Abstract

This chapter reviews the current public debt and debt management characteristics of Caribbean economies. In particular, it reviews the debt profile in the region and assesses whether the structure of public debt offsets the risks emanating from the high public debt ratios. It also briefly discusses estimates of selected contingent fiscal liabilities and reviews the institutional framework for debt management.

This chapter reviews the current public debt and debt management characteristics of Caribbean economies. In particular, it reviews the debt profile in the region and assesses whether the structure of public debt offsets the risks emanating from the high public debt ratios. It also briefly discusses estimates of selected contingent fiscal liabilities and reviews the institutional framework for debt management.

Caribbean economies face high and rising debt-to-GDP ratios, which put at risk their prospects for medium-term sustainability and growth. In 2011, overall public sector debt was estimated at about 84 percent of regional GDP (see Table 3.1 and Appendix Table 3.1), and it has increased further since then. Interest payments on the existing debt stock in the most highly indebted countries with rising debt ratios are already in the range of 16 percent to 42 percent of total revenues. In addition, high amortization exposes some countries to considerable roll-over risk, which could help instigate a financial crisis.

Table 3.1

Selected Debt Indicators, 2001–11

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Source: Debt sustainability analysis for countries from IMF staff reports.

Meanwhile, the institutional framework for debt management is not fully developed. Some countries have a full set of debt management functions, while for others the functions are accorded low priority. The ensuing weak debt management framework and practices constitute a major hidden risk and in some countries have been a key contributor to the rapid accumulation of public debt. Moreover, only in some countries is the public debt market viewed as a tool that creates the infrastructure for the future development of vibrant private capital markets.

A Mixed Profile of Rising Public Debt

The public debt characteristics are heterogeneous among these countries, and in some cases have contributed to macroeconomic vulnerabilities. While in general there has been a shift to domestic debt, there are important holdings of foreign currency debt that leave some countries exposed to risks from exchange rate adjustments. In addition, some countries have increased their reliance on the local financial system and with this the link between fiscal sustainability and financial stability. Additional concerns arise from the exposure of some countries to floating rate debt, lower concessional borrowing terms, and shorter maturity profiles. These vulnerabilities increase the risk of a major fiscal crisis given the high and increasingly unsustainable debt ratios.

Rising Public Debt and Its Originators

Public debt is trending higher, and the proportion held by domestic agents has risen for some countries. High debt burdens and fiscal deficits, in most Caribbean economies, were worsened by the onset of the global financial and economic crisis. Prior to the crisis, moderate growth rates helped some countries to broadly stabilize their debt ratios, albeit at high levels (Table 3.1 and Appendix Table 3.1).

The major portion of the public debt has been accumulated by the central government. This pattern remains whether the debt is broken down into domestic or external debt. Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas, and St. Kitts and Nevis stand out as countries where public enterprises contribute more than 20 percent to the total public debt (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2

Government and Government-Guaranteed Debt by Country, 2011

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Sources: Country authorities; and author’s calculations.

For Suriname, breakdown into central government and public sector enterprises is not available.

This includes government-guaranteed debt.

The largest component of Caribbean public debt is domestic, representing about 60 percent of the total, an increase from 39 percent in 2001 (see Figure 3.1). It is held mainly by commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions, in the form of medium- to long-term instruments. Social security schemes in some countries are also important holders of government debt. However, there are important differences among countries. In some—Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname—the public debt portfolio comprises mainly external debt averaging about 69 percent of total debt. In the remaining five countries, domestic debt averages about 70 percent of total public debt. Foreign debt is held mainly by commercial and private lenders, representing about 52 percent of the external debt (21 percent of total), while multilateral holders represent about 34 percent (14 percent of total). Of the multilaterals, the Caribbean Development Bank holds over 10 percent of the external debt.

Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1

Public Debt Composition, Regional Totals, 2011

Sources: National authorities; and author’s calculations.Note: ATG=Antigua and Barbuda; BHS=The Bahamas; BRB=Barbados; BLZ=Belize; DMA=Dominica; GRD=Grenada; GUY=Guyana; JAM=Jamaica; KNA=St. Kitts and Nevis; LCA=St. Lucia; VCT=St. Vincent and the Grenadines; SUR=Suriname; TTO=Trinidad and Tobago.

Bonds remain the instrument of choice for most countries, but there are important differences.

Debt by Instruments

Domestic bonds represent about 52 percent of total public debt in the Caribbean. Other instruments represent the following proportions: Foreign loans 20 percent, foreign bonds 14.5 percent, treasury bills 3.6 percent, domestic overdrafts 5 percent, and others, including suppliers’ credit, over 4 percent of total debt. However, the holdings of different instruments differ by country (see Figure 3.2). Domestic bonds are more prevalent in The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, where they represent over 50 percent of total debt.

Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2

Public Debt by Instruments and Country, 2011

(share of individual country debt)

Sources: National authorities; and author’s calculations.

On the other hand, foreign bonds represent the most important instrument in Belize at about 48 percent of total debt. They also represent a significant portion of total debt in Grenada and Jamaica. Treasury bills are important in Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Suriname at over 10 percent of total public debt. Foreign loans represent over 40 percent of total public debt in Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.

Have these different debt structures helped to mitigate or offset the risks associated with higher debt levels? No, to the contrary, several factors suggest that the elevated debt levels are accompanied by increased risks emanating from the existing debt structures and, through this, in some countries overall vulnerability is increased.

Risks from Domestic Debt

Although large holdings of domestic debt may help shield the economy from external debt market impulses and provide some degrees of policy freedom, the experience of some countries in the Caribbean is that it has increased their long-term macroeconomic vulnerability and reduced policy space when it has not been effectively managed. There are several channels through which this works. First, with narrow domestic debt markets, government debt holdings are concentrated in the domestic banking system. This has made the banking system’s stability dependent on the fiscal solvency of the sovereign. Second, in countries where the monetary authorities are concerned with defending the exchange rate, they would have to adjust interest rates more aggressively in periods of stress. However, such interest rate adjustments are likely to impact the value of government debt and through this the capital positions of the banks, at times adversely.1

Third, where the return on domestic public debt is higher than the return on funding productive private sector projects, the banking system is likely to become a mere funnel for resources to meet public sector borrowing requirement at the expense of funding private investment. Over time, this directly lowers private investment, GDP growth and employment, and exacerbates the country’s debt overhang. And fourth, with a concentration of public debt in the banking system, the scope for debt relief is considerably reduced should the sovereign need to restructure its debts. Ordinary domestic debt restructuring operations would have a direct impact on the capital and income position of the financial sector, which may call into question the financial probity of these institutions and may cause the public to lose confidence in the system’s capacity to keep its promises.

Debt by Currency

While domestic currency debt represents about 51 percent of total public debt for the region as a whole, foreign currency debt remains substantial for some countries, making them still vulnerable to exchange rate movements.2 The Bahamas, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago have over 50 percent of their public debt in domestic currency. For foreign currency debt, on average over 70 percent is held in U.S. dollars. For some countries, such as Belize and Grenada, the proportion of foreign currency debt is over 90 percent. In general, since 2003 the share of U.S. dollar debt has increased. This general trend for external debt helps to contain risks from intra-currency movements.

Roll-Over Risk

Roll-over risk is an emerging potential problem for some countries. Roll-over risks are clearly evident in respect of external debt.3 Some countries are borrowing increasing amounts of short-term external debt, aggravating a potential roll-over problem (see Appendix Table 3.2). Available data suggests that roll-over risks have risen in both Guyana and St. Lucia, as both have an increasing share of short-term external debt in total external debt. On the other hand, the share of short-term external debt in total external debt has declined in Dominica, suggesting that roll-over risks may have somewhat declined, other things equal. Regarding domestic debt, St. Kitts and Nevis, with treasury bills representing about 20 percent of total domestic debt, is clearly exposed to roll-over risks.

Gross Financing Needs

Gross financing needs, another indicator of potential roll-over risks, are relatively high for some countries (see Appendix Table 3.3 and Appendix Table 3.4).4 In 2011, gross financing needs averaged about 20 percent of GDP for those countries with a debt ratio over 90 percent of GDP. St. Kitts and Nevis and Barbados were highest within this group, with gross financing needs of about 25 percent and 48 percent of GDP, respectively. Countries with debt ratios between 60 and 90 percent of GDP (including Guyana and St. Lucia) on average had gross financing needs of about 11 percent of GDP. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, both of which have debt ratios below 60 percent of GDP, had gross financing needs below 5 percent of GDP.

Over the medium term—2013 to 2016—gross financing needs on average for all Caribbean countries are projected to decline while still remaining at a relatively high level (about 10 percent of GDP). A number of countries, including Barbados, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, are projected to maintain high gross financing needs of between 10 and 26 percent of GDP. These high annual gross financing needs increase the macroeconomic vulnerability of Caribbean economies to shocks.

Floating Interest Rate Risks

Some countries are highly exposed to floating interest rate debt. The public sector’s exposure to floating interest rates is mainly on external debt, which has been increasing as a share of total external debt (see Figure 3.3 and Appendix Table 3.5). In this context, three country groups can be identified. The first group includes countries (Belize, Grenada, and Jamaica) that have over 30 percent of their external debt exposed to floating interest rates. In the case of Belize and Jamaica, this exposure has been increasing over time, but it has been decreasing for Grenada (since 2006). The second group includes those countries (St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname) where between 10 and 20 percent of external debt is exposed to a floating interest rate. The final group includes countries (The Bahamas, Dominica, and Guyana) where the exposure to floating interest rates is less than 10 percent.

Figure 3.3
Figure 3.3

Interest Rate Structure of Public Debt by Country, 2011

(percent of total public debt)

Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance; and author’s calculations.

On the domestic front, except for Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, and Jamaica, all countries have only fixed-rate debt. For The Bahamas, interest rates on government domestic securities are tied to the Bahamian prime rate, which exposes over 90 percent of domestic debt to floating interest rates.5

Interest Rate Resetting Risks

Interest rate resetting risks are concentrated mainly on domestic debt—for treasury bills—and other instruments that mature within one year. In the Caribbean as a whole, about 8 percent of total debt is exposed to interest rate resetting risks. There are, however, important differences across the region, as some countries had an exposure of up to 20 percent of total debt in 2011 (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4
Figure 3.4

Public Debt Exposed to Interest Rate Resetting Risks by Country, 2011a

(percent of total public debt)

Source: Author’s calculations.a Public debt exposed to interest rate resetting is measured for most countries as the share of treasury bills in total debt.

The total debt service burden has risen for most countries, partly reflecting the higher cost of domestic debt.

Debt Service Burdens

Debt service (interest and amortization) averaged 24 percent of central government revenues and grants at end-2011, down from 37 percent in 2004 (see Table 3.1). The average ratio for the high-debt countries was 38 percent of revenues, led by Jamaica (77 percent). The average for the medium-debt countries was 19 percent, led by The Bahamas (27 percent). In the low-debt countries, debt service averaged 6 percent, led by Trinidad and Tobago (6.6 percent). The vulnerability of a number of countries is also revealed by the external debt service ratios shown in Appendix Table 3.6. This ratio averaged about 21 percent of exports of goods and services for high-debt countries, 10 percent for medium-debt countries, and less than 2 percent for low-debt countries (Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). Over the medium term, external debt service ratios are projected to rise to about 14 percent for the medium-debt countries, but fall to about 13 percent of exports of goods and services for the high-debt countries (as some benefit from debt restructuring operations). In this mix a number of countries, including Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, are projected to have high external debt service ratios over 20 percent of exports of goods and services.

Interest Costs

The average nominal interest cost fell marginally since the onset of the global financial crisis to about 6.5 percent, down from 6.7 percent in the period prior to the crisis, while the real cost rose in all countries, except for Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada, and Jamaica. On average, domestic debt was more expensive than external debt during the 2001–11 period. In the case of new external debt commitments, interest rates have risen in 2011 for four countries: Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis. On the other hand, average interest rates have fallen for four other countries: Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Debt by Concessionality

The story on concessionality of external debt is mixed. Since 2003, except for Guyana and Jamaica, the proportion of concessional debt to total external debt has almost steadily risen (see Table 3.3 and Appendix Table 3.7).6 In the case of Jamaica, concessional debt in 2011 was about 7 percent of total public and publicly guaranteed external debt, down from 17 percent in 2003. In Guyana, while the proportion of concessional external debt has fallen, the country still maintains over 50 percent of external debt as concessional.

Table 3.3

Concessionality of External Debt by Country, 2003–11a

(In percent of total public and publicly guaranteed external debt)

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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.

Concessional debt to total external debt stocks. Concessional debt is defined as loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more.

Average Grant Element

Based on available data, the average grant element of recent new external commitments remains generally favorable.7 Most countries maintained a grant element in the range of 40 to 60 percent on new external debt commitments. In fact, in 2011 only Jamaica experienced a sharp fall in its grant element to about 24 percent from 58 percent in 2010 (see Appendix Table 3.7).

Average Grace Period

Since 2007 the average grace period on new external commitments has declined for most countries. The sharpest fall was for St. Lucia, which declined to less than one year in 2011 from 10 years in 2007. For St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the average grace period for new external commitments is just under two years. This means that the governments in St. Vincent and St. Lucia are borrowing on terms that require them to start repaying almost immediately (see Appendix Table 3.7).

Average Interest Rates on New Debt

The average interest rate on new external commitments generally fell for most countries during the period under consideration. Two broad patterns can be identified. First, there are those countries (Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada) for which average interest rates first rose, relative to 2007, but then started to decline from 2010 onwards. The second pattern can be observed in those countries (Belize and St. Kitts and Nevis) where the average interest rate first declined up until 2009 and then started rising in 2010. In 2011, except for Belize and Dominica, the average interest rates on new external debt declined relative to those obtained in 2010 (see Appendix Table 3.7).

Debt Payment Arrears

Repayment arrears on public debt, both on principal and on interest payments, remain a key challenge for many countries. Concerning principal repayments, Grenada and Guyana stand out with the highest proportion of arrears to total external debt since 2003 (see Appendix Table 3.8).8 For Antigua and Barbuda (not shown in the table), it is estimated that arrears on external debt in 2011 were about 20 percent of total external debt. For St. Kitts & Nevis external arrears were estimated at about 10.7 percent of total external debt.9 Concerning official interest payments, Grenada, Guyana, and Jamaica had the highest arrears among countries reporting interest payment arrears. For Guyana and Jamaica (due to the debt exchange in 2010 in the case of Jamaica) the share of interest payment arrears to GDP has declined since 2010 (see Appendix Table 3.8).

Estimates of Contingent Fiscal Liabilities

A key factor in the rising public sector debt levels for Caribbean economies has been the realization of contingent liabilities. In this section, we provide a general estimate of contingent liabilities for all countries. Contingent liabilities consist of both explicit liabilities, which the government is obligated to satisfy once an event occur, and implicit liabilities, which the government may satisfy once an event takes place. Total explicit contingent liabilities in the Caribbean are conservatively estimated to average 19 percent of GDP. This estimate is derived from published IMF staff reports and other publicly available information (see Appendix Table 3.9).

However, the estimate of explicit fiscal contingent liabilities varies among countries. It consists primarily of the Petro-Caribe debt, pending payments for nationalized companies, government debt guarantees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and estimated annual spending related to hurricane damage mitigation. Meanwhile, implicit contingent liabilities have been estimated to average 9 percent of GDP, which reflects exposure to the failure of the CLICO/BAICO insurance conglomerate.10

It must be noted that not all countries fully record contingent liabilities in their public debt statistics. As the case of Belize has shown, realization of contingent fiscal liabilities can precipitate a fiscal crisis. In 2007, the obligations of the state-owned Development Finance Corporation had to be assumed by the central government as part of an overall restructuring of government’s external debt obligations. The government also had to pay debt obligations of domestic private enterprises when guarantees were called. In 2013, the government negotiated a second debt restructuring on the obligations originating from the 2007 debt exchange operations. At the same time, new contingent fiscal liabilities, arising mainly from the combination of adverse court rulings against the state and pending compensation payments for nationalized assets, amounted to about 17 percent of GDP. These were not addressed by the 2013 debt exchange operation.

A Fragmented Institutional Framework for Public Debt Management11

Debt management in Caribbean economies is currently weak, and most countries do not have an explicit debt management strategy. Using the World Bank’s Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) framework, the region does not rank very well on average (see Table 3.4 and Appendix Table 3.10).12 The institutional framework is fragmented, facilitating only limited coordination with macroeconomic policies. Borrowing plans are not fully articulated, and there is only limited practice of comprehensive debt recording and reporting to parliament. The following debt management features are generally observed in the Caribbean.

Table 3.4

Debt Management Practices in the Caribbean

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Sources: Robinson (2010); Government of Antigua and Barbuda (2011); and www.eccb-centralbank.org.Note: CIDA = the Canadian International Development Agency; ECCB = the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank; ECCU = the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union; RGSM = Regional Government Securities Market.

Fragmented Legal Framework

Apart from Jamaica and Suriname, which have a single debt management law, the legal framework for issuing and managing debt is very fragmented (see Appendix Table 3.10). Debt is issued using several pieces of legislation, often targeted at a specific purpose, and while these laws generally provide the minister of finance with the sole authority to borrow, they may or may not prescribe specific borrowing limits.

Weak Coordination between Debt Management and Fiscal and Monetary Policy

In many countries, the coordination mechanism between debt management and the requirements for sustainability of fiscal and monetary policies is either limited or very weak. Even though some countries, including Barbados and Jamaica, have recently created debt management committees to address issues in this area, there is still some way to go to improve coordination. At the ECCU level, there is an explicit limit on direct access to central bank credit, and there is a regional debt coordinating committee for the Regional Government Securities Market (RGSM—See Box 3.1). At the domestic level, however, the mechanism remains underdeveloped.

Weak Debt Management Frameworks

Debt management frameworks are weak, as only a few countries have explicit debt management strategies.13 Even where these strategies exist, they are generally not comprehensive and not focused on or informed by a cost/risk analysis. In addition, in some countries, while parliament provides the ultimate authority on borrowing, there are no explicit requirements for reporting to parliament or for the conduct of audits.

Fragmented and Inefficient Debt Markets

Government debt markets remain underdeveloped, particularly the secondary markets, which are limited and inefficient, preventing effective price discovery. Further, most borrowing activities are generally not supported by evaluation of their impact on the fiscal and debt sustainability of a government’s fiscal strategy. For example, debt sustainability analysis is infrequently done and therefore does not sufficiently influence policy.

Inadequate Risk Management and Debt Recording

Operational risk management procedures are not generally well documented, and even where they exist, they are often not observed. Concerning debt recording and reporting, most countries do not regularly disseminate comprehensive debt statistics, due in part to staffing constraints and the relatively low priority that has been given to debt management and, in particular, measuring accurately and comprehensively the total liabilities of the public sector in some countries. It must be noted that in the case of the ECCU, at one time the central bank facilitated the publication of external debt statistics for its membership. This publication has since been discontinued.

Current Efforts to Improve Debt Management

Against this background, however, deliberate efforts are being made to improve the framework for debt management in the Caribbean, including in the ECCU, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Recent Developments in Public Debt Management in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union

At the core of the ECCU’s debt management modernization plan is the Regional Government Securities Market (RGSM).a This market is modernizing the way governments issue and manage public debt. Supporting components of this initiative include, among others, technical support to the individual debt units in ECCU member countries. This component builds on a previous Commonwealth debt management debt recording and management system and is being supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).b According to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), during 2013 the focus under this initiative would be training and technical support in negotiation techniques for sources of finance; a review of the current debt legislation in the ECCU; and assistance utilizing policy tools, such as debt management strategies. Thus far, this project has facilitated the preparation of debt sustainability analyses to inform policy discussions; conducted training in the evaluation of sources of finance; increased usage of the RGSM; and enhanced debt data quality and security.c

a Not all governments in the ECCU have issued debt on the RGSM, or otherwise use it fully to meet their borrowing requirements.b The Canada Eastern Caribbean Debt Management Advisory Service (CANEC-DMAS) Project is a CIDA-funded debt management project, which commenced operations at the ECCB in 2009. The main objective of the project is to provide capacity building to the ECCU member countries to effectively manage their debt portfolios. This is being done in close collaboration with the ministries of finance in the ECCU member states. The Project Steering Committee, which comprises the governor of the ECCB as chairman, the financial secretaries in the ECCU, and a representative of CIDA, is responsible for providing oversight to the project.c See Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (2013).

A number of countries are making concerted efforts to strengthen their framework for public debt management with the help of technical assistance, in some cases from international agencies. In particular, the new CIDA-funded technical assistance project for Barbados, Belize, the ECCU, and Jamaica, which, along with efforts of other technical assistance providers, including the Commonwealth Secretariat, Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank, will support capacity building in the Caribbean over the coming years.

A key issue that all countries in the region, particularly ECCU countries, need to tackle is how to retain highly trained and skilled persons in the management of public debt portfolios. Part of the solution may rest with the authorities’ utilizing more fully the considerable potential of the existing debt systems and personnel. Further, an accompanying initiative would be the sharing of skills, know-how, technology, and perhaps eventually some back-office functions. Additionally, an appropriate salary structure could be used to retain skilled debt managers, as is done in other countries.

Conclusion

This chapter contains several insights about the key characteristics of public debt and debt management practices in the Caribbean. Of particular note is that, although in aggregate about 60 percent of total public debt is held domestically, for some countries a sizeable proportion remains as foreign debt, especially with multilateral institutions. For most countries, the current structure of their public debt is not mitigating but exacerbating the macroeconomic vulnerabilities attendant to their high debt-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, the high level of domestic debt held by the banking system in some countries has reduced the degrees of freedom for public policy. In addition, contingent fiscal liabilities appear to be a growing problem for most countries, and recent events such as the CLICO/BAICO debacle have increased the risk exposure for most countries. At the same time, the debt management framework and practices in the Caribbean have not kept in step with international best practices. That said, some countries have recognized this problem and are now actively working to close this gap in the midst of the public debt overhang.

A number of policy implications flow from these insights. First, while an increase in domestic debt holdings reduces exchange rate risks, care must be taken that an increase in domestic debt does not dominate the financial system and take resources away from private productive activity. Second, to protect the financial system from excessive exposure to public debt, regulators may consider imposing risk weights (or concentration limits) on the banking system’s holdings of government debt.14 This would help to appropriately budget the risk that banks face when investing in government securities. Third, specific measures must be taken to properly develop the domestic government bond market, which could be a benchmark for developing private capital markets. Fourth, governments should adopt appropriate guidelines for issuing government guarantees, including limiting the scope and duration of contingent liabilities through time and terminating clauses for contingent claims. Further, these should be recorded and reported regularly to parliament. Fifth, international best practices in debt management should be adopted in a systematic and sustainable program. This should involve legal reform to create a single debt law, adoption of explicit debt management strategies, and ongoing capacity building in management techniques and analysis.

Appendix Table 3.1

Selected Debt Indicators by Country, 2001–11

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Source: Countries’ debt sustainability analyses from IMF staff reports.
Appendix Table 3.2

Short-Term External Debt by Country, 2003–11a

(In percent of total external debt)

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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.

Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt.

Appendix Table 3.3

Gross Financing Needs by Country, 2002–16

(In percent of GDP)

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Source: Countries’ debt sustainability analyses from IMF staff reports.
Appendix Table 3.4

Gross External Financing Needs by Country, 2002–16

(In percent of GDP)

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Source: Countries’ debt sustainability analyses from IMF staff reports.
Appendix Table 3.5

Proportion of External Debt Stock with Variable Interest Rate by Country, 2003–11a

(In percent of total external debt)

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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.

Variable interest rate is long-term external debt with interest rates that float with movements in a key market rate; for example, the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) or the U.S. prime rate.

Appendix Table 3.6

External Debt Service by Country, 2002–16

(As a ratio of exports of goods and services)

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Source: Countries’ debt sustainability analyses from IMF staff reports.
Appendix Table 3.7

Selected Terms of New External Commitments by Country, 2003–11

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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.
Appendix Table 3.8

Public External Debt Arrears by Country, 2003–11

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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.
Appendix Table 3.9

Estimated Selected Contingent Fiscal Liabilities, 2012

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise stated)

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Sources: Bank of Guyana (2012); Central Bank of Belize, Information for Creditors (https://www.centralbank.org.bz/financial-system/Finformation-for-creditors); Government of Antigua and Barbuda (2014); Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (2012); Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2013); IMF Country Reports (see IMF, 2011a, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f, 2011g, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) and IMF (2013d); Parliament of Grenada (http://www.gov.gd/egov/pdf/Grenada_2012_public_sector_debt.pdf); and IMF staff estimates.

This includes letters of comfort in the case of Trinidad and Tobago.