Back Matter
  • 1 0000000404811396https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396International Monetary Fund
  • | 2 0000000404811396https://isni.org/isni/0000000404811396International Monetary Fund

Abstract

After the industrial countries established current account convertibility in the late1950s, they began to phase out their capital controls. Their efforts were slow and tentative at first, but built up considerable momentum by the 1980s as market-oriented economic policies gained popularity. This paper describes how national policymakers’ views of capital controls shifted over time, and how these controls have been closely related to regulation in other policy areas, such as banking and financial markets. As developing countries seek to liberalize their capital accounts to obtain the benefits of increased integration with the global economy, what lessons can be drawn from industrial countries’ diverse experiences with capital controls, and how can a country’s liberalization measures be sequenced to minimize disturbances to its exchange rate and monetary policies?

Appendix I Chronology of Key Changes in Capital Account Restrictions in Selected Advanced Countries

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1

As noted in Section I, monetary policy or other motives may also have played sonic pan in motivating capital controls—even where the exchange rate appeared to be the most important factor.

3

Nonresident free yen accounts were introduced in July 1960. Nonresidents could deposit yen balances (received from current account transactions or the sale of foreign exchange) into these accounts. Although yen balances; in these accounts could be freely converted back to foreign currencies, other yen balances could not be converted into foreign exchange.

4

See for example Fukao (1990) and Argy (1987) and the references therein.

5

In 1971, the floating of the deutsche mark and the suspension of the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold led to an expectation of a yen revaluation. Large capital inflows occurred, and Japan’s official reserves increased from US$4.4 billion to US$7.9 billion in the first seven months of 1971, In August alone, just before the floating of the yen, capital inflows of US$4 billion were recorded through channels such as advance payments for exports.

6

In the devises-titres market, proceeds from sales of foreign securities by residents were sold in an unregulated exchange market to other residents to enable them to acquire foreign securities.

8

Restrictions included the establishment of a 100 percent marginal reserve requirement on incremental French franc deposits of nonresidents. At the same time, controls on capital outflows were maintained, partly because there was a simultaneous tendency for the French franc to depreciate against the deutsche mark.

9

In April 1972, after the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the snake was established as a multilateral European exchange arrangement—with bilateral fixed, but adjustable fluctuation margins—aimed at stabilizing intra-European exchange rates.

10

The tightening of controls on capital outflows (in March 1974) was combined with the abolition of the dual exchange market, which, on the whole, had been considered rather ineffective.

11

In 1984, expiration dates were set for the remaining recourse to safeguard clauses for France (two years), which had been invoked since the 1968 civil unrest, and for Italy and Ireland (three years).

12

The Single Act fell short of enacting the complete liberalization of capital movements. However, it stipulated that further obligations concerning the freedom for capital movements could be taken by qualified majority and that unanimity would be required for measures that would constitute a step backward. This greatly facilitated the adoption of secondary legislation with respect to the liberalization of capital movements.

13

The Maastricht Treaty establishing the EMU was not approved in a referendum in June 1992 in Denmark.

14

Spain introduced non-interest-bearing cash reserves for incremental peseta lending to nonresidents. Portugal intensified the enforcement of existing regulations.

16

See, for instance, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993). (The Tobin tax, proposed by economist James Tobin of Yale University, would be a tax on transactions in foreign exchange markets.)

17

Following balance of payments problems in Canada in early 1968, all Canadian transactions were exempted from restrictions under U.S. balance of payments programs. In contrast, the Japanese balance of payments position improved and the exemption for long-term investment in Japan was ended in 1969.

18

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was given the authority to impose regulations (and make the program mandatory) in 1968. However, the Board chose to continue with the voluntary nature of the scheme, given the widespread cooperation from financial institutions.

19

An additional ceiling to finance U.S. exports was introduced at the end of 1969 to ensure that the program did not hinder exports. A more significant easing in the program took place in November 1971 when all foreign credit to finance imports was exempted from the program.

20

Although the growth of the Eurodollar market was partly at the expense of U.S.based financial markets, U.S. banks were very active in this market and reported significant earnings from their international activities.

21

A minimum reserve requirement on the growth of external liabilities, which had applied from December 1968 until October 1969, had been reintroduced in April 1970.

23

A key objective of industrial policy was to prevent the takeover of innovative Japanese companies by foreign competitors. See Ito (1992) and Argy and Stein (1997) for a more detailed discussion of Japanese industrial policy.

24

The Gensaki market was a market for repurchase agreements in which nonfinancial institutions were able to participate. Nonresidents sere allowed to access the market from 1979 onward.

25

The real demand principle was eventually abolished in April 1984.

26

Frankel (1984) provides a summary of the events leading up to the establishment of the working group, including a discussion of a possible misalignment in bilateral exchange rates. He argues that although the stated purpose of the agreement was to bring about a yen appreciation, the changes agreed to were, in practice, more likely to put (temporary) downward pressure on the value of the yen.

27

Segmentation rules for offshore activities were also less strict than those applied domestically.

28

This position was reversed in the early 1990s, when Japanese banks reduced their Euromarket operations.

29

Bond issues by Japanese corporations (both foreign and domestic) rose from ¥1.7 trillion in the year ending March 1980 to ¥6.8 trillion in the year ending March 1985, and to ¥21.8 trillion in the year ending March 1989. Offshore issues rose from around 40 percent of total issues in 1980 to around 60 percent in 1989.

30

Issuing costs were also generally lower offshore (see Takeda and Turner, 1992).

31

Fukao (1990) notes that institutions did not invest offshore to the maximum extent permitted, suggesting that the new limits sere not binding.

33

Ito (1992) illustrates this on the basis of covered interest parity calculations. In contrast, prior to 1980, capital controls appear to have been at least partially effective in insulating Japanese financial markets. Fukao (1990) argues that controls tended to be effective when initially introduced, but that their effectiveness gradually eroded.

34

An indication of the extent of the overseas expansion of financial institutions is provided by foreign direct investment data. Osugi (1990) documents that foreign direct investment by banking and insurance companies exceeded that by manufacturing companies between 1985 and 1987.

35

The debt level of nonfinancial corporations increased from 101 percent of GDP in 1985 to 135 percent in 1990. For the household sector, debt as a share of disposable income rose from 68 percent to 96 percent in the same period.

36

The ratio of financial assets to liabilities for the manufacturing sector rose from about 0.6 at the beginning of the 1980s to more than 1 in 1988.

37

Banks had traditionally operated with interest rate spreads that were largely fixed, and therefore profitability was determined mainly by market share. Deregulation placed downward pressure on interest rate margins while also leading to greater competition between lenders for market share Kanaya and Woo (2000) note that banks reduced credit standards during the asset price boom in their attempts to continue lending.

38

Government involvement in the economy was extensive. This nationalization process added companies accounting for around 15 percent of industrial activity and raised government control of the banking sector to 85-90 percent (Barker, Britton, and Major, 1984).

39

In contrast, the policy objective of the French authorities of ensuring that strategic firms benefit from adequate financial conditions had attracted additional foreign capital inflows.

41

Grilli and Roubini argue, in an article included in Conti and Hamaui (1993), that the removal of capital controls in Europe may have reduced asymmetric intra-EMS exchange rate responses to movements in the U.S. dollar rate by increasing asset substitutability.

42

These exemptions included foreign direct investment. When, in the mid-1970s, serious balance of payments problems arose, further delays were granted. France had been granted a derogation from the liberalization directive since 1968 under the safeguard clause.

43

Alternatively, exemptions for foreign direct investment were granted if the proposal could be expected to be beneficial for the balance of payments. In order to secure such benefit, a substantial part of the profits earned abroad had to be repatriated. In order to enforce compliance, a large administrative apparatus was needed to separate cross-border current account transactions from investment transactions.

45

In mid-1979, official foreign reserves were US$22 billion (equivalent to almost six months of imports) and exceeded the outstanding stock of short-term and medium-term official debt, which was US$15.5 billion.

46

Apart from ceilings on foreign travel allowances and similar restrictions, the main capital controls remaining in mid-1979 were the obligation to finance foreign direct investment abroad in excess of £5 million in foreign currency, the prohibition of sterling bank financing of trade between third countries, and the obligation to execute cross-border portfolio transactions through the investment currency market. In 1979, a window of opportunity arose to abolish the investment currency market, because the effective premium for U.S. dollar purchases had fallen from 50 percent at the beginning of the year to 6 percent by midyear. At such relatively low premium levels, the windfall capita losses in pounds sterling for portfolio holdings were quite limited.

47

See Artis and Taylor (1989), p. 172, who summarize earlier studies on this issue.

48

See, for example, Evans and others (1996) and the various contributions in Silverstone and others (1996).

49

Carey and Duggan (1986) briefly document the history and abolition of exchange controls.

50

At the same time, the exchange rate was fixed against a basket of currencies, replacing an earlier “crawling-peg” system that resulted in frequent small devaluations based on inflation differentials between New Zealand and its major trading partners.

51

Official borrowings in the month prior to the election (mainly to support the exchange rate) totaled US$1.2 billion (3.5 percent of GDP). See the discussion in Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1985).

52

Limits on the spot currency holdings of foreign exchange dealers were relaxed and then abolished at the end of the year (aside from prudential requirements). Rules limiting private offshore borrowing were abolished in October 1984. From November 1984. New Zealand financial institutions were permitted to borrow funds offshore, while foreign-owned companies operating in New Zealand were able to raise funds on domestic capital markets.

53

There has been no intervention in foreign exchange markets since the New Zealand dollar was floated.

54

Direct investment inflows rose from US$175 million in 1983 to US$1.3 billion in 1985, During the same period, the increase in direct investment outflows was less dramatic, rising from US$75 million to US$309 million. The privatization of government businesses is likely to have influenced inflows from the late 1980s. The New Zealand dollar appreciated by almost 50 percent against the U.S. dollar between the beginning of 1985 and the second quarter of 1988. more than offsetting the 20 percent depreciation of mid-1984.

55

The introduction of, and subsequent increase in, a goods and services tax also influenced the inflation rate in 1986 and 1989. respectively.

57

Private sector debt increased from 11.4 percent of GDP in March 1984 to about 14 percent by March 1987.

58

In Norway and Finland, these crises were also linked to falling oil prices and to the collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union. See Drees and Pazarbaşioģlu (1998) for further discussion.

60

Strengthening prudential supervision was seen by some at the time as running counter to the ideology underpinning deregulation and liberalization (see Thomson, 1991). Market participants may also be overconfident of their ability to respond to the new environment. For example, in arguing for financial sector reform. Jonung (1986) claims that “a bank collapse was out of the question” (p.116) in Sweden and considers that there was a tendency to underestimate the market’s ability to self-regulate. In fact, a lightening in prudential standards was required following financial sector reform.

61

The fact that liberalization often followed changes of government (with associated changes in economic philosophy) in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand suggests that political factors also influence the decision on whether or not to liberalize.

62

See Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for an investigation of the links between financial sector reform and financial crisis. They conclude that the institutional environment has an important influence on the risk of a crisis.

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