Abstract

Recent financial sector crises and their resolution have raised new issues and provided additional experiences to draw on in the future. Banking sector problems in Russia, Turkey, and a few Latin American countries occurred within the context of highly dollarized economies, high levels of sovereign debt, severely limited fiscal resources, or combinations thereof. These factors have challenged the effectiveness of many of the typical tools for bank resolution. This publication focuses on the issues raised in systemic crises, not on the resolution of individual bank problems. Based on the lessons learned during the Asian crisis, it updates the IMF’s work on the general principles, strategies, and techniques for managing these crises.

Appendix I Costs of Banking Crises

Estimating the overall costs of banking crises is difficult. While the fiscal costs may be clearly specified, the overall costs to the economy are more difficult to quantify. The methodology for assessing such fiscal costs must take into account both the direct outlays of the government and the recovery from asset sales. In recent crises, the fiscal costs of a banking crisis ranged from zero to over 50 percent of GDP (Table AI.1). The steps for estimating the broader costs to the economy are described but have not been quantified.

Types of Costs

The costs of a banking crisis arise from different causes and develop over time. Clarification of the definitions used is essential if meaningful comparisons are to be made.

The costs can be defined in the following ways:

  • Gross costs to the public sector: Examples of such costs are outlays of the government—restructuring agencies or, in some cases, directly from the treasury—and central bank for liquidity support; deposit payments; purchase of impaired assets; and recapitalization through purchase of equity or subordinated debts.

  • Net costs to the public sector: Gross outlays are netted against resources generated from the sale of acquired assets and equity stakes, and repayment of debt by recapitalized entities. This measure ideally reflects the permanent increase in national debt, or the cumulative increase of fiscal deficits where budget transfers are used, resulting from the crisis.

  • Costs in net present value: Support to financial institutions—and especially the recovery of value from the sale of impaired assets and equity stakes—may occur over relatively protracted periods. Ideally, in estimating costs cash flows should be appropriately discounted so as to reflect the carrying cost of debt issued, the delay in recovering resources from acquired assets, and the opportunity cost of the use of public funds.51

  • Economic costs of crises: Systemic crises result in forgone economic growth because the intermediation function is temporarily curtailed. In some cases, the crisis of confidence may have longer-term consequences for financial sector and, therefore, overall development.52

Many of the costs borne by the public sector represent transfers to the private sector. These are not losses to the economy as a whole.53 Where liquidity support to failed institutions or financing for resolution agencies provided by the central bank has not been fiscalized (i.e., a government body has not issued debt or made cash payments to repay the central bank), the money supply increases. If this is not, or cannot, be absorbed through open market operations or other instruments, where it would show up as quasi-fiscal losses, this will be inflationary or contribute to exchange rate pressures and capital flight.

The present analysis considers only direct costs to the public sector and does not take into account the costs of inflation or forgone economic growth. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to discount appropriately the cash flows to and from the state, or otherwise calculate the net present value of the interventions.54 As asset disposals usually occur over extended periods, the present value of recoveries is lower than shown here.55 On the other hand, asset disposal processes are incomplete for most of the cases included, and no attempt has been made to forecast what future revenues from asset disposals might be. This would underestimate total recoveries in nominal terms.

Table AI.1.

Fiscal Costs of Selected Banking Crises1

(In percent of GDP)

article image

See Table AI.2 for methodology, sources, and country-specific information.

Assets of deposit money banks in the year before the first crisis year.

A central objective was for the estimates to be comparable across countries. This objective could be met only in part, as evidenced by the country notes below. The data are presented as ratios over GDP; where it has been possible to identify the year in which a specific cash flow or debt issuance occurred, this magnitude is divided by nominal GDP for that year. In many cases, however (especially for recoveries), only aggregate data reflecting several years of activity were available. In these cases, an average of GDP for the relevant years was used.

Gross costs were measured as outlays of the government and central bank in terms of bond issuance and disbursements from the treasury for liquidity support, deposit payments, and recapitalization and purchase of nonperforming loans. Recoveries were then subtracted to arrive at net costs. Data limitations meant that even these measures are incomplete. For example, liquidity support may be provided to institutions that later fail, and such outlays are captured here only if they were fiscalized (Table AI.2).

Table AI.2.

Fiscal Costs of Selected Banking Crises: Sources and Country-Specific Information

article image
Note: GDP data are from the World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics databases, and assets of deposit money banks from International Financial Statistics.

Appendix II Case Studies of Banking Crises

Table AII.1.

Description of the System Before and After the Crisis

article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.

Percent of market share shown in parenthesis, where available. For Argentina and Korea, percent of assets is shown; for Finland and Sweden, percent of loans; and for Indonesia, percent of deposits.

Net cost to the public sector (see Appendix I).

Table AII.2.

Crisis Outbreak and Containment: Financial and Monetary Measures

article image
article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.
Table AII.3.

The Restructuring Phase: Judicial and Institutional Measures

article image
article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.
Table AII.4.

The Restructuring Phase: Financial and Corporate Measures

article image
article image
article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.
Table AII.5.

Management of Impaired Assets

article image
article image
article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.
Table AII.6.

Exit from the Crisis

article image
article image
Sources: National authorities; various IMF staff reports, Selected Issues, and Recent Economic Development reports; and IMF staff estimates.

Whether central bank losses were reimbursed by the government.

References

  • Alexander, William, Tomás Baliño, and Charles Enoch, 1995, The Adoption of Indirect Instruments of Monetary Policy, IMF Occasional Paper No. 10 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Alexander, William, Jeffrey M. Davis, Liam P. Ebrill, and Carl-Johan Lindgren, eds., 1997, Systemic Bank Restructuring and Macroeconomic Policy (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ariyoshi, Akira, and others, 2000, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, IMF Occasional Paper No. 190 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Asser, Tobias M.C., 2001, Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in Distress (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

  • Banerji, Angana, Julia Majaha-Jartby, and Gabriel Sensenbrenner, 2002, “Selected Issues in Banking Sector Reform,” in Russian Federation: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 02/75 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bank for International Settlements, 1999, “Bank Restructuring in Practice,” BIS Policy Papers No. 6 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, 2002, Turkey “Banking Sector Restructuring Program: Progress Report,” July (Ankara).

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002, “Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks,” Report of the Task Force on Dealing with Weak Banks, March (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Chaman Saxena, 2003, “Did Output Recover from the Asian Crisis?” IMF Working Paper 03/48 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Curry, Timothy, and Lynn Shibut, 2000, “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences,” FDIC Banking Review, Vol. 13 (December), pp. 26 –35.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Daniel, James, and Matthew Saal, 1997, “Macroeconomic Impact and Policy Response,” in Systemic Bank Restructuring and Macroeconomic Policy, ed. Alexander William E. (Washington: International Monetary Fund), pp. 1 –41.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Das, Udaibir, and Marc Quintyn, 2002, “Financial Crises Prevention and Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance,” in Financial Sector Governance. The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, ed. Robert Litan, Pomerleano, Michael Sundararajan V. (Washington: Brookings Institution).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • de Krivoy, Ruth, 2000, Collapse: The Venezuelan Banking Crisis of 1994 (Washington: The Group of Thirty).

  • De Luna-Martinez, Jose, 2000, “Management and Resolution of Banking Crises: Lessons from the Republic of Korea and Mexico,” World Bank Discussion Paper No. 413 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Drees, Burkhard, and Ceyla Pazarbasiğlu, 1998, The Nordic Banking Crises. Pitfalls in Financial Liberalization? IMF Occasional Paper No. 161 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dziobek, Claudia, 1998, “Market-Based Policy Instruments for Systemic Banking Restructuring,” IMF Working Paper 98/113 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dziobek, Claudia, and Ceyla Pazarbaşiğlu, 1997, “Lessons from Systemic Bank Restructuring: A Survey of 24 Countries,” IMF Working Paper 97/161 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, and others, 2001, “Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis: Two Years of Living Dangerously, 1997–99, ” IMF Working Paper 01/52 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, Gillian Garcia, and V. Sundararajan, 2002, “Recapitalizing Banks with Public Funds: Selected Issues,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, David Marston, and Michael Taylor, eds., 2002, Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, Peter Stella, and May Khamis, 1997, “Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations,” IMF Working Paper 97/138 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Frécaut, Olivier, 2002, “Banking System Losses in Indonesia: Looking Out for Fifty Billion U.S. Dollars. Can the SNA Help?” Paper prepared for the 27th General Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Stockholm, August.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Frydl, Edward, 1999, “The Length and Cost of Banking Crises, ” IMF Working Paper 99/30 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

  • Frydl, Edward, and Marc Quintyn, 2000, “The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises,” IMF Working Paper 00/147 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Garcia, Gillian, 2000a, “Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management, ” IMF Working Paper 00/57 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Garcia, Gillian, 2000b, Deposit Insurance: Actual and Good Practices, IMF Occasional Paper No. 197 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Giorgianni, Lorenzo, 2002, “An Assessment of Thailand’s Fiscal Vulnerability,” Thailand: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/195. (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • He, Dong, 2002, “Emergency Liquidity Support Facilities,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hirschman, Albert, 1963, Journey Towards Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund).

  • Hoelscher, David, 2002, “Guidelines for Bank Resolution,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1998, Toward a Framework for Financial Stability, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington).

  • International Monetary Fund, 2001, “Finland: Financial System Stability Assessment, ” IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/214 (Washington).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002, “Sweden: Financial System Stability Assessment,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/161 (Washington).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2001, Guidelines for Public Debt Management (Washington).

  • Ingves, Stefan, 2000, “The Role of Asset Management Companies in the Bank Restructuring,” paper presented at the Nonperforming Loans Forum of Asia Pacific, Seoul, November.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ishii, Shogo, and others, 2002, Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Sector Stability, IMF Occasional Paper No. 211 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Karasulu, Meral, 2002, “Bank Privatization in Korea: Developments and Strategies,” Republic of Korea: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/20. (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Kawai, Masahiro, Ira Lieberman, and William P. Mako, 2000, “Financial Stabilization and Initial Restructuring of East Asian Corporations: Approaches, Results, and Lessons,” in Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia, ed. Charles Adams, Robert E. Litan, Michael Pomerleano (Washington: Brookings Institution).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000, “The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises. Cross-Country Experience,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2284 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Klingebiel, Daniela, and Laeven, Luc eds., 2002, “Managing the Real and Fiscal Effects of Banking Crises,” World Bank Discussion Paper No. 428 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lindgren, Carl-Johan, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew I. Saal, 1996, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lindgren, Carl-Johan, 1999, Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring—Lessons from Asia, IMF Occasional Paper No. 188 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Nyberg, Peter, 1997, “Authorities’ Roles and Organizational Issues in Systemic Bank Restructuring,” IMF Working Paper 97/92 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Quintyn, Marc, 1994, “Government Securities Versus Central Bank Securities in Developing Open Market Operations: Evaluation and Need for Coordinating Arrangements,” IMF Working Paper 94/62 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Sanhueza, Gonzalo, 1999, “La Crisis Financiera de los Años Ochenta en Chile: Análisis de sus Soluciones y su Costo,” Economia Chilena, Vol. 2 (April), pp. 43 –68.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Sanhueza, Gonzalo, 2001, “Chilean Banking Crisis of the 1980’s: Solutions and Estimation of the Cost,” Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 104 (Santiago: Central Bank of Chile).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Stone, Mark R., 2000, “Large-scale Post-crisis Corporate Sector Restructuring,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper 00/7 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Woo, David, 2000, “Two Approaches to Resolving Nonperforming Assets During Financial Crises,” IMF Working Paper 00/33 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • World Bank, 2001, Effective Insolvency Creditor Rights Systems, http://www.worldbank.org.

1

There is some debate about the definition of a systemic crisis. Systemic crisis is generally considered one in which the stability of the banking system and, as a consequence, the payments system and real sector, are threatened.

4

A joint IMF/World Bank project is developing guidelines for the legal and institutional aspects of dealing with bank insolvencies (forthcoming IMF/WB paper). On this topic, see also Asser (2001).

6

See, among others, Frydl (1999) and Frydl and Quintyn (2000).

7

Appendix Table AI.2 provides these data and a fuller discussion of methodology used, as well as data sources and important country-specific information.

10

See IMF and World Bank (2001) and World Bank (2001).

11

Country-specific factors also include ownership structures of the banking system and the corporate sector; human resource constraints; the legal, regulatory, judicial, and administrative frameworks; traditions of transparency; as well as political cohesion and the quality of leadership. These factors will influence the pace and success of the resolution strategy.

12

The proposal is not to identify and protect a core banking system; in principle, market forces should determine the winners and losers among financial institutions. Rather, the authorities should adopt uniform and transparent rules that apply to all banks. If faced with the need to consolidate the banking system, prudential rules must be sufficiently strong to ensure continued financial intermediation.

13

Also, the government needs to factor in the possible pitfalls of prolonged government management of a bank, e.g., political influence, lack of managerial capacity, and so forth.

14

This process is similar to what Hirschman (1963) has referred to as “reform mongering.”

15

Creditors can refuse to roll over lines of credit, and depositors can withdraw their funds.

18

The use of a blanket guarantee may also be constrained under different private sector involvement scenarios, especially related to nonresident creditors.

19

Dollar deposits, however, usually would be paid out in the local currency, converted at the market exchange rate.

20

Derivatives and other off-balance-sheet contracts cannot be excluded, if a bank continues operations, as derivatives convert into plain on-balance-sheet liabilities in case of defaults.

21

In Indonesia, such transactions were included if contracted at “arm’s length.”

22

In República Bolivariana de Venezuela, the absence of a guarantee led to waves of bank failures in 1994. In the often-cited case of Indonesia (see Box 5) a poorly managed closing decision contributed to a general run on banks and required the retroactive introduction of a blanket guarantee.

23

In Malaysia, capital controls introduced in September 1998 contributed to the containment of capital outflows and the stabilization of the new sharply depreciated fixed exchange rate. In Thailand, exchange controls introduced in June 1997 to support the exchange rate were not successful in preventing the collapse of the baht and played no role in dealing with the subsequent banking problems.

24

Losses would be allocated in accordance with the legal preferences stipulated in banking, bankruptcy, and deposit insurance laws, as applicable: shareholders typically lose their capital, and creditors and depositors lose all or part of their claims according to a legally stipulated ranking.

25

Legal issues in bank restructuring are extremely complex and depend to a considerable degree on the legal and institutional framework in each country. This topic is too broad to be covered adequately in this paper. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank staff are writing jointly a report on the legal and institutional framework for bank restructuring.

26

In some countries, supervisors have been unable to take over insolvent banks because shareholders have been able to impede loss recognition and capital dilution, thus stalling the restructuring process. The process can be hindered by any combination of issues, including lack of authority to intervene banks, deficient operational definitions of insolvency, a judicial stay on interventions, or a lack of protection for supervisors from personal lawsuits.

27

Undercapitalized banks are those operating below the legal minimum CAR. Insolvency is often defined as operating with a CAR of zero or less. In some countries with prompt corrective action regimes, the law may oblige supervisors to intervene in a bank when its CAR falls below a certain threshold (2 percent in some countries).

28

This gradual but monitored approach is not forbearance. Forbearance is defined as permitting banks to operate below prudential norms without a plan or without close monitoring.

29

The former method was used in Thailand, the latter in Indonesia and Korea.

30

For a detailed discussion of recapitalization instruments see Enoch, Garcia, and Sundararajan (2002) and Dziobek (1998).

32

Klingebiel (2000) and Woo (2002).

33

In some legal jurisdictions, the asset management company may have to be a financial institution in order to accept transferred assets, although it should not be allowed to collect deposits or extend loans.

34

Centralized asset management companies with an expanded mandate have also been set up in the past to facilitate the privatization of government-owned banks and intervened banks.

35

Woo (2002).

38

For a more detailed discussion, see Lindgren and others (1999) and World Bank (2001).

39

In the Asian crises, large amounts of liquidity support were effectively sterilized in Korea and Thailand, which allowed the exchange rates to stabilize and interest rates to be brought down. Sterilization was not successful in Indonesia due to administered central bank interest rates but also, perhaps more importantly, to broader factors that lead to a loss of monetary control.

41

For a description of the reform of monetary policy instruments, see Alexander, Baliño, and Enoch (1995).

42

For an analysis of experience with capital controls, see Ariyoshi and others (2000).

43

Some empirical support for the interpretation offered here is found for the Asian crisis countries by Cerra and Saxena (2003). The authors use a regime-switching model, decomposing recessions into permanent and temporary components. Their results suggest that the Asian countries suffered Hamilton-type recessions with permanent output loss rather than the Friedman-type recessions that include a rapid postcrisis growth phase resulting in catch-up to the initial trend.

44

In this context it is important to emphasize that conditions should be created so that banks can contribute to the growth resumption. Such policies include swiftly taking care of (a) the problem of nonperforming assets; (b) provisioning; and (c) recapitalization of banks.

45

The Asian countries entered the crisis (1997) with relatively solid fiscal positions and little public debt. This allowed them to issue a credible blanket guarantee and play a central role in bank recapitalization and resolution. The situation was more delicate in Turkey (2000), and outright unsustainable in cases like Ecuador (1998) and Argentina (2002).

46

For instance, if all or most of the debt is denominated in local currency, inflation may be a viable alternative to debt restructuring.

47

According to International Accounting Standards 32 and 39, banks must disclose the fair value of assets in financial statements.

48

In this case, the benefits derived from the reduction in the full stock of debt will not be offset by the issuance of new debt for bank recapitalization.

49

Nonbank financial institutions would also be affected, with pension funds and mutual funds collapsing.

50

The one exception is in the case of currency reforms (a new currency is introduced to replace the old currency). Currency reform often entails only redenomination of the currency. In some cases, however, the reforms have had a confiscating element. Few countries have applied nominal haircuts and, where tried, they have been challenged frequently on constitutional grounds.

51

However, it can be objected that in considering other public expenditures that generate debt, the net present value of interest payments thus incurred is rarely included in the costing of the activity.

52

See Frydl and Quintyn (2002) for a full discussion of the economic benefits and costs of intervening in crises.

53

See Frécaut (2002) for a detailed discussion with reference to Indonesia.

54

In some cases, part of the cost of debt service is reflected in the discount-to-face value of the funds raised through the debt issued. In Malaysia, for example, zero-coupon bonds were issued, with the discount therefore fully reflecting the servicing costs. This observation serves to highlight one difference in coverage between countries considered here.

55

Nonetheless, where possible cash flows have been divided by the GDP of the year in which they occurred. This provides some measure of discount because GDP typically rises in the postcrisis period, while the resale values of assets taken over rarely rise above the price at which they were acquired.

Recent Occasional Papers of the International Monetary Fund

224. Managing Systemic Banking Crises, by a staff team led by David S. Hoelscher and Marc Quintyn. 2003.

223. Monetary Union Among Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, by a staff team led by Ugo Fasano. 2003.

222. Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, by Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson. 2003.

221. Deflation: Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options, by Manmohan S. Kumar. 2003.

220. Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, by Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and Ayhan Kose. 2003.

219. Economic Policy in a Highly Dollarized Economy: The Case of Cambodia, by Mario de Zamaroczy and Sopanha Sa. 2003.

218. Fiscal Vulnerability and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies, by Richard Hemming, Michael Kell, and Axel Schimmelpfennig. 2003.

217. Managing Financial Crises: Recent Experience and Lessons for Latin America, edited by Charles Collyns and G. Russell Kincaid. 2003.

216. Is the PRGF Living Up to Expectations?—An Assessment of Program Design, by Sanjeev Gupta, Mark Plant, Benedict Clements, Thomas Dorsey, Emanuele Baldacci, Gabriela Inchauste, Shamsuddin Tareq, and Nita Thacker. 2002.

215. Improving Large Taxpayers’ Compliance: A Review of Country Experience, by Katherine Baer. 2002.

214. Advanced Country Experiences with Capital Account Liberalization, by Age Bakker and Bryan Chapple. 2002.

213. The Baltic Countries: Medium-Term Fiscal Issues Related to EU and NATO Accession, by Johannes Mueller, Christian Beddies, Robert Burgess, Vitali Kramarenko, and Joannes Mongardini. 2002.

212. Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and Country Practices, by V. Sundararajan, Charles Enoch, Armida San José, Paul Hilbers, Russell Krueger, Marina Moretti, and Graham Slack. 2002.

211. Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Sector Stability, by a staff team led by Shogo Ishii and Karl Habermeier. 2002.

210. IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises, by Atish Ghosh, Timothy Lane, Marianne SchulzeGhattas, Aleš Bulíř, Javier Hamann, and Alex Mourmouras. 2002.

209. Methodology for Current Account and Exchange Rate Assessments, by Peter Isard, Hamid Faruqee, G. Russell Kincaid, and Martin Fetherston. 2001.

208. Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform, by Klaus Enders, Sherwyn Williams, Nada Choueiri, Yuri Sobolev, and Jan Walliser. 2001.

207. Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery, by Kanitta Meesook, Il Houng Lee, Olin Liu, Yougesh Khatri, Natalia Tamirisa, Michael Moore, and Mark H. Krysl. 2001.

206. The Dominican Republic: Stabilization, Structural Reform, and Economic Growth, by a staff team led by PhilipYoung comprising Alessandro Giustiniani, Werner C. Keller, and Randa E. Sab and others. 2001.

205. Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources, by Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel, and Steven Barnett. 2001.

204. Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS): Is It Desirable and How Could It Be Achieved? by Paul Masson and Catherine Pattillo. 2001.

203. Modern Banking and OTC Derivatives Markets: The Transformation of Global Finance and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, by Garry J. Schinasi, R. Sean Craig, Burkhard Drees, and Charles Kramer. 2000.

202. Adopting Inflation Targeting: Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries, by Andrea Schaechter, Mark R. Stone, and Mark Zelmer. 2000.

201. Developments and Challenges in the Caribbean Region, by Samuel Itam, Simon Cueva, Erik Lundback, Janet Stotsky, and Stephen Tokarick. 2000.

200. Pension Reform in the Baltics: Issues and Prospects, by Jerald Schiff, Niko Hobdari, Axel Schimmelpfennig, and Roman Zytek. 2000.

199. Ghana: Economic Development in a Democratic Environment, by Sérgio Pereira Leite, Anthony Pellechio, Luisa Zanforlin, Girma Begashaw, Stefania Fabrizio, and Joachim Harnack. 2000.

198. Setting Up Treasuries in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union: An Assessment of IMF Technical Assistance, by Barry H. Potter and Jack Diamond. 2000.

197. Deposit Insurance: Actual and Good Practices, by Gillian G.H. Garcia. 2000.

196. Trade and Trade Policies in Eastern and Southern Africa, by a staff team led by Arvind Subramanian, with Enrique Gelbard, Richard Harmsen, Katrin Elborgh-Woytek, and Piroska Nagy. 2000.

195. The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union—Institutions, Performance, and Policy Issues, by Frits van Beek, José Roberto Rosales, Mayra Zermeño, Ruby Randall, and Jorge Shepherd. 2000.

194. Fiscal and Macroeconomic Impact of Privatization, by Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, Thomas Richardson, and Steven Barnett. 2000.

193. Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy, by Michael Mussa, Paul Masson, Alexander Swoboda, Esteban Jadresic, Paolo Mauro, and Andy Berg. 2000.

192. Macroprudential Indicators of Financial System Soundness, by a staff team led by Owen Evans, Alfredo M. Leone, Mahinder Gill, and Paul Hilbers. 2000.

191. Social Issues in IMF-Supported Programs, by Sanjeev Gupta, Louis Dicks-Mireaux, Ritha Khemani, Calvin McDonald, and Marijn Verhoeven. 2000.

190. Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, by Akira Ariyoshi, Karl Habermeier, Bernard Laurens, Inci Ötker-Robe, Jorge Iván Canales Kriljenko, and Andrei Kirilenko. 2000.

189. Current Account and External Sustainability in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, by Donal McGettigan. 2000.

188. Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia, by Carl-Johan Lindgren, Tomás J.T. Baliño, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Gulde, Marc Quintyn, and Leslie Teo. 1999.

187. Philippines: Toward Sustainable and Rapid Growth, Recent Developments and the Agenda Ahead, by Markus Rodlauer, Prakash Loungani, Vivek Arora, Charalambos Christofides, Enrique G. De la Piedra, Piyabha Kongsamut, Kristina Kostial, Victoria Summers, and Athanasios Vamvakidis. 2000.

186. Anticipating Balance of Payments Crises: The Role of Early Warning Systems, by Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Catherine Pattillo. 1999.

185. Oman Beyond the Oil Horizon: Policies Toward Sustainable Growth, edited by Ahsan Mansur and Volker Treichel. 1999.

184. Growth Experience in Transition Countries, 1990–98, by Oleh Havrylyshyn, Thomas Wolf, Julian Berengaut, Marta Castello-Branco, Ron van Rooden, and Valerie Mercer-Blackman. 1999.

183. Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, by Emine Gürgen, Harry Snoek, Jon Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski, and Ron van Rooden. 1999.

182. Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, by a staff team led by Liam Ebrill and Oleh Havrylyshyn. 1999.

181. The Netherlands: Transforming a Market Economy, by C. Maxwell Watson, Bas B. Bakker, Jan Kees Martijn, and Ioannis Halikias. 1999.

180. Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization, by Liam Ebrill, Janet Stotsky, and Reint Gropp. 1999.

179. Disinflation in Transition: 1993–97, by Carlo Cottarelli and Peter Doyle. 1999.

178. IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, by Timothy Lane, Atish Ghosh, Javier Hamann, Steven Phillips, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, and Tsidi Tsikata. 1999.

177. Perspectives on Regional Unemployment in Europe, by Paolo Mauro, Eswar Prasad, and Antonio Spilimbergo. 1999.

176. Back to the Future: Postwar Reconstruction and Stabilization in Lebanon, edited by Sena Eken and Thomas Helbling. 1999.

Note: For information on the titles and availability of Occasional Papers not listed, please consult the IMF’s Publications Catalog or contact IMF Publication Services.

Cited By

  • Alexander, William, Tomás Baliño, and Charles Enoch, 1995, The Adoption of Indirect Instruments of Monetary Policy, IMF Occasional Paper No. 10 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Alexander, William, Jeffrey M. Davis, Liam P. Ebrill, and Carl-Johan Lindgren, eds., 1997, Systemic Bank Restructuring and Macroeconomic Policy (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ariyoshi, Akira, and others, 2000, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, IMF Occasional Paper No. 190 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Asser, Tobias M.C., 2001, Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in Distress (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

  • Banerji, Angana, Julia Majaha-Jartby, and Gabriel Sensenbrenner, 2002, “Selected Issues in Banking Sector Reform,” in Russian Federation: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 02/75 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bank for International Settlements, 1999, “Bank Restructuring in Practice,” BIS Policy Papers No. 6 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, 2002, Turkey “Banking Sector Restructuring Program: Progress Report,” July (Ankara).

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002, “Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks,” Report of the Task Force on Dealing with Weak Banks, March (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Chaman Saxena, 2003, “Did Output Recover from the Asian Crisis?” IMF Working Paper 03/48 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Curry, Timothy, and Lynn Shibut, 2000, “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences,” FDIC Banking Review, Vol. 13 (December), pp. 26 –35.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Daniel, James, and Matthew Saal, 1997, “Macroeconomic Impact and Policy Response,” in Systemic Bank Restructuring and Macroeconomic Policy, ed. Alexander William E. (Washington: International Monetary Fund), pp. 1 –41.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Das, Udaibir, and Marc Quintyn, 2002, “Financial Crises Prevention and Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance,” in Financial Sector Governance. The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, ed. Robert Litan, Pomerleano, Michael Sundararajan V. (Washington: Brookings Institution).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • de Krivoy, Ruth, 2000, Collapse: The Venezuelan Banking Crisis of 1994 (Washington: The Group of Thirty).

  • De Luna-Martinez, Jose, 2000, “Management and Resolution of Banking Crises: Lessons from the Republic of Korea and Mexico,” World Bank Discussion Paper No. 413 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Drees, Burkhard, and Ceyla Pazarbasiğlu, 1998, The Nordic Banking Crises. Pitfalls in Financial Liberalization? IMF Occasional Paper No. 161 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dziobek, Claudia, 1998, “Market-Based Policy Instruments for Systemic Banking Restructuring,” IMF Working Paper 98/113 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dziobek, Claudia, and Ceyla Pazarbaşiğlu, 1997, “Lessons from Systemic Bank Restructuring: A Survey of 24 Countries,” IMF Working Paper 97/161 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, and others, 2001, “Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis: Two Years of Living Dangerously, 1997–99, ” IMF Working Paper 01/52 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, Gillian Garcia, and V. Sundararajan, 2002, “Recapitalizing Banks with Public Funds: Selected Issues,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, David Marston, and Michael Taylor, eds., 2002, Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Enoch, Charles, Peter Stella, and May Khamis, 1997, “Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations,” IMF Working Paper 97/138 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Frécaut, Olivier, 2002, “Banking System Losses in Indonesia: Looking Out for Fifty Billion U.S. Dollars. Can the SNA Help?” Paper prepared for the 27th General Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Stockholm, August.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Frydl, Edward, 1999, “The Length and Cost of Banking Crises, ” IMF Working Paper 99/30 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

  • Frydl, Edward, and Marc Quintyn, 2000, “The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises,” IMF Working Paper 00/147 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Garcia, Gillian, 2000a, “Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management, ” IMF Working Paper 00/57 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Garcia, Gillian, 2000b, Deposit Insurance: Actual and Good Practices, IMF Occasional Paper No. 197 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Giorgianni, Lorenzo, 2002, “An Assessment of Thailand’s Fiscal Vulnerability,” Thailand: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/195. (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • He, Dong, 2002, “Emergency Liquidity Support Facilities,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Hirschman, Albert, 1963, Journey Towards Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund).

  • Hoelscher, David, 2002, “Guidelines for Bank Resolution,” in Building Strong Banks Through Surveillance and Resolution, ed. Charles Enoch, David Marston, Michael Taylor (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 1998, Toward a Framework for Financial Stability, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington).

  • International Monetary Fund, 2001, “Finland: Financial System Stability Assessment, ” IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/214 (Washington).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund, 2002, “Sweden: Financial System Stability Assessment,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/161 (Washington).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2001, Guidelines for Public Debt Management (Washington).

  • Ingves, Stefan, 2000, “The Role of Asset Management Companies in the Bank Restructuring,” paper presented at the Nonperforming Loans Forum of Asia Pacific, Seoul, November.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ishii, Shogo, and others, 2002, Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Sector Stability, IMF Occasional Paper No. 211 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Karasulu, Meral, 2002, “Bank Privatization in Korea: Developments and Strategies,” Republic of Korea: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 02/20. (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Kawai, Masahiro, Ira Lieberman, and William P. Mako, 2000, “Financial Stabilization and Initial Restructuring of East Asian Corporations: Approaches, Results, and Lessons,” in Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia, ed. Charles Adams, Robert E. Litan, Michael Pomerleano (Washington: Brookings Institution).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000, “The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises. Cross-Country Experience,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2284 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Klingebiel, Daniela, and Laeven, Luc eds., 2002, “Managing the Real and Fiscal Effects of Banking Crises,” World Bank Discussion Paper No. 428 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lindgren, Carl-Johan, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew I. Saal, 1996, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lindgren, Carl-Johan, 1999, Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring—Lessons from Asia, IMF Occasional Paper No. 188 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Nyberg, Peter, 1997, “Authorities’ Roles and Organizational Issues in Systemic Bank Restructuring,” IMF Working Paper 97/92 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Quintyn, Marc, 1994, “Government Securities Versus Central Bank Securities in Developing Open Market Operations: Evaluation and Need for Coordinating Arrangements,” IMF Working Paper 94/62 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar