounts disbursed between 1976 and 1978; AFESD (16 percent); the OPEC Fund (12 percent); and the Islamic Development Bank (8 percent). The remaining 40 percent of concessional multilateral assistance went to multilateral institutions with broad membership. The largest contributions, especially in the 1980s, went to the International Development Association (IDA), followed by the different UN agencies and fundsof which the contributions to the International Food and Agricultural Development (IFAD) were very importantthe World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the IMF Trust Fund and Subsidy Account. Among the regional development banks and funds, only the African Development Bank has received relatively substantial sums.

The bulk of the nonconcessional multilateral assistance by Arab donor countries consists of contributions to the IMF oil facility, supplementary financing facility, and enlarged access facility. In 1974 and 1975, the IMF arranged to borrow from the principal oil exporting countries and other countries with strong external positions to finance two special temporary lending facilities, the 1974 and 1975 oil facilities, which were completed in 1983. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates contributed 10.4 percent, 32.3 percent, and 1.6 percent, respectively, of the total of these facilities. In 1977, the IMF made bilateral borrowing arrangements with 14 countries or their institutions to finance commitments under the supplementary financing facility. This facility was established in 1979, and its funds were fully committed by March 1981. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates again contributed to this facility 5.3 percent, 28 percent, and 1.5 percent, respectively, of the total. In March 1981, the first borrowing agreement under the policy on enlarged access to the Fund’s resources was reached with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). SAMA provided all of the funds for this facility up to the end of 1987, for a total of SDR 6.7 billion; in 1987, additional agreements under this facility with central banks, official agencies of a number of countries, and international agencies, came into force.

Bilateral Aid Flows


Given its own development requirements, Algeria’s aid contribution has been modest among the seven Arab donor countries, totaling approximately $1.2 billion over the years 1973–89 (Table 4). Between 1973 and 1978, concessional aid averaged slightly more than $30 million per year, or 0.21 percent of GNP. In 1979, Algeria paid a large part of its $250 million pledge for the Arab Confrontation States, bringing its concessional assistance to 0.81 percent of GNP. Since 1980, concessional aid averaged approximately $68 million annually (but falling to $12 million in 1988), equivalent to an average of 0.15 percent of GNP. Only very partial information is available on nonconcessional assistance, but the amounts involved are believed to be small. Except for its commitment under the Baghdad Agreement, most of Algeria’s bilateral aid has benefited African countries.

Contributions to multilateral organizations have constituted the major part of Algeria’s concessional assistance in most of the years under review. About 40 percent of those contributions was extended to AFESD. The remainder is divided among the other Arab aid agencies (OPEC Fund, Islamic Development Bank and, to a lesser extent, BADEA), the UN agencies and funds (of which IFAD took the lion’s share), the World Bank/IFC, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). No contributions have been made to the IMF Trust Fund and Subsidy Account or to IDA. In 1974, Algeria also established the Algerian Trust Fund (Arab Oil Fund), administered by the AfDB to finance economic development in AfDB member states. It was initially endowed with $20 million, of which $14.4 million has been disbursed; the balance ($5.6 million) was refunded to Algeria in August 1975. By end-1989, $1.56 million of the disbursed money had been repaid.


Iraq contributed more than $3 billion in aid between 1973 and 1982; the war with the Islamic Republic of Iran and reduced oil revenues, however, have turned Iraq from a creditor to a net debtor country from 1983 through 1988; in 1989 Iraq extended a little more than $20 million in concessional assistance (Table 5). From a modest level in 1973 ($19 million), Iraqi aid leapt to $414 million in 1974 (3.90 percent of GNP) and averaged $215 million annually (1.30 percent of GNP) between 1975 and 1978. It rose significantly again to an annual average of $760 million (2.21 percent of GNP) in 1979 and 1980 for the following two reasons: (1) Iraq pledged $520 million for the Confrontation States at the Arab Summit Meeting in Baghdad in November 1978; and (2) wishing to compensate developing countries for the increase in oil prices, Iraq extended long-term, interest-free loans to 12 developing countries that had direct long-term contracts to purchase Iraqi oil. Ten such loan agreements were signed in 1980 for a total value of $210 million, with the remaining two loan agreements (for $8 million) being signed in 1981. Bilateral aid turned negative from 1983 through 1988, while contributions to multilateral organizations have fallen to very modest levels since then.

About 80 percent of Iraq’s assistance has been provided bilaterally, a high proportion of which have been loans to finance petroleum purchases or to compensate for rises in oil prices. Except for the beneficiaries of aid under the Baghdad Agreement (especially Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic), the geographic distribution of Iraqi aid remained diversified, with Asian and African countries receiving a comparatively large share. In particular, Iraq has been the largest Arab aid donor to India.

Oil compensation loans, as well as many concessional project loans, have been extended through the Iraqi Fund for External Development (Table 6). Officially established as an independent institution in June 1974, with a capital of Iraqi dinars (ID) 50 million ($169 million), by end-1989 it had grown to ID 350 million ($1.1 billion), of which ID 217 million ($0.7 billion) was paid in. Its goal is to promote the economic and social development of Arab and other developing countries through concessional loans for projects, investment in joint projects involving Arab economic integration, technical assistance, and cooperation with other Arab international funds. Because of the conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran, it virtually suspended its assistance program after 1982. By end-1989, cumulative loan commitments to about 30 developing countries totaled about $1.9 billion. Nearly half of the amounts committed were for infrastructural projects, with the remainder benefiting agricultural, industrial, and energy projects in addition to oil compensation loans. Net loan disbursements were much lower, totaling $252 million up to end-1989. Furthermore, the Iraqi Fund took equity participations in Arab joint projects and Arab international funds for approximately $200 million, of which $85 million were disbursed.

Contributions to multilateral organizations made up approximately 18 percent of Iraq’s total financial assistance. Most of the concessional multilateral contributions were extended to Arab institutions, particularly to AFESD and BADEA, and to a lesser extent to the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID), the OPEC Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank. Among the multilateral organizations with broad membership, UN agencies and funds (particularly IFAD) got the largest share, followed by the IMF Trust Fund and Subsidy Account and a small contribution to the World Bank and IFC. Iraq does not contribute to IDA or to the African Development Bank or any regional development bank.


Kuwait was the second largest Arab aid donor (after Saudi Arabia) in the period under review, having contributed a total of more than $16 billion between 1973 and 1989 (Table 7). It is also the pioneer of the Arab aid effort, with an assistance program dating back to the beginning of the 1960s and one of the most generous donors in the world in terms of GNP. With a large part of Kuwait’s concessional aid extended to Arab countries, the volume of its aid has fluctuated according to decisions taken at Arab summit meetings and other developments in the Arab world. A major part of its disbursements between 1975 and 1977 benefited Egypt, Jordan, and the Syrian Arab Republic, following the decision taken at the Rabat Summit Meeting in October 1974, and in the years 1979–81 it provided $487 million per annum to the Confrontation States under the Baghdad Agreement.

Only in 1985–89, in the wake of a softer oil market, has Kuwait’s aid fallen below the $1 billion per annum mark. Notably in 1988, concessional net disbursements fell to $108 million (0.4 percent of GNP), the lowest aid volume since Kuwait’s aid statistics have been collected. This is primarily attributable to grants by the Ministry of Finance falling to very low levels. A small recovery was attained in 1989, with concessional aid disbursements rising to $169 million (0.54 percent of GNP). Though the information is incomplete, nonconcessional assistance seems to have accounted for about 17 percent of Kuwait’s total financial contributions between 1973 and 1989, and notably in 1976 stood above the level of concessional aid.

Kuwait contributes aid through various channels. The three main ones are its Ministry of Finance, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, and the General Board for the Gulf and Southern Arabia. Smaller amounts are extended by various ministries, including Education, Religious Affairs, and Commerce, but the data are not available.26 Most of the latter aid is believed to be scholarships and training grants.

The principal aid contributor is the Ministry of Finance, which extends both grants and nonconcessional loans. Most grants provide general support assistance, essentially for Arab countries. Smaller amounts are devoted for educational, health, and other projects as well as for relief assistance after natural calamities or civil wars. Most nonconcessional loans are in bilateral form, benefiting primarily Arab countries. Nonconcessional multilateral contributions are believed to have totaled $419 million net of repayments between 1973 and 1989, the bulk of which was extended to the IMF oil and supplementary financing facilities.

The main organ for the provision of Kuwait’s project assistance to Arab and other developing countries is the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Set up in 1961 as an autonomous public agency endowed with an initial authorized capital of Kuwaiti dinar (KD) 50 million ($140 million), it progressively increased to KD 2 billion ($7.2 billion) in February 1981. Its paid-up capital at end-June 1989 was KD 1,472 million ($5 billion), and it had an accumulated general reserve amounting to KD 532.4 million ($1.8 billion).27 Its main purpose is to assist Arab and other developing countries by providing loans on concessional terms for specific projects that are likely to have a favorable impact on the borrower’s economic development, while yielding a satisfactory rate of economic return. Until 1981, the Kuwait Fund’s activities were limited to loans and relatively small technical assistance grants. New statutes adopted in 1981 now also enable the Kuwait Fund to participate in the capital stock of development-oriented corporations controlled by developing countries and of international and foreign development institutions assisting developing countries.

Total loan commitments between 1973 and 1989 amounted to $5.7 billion for a total of 376 loans, most of which were on concessional terms (Table 8). Lending activities accelerated after 1975, following a fivefold increase in the Kuwait Fund’s capital and a broadening of its geographic coverage to include non-Arab developing countries. The peak level of commitments occurred in 1981–82 after a further doubling of its capital and the adoption of the new statutes. In line with the general decrease in Kuwait’s assistance in the wake of the softer oil market, the Kuwait Fund’s level of commitments fell to slightly more than $300 million per annum since 1984.

The Kuwait Fund disburses loans relatively quickly. Its loan utilization ratio (percentage of gross disbursements to total committed loans) stood at 74.5 percent at end-June 1989, higher than for most other Arab development agencies. Cumulative gross disbursements amounted to KD 1,180 million ($4.1 billion) as of June 30, 1989, and cumulative loan repayments were about KD 370 million ($1,277 million). Net loan disbursements have displayed a relatively regular trend, growing from a small amount in 1973 to a little more than $200 million annually in 1976–79, and further to an average of $325 million per annum between 1980 and 1986. In 1987, concessional disbursements fell to $88 million; in 1988, for the first time, repayments exceeded disbursements, totaling a minus $6.5 million. This worsened in 1989, with net disbursement being a negative $12.5 million. The increase in the level of new commitments in 1989 for the first time in seven years augured well for larger disbursements in the years ahead, but the activities of the Kuwait Fund were severely disrupted by the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

In addition to loan disbursements and small technical assistance grants, the Kuwait Fund contributes part of its capital for participations in multilateral development institutions in the name of the State of Kuwait; a total of KD 212 million ($733 million) was disbursed by end-1989 for this purpose to AFESD, ADB, the African Development Fund, BADEA, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation, and IDA.

Although the Kuwait Fund has been allowed to lend to non-Arab developing countries since July 1974, and 65 countries have benefited from its aid, the geographic distribution of its aid flows has remained heavily tilted toward Arab countries, representing on average 50.9 percent of the total between 1973 and 1989. The second largest beneficiary has been Asia (28.7 percent), followed by Africa (18.7 percent), and other countries (1.7 percent). The sectoral distribution of loans indicates a marked preference for infrastructural projects, which accounted for more than 60 percent of commitments between 1973 and 1989. Agricultural and industrial projects, and energy and other projects, made up about 20 percent each of the total. In particular, since the inception of the Kuwait Fund, the transport and communications sector ranked first with a share of 30.5 percent, followed by electricity (23.3 percent), agriculture (21.2 percent), industry (17.7 percent), water and sewerage (6.6 percent), and other sectors (0.7 percent).28

A small number of grants are also provided for feasibility studies, project preparation, and technical assistance, which would become part of the loan if a project materializes and the Kuwait Fund participates in its finance. It extended 92 different grants up to end-June 1989 for a cumulative value of KD 21 million ($72.5 million), with KD 19.4 million remaining in grant form and KD 1.5 million transferred from technical assistance to loans in line with its policy.

The Kuwait Fund favors harmonizing aid policies, playing an active role in coordinating Arab aid activities, and maintaining contacts with international, regional, and national aid agencies. As of June 30, 1989, 195 projects had been cofinanced with one or more development institutions and joint financing was an element in an estimated 55.3 percent of the total value of the loans extended by the Kuwait Fund. Furthermore, it represents Kuwait in a number of Arab and international multilateral development organizations as well as in the World Bank consultative groups for several countries and in the Development Committee. Finally, it supervised 13 grants extended by the State of Kuwait to a number of Arab and sub-Saharan African developing countries, with a total value of KD 27 million ($93 million), of which KD 17.7 million had been disbursed at end-June 1989.

The third channel for Kuwait’s aid contribution is the General Board for the Gulf and Southern Arabia. Though its operations date back to 1953, several years before Kuwait obtained independence, the present General Board, which has its own budget, was established as the aid agency of the Foreign Ministry in 1966. It extends grants for teachers and medical personnel and the construction of schools and medical facilities. Its activities are limited to five Arab countries: Bahrain, Oman, Yemen Arab Republic, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and, in the early years, the Emirates for the Gulf.29 Its annual budget, which was relatively small up to 1973, grew markedly since 1974 and remained around $40 million between 1977 and 1988. In 1989 disbursements fell to $28 million. The General Board’s aid is given directly to projects, many of which are in remote, poorer regions, and not to governments, though only projects requested by recipient governments are financed.

Kuwait was also the second largest Arab donor to multilateral organizations, contributing about $3.5 billion between 1973 and 1989 (21 percent of its total aid flows), 88 percent of which was on concessional terms. About two thirds of its concessional multilateral contributions was extended to Arab institutions and the OPEC Fund. Within that group, the largest contributions were made to GODE, resulting from very large disbursements between 1976 and 1978; AFESD; the OPEC Fund; and the Islamic Development Bank. The remaining third on concessional terms went to multilateral organizations with broad membership, of which IDA took the lion’s share: with a total of $632 million, contributions to IDA are the second in importance among Kuwait’s concessional multilateral contributions. The remaining contributions have been extended to UN agencies and funds, the several window facilities of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and $10 million to the IMF Trust Fund. The major part of Kuwait’s nonconcessional multilateral assistance was extended to the IMF: it contributed $820 million to the oil facilities between 1974 and 1976 and a total of $420 million to the supplementary financing facility between 1979 and 1983.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Because of incomplete information, the evaluation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’s official aid flows is approximative. Its aid program dates back from 1967, when it extended general support assistance grants to Egypt, Jordan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. In 1970–71, the Central Bank of Egypt also obtained interest-free deposits totaling $106 million that have not yet been repaid. Between 1973 and 1989, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’s total assistance is estimated to have been at $3.6 billion. It is characterized by a much larger share of nonconcessional assistance (estimated at about one third of total) than most other Arab donors, with nonconcessional flows surpassing concessional assistance in certain years. About two thirds of the aid flows were bilateral and the remaining third went to multilateral institutions. Although fluctuating from year to year, aid flows were generally much higher during the period 1973 to 1981 (average of $330 million a year) than in the succeeding eight years (annual average of about $77 million) (Table 9). It is noteworthy that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was the only Arab donor to have increased its aid in 1988, with net disbursements nearly doubling from $67 million in 1987 to $130 million in 1988.

Contributions to Arab countries have been heavily influenced by political developments in the region. Aid to Jordan was discontinued in 1970. After a grant of $168 million to Egypt in 1973, aid to that country was also stopped in 1974. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’s pledges at the Arab summit meetings in Baghdad in November 1978 ($550 million) and in Tunis in November 1979 ($314 million for Lebanon over a five-year period) were not disbursed. On the other hand, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya committed $600 million to the Syrian Arab Republic in 1980, some of which is believed to have been disbursed. The shortfall in payments to Arab countries has been partially compensated by the provision of aid to other recipients, resulting in a broader geographical distribution than most other Arab donors. A large number of African countries as well as some Asian, Latin American, and Mediterranean countries have benefited from this.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not have a national aid agency, but the administration of project loans has been entrusted to the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO), which was established as a government-owned entity in 1981 and which is a member of the Coordination Group of Arab Aid Agencies.30 It was set up to invest funds overseas in all sectors on a profit-making basis. It initiated or contributed to development projects, mostly on nonconcessional terms, has established joint ventures, and has provided program-type loans to certain recipient countries. At end-1988, LAFICO had invested the equivalent of $3.9 billion in over 90 companies located in more than 60 countries, covering a very broad spectrum of activities: 35 percent of these companies were in Arab countries, 48 percent in non-Arab African countries, and about 6 percent each in Asia, the Americas, and Europe.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’s multilateral contributions amounted to $1.15 billion between 1973 and 1989, 74 percent of which was on concessional terms. Although contributions fell to somewhat lower levels in the latter part of the period, the decrease after 1981 was less pronounced than was the case for bilateral concessional assistance. The bulk of the concessional multilateral assistance benefited Arab institutions, in particular AFESD, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund, and BADEA. The largest contribution to non-Arab institutions went to the African Development Bank.


Qatar contributed about $2.2 billion in aid flows between 1973 and 1989, 90 percent of which was on concessional terms (Table 10). The vast majority was extended between 1973 and 1982, with contributions abruptly falling to very low levels since 1983. Furthermore, most contributions since 1983 have been directed to multilateral organizations.

Contributions by Qatar have three main characteristics: (1) most bilateral disbursements favored Arab countries and were influenced by decisions taken at Arab summit meetings or other developments in the Arab world; (2) reflecting the absence of a national aid agency to evaluate and administer projects, a significant part of Qatar’s aid was extended in the form of grants (thus Qatar has had the softest terms among Arab donors); and (3) Qatar used to be one of the world’s most generous donors in terms of GNP. Between 1973 and 1982, contributions averaged 7.2 percent of GNP, and were close to 15 percent of GNP in both 1973 and 1975. Between 1983 and 1988, however, contributions fell to an average of 0.22 percent of GNP.

Little information is available on nonconcessional flows, which form an estimated 10 percent of total aid flows. Although the bulk of Qatar’s aid was directed to Arab countries, smaller amounts were also provided to several African and Asian countries.

Multilateral contributions amounted to $444 million, or about 20 percent of total contributions, three quarters extended on concessional terms. The vast majority of concessional multilateral contributions were for Arab OPEC institutions. Qatar directed the greatest share of its contributions to multilateral organizations with broad membership to the UN agencies and funds, but small amounts were also disbursed to the World Bank facilities and the IMF Trust Fund.

Saudi Arabia

According to available data, Saudi Arabia has been one of the world’s largest aid donors since 1974 (and probably the most generous donor in terms of GNP) (Table 11). By far the most important donor among Arab countries, its share rose steadily from an average of 51 percent of total Arab aid between 1973 and 1979 to nearly 60 percent between 1980 and 1982, and further to an average of 78 percent between 1983 and 1989.

According to available estimates, Saudi Arabia contributed more than $60 billion from 1973 to 1989, essentially through its Ministry of Finance. About 83 percent of these net flows were extended bilaterally, and 17 percent to multilateral institutions. More than 90 percent of the total was extended on concessional terms. Concessional disbursements were $1.1 billion in 1973, averaged about $2.6 billion annually between 1974 and 1977, peaked at a yearly average of $5.1 billion between 1978 and 1981, and then decreased to an annual average of about $3.1 billion between 1982 and 1988. Net disbursements declined further to $1.2 billion in 1989, affecting both bilateral aid and multilateral contributions. Nonconcessional net disbursements were essentially affected by the financing of various IMF facilities, and have been negative since 1985.

For the period 1973–85, 47 percent of the Saudi concessional assistance was given as outright grants and the remaining 53 percent as highly concessional untied loans for development projects and programs in developing countries.31 A large part of Saudi Arabia’s nonproject aid was for general support assistance following decisions taken at Arab summit meetings or other developments in the Arab world and for balance of payments support. In providing the latter kind of soft loans, Saudi Arabia has increasingly tended to link its contributions to economic adjustment programs supported by the IMF32 in order to bring about the necessary structural changes that are prerequisite to a solution of the interrelated problems of international payments imbalances and external debt.33

Other forms of nonproject assistance have been debt relief; aid in kind, notably petroleum; and disaster relief.34 In particular, because of the Government of Saudi Arabia’s concern with the long-standing problems of Africa and the horror of famine, a special allocation of funds has been made to the sub-Saharan region in recent years.35 The Ministry of Finance also provided substantial grants and loans for development projects that, since 1976, have been administered by the Saudi Fund for Development on behalf of the Government. A detailed breakdown of the geographic distribution of Saudi aid is unavailable. Although Arab countries were undeniably the largest recipients, the economies of 70 developing countries—38 in Africa, 25 in Asia, and 7 in other parts of the world—have benefited from Saudi aid.36

In order to promote and administer its project-related aid, the Saudi Fund for Development was established in 1974 as a public entity with an autonomous financial status. It operates from capital provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia. The initial authorized capital was Saudi rials (SR) 10 billion ($2.8 billion), which was raised to SR 15 billion ($4.5 billion) in 1980 and again to SR 25 billion ($6.7 billion) in 1981, which had been fully paid in by end-1989. Furthermore, the Saudi Fund had accumulated reserves amounting to SR 21 billion ($5.6 billion) as of end-1986.

The basic objective of the Saudi Fund is to finance projects in developing countries through highly concessionary loans, with a special emphasis on development projects that promote social and economic well-being in low-income countries. It does not provide grants or equity investments. Its activities have no geographical or sectoral limitations, but financing facilities are concentrated on the least developed countries and other adversely affected low-income countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Saudi Fund started operations in March 1975. Commitments rose rapidly to a peak of $707 million in 1977, decreased gradually to about $300 million in 1981, rose again to $600 million in 1982, then started falling to $64 million in 1988, the lowest annual level since the Saudi Fund was established. However, commitments rebounded in 1989 to $182 million (Table 12). The Saudi Fund attributes the slowdown in recent years to the fact that most low-income developing countries, burdened with the problems of economic adjustment and mobilization of domestic resources, had to temporarily set aside projects previously contemplated.37

As of end-1989, the Saudi Fund’s cumulative commitments amounted to about $5.4 billion for 279 projects in 59 developing countries, and net disbursements were about $2.4 billion. At end-1986,38 gross disbursements totaled $2.7 billion or 48 percent of cumulative commitments, indicating a fairly large pipeline of undisbursed funds. The geographic distribution indicates that 61 countries benefited from its aid: Arab countries received 34.9 percent of cumulative commitments (82 projects), sub-Saharan Africa 34.5 percent (134 projects), South and Southeast Asian countries 28.1 percent (52 projects), and four other developing countries 2.5 percent (8 projects). Though the number of beneficiary countries in Southeast Asia is less than one third that of sub-Saharan Africa, the average size of project loans in Asian countries is more than twice that in African countries. This reflects the fact that Asian countries have, in general, larger populations and better absorptive capacity than African countries. Nevertheless, in pursuit of its primary objective of assisting low-income countries and reflecting the international community’s concern with the problems of Africa, a substantial proportion of the Saudi Fund’s aid in recent years was channeled to that region. During its fiscal year 1406–07 A H (1986), for instance, 79 percent of the total approved aid was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and 21 percent to four other countries (Yemen Arab Republic, India, Pakistan, and Turkey). Also, all but one of the new commitments during 1988 were made to African countries.

The sectoral distribution of commitments reveals a marked preference for physical infrastructure, in particular transport development. Aid to physical infrastructure is given with a view to sustaining agricultural and industrial production. At end-1986, physical infrastructure made up 50.7 percent of cumulative commitments, of which transportation accounted for 33.5 percent; energy, 15.8 percent; and communications, 1.3 percent. The second most important sector is agriculture, accounting for 20.4 percent of total and dominated by capital-intensive irrigation projects, followed by social infrastructure (14.6 percent of total, of which water supply and sewerage is 6.8 percent, education 4.2 percent, housing 1.8 percent, and health 1.8 percent); industry and mines (8.5 percent of total, mainly capital-intensive basic industries); and other sectors (5.8 percent of total).

Between its inception and end-1989 about 70 percent of the Saudi Fund’s assistance was cofinanced. Its most important cofinancing partner was the World Bank, followed by governments of other bilateral donor countries and other specialized bilateral and multilateral institutions. It also administers a number of loans and project-related grants on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government for a relatively small amount of about $15 million.

Saudi Arabia was also the largest contributor to multilateral organizations among Arab donors, providing a little less than half of total concessional multilateral aid and three quarters of nonconcessional multilateral contributions. Its concessional assistance to multilateral organizations between 1973 and 1989 totaled $5.6 billion (9 percent of its total assistance), a little more than half of which was directed to Arab institutions, which is a much lower percentage than most other Arab donors. Among those, the largest contributions went to GODE, the OPEC Fund, AFESD, and the Islamic Development Bank. Saudi Arabia’s largest concessional multilateral contribution went to IDA, followed by the UN agencies and funds, of which IFAD was the main beneficiary.

Saudi Arabia also contributed to various facilities of the World Bank, to the IMF Trust Fund and Subsidy Account, and to the African Development Bank. In 1985, Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi Fund, pledged $97 million to the World Bank’s Joint Program of Action for Sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of the facility is to finance structural adjustment, sectoral policy reforms, and rehabilitation projects in low-income African countries committed to undertake monitorable adjustment programs.

The bulk of Saudi Arabia’s nonconcessional multilateral contributions supported the activities of the World Bank and the IMF. It purchased $2 billion in World Bank bonds between 1974 and 1981, and in 1982 agreed to lend the World Bank $800 million. It provided SDR 2.15 billion ($2.6 billion) and SDR 1.9 billion ($2.2 billion), respectively, to the IMF oil and supplementary financing facilities. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia provided all the funds under the policy on enlarged access to the IMF’s resources between 1982 and 1987, for a total of SDR 6.7 billion ($7.3 billion).

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates was the third largest Arab donor between 1973 and 1989, having contributed a total of about $9.6 billion (Table 13). Growing rapidly from approximately $300 million in 1973, its assistance averaged slightly more than $1 billion annually between 1975 and 1980. In line with the softer oil market, the United Arab Emirates’ net disbursements, however, started to fall steeply from 1981 on, and were slightly negative in 1987–89. In the early years, the United Arab Emirates was one of the leading donors in terms of GNP, with its assistance exceeding 10 percent of GNP in each of the years 1973–75.

The United Arab Emirates extended more than 90 percent of its aid on concessional terms. Most of it took the form of bilateral aid, primarily consisting of cash grants provided in the wake of resolutions taken at Arab summits on other developments in the Arab world. Grants were also provided for some large infrastructure projects, and for housing development, relief assistance, health, and other projects. The Government extended loans for balance of payments support and for various infrastructure and industrial projects; the latter types of grants and loans are essentially administered by the Abu Dhabi Fund on behalf of the Government. Although assistance has been extended to a broad spectrum of recipients, most government aid was directed toward Arab countries.

A large part of United Arab Emirates project assistance is provided by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADF). Established in 1971 as a public autonomous institution possessing an independent budget, the ADF started operations in March 1973 and signed its first loan agreements in 1974. In that year, authorized capital increased from its original Bahraini dinars 50 million ($105 million) to U.A.E. dirhams (Dh) 2 billion ($500 million), and the ADF was authorized to extend the geographic coverage of its activities to non-Arab countries in Africa and Asia. In September 1979, its Board of Directors agreed to double the capital to Dh 4 billion ($1 billion), but the law officially authorizing the increase has not yet been ratified. However, by the end of 1989 the paid-up capital exceeded Dh 2 billion ($580 million) and general reserves amounted to Dh 1.1 billion ($304 million).

The main objective of the ADF is to offer economic aid to Arab, African, Asian, and other countries in support of their economic development through loans or equity participations in projects. The ADF also provides grants for technical assistance or feasibility studies. Other objectives of the ADF are to establish, or participate in the establishment of, financial institutions that help create and foster a financial market in the Emirates, and to issue guarantees to complement its purposes.

The ADF’s cumulative commitments during 1973–89 totaled $1.3 billion (Table 14). Its annual level of commitments roughly displayed the same pattern as the United Arab Emirates’ aid, growing from $55 million in 1974 to a peak of about $220 million in 1978, then gradually declining to nearly zero in 1987. However, total commitments rebounded to $30 million in 1988 and $100 million in 1989; concessional commitments, which were zero in 1987, rose sharply from $10 million in 1988 to $86 million in 1989, of which $75 million was for land reclamation in Egypt. In contrast to the other national Arab agencies, 34 percent of total commitments involved nonconcessional loans and equity investments. Annual disbursements have followed the pattern of commitments with a lag, culminating in the late 1970s and 1980, then starting to decrease perceptibly. The ratio of gross disbursements to total signed loans has, however, shown a constant ameliorating trend, starting from 1 percent in 1974 to 86 percent in 1986. Net disbursements, which totaled $438 million over the period, have been negative since 1984. The reason for the Fund’s negative net disbursements are on the one hand resource constraints and on the other hand a shift in recent years toward domestic activities. Out of five new loan commitments in 1988, four concerned projects in Abu Dhabi.39

By the end of 1989 the ADF had extended 92 loans to 42 developing countries, of which 12 were Arab countries (75.5 percent of cumulative commitments), 20 African countries (13.5 percent), 8 Asian countries (8.4 percent), and 2 European countries (Malta and Turkey—2.7 percent). The sectoral distribution of the ADF loans reveals a marked preference for loans to manufacturing and extractive industries (45.4 percent of cumulative commitments), followed by water and electricity (22.4 percent); transport, communications, and storage (16.3 percent); agriculture, fisheries, and rural development (14.0 percent); housing (1.0 percent); and tourism (0.9 percent). The concentration on infrastructure and agriculture projects has been motivated by the fact that these areas generally are unable to attract financing from commercial sources. In addition, the ADF extended five small grants for technical assistance programs and feasibility studies.

A marked feature in recent years has been the growth in equity participations. From five investments representing a participation of Dh 45.3 million ($12 million) in its first seven years of operations (1974–80), the equity portfolio grew to 15 investments totaling Dh 283 million ($77 million) at end-1987. The equity investments have essentially been concentrated in Tunisia, Morocco, and Oman, plus one recent investment in Turkey.

A large proportion of ADF projects has been coordinated and cofinanced with other aid agencies. One ADF condition is that relatively large projects in particular be cofinanced with other national, regional, and international development institutions to facilitate and ensure their implementation. At end-1984, 54 percent of loans granted by the ADF had been cofinanced by at least one agency.

The ADF also administers 9 grants and 11 loans made by the Government of Abu Dhabi, which at the end of 1989 amounted to Dh 3.6 billion ($1 billion)—Dh 2.8 billion ($0.8 billion) in soft loans and Dh 785 million ($214 million) in grants. These loans have been extended for balance of payments support and infrastructure and industrial projects. The grants concern a large irrigation project in the Yemen Arab Republic and several road, housing, and social services projects. Most of these government loans and grants have been extended to Arab countries and a smaller portion to African and Asian countries. The ADF also administers, for the Government of Abu Dhabi, a small portfolio of investment participation in joint companies and a number of projects inside the United Arab Emirates, including a loan to Gulf Air, the national airline of the United Arab Emirates.

The United Arab Emirates’ multilateral contributions were comparatively small, representing about 10 percent of total flows. Like the United Arab Emirates’ bilateral aid, the highest level of contributions occurred in the late 1970s (including close to $300 million paid to GODE between 1976 and 1978), with very low levels appearing from 1984 on. Concessional assistance (79 percent of total multilateral contributions) was essentially directed to Arab institutions. The main beneficiaries were GODE, AFESD, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund. The UN agencies and funds took the largest share of contributions to multilateral organizations with broad membership, followed by the financing facilities of the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and small contributions to IDA and the IMF Trust Fund. Nonconcessional multilateral assistance consists essentially of contributions to the IMF oil and supplementary financing facilities.


A large part of the factual information used in this part of the paper has been drawn from Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 19–78.


Development and balance of payments financing only, excluding military assistance and certain other transactions.


Development Co-operation in the 1990s, Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Comittee, 1989 Report, p. 178.


According to the official definition of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, aid flows qualifying as ODA comprise grants and loans (1) undertaken by the official sector, (2) with the promotion of economic development and welfare as main objectives, and (3) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 25 percent grant element).


No information is available on net nonconcessional bilateral disbursements for 1989.


Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.


Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R.


The OECD estimates that concessional Arab aid fell to 0.54 percent of GNP in 1989, the lowest level ever recorded. See Development Co-operation, 1990 Report, p. 160.


A precise breakdown is not available, in part because Saudi Arabia does not publish the split between grants and loans.


Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, Annual Report, 1982, p. 12.


Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 24.


The “Confrontation States” were Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.


The total amount of aid provided to Iraq during those years is unknown. A letter from King Fahd ibn Adb al-’Aziz of Saudi Arabia to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, published by the Saudi Press Agency, put the Saudi aid to Iraq in recent years at a total of $25,734 million. The letter does not specify the time frame over which the money had been extended, but it seemed to refer to the years since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. The figures quoted in the letter are as follows (in millions of dollars):

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Reported in the Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 16, 21 January, 1991, pp. B2 and B3. Kuwait is also believed to have extended important sums to help Iraq during its conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran.


For more details, see individual country programs (below).


Aid from OPEC Countries, pp. 25–27.


Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 36.


Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 37; see also: The coordination process of the Arab/OPEC/Islamic Development Institutions, in the OPEC Fund for International Development, Annual Report, 1985, p. 32.


The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report XII, 1405–06, A.H. (1985–86), p. 14.


The ratio of cofinanced projects as a share of total accumulated committed aid was 54 percent at end-1984 for the Abu Dhabi Fund, 55.3 percent at end-June 1989 for the Kuwait Fund, and 69 percent at end-December 1986 for the Saudi Fund (sources: annual reports of the various national agencies).


Aid from OPEC Countries (Paris: OECD, 1983), p. 44.


The Kuwait Fund’s fiscal year runs from July to June.


Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Twenty-Seventh Annual Report, 1988/89, p. 9.


The General Board’s activities in the poorer Emirates of the Gulf ceased in 1971–72, when the United Arab Emirates were formed. However, since 1973 the General Board had administered a small program in southern Sudan on behalf of the Kuwait Government.


LAFICO’s predecessor was the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, which had been established in 1972.


H.E. Mohammed Abalkhail, Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy, in “The Saudi Fund for Development,” Annual Report XII, 1405–06 A H (1985–86), p. 3.


Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 57.


Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report XIII, 1406–07 A H (1986), p. 3.


Aid from OPEC Countries, p. 57.


The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report XI, 1404–05 A.H. (1984–85), p. 3., and Annual Report XII, 1405–06 A.H. (1985–86), p. 3.


The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report XII, 1405–06 A.H. (1985–86), p. 3.


The Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report. Vol. XI, (1984/85), Part III, and Vol. XII (1985–86), p. 11.


Most of the figures in this and the next two paragraphs were drawn from the Saudi Fund for Development, Annual Report XIII, 1406–07 A.H. (1986).


Development Co-operation in the 1990s, 1989 Report, p. 180.

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