Abstract

A quantitative assessment of the likely impact on trade of the recent rise in protectionism would undoubtedly aid in evaluating the significance of the rise in protectionism, but, as has been pointed out earlier in this study, such an assessment is difficult to make. This section, therefore, is limited to a brief, general description of some likely effects of increased protectionism, a summary of the information available on the impact of recent restrictions on a selected number of developing countries, an outline of some of the implications of the rise in protectionism for the international economy, and an assessment of the growing trend toward the organization and structuring of international trade.

A quantitative assessment of the likely impact on trade of the recent rise in protectionism would undoubtedly aid in evaluating the significance of the rise in protectionism, but, as has been pointed out earlier in this study, such an assessment is difficult to make. This section, therefore, is limited to a brief, general description of some likely effects of increased protectionism, a summary of the information available on the impact of recent restrictions on a selected number of developing countries, an outline of some of the implications of the rise in protectionism for the international economy, and an assessment of the growing trend toward the organization and structuring of international trade.

Some General Implications

The basic argument against a protectionist measure is that it provides no real solution to the underlying problems of the protected industry and often compounds the difficulty of finding long-lasting solutions. The immediate impact of a protective measure—whether it takes the form of increased customs tariffs or other import charges, import quotas, or tariff quotas—is an increase in the price of the imported goods in the market of the importing country. This gives the domestic producers of the import-competing product an advantage that may be sufficient to stimulate domestic sales or protect their share of the domestic market. In turn, this may benefit labor by preventing layoffs, and it may increase the return on shareholders’ equity in the protected firms. However, the increased cost of protection is ultimately borne by the economy as a whole through the higher prices paid by consumers and through the loss of income and employment opportunities in more efficient industries. Relatively inefficient industries are able to hold or attract resources, while the economy forgoes the higher level of income and employment that would have resulted in the absence of protection. Protectionist measures, once adopted, tend to become entrenched because the sectors that benefit have a vested interest in preventing their removal. In a major intermediate goods industry, such as steel, the higher costs are likely to be transmitted throughout the economy in the form of higher prices, e.g., for automobiles and construction materials. Furthermore, the inflationary impact of import restrictions on such products as steel is likely to have an immediate adverse effect on steel-using products, resulting in demands for additional protection against foreign competitors in the affected industries and/or adversely affecting exports.

Over the past three decades much of the increase in world trade has been among the industrial countries, and prima facie it appears that much of the trade takes place in broadly similar products or sectors. However, the aggregate statistics do not reveal clearly the increasing trade specialization and product differentiation among these countries. Trade actions even on a limited number of products within a given sector can disrupt this specialized pattern of trade, thus having a broader impact than would be apparent from an examination of the level of trade flows in the restricted categories.

As discussed earlier, an increase in import penetration or the market share of foreign suppliers is often presented by industry spokesmen as grounds for protective action by the government. However, not only do such justifications ignore the more fundamental reasons why the domestic industry may be losing ground to foreign suppliers, but often only a small portion of the domestic market in a particular product is supplied by imports, and under these circumstances any action to expand domestic activity significantly could require a drastic reduction or even a complete prohibition of imports. Unless pressures for even moderate protection are firmly countered from the outset, governments may face subsequent demands for more protection from the same industry.

The introduction of trade restrictions also has direct adverse effects on the exporting country, whose ability to exploit fully its competitive advantage becomes limited. Whether the exporting country is a developed or a developing country, its reduced access to foreign markets impinges on its ability to share fully in the benefits of increased international trade, and thus on its willingness to offer foreign suppliers assurance of access to its own market.

The effects of protectionist measures on developing countries are likely to be even more serious. Given the dependence of developing countries on trade in a still quite narrow range of products and the small size of their exports relative to the size of the markets in developed countries, measures with a seemingly minor impact from the developed countries’ point of view can have serious consequences for the developing countries’ exports. Furthermore, most developing countries faced with reduced access to certain foreign markets may encounter difficulties in finding substitute outlets for their exports, especially in the short run. Such substitution possibilities are often limited by the nature of the export product (which may be designed specifically for certain markets), and by the historical and cultural ties that often determine the direction of the country’s trade. Even if such substitution possibilities exist, the process is frequently slow and costly and exporters may fear that redirection of sales may itself provoke restrictions in the new markets.

Several developing countries currently facing renewed protectionist pressures in the industrial countries have incurred external indebtedness on the assumption that foreign markets will remain open. Unless this assumption is realized, debt servicing may become difficult, resulting in a vicious circle of balance of payments crises, debt renegotiations, and shrinking capital flows from abroad.

Effects on Some Developing Countries

The survey of recent trade actions taken by major industrial countries (see pages 8–34 above) indicated that a wide cross section of developing country exports have been affected. Quantification of the adverse impact on the developing countries could be made at two levels. A partial analysis would involve estimates of losses in export earnings and increases in unemployment on a sectoral basis. A fuller analysis would involve estimates of the damage to the economy as a whole, in terms of the retardation of growth and development, taking into account both the impact and the multiplier effects.

While an exercise along the lines of the second alternative clearly would have been preferable, information of the type and accuracy necessary to undertake it was not available. Consequently, the analysis that follows is based entirely on information that was made available by a selected group of developing countries.

During the period under review, a wide variety of exports from the Republic of China have been subject to an array of restrictions by developed countries, most of which continue in force (see Appendix X). Among the products involved have been textiles, clothing, footwear, television sets, radios, bicycles and parts, iron and steel pipes, umbrellas, handbags, ceramics, frozen and canned foods, doors, and nuts and bolts. The trade measures involved include tariff increases, quotas, orderly marketing agreements, total prohibitions, minimum import prices, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and import licensing. The Republic of China has relatively few resources (except in agriculture), and processing imported raw materials for export is the predominant economic activity. Under these circumstances, reduced access to markets has severe repercussions domestically. The textile and clothing sector is the largest in the economy, and there is grave concern that restrictions negotiated under the Multifiber Arrangement, as well as severe competition from other developing countries in markets still open, would not only prevent further growth but even result in contraction of production.

In Colombia (see Appendix XI), the main exports involved have been textiles and clothing, which accounted for 10 per cent of total exports in 1974. Under the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, three bilateral agreements were concluded with the United States (1965–75) and two with Canada (1971–74). Under the Multifiber Arrangement, voluntary export restraint agreements were concluded with the United States (1975–78) and with the eec (1976–77 and subsequently 1978–82). The agreement concluded with the United States did not seem unduly restrictive, as exports were expected to amount to only 60 per cent of quotas; and indeed, in 1975–76 shifts in consumer tastes enabled Colombia to fulfill its quotas for only some product lines. In contrast, under the 1976–77 agreement with the eec, most of the quotas for exports of cotton yarn and thread to the Benelux countries and finished cotton textiles to the United Kingdom were fully utilized; however, owing to severe competition from other developing country suppliers, quotas for some other textile products were not fully utilized. The 1978–82 agreement with the eec provides for broader product coverage and involves more eec countries than did the previous agreement, but it provides for an annual increase in quotas of only 0.5 per cent and sets strict limits on possible shifts between the categories concerned.

Colombian exports of flowers and of beef each accounted for about 1 to 2 per cent of exports in 1974. The 13 per cent countervailing duty imposed on Colombian flowers and buds by the United States in 1974–75 resulted in a shift in the destination of Colombia’s exports away from the United States and toward the eec. In respect of beef, eec measures dating from early in 1974 reduced Colombian exports to the eec from US$17 million in 1973 to zero in the first half of 1977. This was largely compensated for by larger sales to Venezuela.

While the agricultural and livestock sectors in Uruguay account for only about 15 per cent of the gross domestic product, they contribute 60 per cent of export earnings and provide employment for about 18 per cent of the labor force. Within these sectors, meat exports have been particularly important: until 1974, they accounted for at least a third of total exports. Owing to sanitary regulations, particularly those regarding hoof-and-mouth disease, the markets of Canada, Japan, and the United States have been closed for several years to Uruguayan exports of chilled and frozen beef, which constitute the greater part of meat exports. Until the end of 1973 the eec had been Uruguay’s most important single market for such products, taking around two fifths of the total (see Appendix XII). Thus the import restrictions on beef and veal adopted by the eec since early 1974 have had severe repercussions for Uruguay. As world prices declined owing to excess supplies, access to Uruguay’s largest market was also cut drastically. As a result, the value of exports of chilled and frozen beef fell from a peak of US$138 million in 1974 to US$68 million in 1975. In 1977, the volume of Uruguay’s exports to the eec amounted to only about one-fifth that in 1972–73.

During the period under review, a wide variety of exports from the Republic of Korea were made subject to import restrictions by the United States, Canada, the eec, individual eec members (Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom), Australia, Austria, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (see Appendix XIII). The most important of these exports were textiles, clothing, footwear, intermediate and consumer steel products, and electrical appliances. The number of products covered, as well as the number of countries imposing restrictions, increased significantly from 1974 onward. The restrictions applied include import quotas, voluntary export restraints, import licensing, tariff quotas, countervailing duties, antidumping duties, and actions taken under the trigger price system by the United States and under the minimum price system by the eec. It has been estimated that the loss of export earnings resulting from trade restrictions was US$600–700 million in 1976 and US$800–1,000 million in 1977. Where quantitative restrictions have been placed on low-priced textiles, clothing, and footwear, Korean producers have begun to export higher-quality products. Moreover, the structure of production is being shifted away from light industries to chemical and heavy industries, with a view to expanding markets in the Middle East and elsewhere.

A wide variety of exports from the Philippines currently face restrictions in that country’s major markets in developed countries (see Appendix XIV). These exports include tuna, alcoholic beverages, and textiles and clothing to the United States; pineapple preparations, plywood and laminated wood products, and textiles and clothing to the eec; textiles and clothing to Norway; tropical fish, crustaceans and mollusks, pineapple preparations, and footwear to Japan; tobacco and footwear to Canada; wood veneer objects and plywood to Australia; and coconut oil, pineapple preparations, plywood, and wooden utensils to New Zealand. Among the restrictions used are import quotas, tariff quotas, discretionary licensing, and bilateral restraint agreements.

The Philippine authorities have expressed grave concern about the impact of these restrictions on economic development. In particular, they have pointed to the severity of the quotas for textiles and clothing for the period 1978–82 that the Philippines negotiated with Norway and the eec under the Multifiber Arrangement in order to forestall the imposition of unilateral import restrictions. A bilateral agreement for these products has also been reached with the United States.

In Tunisia, exports most severely affected by trade restrictions are textiles, clothing, and olive oil. The production of textiles and clothing in Tunisia is geared essentially to the eec market. In June 1977, France imposed import quotas on Tunisian shirts, T-shirts, trousers, and cotton thread. In July 1977, the eec established import quotas on cotton yarn, T-shirts and vests, knitted shirts, and blouses and shirts, which incorporated the earlier French import restrictions. The loss of earnings to Tunisia as a result of these restrictions is estimated at some US$33 million, or about 4 per cent of export receipts in 1977. Tunisian exports of olive oil to the eec were adversely affected for the first time in 1975 as a result of the application of a variable levy aimed at equalizing the import price and the purchase price guaranteed by the eec to domestic producers. This levy is estimated to have reduced Tunisia’s export earnings in 1977 by US$28 million, or about 3 per cent of total export earnings.

Implications for International Economy

The survey undertaken for this study suggests that although the major trading nations have successfully resisted much of the general pressure for restrictions on trade, they have been less successful in resisting pressure from specific sectors to implement direct and indirect forms of protectionist action. An alarmist view of the global impact of the measures taken to date does not seem warranted, however, and the trade actions of major trading nations have not attained a degree of restrictiveness that would hamper the growth of world trade. Notwithstanding these conclusions, however, the survey also reveals that through a series of individual measures, international commercial policy has recently taken a markedly restrictive direction, which, if not resisted firmly, poses a threat to world trade, employment, and economic growth. In particular, the implications of the recent actions for a large number of developing countries are a cause for serious concern. The proliferation of restrictions has the potential for affecting the level and pattern of trade among developed countries and between developed and developing countries. Even if the direct impact of the recent actions is limited, the cumulative impact of the rise in protectionism is likely to affect commercial and investment policies and further jeopardize the efficient allocation of resources. As an illustration of the dangers of a generalized increase in protectionism may be cited a recent simulation exercise undertaken by the staff of Project LINK, according to which the imposition of a 5 per cent (alternatively, a 10 per cent) tariff or equivalent on all imports of manufactures by 13 of the largest oecd countries would engender a 3 per cent (alternatively, a 5 per cent) decline in the volume of world trade by 1979; and in money terms the decline would be US$37 billion (alternatively, US$66 billion).

There are three principal elements underlying the concern about the rise in protectionist tendencies in the major trading nations: (1) the nature of the domestic and international decision-making process, (2) the tendency for restrictive trade actions to spread across sectors and countries, and (3) the potentially significant effects on the international trading environment.

(1) The extent to which particular actions are examined or monitored from the point of view of their overall economic effects varies considerably from country to country. Moreover, the speed and frequency of reporting trade actions to international organizations are generally not satisfactory, so that it is feasible for countries to resort to protectionist actions without being subject to immediate international scrutiny. Individual domestic industries that are threatened by import competition can often bring considerable pressure to bear upon governments to restrict that competition. The subsequent internal decision-making processes (on antidumping, countervailing duty, “escape clause,” or safeguard actions) focus mostly or entirely on the problems and prospects of the particular industry seeking relief. Even when foreign suppliers are entitled to present a defense of their sales or pricing policies in the domestic market, greater consideration tends to be given to the proximate causes and effects of the alleged market disruption.

(2) A disquieting aspect of restrictive trade actions is their tendency to spread to other countries, resulting from the fact that once a major market limits access to foreign suppliers, other markets may feel obliged to erect import barriers to protect their own domestic producers. Thus, a measure conceived of initially as a limited short-term restriction may be built into the restrictive system and be adopted by other countries as a protective reaction. The evolution of the successive arrangements for textiles bears testimony to this tendency. The impetus for the first major set of postwar import restrictions in this sector came from the United States, which in 1957 concluded a bilateral export restraint agreement with Japan. These restrictions were progressively globalized, with 19 countries participating in the 1961/62 Short-Term Arrangement, 33 countries participating in the successor Long-Term Arrangement, and 50 countries participating in the 1973 negotiation of the Multifiber Arrangement. Furthermore, the traditional claim advanced in favor of restrictive arrangements of this type—that in the absence of internationally agreed market-sharing arrangements there would be chaotic unilateral import restrictions—may be questioned in the light of more recent experience.

The experiences with beef and, more recently, with steel also are illustrations of the fact that restrictive trade actions in respect of particular commodities may spread to other countries. The imposition of import restrictions by Canada and Japan was prompted by fears of diversion of beef exports from the eec market. The eec and the United States reinforced their antidumping controls on steel virtually simultaneously, and there are concerns about the impact on the U.S. market of the proposed bilateral agreements to be concluded by the eec with each of its suppliers. In the footwear sector, the conclusion of the orderly marketing agreements by the United States with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China in mid-1977 was followed by the imposition of global quotas by Canada at the end of that year. Export restraint agreements concluded with principal suppliers also tend to be expanded to include new suppliers.

(3) A third factor contributing to the concerns about recent trade actions is the unsettling effects of the threat of import restrictions on expectations. Even if certain governmental actions have little or no immediate impact on the volume of trade and cannot be considered restrictive, the timing of the action and the accompanying public explanation for it may be such as to give rise to fears of subsequent protectionist actions. The introduction of import surveillance, for example, can be considered as putting exporters on notice that at least some degree of “voluntary” restraint in shipments will be expected, failing which more overt restrictions may be introduced. Often the launching of antidumping or countervailing duty investigations, even if they do not result in trade restrictions, may create uncertainties about the prospects for foreign markets remaining open, and thus may retard exports. In this context, the recent U.S. and eec actions in the steel sector have elements of both direct and indirect restrictions, although only the eec scheme is intended to be replaced by bilateral restraint agreements. In these circumstances, the longer-term effect of the new measures on small or new steel producers, which may be able to produce steel even more efficiently, can only be to discourage the installation of capacity.

Growing Trend Toward Organization and Structuring of International Trade

In recent years a number of major trading nations have relied increasingly on various arrangements that are similar in some respects to quantitative limitations on trade but that do not involve formal resort to trade restrictions. These arrangements are usually termed orderly marketing agreements (OMAs), voluntary export restraints (VERs), or export restraint agreements or arrangements (ERAs), although other terms, such as “self-restraint arrangements” or “market penetration constraints,” have also been used.57 This subsection describes the features of such arrangements, and concludes with a commentary on recent public discussions of the concept of “organized free trade.”

Export Restraints

Voluntary export restraints have been defined as “limitations on export sales (a) administered by one or more exporting countries or industries (b) on the volume or value of their sales (c) to a single foreign market or several markets, or (rarely) the world as a whole, (d) triggered by pressure from the government or industry of the importing country or countries, (e) carried out either bilaterally or within a multilateral framework, (f) sometimes explicitly authorized or guided by domestic law, and sometimes not. There are thus numerous permutations among specific VER arrangements.” 58

It should be added that “voluntarism” on the part of the exporting country concluding a “voluntary” export restraint agreement is more than nominal only to the extent that the agreement may avoid the alternative of unilateral, and possibly more severe, import restrictions imposed by the importing country. From the point of view of the importing country, voluntary export restraints are often alternatives to outright import restrictions.59

A fundamental reason for the increasing recourse to export restraints is that, in the view of policymakers, they are more acceptable nationally and internationally than the unilateral imposition of import restrictions. They are unlikely to be subject to as much public scrutiny as other forms of restrictions; and from the point of view of commercial policy they may be more acceptable, since the limits on trade are theoretically determined by the exporting country. Moreover, they provide a degree of flexibility to policymakers that would not be available with tariffs and quantitative measures: because they are, at least nominally, “voluntary,” there may be no need for the importing country to resort to unilateral measures, which may be subject to lengthy multilateral consultations at the international level. Finally, export restraint agreements often bypass international or national rules requiring not only the demonstration of injury to domestic industry and of causality between imports and injury, but also the obligation that the restrictions be temporary and nondiscriminatory among suppliers.

Export restraint agreements also provide another type of flexibility in that they are generally concluded with specific countries to cope with the particular trade flows that are viewed as giving rise to problems. In principle, they can be adjusted to reflect changing market conditions and can be removed with greater ease. In the important textile sector, the Multifiber Arrangement provides a multilateral framework for the implementation of export restraint agreements on a bilateral basis.

For the importing country, export restraint agreements have two main purposes: the protection of domestic industry and the prevention or correction of market disruption.60 As an instrument of protection they are, in principle, similar to quantitative restrictions, in that they effectively limit the amount of foreign-produced goods that may be sold on the domestic market and they insulate domestic producers from world market conditions. Thus, the well-known disadvantages associated with quantitative import restrictions apply to export restraints. The most commonly adduced purpose is, however, the prevention of market disruption. Here the case for export restraints rests on the premise that they help to smooth economic adjustment to changing economic conditions. In assessing export restraints, therefore, the crucial question is whether they contribute to smoothing the transitions necessitated by changing economic conditions and provide for the orderly contraction of industries that have become noncompetitive, or whether they prolong the existence of inefficient industries.

A major conclusion based on a survey of export restraint agreements is that as an instrument of trade policy they are not always as flexible as has been asserted. Although such agreements undergo frequent revision, renewal, and amendment, these changes are more often attempts to restore a degree of protection that may have eroded with time than attempts to restore trade patterns consistent with comparative advantage. There is also ample evidence to suggest that, on the whole, export restraints do not tend to be temporary, but have increasingly come to be built into the trade regimes of many countries, even if the initial intention of policymakers was the temporary correction or prevention of market disruption. Historically, export restraints have undergone a gradual but steady expansion in geographic and product coverage, and over time have become more specific as to products and more complex administratively.

Organized Free Trade

The concept of “organized free trade” or “organized freedom of trade” was reportedly first enunciated by the President of France at the economic summit in London in May 1977. Although there has been considerable public discussion and speculation on the precise scope and content, the suggestions have not so far been spelled out as concrete proposals for international discussion. Some further explanations of this concept have been provided, however. 61 On the basis of these explanations, “organized free trade” appears to consist of several propositions, including the following: (1) respect for free trade calls for strict discipline and avoidance of chaotic trading conditions; (2) long-term structural adjustments should not be impeded, but inefficient industries should be phased out gradually rather than suddenly; (3) market shares must be allowed to adjust to market developments, but international agreements based on multilateral cooperation aimed at avoiding disruptive changes in market shares must be concluded; (4) the evolution of market shares should be subject to multilateral surveillance and used as an indicator of the need to effect necessary structural changes over a period of time; (5) internationally coordinated investment decisions are essential in sectors, such as steel and shipbuilding, that are faced with excess capacity; and (6) a principal instrument in ensuring a smooth evolution of market shares would be multilaterally negotiated export restraint arrangements somewhat similar to the bilateral export restraints currently in vogue.

The key elements of these propositions appear to be the extension of restraint arrangements to a number of sectors through international negotiation and multilateral surveillance of the evolution of market shares. They would be similar to the existing multilateral arrangements in the textile sector in two essential respects: first, restraints would be multilaterally agreed, ostensibly to avoid the proliferation of unilateral restrictions, and second, the restraints would be implemented through bilateral restraint agreements between the importing and the exporting country.

At first glance, it appears that market organization could provide some assurance of access to markets for participating countries, and thus result in less friction caused by fears of an uncontrolled spread of protectionism. However, experience in the textile sector indicates that successive agreements may become increasingly restrictive and that the existence of multilaterally negotiated arrangements is no guarantee that recourse to unilateral import restrictions can always be avoided. Therefore, it seems doubtful that organization of markets would effectively strengthen the ability of governments to resist protectionist pressures in the future. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a comprehensive international agreement could provide adequately for shifts in comparative advantage, technological change, emergence of new suppliers, and numerous other unpredictable factors.

Recent developments, in particular the growing trend toward the organization and structuring of world trade, have raised serious questions about whether international commercial policies can or should be expected to evolve along the same lines as in the past thirty years. In particular, the principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity, which have governed trade policies until recently, have been questioned. A related issue is whether the existing forms, channels, and instruments of multilateral cooperation are adequate to cope with the resurgence of protectionist tendencies and, in particular, to help resolve the conflict between the short-term interests of trading nations and the broader objectives of achieving a full utilization of the world’s resources.

  • American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report (Washington, 1977).

  • Australia. Industries Assistance Commission, Annual Reports, 1975-76 and 1976-77 (Canberra).

  • Balassa, Bela,Tariff Protection ir Industrial Countries: An Evaluation ,”Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), Vol. 73 (1965), pp. 57394.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Balassa, Bela, and associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins for World Bank, 1971).

  • Baldwin, R., and J. Mutti,Policy Issues in Adjustment Assistance: The United States ,”Prospects for Partnership, Helen Hughes, ed. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins for World Bank, 1973).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Baldwin, Robert E., Nontariff Distortions of International Trade (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1970).

  • Basevi, Giorgio,The United States Tariff Structure: Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection of United States Industries and Industrial Labor ,”Review of Economics and Statistics (Boston), Vol. 42 (1966), pp. 14760.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bergsten, C. Fred,On the Non-Equivalence of Import Quotas and ‘Voluntary’ Export Restraints ,”in Toward a New International Economic Order: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1972-1974 (Lexington, Mass., Heath, 1975).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bhagwati, Jagdish N.,Market Disruption, Export Market Disruption, Compensation and GATT Reform ,”World Development (Oxford), Vol. 4, No. 12 (1976).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and Padma Desai, India—Planning for Industrialization: Industrialization and Trade Policies Since 1951 (London, 1970).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Blackhurst, Richard, Nicolas Marian, and Jan Tumlir, Trade Liberalization, Protectionism, and Interdependence, GATT Studies in International Trade, No. 5 (Geneva, November 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal, “Inquiry Under Section 16 of the Anti-Dumping Act ,”various reports (Ottawa, documents).

  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal,. Commission du textile et du vêtement, Enquête sur les vêtements: un rapport au Ministre de l’Industrie et du Commerce (Ottawa, May 29, 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal,. Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Office of Special Import Policy, Background and Historical Development in Textile Imports, 1950-1975 (Ottawa, September 21, 1977, document).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal,. Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Office of Special Import Policy, “Textiles—Surveillance and Restraint Measures” (Ottawa, 1976, 1977, documents).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal,. Reports of the Textile and Clothing Board to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce pursuant to Section 19 of the Textile and Clothing Board Act (Ottawa).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Canada. Anti-Dumping Tribunal,. Trade and Tariffs Committee, Review of Developments in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva (Ottawa, August 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cline, W. R., Noboru Kawanabe, T. O. M. Kronsjö, and Thomas Williams, Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round: A Quantitative Assessment (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1978).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Corden, Warner M., and Gerhard Fels, eds., Public Assistance to Industry (London, Macmillan, 1976).

  • Curtis, Thomas B., and John R. Vastine, The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade (New York, Praeger, 1971).

  • Curzon, Gerard, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (New York, Praeger, 1966, and London, Michael Joseph Ltd., 1965).

  • Dam, Kenneth W., The GATT Law and International Economic Organization (University of Chicago Press, 1970).

  • Denton, Geoffrey, and Seamus O’Cleireacain, Subsidy Issues in International Commerce (London, Trade Policy Research Center, 1972).

  • Donges, Juergen B., Gerhard Fels, and Axel D. Neu, Protektion und Branchen-struktur der westdeutschen Wirtschaft (J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1973).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Europe Documents, Agence Internationale d’Information pour la Presse (Brussels), various issues, including “Rationalization of Shipbuilding Sector in Community,” in No. 979, December 23, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Communities. Bulletin of the European Communities (Brussels), various issues.

  • European Communities. Commission des Communautés Européennes, Assainissement du secteur de la construction navale dans la Communauté (Brussels, December 6, 1977). Partial translation into English in Europe Documents, No. 979, December 23, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Communities. Commission des Communautés Européennes, Mesures de surveillance et de sauvegarde Communautaire (Brussels, July 20, 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, Exporting to the European Community: Information for Foreign Exporters (Brussels, 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, Information, No. 131/76.

  • European Communities. Complément d’information sur l’évolution de l’emploi dans l’industrie textile et de l’habillement de la CE and attachments (written reply and documentation provided by EC staff to IMF mission, December 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • European Communities. Eleventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1977 (Brussels, 1978).

  • European Communities. European Community Information Service, Commercial Policy of the European Community (Washington, January 1973).

  • European Communities. Official Journal of the European Communities, various issues.

  • Evans, John W., The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971).

  • France. Address by Prime Minister of France, Raymond Barre, before National Press Club (Washington), September 16, 1977.

  • France. Address by Prime Minister of France, Barre, Raymond, “Pour une liberté organisée des échanges ,”Journal de Genève, September 15, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • France. Address by Prime Minister of France, Barre, Raymond, Interview with Thierry de Montbrial, Chief, Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision, French Foreign Ministry, in Journal of Commerce (New York), September 15, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • France. Address by Prime Minister of France, Barre, Raymond, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête parlementaire chargée d’examiner les conditions dans lesquelles ont lieu des importations “sauvages” de diverses catégories de marchandises, by M. Limouzy, rapporteur (Paris, November 18, 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, A Study on Cotton Textiles (Geneva, July 1966).

  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Activities (Geneva), various issues.

  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Vol. IV, Text of the General Agreement (Geneva, March 1969).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (Geneva), Ninth Supplement, February 1961; Tenth Supplement, March 1962; Eleventh Supplement, March 1963; Fifteenth Supplement, April 1968; Eighteenth Supplement, April 1972; Twenty-First Supplement, February 1975.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade (Geneva), various issues.

  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Press Releases, No. 1199, November 9, 1977 (address by Olivier Long, Director-General of GATT, to Zürich Economic Society); No. 1208, December 15, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Study on Textiles: Report of the Working Party on Trade in Textiles, L/3797, December 29, 1972. Also, Summary Tables and Basic Statistics, L/3797/Add. 2, December 29, 1972.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Textiles Committee, Production and Trade in Textiles and Clothing, 1974 to 1976: Report by the Secretariat, COM.TEX/W/35, October 29, 1976.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Textiles Committee, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Textiles Committee, COM.TEX/8, March 14, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trends in International Trade: A Report by a Panel of Experts (Geneva, October 1958).

  • Glismann, Hans, and Axel Neu,Towards New Agreements on International Trade Liberalization—Methods and Examples of Measuring Nontariff Trade Barriers ,”Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (Tübingen), Vol. 107 (1971), pp. 23571.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hawkins, Robert G., and Ingo Walter, eds., The United States and International Markets (Lexington, Mass., Heath, 1972).

  • Henner, H.-F., G. Lafay, and B. Lassudrie-Duchêne, La protection effective dans les pays industrialisés (Paris, Economica, 1972).

  • Holzman, Franklyn D.,Comparison of Different Forms of Trade Barriers ,”Review of Economics and Statistics (Cambridge, Mass.), Vol. 51, No. 2, May 1969.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Holzman, Franklyn D.,On the Technique of Comparing Trade Barriers of Products Imported by Capitalist and Communist Nations ,”European Economic Review (Amsterdam), Vol. II, No. 1 (Fall 1970), pp. 322.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hudec, Robert E., The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York, Praeger, 1975).

  • International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Prospects for Developing Countries, 1978-85, Study by Development Policy Staff (Washington, November 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Labour Office, Bulletin of Labour Statistics (Geneva), 1977 issues.

  • International Labour Office, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1975-1976, Geneva.

  • International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1977 (Washington, 1977).

  • International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington).

  • Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

  • Jondrow, James M.,Effects of Trade Restrictions on Imports of Steel ,”Professional Paper No. 165 (November 1976), presented at a conference sponsored by the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, December 2-3, 1976.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Kaldor, Nicholas,The Nemesis of Free Trade ,”Spectator (London), August 27, 1977.

  • Kelly, William B., Studies in United States Commercial Policy (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963).

  • “L’année économique et sociale, 1977: la langueur,” published by Le Monde (Paris), January 1978.

  • Lowinger, Thomas C,Discrimination in Government Procurement of Foreign Goods in the U.S. and Western Europe ,”Southern Economic Journal (Chapel Hill), Vol. 42 (1975-76), pp. 45160.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lynch, John, Toward an Orderly Market (Tokyo, Sophia University, 1968).

  • MacPhee, Craig R., Restrictions on International Trade in Steel (Lexington, Mass., Heath, 1974).

  • Magee, Stephen P.,The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on U.S. Trade ,”Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Arthur Okun and George Perry, eds. (Washington, 1972).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Melvin, James R., and Bruce W. Wilkinson, Effective Protection in the Canadian Economy, Economic Council of Canada, Special Study No. 9 (Ottawa, August 1968).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Metzger, S., Injury and Market Disruption from Imports (Washington, July 1971).

  • Muñoz Durán, Roberto, El Comercio de Carne Bovina de la Comunidad Económica Europea con el Rio de la Plata: Analysis y Reflexiones (Montevideo, August 1976).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Muñoz Duran, Roberto, Perspectiva del Mercado Mundial de Carne Bovina (Montevideo, Central Bank of Uruguay, 1976).

  • New York Times, March 2, 1978 (article entitledU.S. Steel Ending Antidumping Suit Against Japanese”).

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Adjustment for Trade: Studies on Industrial Adjustment Problems and Policies (Paris, 1975).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Footwear Industry (Paris, 1970-1975).

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Meat Balances in OECD Member Countries, 1962-75 (Paris, April 1977).

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Press Release No. A(77)54 (Paris), November 30, 1977.

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Textile Industry, 1975 (Paris).

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Iron and Steel Industry … 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975 (Paris).

  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working Party on Agricultural Policies, Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community (Paris, 1974).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Pestieau, Caroline, and Jacques Henry, Non-Tariff Trade Barriers as a Problem in International Development (Canadian Economic Policy Committee, Private Planning Association of Canada, April 1972).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Rieben, Henri, L’Europe sidérurgique au défi I: la bataille de Vacier (Lausanne, 1977).

  • Riedel, James,Tariff Concessions in the Kennedy Round and the Structure of Protection in West Germany: An Econometric Assessment ,”Journal of International Economics (Amsterdam), Vol. 7, No. 2 (1977), pp. 13343.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Roningen, Vernon, and Alexander Yeats,Nontariff Distortions of International Trade: Some Preliminary Empirical Evidence ,”Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (Tübingen), Vol. 112 (1976), pp. 61325.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Soligo, Roland, and Joseph J. Stern,Tariff Protection, Import Substitution and Investment Efficiency ,”Pakistan Development Review (Islamabad), Vol. 5 (1965), pp. 24970.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1960 (Geneva, 1961).

  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Structure and Change in European Industry (New York, 1977).

  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1975, Vols. I and II (New York, 1977).

  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1972-73 (New York, 1974).

  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1975-76, Vol. I, ‘Trade by Country” (New York, 1976).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1975-76, Vol. II, “Trade by Commodity” (New York, 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fourth General Report on the Implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences, TD/B/C.5/53, May 27, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1976 (New York, 1976).

  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Improving the Capability of the Developing Countries to Supply Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures, TD/B/C.2/178, May 25, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Interdependence of Problems of Trade, Development Finance and the International Monetary System, Trade and Development Board, 17th session, TD/B/665/Add. 1 (Part II), July 25, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Trade in Cotton Textiles and the Developing Countries: Problems and Prospects (New York, TD/B/C.2/117/Rev. 1, 1974).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States.Color Television Receiver Imports ,”Presidential Proclamation 4511 and Directive to U.S. Customs Service on Implementation of Orderly Marketing Agreement with Japan, Federal Register (Washington), Vol. 42, No. 123, June 27, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Council on Wage and Price Stability, Report to the President on Prices and Costs in the United States Steel Industry (Washington, October 1977).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings (Washington), Vol. 24, No. 12, December 1977.

  • United States. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Trade, “U.S. Import Protection Laws,” “Antidumping Investigations—1970 to Present,” “Countervailing Duty Actions—1969 to Present” (Washington, documents).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Department of the Treasury, Office of the Secretary, “‘Trigger Prices’ for Imported Steel Mill Products ,”News (Washington), January 3, 1978.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, “Trigger Price Mechanism: Questions and Answers ,”News (Washington), February 10, 1978.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. International Trade Commission, Annual Reports.

  • United States. International Trade Commission, Reports to the President on various investigations under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. International Trade Commission, The History and Current Status of the Multifiber Arrangement (Washington, January 1978).

  • United States. “Non-Rubber Footwear Imports ,”Presidential Proclamation 4510 and Notice of Orderly Marketing Agreements Between the United States and the Republics of China and Korea, Federal Register (Washington), Vol. 42, No. 122, June 24, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, “Trade Actions Monitoring System Report,” Memorandum (Washington), September 19, 1977.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • United States. Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93–618).

  • Uruguay. Instituto Nacional de Carnes, Estadísticas, October 1977.

  • Walter, Ingo,Nontariff Barriers and the Export Performance of Developing Economies ,”American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of Eighty-Third Annual Meeting of American Economic Association, May 1971), pp. 195205.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Walter, Ingo,Nontariff Barriers and the Free-Trade Area Option ,”Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review (Rome), Vol. 22 (1969).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Walter, Ingo,Non-Tariff Protection Among Industrial Countries: Some Preliminary Evidence ,”Economia Internazionale (Genoa), Vol. 25 (1972), pp. 33554.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation